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This thesis interrogates whether, and if so how, international mediation might shape the 
identities of the conflict parties. Proceeding from the position that identities are socially 
constructed, I examine two contemporary instances of mediation: stages I and II of the Geneva 
Peace Process, the early United Nations (UN)-led efforts in relation to the Syrian civil war; and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative and UN-sponsored National Dialogue 
Conference (NDC), the initial phases of the peace process launched to resolve the Yemeni 
crisis. I investigate these cases by gathering and thematically analysing an original qualitative 
dataset comprising 74 semi-structured interviews, 50 press conferences and 110 official 
documents.  
 
In essence, I argue that mediators and conflict parties, in partnership or in opposition, can 
reimagine the identities of the conflict parties within, and in response to, mediation. Mediation 
can operate as an arena in which identities are reconstructed while the very occurrence of 
mediation can trigger and fuel processes of identity reconstruction. Furthermore, the practice 
of mediation, and in particular the norms promoted through and contained within it, can serve 
to reconstruct identities. 
 
My analysis variously reinforces, enriches and challenges the limited cohort of studies which 
has begun to consider the possible influence of mediation upon identity. Secondly, I contribute 
to our understanding of how identities in Syria and Yemen were transformed following the 
uprisings of 2011. Thirdly, I intervene in two intertwined debates within mediation studies: 
those surrounding impartiality and power. I demonstrate that examining processes of identity 
construction may strengthen our understanding of whether a mediator is viewed as being 
impartial. Moreover, and relatedly, I show how identity construction can be employed, by 
mediators, to convince and corral conflict parties, and to guide them towards particular 
solutions. Finally, by proving that mediation can intercede in processes of identity mutation, I 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
A little over a decade ago, tens of thousands took to the streets across the Middle East and 
North Africa in protest against authoritarianism, corruption and poverty. Almost without 
exception, the states swept up in the uprisings, dubbed the ‘Arab Spring’ in the West, convulsed 
into crises. The headiness of the early months of the demonstrations dissipated. Autocratic 
regimes tightened their grips, provoking eddies of violence and, ultimately, civil wars which 
persist to this day. As the death tolls mounted, international actors stepped in, offering to 
mediate settlements and transitions. However, as Nesrine Malik wrote in late 2020, on the 
anniversary of the uprisings, ‘the phrase “Arab spring” has become synonymous with shattered 
dreams of liberation…Peaceful transition was simply impossible, at that time and in that 
manner’.1 This thesis will examine two failed attempts at international conflict mediation which 
were launched following the 2011 protests: stages I and II of the Geneva Peace Process, the 
early United Nations (UN)-led mediation efforts in relation to the Syrian civil war; and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative and the UN-sponsored National Dialogue 
Conference (NDC), the initial phases of the peace process launched to resolve the Yemeni 
crisis. This thesis will do so through the prism of the following, over-arching research question: 
how does mediation shape the identities of the conflict parties? Proceeding from the position 
that identities are socially constructed, I will gather and thematically analyse an original 
qualitative dataset, comprising 74 semi-structured interviews, 50 press conferences and 110 
official documents, to develop a response. The aim will be to forge original interventions within 
both mediation studies and scholarship concerning Syrian and Yemeni identities.  
 
1.1 The practice of mediation 
 
This thesis interrogates whether, and if so how, international mediation might shape identity. 
Evidence of the use of mediation extends back to Ancient Greece: Thucydides wrote, in his 
description of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 BC, that the Epidamnians appealed 
to Corcyra for intervention, urging the city to ‘broker a settlement’ and ‘put an end to the war 
waged by the barbarians’.2 In the modern day, the rise in mediated settlements has been 
 
1 Nesrine Malik, ‘The Arab Spring Wasn’t In Vain. Next Time Will Be Different’, The Guardian (2020) 
[online], available from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/dec/21/arab-spring-people-
movement [last accessed: 21 May 2021] 
2 Translation by Martin Hammond, Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), p. 13 
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described as ‘one of the notable trends of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries’ 
and it has been claimed that there has been an ‘explosion’ in the supply of willing third-party 
mediators.3 Before I outline the chief findings of this thesis, and the two cases of mediation 
under investigation in this study, this section will consider more broadly the practice of 
mediation, exploring the characteristics of third-party peacemaking which prompted the 
research question.  
 
While ‘definitions of mediators are as various as mediators themselves’,4 this form of conflict 
management entails the intervention of a third party in either an inter-state or civil war. This 
third party could be an individual, a group, another nation, an organisation, or could involve 
multiple parties, cooperating in either a formalised or an ad hoc manner.5 In order to qualify as 
mediation, the intervention should not entail the use of physical force nor should the third party 
invoke the authority of the law.6 The act of mediation is ‘not a single processes’ but, rather, ‘a 
continuous set of related activities’.7 Moreover, mediators can employ a range of strategies: 
these vary from the more passive, in which a third party may aid communication by sharing 
information and facilitating discussions, to an increasingly active approach, such as exercising 
control over or influencing the agenda of negotiations, the devising and enforcing of timetables, 
or attempting to re-frame the dispute. Lastly, that which has been termed a ‘directive’ strategy 
involves the shaping of the content of the settlement and the manipulation of the willingness 
of the conflict parties to resolve their differences, possibly through the use of incentives and 
sanctions.8  
 
Traditionally, mediation has been a murky, secretive practice comprising clandestine 
negotiations conducted in secluded settings, convening political leaders and representatives of 
 
3 Chester A. Crocker et al., International Negotiation and Mediation in Violent Conflicts: The Changing Context 
of Peacemaking (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), p. 61 
4 Chester A. Crocker et al., ‘Introduction’ in Chester A. Crocker et al. (eds.), Herding Cats: Multiparty 
Mediation in a Complex World (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), p. 7 
5 Jacob Bercovitch et al., ‘Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation 
in International Relations’, Journal of Peace Research 28:1 (1991), p. 8; Crocker et al., International 
Negotiation and Mediation in Violent Conflicts: The Changing Context of Peacemaking, p. 81 
6 Bercovitch et al., ‘Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in 
International Relations’, p. 8 
7 Ibid 
8 Michael Butler, International Conflict Management (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 128-31 
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armed groups.9 However, mediation processes now often feature attendant mechanisms to 
broaden their inclusion10 while more participatory, and thus more transparent, ‘National 
Dialogues’ are also ‘increasingly popular’ mediation tools.11 Intended to grapple with ‘crises 
of national importance’,12 and to offer the opportunity ‘for meaningful conversation about the 
underlying drivers of conflict and ways to holistically address these issues’,13 inclusion and 
national ownership are deemed central to the very definitions of a National Dialogue. As Katrin 
Planta et al. have argued, ‘National Dialogues are increasingly seen per definitionem as the 
most participatory and inclusive tool for conflict transformation’;14 moreover, Thania 
Paffenholz et al. have suggested that this ‘largescale inclusion’ can, in turn, help to ‘generate 
ownership’ of the outcomes of the mediation effort, thus enhancing its sustainability.15 As we 
will see later in this chapter, the first case under investigation in this thesis, the initial stages of 
the Geneva Peace Process, adopted a more conventional mediation format. The second case, 
however, featured a lengthy, comprehensive and wide-ranging National Dialogue Conference. 
This crucial difference between the two instances of mediation will be reflected upon.  
 
The professed purpose of mediation is not to aid the victory of a particular disputant but, rather, 
to promote a settlement acceptable to the conflict parties and, more contentiously, the 
 
9 Andreas Hirblinger and Dana Landau, ‘Strategies of Inclusion in Peacemaking: Beyond Box-ticking and Photo 
Opportunities?’, Security Dialogue Blog (2020) [online], available from: 
https://blogs.prio.org/SecurityDialogue/2020/02/strategies-of-inclusion-in-peacemaking-beyond-box-ticking-
and-photo-opportunities/ [last accessed: 30 May 2021] 
10 Thania Paffenholz, for example, has identified nine different ways in which civil society actors might be 
included within mediation processes (Thania Paffenholz, ‘Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Beyond the 
Inclusion-Exclusion Dichotomy’, Negotiation Journal 30:1, pp. 76-7) 
11 Susan Stigant and Elizabeth Murray, ‘National Dialogues: A Tool for Conflict Transformation’, United States 
Institute of Peace (2015) [online], available from: https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/10/national-
dialogues-tool-conflict-transformation [last accessed: 21 May 2021] 
12 No author, ‘National Dialogue Handbook: A Guide for Practitioners’, Berghof Foundation (2017) [online], 
available from: https://berghof-foundation.org/library/national-dialogue-handbook-a-guide-for-practitioners [last 
accessed: 21 May 2021], p. 21 
13 Stigant and Murray, ‘National Dialogues: A Tool for Conflict Transformation’ 
14 Katrin Planta et al., ‘Inclusivity in National Dialogues: Guaranteeing Social Integration or Preserving Old 
Power Hierarchies?’, Berghof Foundation (2015) [online], available from: https://berghof-
foundation.org/library/inclusivity-in-national-dialogues-guaranteeing-social-integration-or-preserving-old-
power-hierarchies [last accessed: 21 May 2021], p. 4; see also: Stigant and Murray, ‘National Dialogues: A Tool 
for Conflict Transformation’; No author, ‘National Dialogue Handbook: A Guide for Practitioners’, Berghof 
Foundation (2017) [online], available from: https://berghof-foundation.org/library/national-dialogue-handbook-
a-guide-for-practitioners [last accessed: 21 May 2021], pp. 20, 29, 82, 86; Thania Paffenholz et al., ‘What 
Makes or Breaks National Dialogues?’, Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative [online], available from: 
https://www.inclusivepeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/report-national-dialogues-en.pdf [last accessed: 2 
June 2021], p. 9 
15 Paffenholz et al., ‘What Makes or Breaks National Dialogues?’, p. 9; see also: Stigant and Murray, ‘National 
Dialogues: A Tool for Conflict Transformation’; No author, ‘National Dialogue Handbook: A Guide for 
Practitioners’, p. 21 
14 
 
mediator.16 In brief, the purported aim is to support the parties in reaching a peaceful solution 
which they are unable, or unwilling, to reach alone. This method of conflict resolution, defined 
by an absence of force, is thus characterised as a benevolent, pacific intervention with 
humanitarian intent. However, if mediation can shape the identity of those who participate, this 
demands a reassessment of our understanding of third-party peacemaking.  
 
Prominent mediators have hinted at the possibility that mediation, and mediators, may 
intercede in processes of identity mutation. Within his reflections on his role promoting peace 
in Palestine and Israel during the second intifada, Kofi Annan has claimed that accusations of 
terrorism were ‘too often used to deny the Palestinians’ political identity’, while he also 
highlighted his appreciation of the ‘compelling and legitimate narrative of Israelis’, 
encompassing their ‘uniquely tragic history’.17 President Jimmy Carter’s recollections of the 
Camp David Accords appear to recognise the sensitivity of symbolism within peacemaking; 
for instance, he recalls that ‘Sadat [Egyptian President, 1970-81) said he could accept the entire 
Jerusalem proposal if there was provision for the flag of Islam to fly over Islamic holy places, 
but acknowledged that Begin [Israeli Prime Minister, 1977-83] would be reluctant to agree to 
this because of its symbolism of sovereignty’.18 Alvaro de Soto, who served as UN Under-
Secretary-General for the Middle East Peace Process between 2005 and 2007, mentions in his 
leaked End of Mission report how the Secretary-General of the UN is a ‘normative mediator 
par excellence [emphasis in original]’.19 Even Henry Kissinger, notorious proponent of 
realpolitik and former United States (US) Security Advisor and Secretary of State, features the 
following observation in his memoirs once more in relation to the Palestine-Israel dispute: 
‘formal positions are like the shadows in Plato’s cave…reflections of a transcendent reality 
almost impossible to encompass in the dry legalisms of a negotiation process’.20  
 
 
16 William I. Zartman and Saadia Touval, ‘International Mediation’ in Chester A. Crocker et al (eds.), Leashing 
the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 
2007), pp. 437-8; Butler, International Conflict Management, pp. 120-1 
17 Kofi Annan and Nader Mousavizadeh, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace (London: Penguin Books, 
2013), pp. 257, 269 
18 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Arkansas: University of Arkansas, 1995), p. 398 
19 Alvaro de Soto, ‘End of Mission Report’, published by Rory McCarthy and Ian Williams, ‘Secret UN Report 
Condemns US for Middle East Failures’, The Guardian, (13 June 2007), [online], available from: 
http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2007/06/12/DeSotoReport.pdf and 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/13/usa.israel [last accessed: 4 February 2021], p. 40 
20 Henry Kissinger, White House Years: The First Volume of His Classic Memoirs (London: Simon and 
Schuster, 2011), p. 342 
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A number of war-weary mediators seem to have grasped the potential for third-party 
peacemaking to interact with identity. Simply within the few, disparate quotations provided 
here, we can see arguments surrounding the importance of recognising a national identity 
within a peace process; an emphasis on narratives, symbols and norms which, as I will explore 
later in this thesis, constitute crucial means through which identities are created, conveyed and 
upheld; and a broader appreciation of the significance of social forces within third-party 
peacemaking. However, within mediation studies, the possible relationship between mediation 
and socially constructed identity has faced relative neglect. Yet identities tell us both who we 
are and that which we seek. Identities constitute interests, conditioning those actions which 
groups can pursue, and shaping our interactions with others. For identities to be recast within 
and through mediation, by mediators or by conflict parties, necessitates a concomitant recasting 
of our understanding of third-party peacemaking.  
 
1.2 Principal arguments of the thesis and contributions made to existing 
scholarship 
 
In essence, this thesis will indeed suggest that mediation can shape identity. The fundamental 
claim I will make can be formulated as follows: mediators and conflict parties, in harmony or 
in competition, may freshly imagine the identities of the conflict parties within and in reaction 
to mediation. Mediation may form a backdrop to processes of identity construction while the 
very occurrence of mediation can drive and provoke processes of identity construction. 
Furthermore, the norms and practices contained within mediation can reconstruct the identities 
of the conflict parties. More precisely, I will contend that the identities of the state or states at 
war may be reshaped in order to offer support to a particular conflict party’s aspiration to 
govern; due to a perceived need to legitimise the mediation attempt; and/or following the 
promotion of norms. With regard to this latter point, I assess both the encouragement of the 
norm of democracy and, also, the influence of national ownership and inclusion, two mediation 
process norms.  
 
By making these claims, I will refine, develop and challenge the scant existing literature 
surrounding the relationship between mediation and social constructed identity: literature 
which I will map and assess in Chapter Three, and from which I will derive three hypotheses 
for exploration within this thesis. The fundamental findings of this thesis, that mediation can 
shape the identities of the conflict parties, and the constituent claims which coalesce to form 
16 
 
this overall argument, represent an original contribution to mediation studies. Moreover, I will 
also suggest that my analysis demands a reconfiguration of our very understanding of 
mediation: its intent and its impact. However, I will also use my conclusions to intervene in 
two further bodies of scholarship.  
 
Firstly, I will contribute to our understanding of how Syrian and Yemeni identities mutated 
following the demonstrations, and crises, of 2011. I will show that, within the initial stages of 
the Geneva Peace Process, the Syrian national identity was reimagined: the national collective 
was reconstructed by both the mediators and the Syrian opposition. In harmony, these two 
groups meticulously built a fresh image of the Syrian people, depicting the nation as being 
bound together by suffering and by an aspiration for a democratic political system. Crucially, 
within the mediation efforts, it was the national identity of Syrians which was summoned and, 
moreover, reshaped: the national identity I detect differs from the national identity which 
scholars have claimed held relevance within Syria prior to the uprisings. However, sub- and 
supra-state identities were also invoked within the dataset. While their content was neither 
explored nor remoulded within and through the mediation process, this nevertheless 
demonstrates that the Syrian national identity summoned within the peace process was not 
without challenge. Indeed, I will propose that these efforts to recast the shared experiences and 
aspirations of the Syrian people within, and in response to, the mediation process may have 
masked an anxiety at the territorial and ideational fragmentation of the Syrian people amid 
violence.  
 
Within the mediation efforts launched to solve the crisis in Yemen, I will suggest that the voices 
of the international officials represented within my dataset, together with a more limited 
number of Yemeni voices, sought to characterise the Yemeni people as being united by 
suffering, and as seeking reform, change, and a transition; occasionally, this was specified more 
precisely as democracy. However, a number of Yemeni voices expressed disagreement, 
depicting the Yemeni national experience, instead, as being suffused with revolution and 
resistance, and with opposition to the autocratic structures of Yemen. Moreover, this 
reconstruction of the Yemeni national identity was not as sharply depicted as was the case in 
relation to Syria: it was constructed with less clarity, and by fewer voices. This apparent clash 
and seeming timidity notwithstanding, once more it is the national identity of Yemenis which 
was reshaped, and which was re-sculpted in a deviation from the national identity observed by 
scholars prior to 2011. However, the notion of sub-state identities is also present within the 
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dataset showing, once more, that the national identity reconstructed within the third-party peace 
process was not uncontested.  
 
In addition to considering the restructured visions of the Syrian and Yemeni national people 
conjured within the peace processes, and comparing these images to the various identities 
which have been argued to hold relevance in Syria and Yemen prior to 2011, I will also 
interrogate why it was the specifically national identities of Syria and Yemen which were 
articulated and considered within the peace processes, and why these national identities bore 
such similarity to one another. I will suggest that this finding is revealing of both mediation 
and the mediators implicated within the two cases under investigation. 
 
Secondly, my proposal is that the findings of this thesis also demonstrate the need to better 
incorporate ideational concepts, such as identity, within the traditional debates contained within 
mediation studies; my suggestion is that, by systematically considering processes such as 
identity construction, such debates may be enriched. I will support this claim by considering 
the ramifications of my findings upon the intertwined and simmering debates within mediation 
scholarship surrounding impartiality and power. I will show that the intercession, by mediation 
and mediators, within ongoing processes of identity mutation can contribute to our 
understanding of whether, or not, a mediator may have been viewed as impartial. Furthermore, 
and relatedly, I will show how attempts at identity reconstruction can be wielded, by mediators, 
to configure, convince and corral parties and, thus, to guide them towards particular solutions. 
This contention also links to impartiality by revealing a bias of outcome. I will therefore 
demonstrate that, by considering identities, and their construction, it may prove possible to 
uncover further sources of impartiality and further sources of power at work within mediation.  
 
1.3 Research design and introducing the cases 
 
In order to develop these claims and to make these contributions to existing scholarship, I will 
adopt a case study approach, assessing two contemporary instances of mediation. A case can 
be defined as an ‘instance of a class of events’; in other words, a phenomenon of scientific 
interest21 which, in this study, constitutes mediation. This is a naturalistic, as opposed to 
experimental, research design, ‘used to generate an in-depth, multi-faceted understanding of a 
 
21 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), p. 17 
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complex issue in its real-life context’.22 While the decision to focus on two cases means the 
generalisability of my findings has been sacrificed,23 the case study approach has been selected 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, ‘depth of analysis’ is ‘one of the primary virtues of the case 
study method’;24 the design provides ‘an opportunity for the researcher to gain a deep holistic 
view of the research problem’.25 Secondly, and relatedly, by employing a case study approach, 
researchers are able to achieve ‘high levels of conceptual validity’26 as they are permitted the 
detail to measure variables accurately and to consider contextual factors. Chapter Two will 
demonstrate the importance of this: socially constructed identity is an inherently complex 
concept and demands flexibility, care and abundant data. Finally, I have elected to assess two 
cases within this thesis. While bearing a number of similarities, the cases also differ in critical 
ways. Indeed, the intention is that their diversity will reveal whether, and if so how, divergent 
approaches to mediation may, or may not, interact with socially constructed identity. 
 
The following sub-sections will introduce the two cases selected for investigation. I will detail 
the two mediation processes, briefly narrating the 2011 Uprising in Syria and the ensuing civil 
war before outlining in depth Stages I and II of the Geneva Peace process. Next, I will turn to 
Yemen, and will follow a similar structure. I will conclude this section by drawing out the 
differences and similarities between the two cases, justifying their selection. 
 
1.31 Syria: an overview of the 2011 revolution and civil war  
 
The revolution in Syria awakened a few months after Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen but rapidly 
evolved into a civil war. The catalyst can be traced to the peripheral southern city of Deraa: the 
disproportionately harsh punishment inflicted upon a group of teenagers from the area, whose 
crimes had been to scrawl anti-government graffiti on the walls of their school, provoked 
demonstrations led by their families.27 Syria’s security forces violently struggled to quash the 
protests, igniting further resentment, and both the demonstrations and the ferocity of President 
Bashar al-Asad’s response grew.28 Thousands of Deraa residents were drawn to the streets and, 
 
22 Sarah Crowe et al., ‘The Case Study Approach’, BMC Medical Research Methodology 11:100 (2011), p. 1 
23 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (California: SAGE Publications, 1984), p. 21 
24 John Gerring, ‘What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?’, American Political Science Review 98:2 
(2004), p. 348 
25 Saša Baškarada, ‘Qualitative Case Study Guidelines’, The Qualitative Report 19 (2014), p. 1 
26 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, p. 19 
27 Diana Darke, My House in Damascus (London: Haus Publishing Ltd., 2014), p. 12; Robin Yassin-Kassab and 
Leila al-Shami, Burning Country (London: Pluto Press, 2016), p. 38 
28 Darke, My House in Damascus, p. 12 
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before long, seemingly compelled by the deaths, casualties and arrests perpetrated by the 
regime, Syrians across the country rose up against the ruling party and demanded the release 
of prisoners, a new law permitting the organisation of political parties, and the repeal of Syria’s 
Emergency Law.29 Bashar addressed the Syrians in March 2011, but he refused to acknowledge 
the existence of a popular protest movement, claiming foreign enemies, Salafist terrorists, 
Saudi Arabia and Mossad were to blame.30 The demonstrators began to increasingly call for 
the end of the regime.31  
 
The revolution militarised, particularly following defections from Bashar’s army, and initiated 
its first large-scale attack in June 2011.32 The various militias coalesced into the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA), intermittently supported by a multitude of international actors, and the movement 
began employing guerrilla tactics to seize areas of the Syrian countryside.33 These rebels were 
highly disparate, with each group often centred upon a particular individual, region or ideology, 
and, increasingly, many were Islamist in nature and dominated by al-Qaida-affiliated 
factions.34 The various forms of violence which have erupted in Syria – organised state 
repression, armed resistance, jihadi violence and criminal activity – have been claimed to have 
led to more than 500,000 deaths and to have displaced 13 million.35 At the time of writing, 
Bashar has managed to cling on and, moreover, has clawed back most of Syria, fortified by the 









29 Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami, Burning Country, pp. 37-8; Christopher Phillips, The Battle for Syria (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), p. 2 
30 Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami, Burning Country, p. 40; David Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad 
(US: Yale University Press, 2012), pp. 76-81 
31 Phillips, The Battle for Syria, p. 2 
32 Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami, Burning Country, pp. 82-3; Phillips, The Battle for Syria, p. 2 
33 Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami, Burning Country, pp. 86-7 
34 Phillips, The Battle for Syria, p. 2 
35 Emile Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 40 
36 No author (n.d.), ‘Civil War in Syria’, Council on Foreign Relations [online], available from: 
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-syria [last accessed: 18 January 2021] 
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1.32 The Geneva Peace Process, Stages I and II (2012-14) 
 
Stages I and II of the Geneva Peace Process constitute a short, yet convoluted, period of 
peacemaking during the Syrian conflict.37 It was ostensibly led by the UN. However, just as an 
array of regional and international actors, state and non-state, has contributed to the complexity 
of the Syrian crisis and the destruction wrought,38 in the peacemaking realm, too, it is 
impossible to focus on a single actor and hope to capture the intricacy of the process. The 
summary here will therefore feature not only the actions and decisions of the Syrian 
‘disputants’ and those of the UN, but also the choices made by the various states and groups 
implicated in this phase of the mediation attempt.  
 
Although difficult to delineate, the period under study began with a failed UN Security Council 
(UNSC) Resolution in early February 2012; the text would have called for a ‘Syrian-led 
political process’, echoing an earlier Arab League proposal, but both Russia and China wielded 
their vetoes, claiming the Resolution threatened Syria’s sovereignty and that blame for violence 
in the country had not been apportioned equitably.39 ‘Outraged’, former French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy promptly launched the ‘Friends of Syria’ (FoS), a coalition of Arab and 
Western states, which met for the first time in Tunisia in February 2012, ‘marshalled 
international condemnation of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’ and recognised the Syrian 
National Council (SNC) as ‘a legitimate representative of Syrians seeking peaceful change’.40 
Having emerged in 2011, the SNC encompassed recent and long-term exiles opposed to al-
Asad’s government together with representatives of Local Coordination Committees (LCCs), 
activist bodies inside Syria which were coordinating protests across the country.41  
 
37 In addition to the UN-sponsored process, parallel initiatives have also been launched to negotiate peace, the 
most prominent of which has been the Astana Process, sponsored primarily by Russia (for a recent analysis of 
the Astana Process, see: Charles Thépaut, ‘The Astana Process: A Flexible but Fragile Showcase for Russia’, 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2020) [online], available from: 
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/astana-process-flexible-fragile-showcase-russia [last 
accessed: 17 January 2021]). However, these parallel initiatives were launched after the period of study. 
38 Phillips, The Battle for Syria, p. 3 
39 UNSC, ‘Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft Resolution’ (S/2012/77) (4 February 2012) 
40 Ibid; No author, ‘Sarkozy Pushes ‘Friends of Syria’ Group at UN’, Euractiv (2012) [online], available from: 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/sarkozy-pushes-friends-of-syria-group-at-un/ [last 
accessed: 27 May 2020]; Arshad Mohammed and Christian Lowe, ‘Friends of Syria’ Condemn Assad but See 
More Killing’. Reuters (2012) [online], available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/syria-meeting-
tunis/friends-of-syria-condemn-assad-but-see-more-killing-idINDEE81N0I320120224 [last accessed: 27 May 
2020] 




Also in February 2012, Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the UN and recipient of the 
2001 Nobel Peace Prize, was appointed Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League 
on the Syria crisis and, one month later, he unveiled a fresh peace plan comprising six points. 
This scheme was successful in gaining the backing of the UNSC, and advocated once more for 
a political process headed by Syrians together with a cessation of armed violence in the country, 
the provision of humanitarian assistance, the release of detainees, the granting of access to 
journalists, and the guarantee of the right to peaceful protest.42 In April of the same year, the 
UNSC adopted two Resolutions concerning Syria: 2042, which expressed support for Annan’s 
‘Six-Point Plan’ and authorised a team of unarmed military observers to monitor a ceasefire in 
Syria,43 and 2043, which established the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), a 
deployment of 300 military observers to monitor a ‘cessation of armed violence’ and the 
implementation of Annan’s proposal.44 However, ‘escalating violence’ moved the commander 
of UNSMIS, General Robert Mood, to suspend the mission in mid-June45 and, at the end of 
this month, Annan gathered together the Secretaries-General of the UN and the Arab League, 
together with the foreign ministers of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), the 
US, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the European Union (EU), to form an ‘Action Group for 
Syria’. In the communiqué released by the group, the six points were reiterated, and the text 
also introduced the notion of the need for a ‘Syrian-led transition’ and the ‘establishment of a 
transitional governing body which…should be formed on the basis of mutual consent’. 
Although no Syrian representatives attended these officials’ one-day meeting, this event later 
came to be known as ‘Geneva I’.46  
 
A ‘political process’ to promote peace, including Syrian delegates, was not convened until 
January 2014. In the intervening period, Annan resigned; shortly after the release of the 
document, Russia and the US aired conflicting interpretations of the ambiguously-worded 
Geneva I communiqué and, when he abdicated his post in August 2012, the frustrated Envoy 
 
42 UNSC, ‘Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft Resolution’ 
43 Ibid 
44 UNSC, ‘Preliminary Understanding: United Nations Supervision Mechanism’ (S/2012/250) (23 April 2012) 
45 No author, ‘UN Observers Suspend Syria Work’, BBC (2012) [online], available from: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18471686 [last accessed: 27 May 2020] 
46 UNSC, ‘Final Communiqué of the Action Group for Syria’ (A/66/865-S/2012/522) (6 July 2012); Phillips, 
The Battle for Syria, p. 101  
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bemoaned the divisions within the UNSC.47 The SNC fragmented and fell from favour while 
a broader opposition organisation, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces (commonly abbreviated to SOC), received endorsement from those 
members of the international community opposed to al-Asad and was formally announced in 
November 2012. During a conference held by the FoS conference in Morocco in December 
2012, SOC was declared ‘the legitimate representative of the Syrian people’, and the Coalition 
gradually drifted into the orbit of Saudi Arabia, receiving the majority of its funding from this 
state, in addition to substantial financial support from Qatar and Turkey.48 Lakhdar Brahimi 
assumed the helm at the UN and the Arab League, replacing Annan, while the FoS together 
with a reduced consort, dubbed the ‘London 11’, continued to assemble, inviting members of 
SOC to their meetings and offering ‘political and practical support’.49 Lastly, the conflict in 
Syria continued to rage. At the point at which Geneva II was eventually initiated, more than 
100,000 had been killed in the course of the violence, millions had been displaced or had sought 
refuge outside Syria, and chemical weapons had been used against Syrian citizens.50  
 
Following pressure exerted by Russia, in November 2013 Damascus revealed that a Syrian 
government delegation would attend the negotiations but the process by which SOC acquiesced 
proved more tortuous. Members threatened to, and eventually did, abandon the Coalition, fewer 
than half of those who remained voted to participate, SOC attached preconditions to their 
attendance which were never met, and the composition of their delegation was shared only 
days before the conference.51 Invitations to attend the opening of the talks in Montreux, 
Switzerland, were delivered to 44 states and organisations but, while Iran was originally among 
this number, the outrage this provoked within SOC, and Iran’s refusal to declare their support 
for Geneva I, forced the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to issue a humiliating retraction.52 
 
47 Ian Black, ‘Kofi Annan Resigns as Syria Envoy’, The Guardian (2012) [online], available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/02/kofi-annan-resigns-syria-envoy [last accessed: 27 May 2020] 
48 Phillips, The Battle for Syria, pp. 114-6 
49 No author, ‘UK Hosts Syria London 11 Senior Officials Meeting’, UK Government (2013) [online], available 
from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-hosts-syria-london-11-senior-officials-meeting [last accessed: 
28 May 2020] 
50 No author, ‘What is the Geneva II Conference on Syria?’, BBC (2014) [online], available from: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24628442 [last accessed: 27 May 2020]; No author, ‘Attacks on 
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withdrawn-after-boycott-threat-idUSBREA0J01K20140120 [last accessed: 27 May 2020] 
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Two short rounds of talks between the Syrian delegations, mediated by Brahimi and his team, 
followed in the Palais des Nations in Geneva but very little was achieved. While an agreement 
leading to a three-day truce in the city of Homs was thrashed out,53 Brahimi felt forced to bring 
the mediation effort to an abrupt close on the 15th of February 2014 with the words: ‘I’m very, 
very sorry, and I apologise to the Syrian people.’ He told the journalists congregating in the 
Palais that the Syrian government delegation had refused to discuss the notion of a transitional 
governing body (TGB) in parallel with their favoured topic of ‘terrorism’, provoking concerns 
within the opposition delegation that the government would never relinquish power. Brahimi 
therefore seemingly attributed the collapse of the talks to the intransigence of al-Asad’s 
representatives.54  
 
1.33 Yemen: an overview of the 2011 revolution and civil war  
 
In Syria, it took months, and two separate Envoys, to eventually convene direct talks. During 
this time, the revolution descended into a ferocious conflict, violence which the mediation 
efforts proved incapable of quelling. In Yemen, the path taken during the same period diverged 
considerably despite emerging, once more, from popular protests. Tawakkol Karman, a 
Yemeni journalist and activist, kindled her country’s revolution on the 15th January 2011; 
stirred by the ousting, by civilian protesters, of authoritarian former President of Tunisia, Zine 
El Abidine Ben Ali, she demanded freedom of speech and criticised the restrictions placed 
upon journalists in Yemen.55 Former President Saleh’s attempts to change the state’s 
constitution to allow him to run for a third term seemed to galvanise the movement, and the 
revolution grew, spreading to Taiz.56 Driven by years of dissatisfaction with the regime, the 
youth and civil society representatives who led the initial protests harboured a ‘long-standing 
frustration over the lack of economic opportunities and unemployment, flagrant corruption, 
government malfeasance, and food security, health, and education’.57 The President retreated, 
promising to halt the amendment, as well as pledging intensified decentralisation, the 
 
53 UN, ‘Homs Agreement Mediated by the UN’ (2014) [online], available from: 
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establishment of a government of national unity, and salary increases for security and military 
personnel. Nevertheless, once Egyptian protesters proved successful in driving out their 
dictatorial ruler, Hosni Mubarak, Yemen’s demonstrations against the ruling regime attracted 
increasing numbers of supporters.58 Those loyal to the regime reacted with violence, yet the 
protests increased; by the 25th February 2011, 100,000 Yemenis had taken to the streets across 
the country and the capitals of all Yemeni governorates had ‘Change Squares’, overwhelmed 
by protesters.59 When fifty protesters were killed by regime forces as they prayed in Sanaa’s 
‘Change Square’ on the 18th of March 2011, Major General Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar, a member 
of Saleh’s Sanhan clan and a close associate of the President, defected along with his troops. 
Two tribal leaders also confirmed their support for the revolution.60 It was at this stage that an 
external third party interceded. 
 
1.34 The GCC Initiative, the Yemeni Transition and the National Dialogue Conference 
(2011-14)  
 
The GCC intervened, brokering a proposal which recommended Saleh’s abdication, protected 
by an immunity deal, after which elections would take place.61 However, opposition leaders 
were unwilling to participate in the proposed unity government, an institution which the GCC 
had suggested should rule following Saleh’s departure, and both they and Saleh prevaricated.62 
Meanwhile, the protests swelled ever further, with many activists equally dismissive of the 
GCC deal, deeming it ‘an elite stitch-up that betrayed their demands for an entirely new 
system’.63 On a number of occasions, Saleh refused to sign; following one instance on the 22nd 
of May 2011, forces loyal to Saleh clashed with tribal militia controlled by the al-Ahmar family 
in the Hasaba district of Sanaa and, when tribal sheikhs arrived to mediate, at least two were 
killed.64 An outbreak of violence followed, ceasing only once Saleh was injured in a bomb blast 
on the 3rd of June 2011. He was evacuated to Riyadh and, forced to undertake several months 
of convalescence, Vice-President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi assumed control.65 However, 
Saleh’s son, Ahmed, retained power behind the scenes.66 Violence erupted once more in 
 
58 Lackner, Yemen in Crisis, pp. 35 – 36  
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September 2011 and, although Saleh granted Hadi the authority to negotiate an agreement to 
facilitate early presidential elections, the protesters marched into the south of Sanaa, Saleh’s 
domain, and the regime’s gunmen opened fire as protesters flung rocks towards the military 
police.67 
 
Saleh returned to Yemen, and activists continued to suffer casualties from sniper fire while 
shelling persisted in Hasaba.68 A military stalemate persisted throughout the autumn of 2011; 
while Saleh could exert influence over three quarters of the capital and held the balance of 
conventional forces, he did not control quite enough to ensure victory against Mohsin’s First 
Armoured Division which was rapidly gaining popularity due to the protection offered to 
protesters by these troops.69 Earlier in the year, in April 2011, Jamal Benomar had been 
appointed as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Yemen; he began travelling to Sanaa, 
reporting monthly to the UNSC, and developed an Implementation Mechanism for the GCC 
Initiative in conjunction with Yemeni political leaders. Indeed, it was only following an 
intervention from Benomar that Saleh finally signed the GCC deal in November 2011.70 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the crafting of UNSC Resolution 2014, which 
threatened sanctions against Saleh, also played a role in persuading the President to eventually 
relinquish formal power. Three months later, in a referendum with only one option, the Yemeni 
people acquiesced to Hadi adopting the role of caretaker President for two years.71 However, 
in practice, Hadi assumed authority over no more than 20% of the military and security services 
and, although he began to remove Saleh’s cronies and family members from key positions, he 
replaced such individuals with Yemenis originating from his own governorate, prompting 
accusations that Hadi’s rule was proving ‘more of the same’.72 Hadi proved unable to manage 
the transition, creating a government of national unity which ‘gained the reputation of being 
the most incompetent and corrupt in the country’s history.’73 It was in this context, in March 
2013, with key political factions amassing ever more weapons,74 that a National Dialogue 
Conference (NDC), the next step proposed within the GCC Initiative Implementation 
Mechanism, was launched. 
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Preparations for the NDC had begun almost a year earlier, in June 2012.75 A select Technical 
Preparatory Committee, appointed by Hadi,76 negotiated ‘the structure, organization, rules of 
procedure, and management’ of the NDC.77 The group struggled to decide on the composition 
of the Dialogue; eventually, following advice from Benomar,78 it was decided that 565 
delegates, drawn from across Yemeni society, would attend.79 Seats were awarded to a wide 
range of political parties,80 and President Hadi was also afforded the right to appoint a further 
62 delegates. However, the focus, at least superficially, was also on broadening participation 
beyond members of the political elite and on empowering the south:81 forty seats each were 
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Conference: Managing Peaceful Change?’, Accord Issue 25 (2014) [online], available from: https://www.c-
r.org/accord/legitimacy-and-peace-
processes#:~:text=Legitimacy%20and%20peace%20processes%3A%20from%20coercion%20to%20consent&t
ext=Legitimacy%20matters%20for%20peace.,the%20bedrock%20of%20peaceful%20societies. [last accessed: 
2 June 2021], p. 53 
81 In the years preceding the Uprising, Saleh faced serious unrest in the south; elements within a vocal and, on 
occasion violent, movement, known as Hiraak, had been leading calls for the secession (Gaston, ‘Process 
Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue’, p. 2) 
27 
 
additionally allocated to ‘independent’ representatives of Yemeni youth, women and civil 
society; moreover, the political factions invited were mandated to ensure their nominations 
comprised those of southern origin (50%), women (30%) and youth (20%). The committee 
advertised the independent positions throughout the country, and more than 10,000 Yemenis 
applied in fewer than two weeks;82 these 120 participants were then selected by the Technical 
Committee in an opaque process.83  
 
The Committee also considered how the conference would be organised and overseen, electing 
to create a Secretariat for its management, a Presidium to further oversee its progress,84 and a 
Consultative Committee to assist in resolving disputes.85 All were populated by Yemenis. It 
was decided that the delegates, when they arrived in Sanaa, would be tasked with negotiating 
‘the future’ of Yemen86 with a view to creating a new constitution for the state.87 To this end, 
they would be organised into nine Working Groups, each of which would grapple with a 
different theme and generate a series of recommendations. These nine themes were as follows: 
‘The Southern Question’, ‘Sadah’,88 ‘Reconciliation and Transitional Justice’, ‘Statebuilding’, 
‘Good Governance’, ‘Military and Security’, ‘Independent Institutions’, ‘Rights and 
Freedoms’, and ‘Sustainable Development’.89 It was affirmed by the members of the 
Committee that any decisions taken through the NDC would operate on the basis of consensus, 
 
82 Paffenholz and Ross, ‘Inclusive Political Settlements: New Insights from Yemen’s National Dialogue’, pp. 
203-4 
83 Ibid, p. 204. Indeed, Murray has also remarked that ‘agreement on these [independent] positions was difficult 
and there are allegations that many of them were filled by representatives of political parties’ (Murray, 
‘Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference’, p. 6) 
84 No author, ‘National Dialogue Conference’. The functions of the Secretariat are listed here: No author, ‘NDC 
Secretariat General’, National Dialogue Conference [online], available from: 
http://www.ndc.ye/page.aspx?show=59 [last accessed: 18 February 2021]. The nine members of the Presidium, 
the majority of whom represent the main Yemeni political parties, are listed here: No author, ‘NDC Presidency’, 
National Dialogue Conference [online], available from: http://www.ndc.ye/page.aspx?show=92 [last accessed: 
18 February 2021] 
85 This committee is also frequently referred to as the ‘Consensus Committee’, and included the nine-member 
Presidium, the Chair of each Working Group, and six additional members from the Technical Committee in a 
bid to broaden the inclusivity of this body. Saif Hassan, ‘National Dialogue Conference: Managing Peaceful 
Change?’, p. 52; Murray, ‘Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference’, pp. 5, 7. The tasks of the Consensus 
Committee, and its membership, are listed here: No author, ‘NDC Consensus Committee’, National Dialogue 
Conference [online], available from: http://www.ndc.ye/page.aspx?show=97 [last accessed: 18 February 2021] 
86 Paffenholz and Ross, ‘Inclusive Political Settlements: New Insights from Yemen’s National Dialogue’, p. 203 
87 Murray, ‘Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference’, p. 4 
88 Sadah is a northern governorate and stronghold of the Huthi movement. Saleh’s government waged a series of 
wars against the Huthis from 2004, and government shelling flattened much of the governorate (Gregory D. 
Johnsen, The Last Refuge: Yemen, Al-Qaeda, and the Battle for Arabia (London: Oneworld Publications, 2013), 
pp. 150-3; Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (London: C. Hurst & 
Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 2017), in particular, pp. 153-335) 
89 No author, ‘National Dialogue Conference’ 
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and that they would be binding.90 The Technical Committee also suggested the implementation 
of twenty ‘confidence-building measures’ in the months preceding the NDC; the majority were 
designed to build trust with Hiraak, a southern secessionist movement, and to attain greater 
Hiraaki participation in the NDC. Nonetheless, these proposals were not pursued.91 Indeed, a 
number of Hiraakis refused to participate in both the Committee and the NDC and sought, 
instead, ‘bilateral negotiations between the north and the south over separation, not to discuss 
the shape of the unified state’.92 
 
During this period of the transition, in addition to Benomar, the international community also 
offered support through the Friends of Yemen (FoY)93 together with a narrower collective of 
diplomats, the ‘Group of 10’ (G10). The FoY was launched in 2010 following a foiled al-Qaida 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attack on an airliner bound for Detroit. While there were 
hopes that the FoY would serve as ‘the logical mechanism for the international community to 
coordinate its response’ to the Yemeni transition,94 it was the G10 which proved more 
influential. An informal body composed of the permanent members of the UNSC, the EU, 
Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait and the UAE,95 the group is proclaimed by the UK government 
to have helped ‘ensure rapid and effective disbursement of donor funds and effective 
implementation of reforms to improve, governance, unify the military, strengthen security and 
 
90 Paffenholz and Ross, ‘Inclusive Political Settlements: New Insights from Yemen’s National Dialogue’, p. 
204. Furthermore, as these authors write, it was decided that, in any first rounds of voting, no more than 10% of 
delegates could object should a motion or recommendation wish to pass while, if there was a need for a second 
round of voting, 75% of delegates would have to be in favour. 
91 Zyck, ‘Mediating Transition in Yemen: Achievements and Lessons’, p. 6. Murray has written that these points 
emphasised the building of trust with the south and in Sadah; they included ‘requiring an official apology for the 
1994 war, reinstating people who lost jobs in the aftermath of that war, the return of property seized after the 
war, the release of detained members of the Southern Peaceful Movement and the employment of southerners in 
central government institutions’ together with ‘an official apology for the damage caused by the conflict in 
Saada and the release of detainees’. Furthermore, as Murray notes, progress on enacting these recommendations 
was extremely slow and, as the NDC drew to an end, ‘few had been addressed in any way’ (Murray, ‘Yemen’s 
National Dialogue Conference’, p. 5) 
92 Peter Salisbury, ‘Yemen’s Southern Intifada’ in Yemen’s National Dialogue POMEPS Briefings 19 (2013) 
[online], available from: https://pomeps.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/POMEPS_BriefBooklet19_Yemen_Web.pdf [last accessed: 18 February 2021], p. 15 
93 The members of the FoY included Algeria, the Arab League, the European Union, the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
Brazil, the People’s Republic of China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, the Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, the Netherlands, the Sultanate of 
Oman, Qatar, the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (co-chair), Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, 
Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom (co-chair), the United States of America, the Republic 
of Yemen (co-chair), the GCC Secretariat, the Islamic Development Bank, the International Monetary 
Foundation, the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation, the World Bank, and the UN (No author, ‘Friends of 
Yemen: How Has it Performed and Where is it Going?’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2013) [online], 
available from: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/55375d834.pdf [last accessed: 18 February 2021], p. 2 
94 Ibid, p. 3 
95 Burke, ‘EU-GCC Cooperation: Securing the Transition in Yemen’, pp. 13-4; Schmitz, ‘Yemen’s National 
Dialogue’, p. 17; No author, ‘Friends of Yemen: How Has it Performed and Where is it Going?’, p. 3 
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justice and promote strong economic growth’.96 The diplomats in the G10 thought of 
themselves as the ‘sponsors and guardians of the GCC initiative’, and met weekly, playing a 
role in persuading various Yemeni factions to attend and commit to the NDC.97 
 
The Dialogue launched, three months behind schedule,98 on the 18th of March 2013, and was 
intended to last for six months.99 Gathered within the opulent Mövenpick Hotel, perched above 
Sanaa, the delegates separated into their Working Groups and, as they began to re-think the 
future of their state, Yemenis experienced continued intervention from the UN, the G10 and 
various international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). International officials would 
seek permission to attend the negotiations, would offer ‘capacity building’ and lectures from 
‘experts’, and conduct clandestine negotiations alongside the conference.100 The UN claims 
that it ‘facilitated dozens of Dialogue sessions, and at the request of the interlocutors, presented 
dozens of papers reflecting on the experiences of other countries’101 while it has been reported 
that the Mediation Support Team of the European External Action Service (EEAS) offered 
international examples of best practice to the Secretariat and the Working Groups.102 
Nevertheless, Benomar and his team have been described as having played ‘a relatively modest 
role in the conference’; the team was small, lacked Arabic speakers, and had ‘no written or 
unwritten strategy or standard operating procedures’ during these years.103 Indeed, the Working 
Groups tended to be facilitated by Yemenis and, when conflicts occurred, the Consultative 
Committee would swoop in, escalating the most thorny of challenges to Hadi himself.104  
 
While a number of the Working Groups progressed without difficulty, other teams faced 
profound disputes. In early August 2014, a number of Hiraaki representatives abandoned the 
conference in protest at the discussions,105 and the six-month deadline for concluding the 
Dialogue was missed following deadlocks in ‘The Southern Question’ and ‘Statebuilding’ 
 
96 No author, ‘Friends of Yemen: Questions and Answers’, UK Government (2013) [online], available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/friends-of-yemen-q-a [last accessed: 18 February 2021] 
97 Burke, ‘EU-GCC Cooperation: Securing the Transition in Yemen’, p. 14 
98 Gaston, ‘Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue’, p. 4 
99 Ibid, p. 6 
100 Details gathered from the interviews conducted as part of this study 
101 No author, ‘National Dialogue Conference’ 
102 Burke, ‘EU-GCC Cooperation: Securing the Transition in Yemen’, p. 16 
103 Zyck, ‘Mediating Transition in Yemen: Achievements and Lessons’, p. 8 
104 Details gathered from the interviews conducted as part of this study 
105 Gaston, ‘Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue’, p. 3; Indeed, Murray has argued that the 
Hiraak movement, within the NDC, is represented ‘by moderates with limited following in the South’ (Murray, 
‘Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference, p. 2; see also Paffenholz and Ross, ‘Inclusive Political Settlements: 
New Insights from Yemen’s National Dialogue’, p. 206) 
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Working Groups.106 As August gave way to September, Hadi charged an exclusive sub-
committee, known as the ‘8+8 Committee’ due to its being formed of eight representatives 
from the north and the south, with finding a solution to the ‘southern issue’.107 In its ‘Agreement 
on a Just Solution’, the group, which included just one member of the Huthis, proposed the 
idea that Yemen should be federalised.108 During the committee’s discussions, ‘Benomar was 
reportedly tasked to take a leading role in mediating between’ the participants109 but this 
committee could not reach consensus on the precise form which federalism would take.110 
Nonetheless, in January 2014, the conference produced its Final Report, detailing 1,800 
ambitious recommendations for reform; the intention had been that each of these 
recommendations, developed by the Working Groups, would be voted upon but, on the day of 
the vote, Ahmed Sharif al-Din, one of the most prominent Huthi delegates, was assassinated 
on his way to the Mövenpick hotel and his fellow Huthi delegates withdrew.111 Hadi himself 
waved through the submissions of the Working Groups, announcing that a further body would 
be formed to further deliberate the federalisation of Yemen. Within a few weeks, without broad 
consultation, this 22-member ‘Region-Defining Committee’, chaired by Hadi, proposed that 
the state would be divided into six.112 All but the Huthi representative on the committee agreed; 
indeed, the Huthi movement argued that the distribution of natural wealth within the new map 
was unequal, depriving Sadah of resources and access to the sea. Other factions, too, expressed 
reservations, or rejected, the proposed federalisation of Yemen.113  
 
 
106 Gaston, ‘Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue’, p. 1 
107 Ibid, pp. 3-4; Tobias Thiel, ‘Yemen’s Imposed Federal Boundaries’, Middle East Research and Information 
Project (2015) [online], available from: https://merip.org/2015/07/yemens-imposed-federal-boundaries/ [last 
accessed: 2 June 2021] 
108 No author, ‘Outcome of the Subcommittee of the Southern Working Group: Agreement on a Just Solution to 
the Southern Question’ (2013) [online], available from: 
https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/140118_agreement_on_the_southern_question_en_final.pdf [last 
accessed: 18 February 2021] 
109 Zyck, ‘Mediating Transition in Yemen: Achievements and Lessons’, p. 9 
110 Gaston, ‘Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue’, p. 4 
111 Ibid, p. 5; Paffenholz and Ross, ‘Inclusive Political Settlements: New Insights from Yemen’s National 
Dialogue’, p. 205; details also gained from interviews conducted as part of this study 
112 Tobias Thiel, ‘Yemen’s Negotiated Transition Between the Elite and the Street’, London School of 
Economics (2014) [online], available from: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2014/03/03/yemens-negotiated-
transition-between-the-elite-and-the-street/ [last accessed: 18 February 2021]; Thiel, ‘Yemen’s Imposed Federal 
Boundaries’; Gaston, ‘Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue’, pp. 4-5; details also gained 
from interviews conducted as part of this study 
113 Thiel, ‘Yemen’s Imposed Federal Boundaries’; Yara Bayoumy, ‘Yemen’s Federal Plan A Bold Idea, But 
Many Hurdles Remain’, Reuters (2014) [online], available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-
politics-analysis/yemens-federal-plan-a-bold-idea-but-many-hurdles-remain-idUSBREA1M05720140223 [last 
accessed: 18 February 2021]; Paffenholz and Ross, ‘Inclusive Political Settlements: New Insights from Yemen’s 
National Dialogue’, p. 205; Gaston, ‘Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue’, p. 4 
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The decisions made by this final committee marks the end of the period under study in this 
thesis. Following the conference, responsibility was passed to a Constitutional Drafting 
Committee. However, the conflict in northern Yemen had intensified during the NDC and, just 
one year following the conference, the Huthis marched into Sanaa, captured the presidential 
palace, forced Hadi into exile, and began marching south. The violence intensified as a Saudi 
Arabia-led coalition launched air strikes against the Huthis and bolstered factions in support of 
Hadi and southern separatism, the latter of which have also clashed with Hadi’s forces in 
Aden.114 Following a brief partnership with the Huthis, Saleh was murdered by the movement 
in 2017.115 Over the course of the conflict, it has been estimated that 233,000 Yemenis have 
lost their lives, and that 3.6 million have been displaced, while the UN has documented 
‘shocking levels of civilian suffering’.116  
 
1.35 Justifying the selection of the case studies 
 
This section has explored the events of the two cases selected for investigation. These 
overviews will assist readers in grasping the empirical material presented in Chapters Five, Six 
and Seven. These chapters will foreground the voices contained within the dataset and, having 
chronologically detailed the two peace processes here, it will be possible for readers to follow 
their recounting of, and perspectives on, the events of the two mediation processes. Having 
charted the two mediation efforts will now also allow me to explore their similarities and 
differences, and explain how these will enrich the findings of this thesis.  
 
Both mediation efforts were launched, and ostensibly spearheaded, by the UN with support 
offered by members of the international community and international NGOs. Both took place 
within the same period, between the years 2011 and 2014, and sought to resolve civil conflicts 
which had erupted in the same region of the world and which were provoked by the same trans-
national demonstrations, seeking broadly similar aspirations. Both peace processes also failed 
to secure lasting peace: stage II of the Geneva Peace Process was abruptly abandoned. Brahimi 
could not persuade the two Syrian delegations to even agree upon an agenda for the 
 
114 No author, ‘Global Humanitarian Overview: Yemen’, UN OCHA (2021) [online], available from: 
https://gho.unocha.org/yemen [last accessed: 17 January 2021] 
115 Patrick Wintour, ‘Yemen Houthi Rebels Kill Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’, The Guardian (2017) 
[online], available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/04/former-yemen-president-saleh-killed-
in-fresh-fighting [last accessed: 18 February 2021] 




negotiations. While the NDC did conclude having generated a vast series of recommendations, 
less than a year following its conclusion, the crisis was inflamed as the Huthis captured Sanaa 
and Hadi fled. Indeed, the two cases under investigation here merely mark the beginning of 
lengthy and ongoing peace negotiations.  
 
Despite these similarities, the two mediation efforts took markedly different shapes: the Geneva 
Peace Process can be considered to have adopted a more traditional form of mediation, finally 
convening two opposing Syrian delegations for clandestine talks, overseen by the UN Envoy, 
in January 2014. In Yemen, the period of the peace process upon which I will focus began with 
secretive negotiations, including an exclusive group of political leaders and international actors 
and culminating in the GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanism. Later, however, it 
expanded into a participatory, comprehensive and months-long National Dialogue. 
International actors remained present, particularly ‘behind-the-scenes’, but it was Yemenis 
who designed the NDC, who managed the NDC, and who facilitated the NDC. It was Yemenis 
who authored and approved its outcomes. The two mediation attempts were selected for 
investigation due to these differences; the hope is that their diversity will enrich the conclusions 
reached, potentially illuminating whether, and if so how, divergent approaches to mediation 
may, or may not, interact with processes of identity construction.  
 
1.4 Thesis outline 
 
This introductory chapter has offered a summary of the main findings of this thesis together 
with the contributions it will make to mediation studies and scholarship concerning collective 
identification in Syria and Yemen. It has also introduced the research design and case studies 
under investigation, justifying their selection. The remainder of the thesis will proceed as 
follows: in Chapter Two I will navigate the concept of identity, placing it within the social 
constructivist school of thought. Here, I will also survey existing literature which explores 
group identities in Syria and Yemen, focusing in particular on those arguments forged in the 
wake of the 2011 protests. Chapter Three will survey scholarship concerned with the 
relationship between mediation and identity. I will chart the findings reached concerning the 
multifarious impacts of identity upon mediation, before focusing in far greater detail on the 
limited number of studies which have explored the possible effects of mediation upon identity. 
From these, I will extrapolate three hypotheses for investigation. Chapter Three will also 
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introduce the intertwined debates surrounding impartiality and power in mediation. The final 
preliminary chapter, Chapter Four, will explore the methods used to gather and analyse the 
qualitative data which underpin the findings of this thesis.  
 
In Chapters Five, Six and Seven, I will assess the three hypotheses formulated in Chapter 
Three. Chapter Five will therefore focus on the manner in which mediation, identity, and 
legitimacy are intertwined; Chapter Six on two norms which were promoted over the course of 
the mediation efforts, and the interlinking of these attempts with identity; and Chapter Seven 
on the effect of inclusive mediation on identity. Chapter Eight will conclude the thesis, 
exploring the ramifications of the findings reached in Chapters Five, Six and Seven for our 
understanding of: the relationship between mediation and identity; the manner in which 
identities in Syria and Yemen have mutated following the crises of 2011; how processes of 
identity construction through mediation can affect perceptions of impartiality and power; and 

























As stated in Chapter One, this thesis will offer a response to the following, over-arching 
research question: how does mediation shape the identities of the conflict parties? The process 
of mediation was explored in Chapter One while the two mediation efforts under consideration 
were also outlined. In order to assess whether and, if so, how these two instances of mediation 
may have shaped the identities of Syria and Yemen, it is necessary to operationalise this latter 
concept. How might we define identity? How might identities be moulded? What kinds of data 
might reveal the nature of identities and the means by which they are constructed? By drawing 
upon a wide range of social constructivist texts, I will argue in this chapter that identities are 
forged as members of a given group, and as peers of this group, consider both that which the 
group is, and that which the group seeks. Identities are built as these themes are deliberated, 
until distinctive images and characters which define the bonds between members of the group 
are constructed. I will further contend that multiple identities may be held simultaneously, that 
identities can operate at a variety of different levels, that identities can mutate, that identities 
are infused with norms, and that identities may be built through processes of ‘Othering’. I will 
also claim that the rhetoric of members of a political elite can provide, at the very least, hints 
as to the communally held identities of a group and thus forms a crucial data source. 
 
By focusing upon the UN-led mediation efforts in Syria and Yemen, the findings of this thesis 
will contribute to our understanding of how Syrian and Yemeni identities developed following 
the uprisings of 2011. Therefore, the second section of this chapter will explore existing 
academic debates surrounding collective identification in Syria and Yemen. I will briefly 
examine the development of identities in the states prior to 2011. I will show that, in relation 
to Syria, traditional understandings of the state speak of a fragmented nation, torn between pan-
Arab ties and sect-based affiliations; nevertheless, a nascent body of work also argues for the 
relevance of national belonging during the reigns of Hafez al-Asad and his son, Bashar. 
Following the outbreak of war, this divide persists: while academics have claimed that the 
nation was reimagined through the protests, and that a form of civic nationalism came to define 
the Syrian identity, a substantial number of scholars suggest, instead, that the uprisings and 
violence have served to further sectarianise Syria. Although group identities in Yemen have 
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received less attention by comparison with Syria, a similar debate can be detected. As I will 
show in this chapter, preceding 2011, authors tend to write of sub-state ties, of the divisions 
between Shafii Sunni and Zaydi Shia communities, the prominence of tribal affiliations, and 
the power of regional identities. Nevertheless, national solidarities are also evoked and, 
following the outbreak of the demonstrations, it has been argued that the Yemeni protesters 
called for the citizens to seize the state, and to create a new society infused with civic values. 
Sectarianisation has also been charted in Yemen, however, while authors have further claimed 
that identities at the level of the governorates, and at the level of the south, have wielded 
increasing power following the transition and its breakdown. Exploring these debates will 
allow me to, later in the thesis, compare my findings with those of others. Within the cases of 
mediation under investigation here, I will be able to assess whether we appear to be witnessing 
processes of identity sustainment, construction, reconstruction and/or deconstruction. 
 
2.2 Understanding socially constructed collective identity 
 
The concept of identity occurs regularly within social constructivist writing and it is this 
broader approach to the study of international relations which will both underpin this thesis 
and which will inform the operationalisation of identity deployed. Indeed, the research question 
guiding the study is rooted in this conceptualisation of identity; the notion that the process of 
mediation may be able to shape identity connotes an understanding of identity which is neither 
primordial nor static. In this first section I will outline the concept of identity according to 
social constructivists. I will begin by summarising social constructivism before considering 
how identity might be defined and researched. The final sub-section will briefly consider how 
causality is approached within social constructivism. 
 
2.21 Social constructivism: a brief overview 
 
A number of authors have attempted to distil social constructivism down to a few fundamental 
statements. Perhaps most well-known is Alexander Wendt’s assertion that the school of thought 
can be represented by the following two assumptions: firstly, ‘that the structures of human 
association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces’ and, secondly, 
‘that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather 
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than given by nature.’117 Stefano Guzzini has also offered two core principles in which he 
claims social constructivists are united: ‘the social construction of meaning’ and ‘the 
construction of social reality’,118 with the first referring to the significance of our interpretations 
and use of language, and the second recognising that the resulting ‘knowledge’ then comprises 
that which we experience in day-to-day life.119 Jeffrey Checkel’s two tenets are pared down 
even further: he claims that the social constructivist approach is based on the suppositions that 
‘the environment in which agents/states take action is social as well as material’ and that ‘this 
setting can provide agents/states with understandings of their interests’.120 I would offer the 
following summary: social constructivism focuses upon the manner in which ideas, or an 
ideational structure, make(s) up the social world. Furthermore, social constructivism considers 
these ideas to both regulate the behaviour of agents in addition to constituting their very 
character; depicts ideas as intersubjective and meaningful only in the collective sense; 
emphasises the awareness and consciousness of individuals and groups operating within this 
ideational structure and, therefore, their capacity to change social reality; and, finally, 
highlights the dynamism and contingent nature of the social world.  
 
2.22 Operationalising identity 
 
This section will chart the concept of identity. Before I begin, it is worth noting that, while the 
study of ‘identity’ occupies a prominent role within social constructivism, the concept has 
tended to defy clear, unanimous characterisation: as Rawi Abdelal et al. lament, ‘the wide 
variety of conceptualisations of identity have led some to conclude that identity is so elusive, 
slippery and amorphous that it will never prove to be a useful variable for the social 
sciences’.121 Nevertheless, I will attempt to offer an operationalisation here, highlighting the 
particular facets of identity which I believe to be of relevance both to the data gathered and to 
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my analysis. It is also worth noting that the material drawn upon in this section refers to various 
types of group identity, considering national identity together with transnational or supra-state 
identities, and sub-state identities. The sections which follow will draw out arguments 
surrounding how collective identities can be defined and formed; my suggestion is that this 
‘content’, these ‘mechanisms’, and the data sources which can illuminate these are relevant to 
all collective identities. The means by which national identities, for instance, are built and 
sustained share similarities, I propose, with the manner in which alternative group identities 
are built and sustained.  Furthermore, as will become apparent in the third and fourth sections 
of this chapter, scholars have pinpointed a wide range of identities, operating below and above 
the state, as holding fluctuating rates of relevance within Syria and Yemen. For this reason, the 
research question guiding this study does not specify the precise level of identity which may 
have been shaped through the mediation process: indeed, the precise levels characterised and 
reflected upon constitute a crucial finding of the thesis.  
 
2.221 The ‘content’ of identity 
 
Firstly, identity is thought of here as the ‘basic character’ of groups, as referring to their ‘images 
of individuality and distinctiveness’.122 Crucially, these are shared: ‘social identities convey a 
sense of “we-ness”’, of commonality.123 The second critical assumption made is that identities 
are constructed, and they are constructed by people. As Thomas Risse argues, the bonds which 
fuse individuals together as a collective are formed as actors ‘make sense of who they are and 
what they want’124 or, as Felix Berenskötter contends, as meaning is given to the past and to 
the future.125 Identities are thus ‘collectively shared social constructions’ based upon 
‘collective narratives of a common fate, a common history, and a common culture’.126 They 
can be thought of as ‘mental phenomena’, or ‘complex sets of information stored in the memory 
that shape cognitive processing’.127 They are not ‘presocially given’, and they do not 
 
122 Ronald Jepperson et al., ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’ in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The 
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), pp. 33, 59 
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objectively exist and lie ‘waiting to be discovered’.128 We therefore need to gain an 
understanding of the ‘self-understandings of group members’ if we are to hope to gain an 
appreciation of a given identity.129 Closely linked with this is my third assumption, that 
identities can change: ‘they are not carved in stone’, they are ‘in process’,130 and their content 
is the outcome of ever-fluctuating processes ‘of social contestation within the group’.131 As 
Jonathan Leader Maynard has aptly summarised: identities are ‘contingent, fluid, ideationally 
thick, and socially constructed notions of selfhood’.132  
 
It is also presumed that crises, such as wars and military defeats, may be particularly likely to 
provoke ‘identity conflicts’, profound challenges to existing identities, and, possibly, rapid 
change following ‘open, political debate’.133 Relatedly and, as will become apparent in the 
chapters which follow, particularly relevant to the data gathered here is the notion that 
suffering, or collective trauma, can not only cause shifts in identity but, moreover, can come to 
define identity. Sevan Beukian has described collective trauma as the shared sense of having 
been ‘subjugated to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon [a] group 
consciousness, marking their memories forever’.134 Ernest Renan famously argued that 
‘suffering in common unifies more than joy does’;135 more recently, Gilad Hirschberger, 
drawing on a long tradition, has also theorised the interrelationship between shared suffering 
and the construction of group identities. This scholar cites Kai Erikson who evocatively 
claimed that collective trauma deals ‘a blow to the basic tissues of social life’, a blow which 
‘damages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of 
communality’.136 However, Hirschberger suggests that ‘collective trauma’ may also ‘transform 
the way survivors perceive the world and understand the relationship between their group and 
other groups’. In turn, this might ‘facilitate the construction of the various elements of meaning 
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and social identity: purpose, values, efficacy, and collective worth’.137 Indeed, suffering 
endured by groups, Hirschberger suggests, might become ‘the epicenter of group identity, and 
the lens through which group members understand their social environment’. As meaning is 
made, ‘a transgenerational collective self is pieced together’, promoting ‘group cohesion, a 
sense of group importance and common destiny, and a strong commitment to group identity’.138 
Furthermore, following the period of violence and suffering, ‘the intergroup animosity that 
existed during the trauma is often replaced with memory wars over the attributions made for 
the trauma and the significance of the trauma for the image of both victim and perpetrator 
groups’.139 Thus, collective trauma can also provoke an identity crisis by representing a threat 
to the self-image and belonging of perpetrators. 
 
2.222 How are identities (co-)constructed? 
 
A fourth assumption made is that the ‘stories’ told by members of a political elite, ‘their official 
texts, rhetoric and symbols’140 may, at the very least, provide clues as to the common social 
characteristics and aims of a group. Of course, ‘the efforts’ of members of a political elite ‘to 
create, develop, and…popularise the idea of the nation and the national community’141 
constitute just one means through which nations, or groups, are imagined, and one limitation 
of this thesis is that I will not be able to reveal the extent to which the broader Syrian and 
Yemeni people have inspired, resisted and/or accepted the narratives which I will analyse.142 
Indeed, ‘everyday knowledge’ has long been neglected within international relations literature 
concerning identity143 and, moreover, it may be the case that ties of belonging are most 
meaningfully generated from the grassroots.144 Nevertheless, members of a political elite can 
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still be assumed to play a vital role in constructing, reconstructing and deconstructing 
identities.145  
 
A further three, intertwined, ideas also underpin the research undertaken here. These arise from 
the notion that identities are not only ‘contested, imagined and reimagined, transformed and 
negotiated’ by their members but also ‘through their interaction with others’.146 This has three 
implications: the first is the notion that identity is ‘inherently relational’,147 intertwined with 
demarcations of an ‘Other’, a suggestion which constitutes a common thread within social 
constructivist theorisations: as Wendt writes, ‘the daily life of international politics is an 
ongoing process of states taking identities in relation to Others, casting them into corresponding 
counter-identities, and playing out the result.’148 For Telhami and Barnett, ‘many definitions 
of identity begin with the understanding of oneself in relation to others’149 while Risse has 
asserted that ‘collectively held identities not only define who “we” are but also delineate the 
boundaries of the “Other”’.150 Moreover, ‘Othering’, or ‘naming’, can be wielded ‘as a form of 
social control’;151 as Maynard has contended, ‘identities are not always self-generated and 
personal, they may be ascribed and even forcibly imposed’.152 
 
The second implication is that ‘the producer of an identity is not in control of what it means to 
others’.153 The very meaning, or ‘content’, of identities is, at least in part, shaped by external 
groups, by their shared interpretations of behaviour. As Wendt describes at length, a state could 
be lauded as a ‘hegemon’ or condemned as an ‘imperialist’, dependent upon the community of 
nations’ collective understanding of interventionist behaviour. He thus argues that ‘the truth 
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conditions for identity claims are communal rather than individual’.154 This, in turn, 
necessitates gaining an appreciation not only of the group members’ perceptions of their 
collective, but also those of their ‘peers’.  
 
Thirdly, I will also proceed from the assumption that interactions with others, and the very 
existence of a group within particular social structures, can mould identities: ‘the international 
and domestic societies in which states are embedded shape their identities in powerful ways’.155 
This notion is linked to the idea of ‘socialisation’, defined by Checkel as ‘the process through 
which actors adopt the norms and rules of a given community’.156 As Finnemore and Sikkink 
explain, ‘in the context of international politics, socialization involves diplomatic praise or 
censure’, which is reinforced ‘by material sanctions and incentives’.157 However, the concept 
of socialisation brings with it the ‘analytic danger of neglecting agency’, of treating groups ‘as 
blank slates on which new values are inscribed’.158 Thus, it will also be assumed that the 
concept of ‘strategic social construction’ holds weight in considerations of identity. This phrase 
is intended to capture the process by which ‘extremely rational’ actors ‘maximize their utilities’ 
by influencing others’ identities159 or, conversely, the possibility that groups will tactically 
reconfigure their identities in order to gain advantage.160  
 
The consideration of these latter two possibilities is not intended to disempower Syrian and 
Yemeni identity constructors but merely to add a further prism through which we can attempt 
to gain an understanding of the way in which identity may have developed within, and through, 
the initial stages of the Geneva Peace Process and the Yemeni transition years. In addition, the 
contemplation of the possibility that identities may be strategically constructed is not intended 
to imply a purely instrumentalist understanding of identity. As Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink have argued, ‘if identities are constructed, this implies that actors have choices about 
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identities and might use rational calculations in constructing their identities’; this, in turn, 
means that identities may ‘appear natural to members of groups even as individuals engage in 
projects of identity construction’.161 Indeed, social constructivism has been argued to adopt ‘a 
middle ground between primordialism and instrumentalism’162 and, therefore, it will also be 
assumed that members of the political elite can both ‘manufacture and manipulate [emphasis 
added]’ identities, conceivably achieving both simultaneously, but it will be proposed that 
constraints prevail: an ‘existing cultural fabric’ can only be exploited so far.163 
 
2.223 Norms and identity 
 
Abdelal et al. claim that ‘norms’ form an important element of identity164 and, indeed, many 
social constructivists, almost imperceptibly, transition from discussing identity to invoking 
norms. Indeed, many authors define norms as collective expectations concerning the behaviour 
of actors occupying any given identity.165 Norms are frequently divided into two main types: 
regulative and constitutive. The former ‘operate as standards for the proper enactment or 
deployment of a defined identity’,166 ordering and constraining behaviour,167 whereas the latter 
‘operate like rules that define the [very] identity of an actor’,168 creating ‘new actors, interests, 
or categories of action’.169 However, just as norms may guide identity, so too might identity 
shape the diffusion of new norms: it has been suggested that states comply with norms ‘for 
reasons that relate to their identities as members of an international society’.170 International 
norms are more likely to be conformed to if they resonate with states’ domestic context, or 
complement or align with ‘existing collective understandings embedded in domestic 
 
161 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, p. 411 
162 Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, ‘Introduction: The Sectarianization Thesis’ in Nader Hashemi and Danny 
Postel (eds.), Sectarianization (London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 2017), p. 7 
163 Telhami and Barnett, ‘Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East’, p. 12 
164 Abdelal et al., ‘Identity as a Variable’, p. 696; see also: Annika Björkdahl, ‘Norms in International Relations: 
Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15:1 (2002), p. 
16   
165 See, for example: Checkel, ‘Review: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, pp. 327-8; 
Jepperson et al., ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’, p. 54; and Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: 
Alternative Perspectives on National Security’, p. 5. 
166 Jepperson et al., ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’, p. 54 
167 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, p. 891 
168 Jepperson et al., ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’, p. 54 
169 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, p. 891; Checkel, ‘Review: 
The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, p. 331 
170 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, p. 902 
43 
 
institutions and political cultures’.171 Furthermore, the greater the insecurity associated with a 
state’s identity, the more likely it is, according to Finnemore and Sikkink, that a new 
international norm will be adopted.172 
 
More broadly, it has been argued that norms ‘provide people with a medium through which 
they may communicate’173 and, furthermore, that actions are, at least in part, imbued with 
meaning through normative structures.174 New, emergent norms, and competitions between 
such rules and those already in existence, are also envisioned by social constructivists,175 while 
Finnemore’s idea of norm entrepreneurs, ‘committed individuals who happen to be in the right 
place at the right time to instil their beliefs in larger global social structures’,176 has gained a 
great deal of currency. Within this line of thought, it is emphasised that norms are not conjured 
from nothing; they are ‘actively built’ by norm entrepreneurs who ‘call attention to issues or 
even “create” issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them’.177 In 
Section 2.222, I introduced the ideas of socialisation and strategic social construction. These 
processes also hold weight in relation to norms. For instance, the potential for influential 
political actors to ‘use society’s norms for ulterior purposes’ has been recognised.178 Norm 
entrepreneurs are argued to be ‘extremely rational’: ‘the utilities they want to maximize involve 
changing the other players’ utility function in ways that reflect the normative commitments of 
the norm entrepreneurs’.179 Furthermore, actors may conform to norms due to habit, duty, a 
sense of obligation, or their principled beliefs while they may also ‘conform to norms because 
norms help them get what they want [emphasis added]’.180 In Chapter Three, we will see that, 
while identity, as understood by social constructivists, has been relatively neglected by 
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2.224 The differing levels of identity 
 
Finally, it is important to highlight the various levels of collective identity. International 
relations theorists tend to focus on ‘national identity’.181 However, Middle East scholars have 
pioneered research into the numerous loci around which identities may form, perhaps 
simultaneously, and have scrutinised dynamics of unease between these different 
identifications.182 Indeed, identity has been argued to play a central role within the Middle East 
and, moreover, ‘much of the debate within Middle East studies about the role of identity…takes 
its point of departure in statements about how state identities in the region are challenged by 
other identities emerging from above or below’.183 Overall, it is suggested that ‘the region is 
marked by the simultaneous presence of multiple identities’, with particular attention paid to 
the claim that it is ‘not possible to simply assume  that the territorial state is the source of the 
most important identity’.184 Indeed, Raymond Hinnebusch claimed, in 2005, that ‘the relative 
incongruity between state and identity is perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Middle 
East state system’185 while Ghassan Salamé, in 1994, dismissed the states of the region as 
nothing more than ‘external, formal, legal skeleton[s]’.186 An argument made by P. R. 
Kumaraswamy, in 2006, is notable in this regard and, as will become clear, is also significant 
in the light of my analysis of the data gathered as part of this study. His claim is that none of 
the countries in the Middle East has ‘succeeded in evolving a national identity that reflects their 
heterogeneity’ and, furthermore, that ‘the region as a whole has been unable to address, let 
alone resolve, the core issue of national identity’.187 We will see that this final argument has 
faced challenge from scholars of Syria and Yemen, and will also be challenged by the findings 
of this thesis. 
 
More broadly, it is accepted that, just as individuals ‘possess multiple notions of selfhood’, 
such as class, ethnicity, gender and religion, so too might groups. These levels include national 
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identity but, also, state identity, ‘the corporate and officially demarcated identity linked to the 
state apparatus’; regime identity, ‘the self-conception held by [a] dynastic leadership’;  and 
various sub- and supra-state identities. In the Middle East context, pan-Arabism, Islamism, 
sectarianism, class and tribal affiliations serve as just five examples. These multiple identities 
may ‘vary in content, affective strength and quality, [and] social prominence’, many may fade 
in relevance for most of the time, but all hold the potential to be activated.188  
 
2.23 Social constructivism and causality 
 
Having attempted to operationalise the concept of identity, I will now return to the broader 
theory of social constructivism, and the role of causality within this approach. This is important 
as these epistemological debates will have a significant impact on the scope of this study, 
shaping its aims, its methods and, eventually, its conclusions. Firstly, the extent to which it is 
accurate to characterise social constructivism as a theory of international relations has been 
scrutinised; indeed, a number of authors strongly condemn that which they perceive to be the 
failure of constructivists to develop an all-encompassing framework accompanied by 
hypotheses which can be tested in a straightforward way.189 It is worth questioning, however, 
whether it is appropriate to stringently hold social constructivism to such positivist standards. 
As John Ruggie argues, constructivism is, unapologetically, best described as a ‘theoretically 
informed approach’.190 Inductive in its orientation, Ruggie claims that expanding ‘the empirical 
and explanatory domains of international relations theory beyond the analytical confines of 
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism’ is the guiding aim of this school of thought.191  
 
Inextricably linked to this discussion is the role and, indeed, conception of, causality within 
social constructivism. ‘Disarray’192 can frequently be perceived here, often resulting from an 
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ambiguous use of language.193 However, as Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen note, 
constructivists cannot subscribe to ‘mechanical positivist conceptions of causality’.194 As 
Emanuel Adler elucidates, while it may be appropriate to claim to have uncovered causal 
relations connecting entities and occurrences within the physical world, such deterministic laws 
are both improbable and inappropriate in relation to the social world. Instead, social forces can 
be argued to ‘constitute’ action and, thus, ‘causality in [constructivist] social science involves 
specifying a time-bounded sequence and relationship between the social phenomena we want 
to explain and the antecedent conditions, in which people consciously and often rationally do 
things for reasons that are socially constituted by their collective interpretations of the social 
world and the rules they act upon’.195 Indeed, it has also been claimed that, at best, 
constructivists can tease out speculative explanations following a ‘process of successive 
interrogative reasoning’, oscillating between explanation and the phenomenon under 
consideration.196 I will return to these debates both when formulating my hypotheses in Chapter 
Three and when presenting my methods in Chapter Four.  
 
2.3 Academic debates on collective identities in Syria post-2011 
 
Having operationalised identity, and having considered the broader social constructivist 
approach, I will now survey the arguments which have been developed surrounding group 
identity in Syria and Yemen following the Uprisings of 2011; I will also, very briefly, consider 
academic debates concerning collective identities within these states prior to the stymied 
revolutions. Later in the thesis, this will allow me to assess whether, within the cases of 
mediation under investigation here, we appear to be witnessing processes of identity 
sustainment, construction, reconstruction and/or deconstruction within, and in response to, the 
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2.31 Collective identity in Syria prior to 2011 
 
Traditional readings of Syria prior to 2011 speak of ‘a state fragmented on identity lines’,197 
‘devoid of any sense of national responsibility’198 and torn between the persistent power of 
pan-Arabism and the similarly relentless, if at times concealed, pull of sect-based affiliation. 
Authors examine the politicisation199 of ‘sectarian boundaries’200 through the divide-and-rule 
policies of the French;201 the capitalisation ‘on sectarianism as a social resource’ within the 
political battles of the Bath party;202 the Alawi203 ‘aṣabiya – or kinship – claimed to form ‘the 
backbone of the Asad regime’;204 the hardening of ‘the communal solidarity of Alawis and 
other minority groups’ during the 1980s rebellion by the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
subsequent massacre, committed by the regime, in Hama;205 and the increasing resentment 
harboured by the impoverished, and predominantly Sunni, peasantry towards Syria’s crony 
capitalists, connected to Bashar by sect and family, in the decade preceding the protests.206 
Nevertheless, authors write, too, of the ‘grand visions of Arab nationalism’ espoused by Syria’s 
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elite during the French mandate,207 with Arabism having been described as ‘the most 
compelling integrating bond which alone had the power to compete with powerful sub-state 
loyalties in a heterogenous artificial state’.208 Scholars claim that the idea of pan-Arab unity 
permeated Syrian society following the rise of the Bath209 and that, following the seizure of 
power by Hafez, state schools indoctrinated citizens in Arab nationalism and the regime 
proclaimed Syria to be the champion of the Arab cause through its steadfastness in the face of 
Israel.210 Bashar is also argued to have continued to promote Arabism and the claim has been 
made that, as recently as 2010, Syrians continued to feel ‘a layer of Arab identity’.211  
 
However, there is also a nascent body of work which argues for the relevance of a specifically 
Syrian national identity in the years preceding the protests. Thus, for one author, a ‘sense of 
Syrian national identity’, and of ‘national belonging’, ‘blossomed’ under the rule of Hafez: 
pride in the modern state and in a ‘reworked’ past was stimulated by the government-controlled 
media, education system and Bath Party apparatus.212 For others, Syrians were bound together 
through official discourse emphasising the familial bonds ‘between the people and the party 
leader’;213 by the religious nationalism promoted by Bashar;214 and by ‘everyday’ acts. These 
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acts have been argued to include inter-sect marriages and the development of a Syrian ‘high’ 
culture. They have also been suggested to include the process by which Syrians increasingly 
encountered and came to define themselves against both the Israelis and the Lebanese.215 This 
apparent tussle, between national and sectarian meanings of belonging, prevails within 
scholarly examinations of identity in Syria post-2011, and I will explore these arguments in the 
following two sub-sections.  
 
2.32 Re-inventing the Syrian nation through protest  
 
A number of scholars have written of the nationalistic strains of the protests which erupted in 
2011, the national belonging promoted by the opposition and, moreover, the specifically civic 
national identity of ‘ordinary’ Syrians following the conflict. According to Salwa Ismail, a new 
Syria was envisioned through these protests. Writing in the early years of the revolution, Ismail 
claimed that the protesters sought to ‘reclaim the nation from the ruler’, and ‘engaged in a re-
imagining of the nation’ through ‘symbolic production and practices of protest’.216 She 
provides a series of examples: the hoisting of imposing national flags at demonstrations; the 
removal of public government iconography; the demands for rights for all Syrians regardless 
of religion or ethnicity; the persistent referral by protesters to ‘the Syrian people’ and to the 
unity, solidarity and diversity of this Syrian people; and an explicit rejection of sectarianism.217 
Shayna Silverstein has offered a parallel argument; she has observed that the Levantine folk 
dance, dabka, having been ‘usurped by the state for ideological purposes’, promoted by the 
Bath Party and, earlier, by Arab nationalist politicians as an ‘emblem’,218 was transformed by 
protesters: ‘demonstrations occasionally break out into what might be called radical dabka’; 
troupes costumed in the colours of the pre-Bath Syrian flag demonstrate ‘how Syrians have 
taken back the streets, as well as the cultural symbols of their national heritage’.219 
 
Phillips supports this interpretation, arguing that the initial protests were ‘decentralised and 
local, but with national goals’, speaking on behalf of ‘the people’ and of ‘Syria’. He also 
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explores how the Syrian government countered such framing by emphasising its own 
‘nationalist credentials’, with both ‘sides’ deploying ‘inclusive slogans and symbols’.220 Enrico 
Bartolomei charts a similar narrative in relation to the early months of the Uprising, claiming 
that the protesters, ‘in their public statements and founding documents…began to forge a new 
political language that prioritized national affiliation over ethnic, religious or sectarian 
identities while affirming a commitment to a civil democratic state based on equal citizenship 
for all components of Syria’. He notes, for instance, how demonstrators issued a code of ethics 
which warned against ‘sectarian thinking and behaviour’. Offering further detail, Bartolomei 
highlights that early FSA units also ‘publicly embraced principles of non-sectarianism, framing 
their armed confrontation as a national liberation struggle’ and that the SNC, too, sought to 
‘present itself as the legitimate representative of all segments of the Syrian people’ while 
accusing al-Asad of attempting to ‘fragment Syrian society and drive a wedge within mixed 
communities’.221 Paulo Pinto, too, has argued that the protesters rejected sectarianism, 
proclaiming the Syrian people to be one,222 while Reinoud Leenders has stated that 
demonstrators, in the initial years, ‘successfully framed their uprising as a national endeavour’ 
and ‘managed, at least temporarily, to overcome Syrian society’s strong if not predominant 
local, regional, and transnational identities’.223  
 
Finally, two authors have made the claim that this civic nationalism which emerged during the 
early months and years of the protests has persisted and, crucially, has taken root at the level 
of the ‘everyday’. Adélie Chevée has conducted a study of the revolutionary print press and its 
deployment, over almost a decade, of symbols of civic nationalism. She explores repeated 
references to the nation in the titles of periodicals published by those in opposition to al-Asad, 
and their use of the independence flag. She also considers in depth the newspaper Souriatna – 
meaning ‘our Syria’ – produced from 2011 until 2018, as a representative example. She shows 
how the writers, editors and illustrators cultivated an emphatic discourse of cross-sectarian, 
national unity, arguing that its front pages reimagined the nation, in civic terms, through 
creative deployments of the Syrian flag and map. Her conclusion is that Souriatna ‘illustrates 
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a typical pattern of identity-making that has been too infrequently examined in current 
scholarship on the Syrian conflict: opposition actors…formulated identity claims around civic 
nationalism well beyond the first months of mobilization, and even after sectarian strife and 
political violence increased territorial fragmentation’.224 Her arguments are supported by 
Kathrin Bachleitner, who conducted 200 interviews in 2019 – 100 with Syrians who have 
remained in the state and 100 with those who have sought refuge outside the country – to 
explore ‘ordinary Syrians’ ideas of their state’. She argues that a clear majority of respondents, 
81%, described themselves as belonging to the ‘national identity category Syrian’, as opposed 
to selecting an ethnic or religious affiliation. Moreover, when questioned as to their shared 
social purpose, Bachleitner detects an ‘overwhelming presence of…civic rationale’: ‘demands 
for a democratic, civic state based on the rule of law and secularism, as well as for a unified, 
yet pluralistic, nation and society frequently appear in respondents’ vision of a future Syria’. 
This was primarily true both for those who identified with a Syrian national identity and for 
those who did not, and also dominated both the responses of those who fled and those who 
remained. Her conclusion, therefore, is that ‘from the bottom-up, and at least when 
extrapolating from the minds of the Syrian individuals making up this study’s sample 
population, a civic form of nationalism seems to prevail among the Syrian people’.225 
 
2.33 Fragmenting Syria through civil war 
 
Nevertheless, Ola Rifai, Christopher Phillips, Raymond Hinnebusch, Bartolomei and Pinto 
have all compellingly explored the sectarianisation of identities within Syria during the 
Uprising and civil conflict. The al-Asad administration, Sunni actors and external parties are 
all claimed to have fomented sectarian identities in response to the crisis, and it is argued that 
their discourse and actions – often painted as manipulative – ultimately took hold at the level 
of the ‘everyday’, painfully dividing Syrians according to sect. Rifai, for instance, has made 
the argument that, once the protests began, the Syrian government painted the opposition as an 
anti-Alawi movement in a bid to incite their security apparatus, which remained dominated by 
Alawi conscripts, to take up arms against the rebels, the majority of whom were Sunni.226 
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Phillips agrees,227 and Bartolomei also expresses accord, exploring the manner in which the 
government contrasted the alleged aims of the opposition with their own, supposed, focus upon 
nationalism: he argues that the al-Asad administration ‘aimed to undermine the legitimacy of 
the popular Uprising by portraying the demonstrators as foreign-backed takfiris and terrorists 
and to raise the spectre of sectarian strife in order to present itself as the sole guarantor of 
Syria’s national unity’.228 Pinto offers a similar reading while Hinnebusch, likewise, argues 
that ‘the regime…saw its best chance to survive by rallying the minorities and reinforcing the 
cohesiveness of its Alawi base by painting the opposition as Islamist terrorists’.229      
 
Violence, seemingly inflicted by one sect upon another, is argued by a number of these writers 
to have entrenched sectarian identification. Rifai claims that Sunni districts were targeted by 
forces clad in ‘identifiers of their communal belongings’ while Sunni protesters were tortured 
by soldiers ‘speaking in tough Alawi accents’.230 Indeed, Bartolomei writes of a ‘depopulation 
campaign aimed at forcing Sunni civilians out of insurgent-held areas using artillery shelling, 
air strikes, and massacres of Sunni villages and neighbourhoods’ before citing Joseph 
Holliday’s comment that this served to harden ‘sectarian lines as communities group[ed] 
together out of fear and the need for self-protection’.231 Pinto states agreement, exploring, for 
instance, the repercussions of the massacre committed in Houla, in which Alawi-dominated 
shabiḥa militias were accused of slaughtering 108 people.232 Rifai claims that this violence 
inflicted, seemingly ostentatiously, by Alawis upon Sunnis ‘elicited a collective radicalization 
of Sunni identity’ and that Sunni militants, too, wrought targeted harm upon Alawi militias.233 
Pinto thus writes of the murder of Alawi villagers by elements of the FSA from mid-2012, and 
the proliferating trend in which ‘religious and local identities became territorialized as villages 
and towns organized defense forces along sectarian lines’.234 Hinnebusch additionally 
highlights that, as Alawis disproportionately made up the security services, it was this group 
which ‘suffered a large proportion of casualties’ and that this also served to reinforce ‘their in-
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group solidarity around the regime’.235 More broadly, he also invokes this ‘security dilemma’, 
maintaining that this volatile and threatening climate ‘strengthened people’s identification with 
and reliance for protection on sectarian communities’236 and arguing that this, in turn, 
‘facilitated receptivity to sectarianism at the grassroots level’.237 Indeed, Bartolomei’s overall 
claim is that, over time, ‘a dynamic of polarization emerged, in which religious identity groups 
increasingly held one another collectively responsible for violations, real and perceived’.238 
 
The ‘sectarian narrative’ of those opposed to al-Asad has also been documented and assessed. 
Rifai has argued that the aforementioned ‘radicalization of Sunni identity’ was spurred on by 
Sunni clerics and activists who ‘accentuated the line’ between the two sects.239 Furthermore, 
she has written of Sunni protesters’ vow to rid Syria of Alawis, and to establish an Islamic 
Caliphate.240 Bartolomei has, moreover, observed that the ‘first half of 2012 witnessed the 
appearance of a strong Salafi-jihadist current within the Syrian armed opposition that described 
the struggle against the Asad regime as being essentially sectarian in nature’.241 Derogatory 
terms were deployed to describe al-Asad’s forces, such as ‘Nusayri’,242 with Bartolomei 
making the argument that ‘this sectarian narrative aimed at fuelling perceptions of community 
divisions along sectarian lines in order to gain the support of Syria’s predominantly Sunni 
population’.243 Hinnebusch has also noted that, ‘as the regime…inflicted violence on unarmed 
protesters, the opposition increasingly adopted anti-Alawi and Sunni sectarian discourse, and 
as it also militarized, sectarian Islamist ideologies became the most effective recruitment 
tools’.244  
 
Finally, external parties have been argued to have contributed to the sectarianisation of 
collective identification in Syria post-2011. According to Phillips, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey ‘supported militia with pronounced sectarian elements’ and, as Syrian paramilitaries 
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competed for funds from the Gulf regimes, ‘many adopted more Islamic and sectarian 
characteristics to attract support’.245 Supporting this, Bartolomei has argued that Hezbollah and 
other Shia militias ‘developed a political discourse entrenched in radical political Shi’ism’ 
which, in turn, ‘functioned as formidable political tools to mobilize support and justify 
intervention’.246 This author has also argued that, likewise, prominent Sunni clerics outside 
Syria deployed a ‘virulent anti-Shi’i rhetoric, characterising the Syrian Uprising as Sunni jihad 
against a polytheistic Alawite regime and its Shi’i allies’.247 Lastly, Phillips has claimed that 
‘Western media and policy makers reinforced a sectarian reading of the conflict’, assuming 
ethno-sectarian agendas; ‘lazily’ describing the al-Asad administration as Alawi or, even, Shia; 
and reproducing reductive maps of Syria, crudely dividing the state according to religion.248 
 
Therefore, despite the persuasive arguments made that a specifically Syrian national identity, 
albeit with variable meaning, has served to unify Syrians since the ascendancy of Hafez al-
Asad, and was re-claimed and then sustained following the 2011 protests, a range of scholars 
has also compellingly analysed the strength of supra- and sub-state ties within the state. 
Following the Uprising, it has been credibly claimed that identities in Syria have been 
resolutely sectarianised. It also possible to perceive numerous links with the previous section 
in which identity was conceptualised. The authors surveyed in this section have explored how 
these identities have been constructed, claiming that it has been through the proclamation of 
symbols, through rhetoric, through cultural practices, through violence, and through processes 
of Othering. While the content of these identities has received relatively less focus, these 
scholars have nevertheless highlighted the values, aspirations, norms, reconceived histories and 
myths, and narratives of suffering and fear which have come to define the bonds between 
Syrians, and sub-groups within Syria. We have also seen that these practices and this political 
language have stemmed from within the groups considered, from members of the elite together 
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2.4 Academic debates on collective identities in Yemen 
 
By comparison with Syria, group identities in Yemen have been relatively neglected in 
academic studies; indeed, Yemen has occupied a ‘marginal status in scholarship on the Arab 
world’.249 Identity is often mentioned merely in passing, without conceptualisation or deep 
consideration, or synonyms for the term identity are employed. This section will outline the 
limited number of arguments which have been developed concerning collective identification 
in Yemen, mentioning also those studies which seem, clearly, to be deploying cognates for the 
concept. I will follow a similar structure to that which I adopted in relation to Syria, briefly 
overviewing arguments surrounding group identity in the state prior to 2011 before considering 
in greater detail scholarship on Yemeni identities following the Uprising.  
 
2.41 Collective identity in Yemen prior to 2011 
 
For the few scholars who have assessed the nature of collective identification in Yemen in the 
years preceding the Uprising, it is sub-state ties which dominate. Scholars write of the manner 
in which meaning was given to, and lines drawn between, Shafii Sunni and Zaydi Shia 
communities: it is argued that this occurred following the Sadah wars and their attendant 
political rhetoric, but also in response to, for instance, the regime’s valorisation of Sunnism 
and castigation of Zaydism, the marginalisation of self-identified Zaydis in political life, and 
the defensive establishment of Zaydi political parties and schools.250 For other authors, hinting 
at the notion of collective identity, ‘tribal affinity’ and ‘religious sectarianism’ coalesced to 
provoke violence in the northern region of Sadah251 while, more broadly, tribal rapport has 
been argued to form ‘one component of sociopolitical identification for many Yemenis’, 
particularly ‘in areas where the state [was] institutionally weak’.252 Yet more scholars consider 
‘regional’ identities to be of significance. In this understanding, Yemen was fused together 
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post-unification as Saleh formed exploitative and divisive patron-client relations ‘with various 
groups in other regions of the country’,253 provoking the emergence ‘of a multiplicity of 
competing social identities throughout the country’ and ‘destroying what shared identification 
people had developed with the state’.254 The existence of a ‘distinctive South Yemeni identity’ 
has also been posited, infused with ‘the history of the South before 1967, by the South’s period 
as an independent state (1967-90) and by a belief that the Saleh regime after 1990 abused the 
unity agreements to assert northern domination and exploitation of the South’.255  
 
However, in contrast, Lisa Wedeen has written in great detail of Yemeni ‘national solidarities’ 
prior to the current crisis, characterising these as episodic.256 She charts the disputed ‘political 
narratives of nationalism’ proffered by both the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY) and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR)257 prior to unification, and the ‘nationalist work’ 
executed by historians, poets and radio broadcasters within the same period; she highlights the 
content of such discourses to have been ‘an ancient Arabian past’ intertwined with ‘the promise 
of Greater Yemen’.258 Wedeen also explores more contemporary drivers of everyday 
performances of national affiliation, including the efforts made by the state to combine symbols 
of the north and south during the tenth anniversary of unification and the nationally shared 
moral panic following a series of murders in Sanaa.259 Lastly, scholars have also connected the 
‘focus on Yemeni unity’, ‘the sanctity of the Yemeni republic’ and the appeals made to 
nationalism by both Saleh and al-Huthi preceding, and during, the Sadah conflicts with the 
enduring ‘symbolic importance of a shared Yemeni identity’.260  
 
I will now turn to the limited works which have explored the development of Yemeni identities 
post-2011, beginning with those authors who have focused on the re-generation of national ties 
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shared by Yemenis before turning to those who have depicted this collective Yemeni identity 
as having fragmented further amid the crisis.  
 
2.42 Generating national ties between Yemenis through protest 
 
Although these authors do not use the term identity, Laurent Bonnefoy and Marine Poirier 
describe the 2011 protests in a similar manner to Ismail’s analysis of the Syrian Uprising. 
Bonnefoy and Poirier highlight that the concept of the civil state rapidly became a crucial 
reference for Yemeni demonstrators, claiming that the Yemeni Uprising ‘was defined as a 
project for a new society centered on the rule of law, social justice, the guarantee of basic 
freedoms, and the need for citizens to reclaim the state and politics’.261 It is noted, too, that 
members of the Zaydi youth movement, who joined the demonstrators, did not merely espouse 
the ‘Zaydi revival cause, which would have [had] an exclusive character’ but sought to defend 
the rights ‘of all those who [had] suffered political discrimination at the hands of the regime’.262 
Deploying terminology evocative of the concept of identity, their argument is that participation 
in the demonstrations ‘generated powerful feelings of fraternity among camp dwellers and gave 
rise to unprecedent collective and individual practices’ including the ‘promotion of shared 
ground rules based on mutual respect and cooperation’.263 
 
Stacey Philbrick Yadav has offered a similar assessment. She has written of the ‘moments of 
solidarity across sectarian lines’ which emerged during the protests, arguing that ‘the process 
of shared collective action during the 2011 uprising revealed substantial overlap between rival 
Islamist organisations’.264 She conducted a series of interviews with activists, and attended 
workshops and training sessions with these young demonstrators between 2011 and 2013, and 
has argued that ‘activists cited the quotidian work of maintaining protest spaces as constitutive 
of a shared activist identity that was deeply republican in its focus’.265 She also observes that 
that ‘there was a clear rejection of sectarianism’ and that ‘there were moments of explicit 
political coordination between Houthi and Islahi youth that were characteristic of the potential 
of both political movements to advance republican aims’.266 United, according to Yadav, they 
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expressed a desire for a ‘civil state’, ‘premised on republican notions of political accountability, 
popular sovereignty, and rule of law’.267 In addition to hints of national unity, then, we can also 
perceive here a suggestion that a new identity arose during the protests, that fresh, civic and 
republican ties between protesters were generated by the demonstrations, an argument also 
intimated by Bonnefoy and Poirier. Finally, in a further, albeit brief, offer of support for this 
interpretation, for Stephen Day, the ‘best hope’ for Yemeni national unity ‘is to build on [the] 
new solidarities [created] among the population during the 2011 uprisings against President 
Salih’s regime’.268 
 
2.43 Fragmentation: sectarianism, tribalism and regionalism 
 
Despite her assessment that the Uprising generated powerful national ties between 
demonstrators, Yadav also claims that this national solidarity was then undermined by the GCC 
Initiative, the transition which followed, the NDC and the ensuing civil conflict. She notes that 
the composition of the transitional government ‘gave disproportionate power to existing 
political parties’, benefitting Islah and the former ruling party, while the Huthis and Hiraak 
were excluded from the administration; they also faced sanctions and asset freezes by the US 
and the UN.269 Yadav then argues that a further ‘mechanism by which transition planners undid 
the possibilities for shared republican commitments and contributed to the sectarianization of 
the conflict was, paradoxically, the NDC itself’: the inclusion of the Huthis ‘in the most 
toothless of the transitional institutions underscored their exclusion from institutions of 
transitional governance with the power to shape policy’.270 Furthermore, her argument is that 
the ‘military campaigns led by Houthi militias and their Salih-loyalist allies, and by the Saudi-
led coalition fighting on behalf of the transitional government, have engaged in collective 
punishment along sectarian lines’.271 Yadav thus concludes that ‘these everyday realities of the 
war in Yemen have torn the social fabric in ways that may be irrecoverable’ and ‘a Yemen 
polarized along sectarian lines is now a social fact with which postwar planners will have to 
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contend’.272 The focus within Yadav’s chapter is on the means by which Yemenis have begun 
to identify with fellow members of their sect as opposed to the meaning of these identities. 
 
Turning to regional identities following the 2011 crisis, Helen Lackner and Raiman al-Hamdani 
have claimed that, ‘within the south, there are numerous groups separated both by perceived 
identities and by competition over the region’s sparse natural resources’; their ‘allegiance’, in 
the view of Lackner and al-Hamdani, ‘is first to the memory of the “national” entities of Aden 
and the Protectorates and second to new political institutions and movements that emerged in 
the decades since unification’.273 As an example, the authors claim that, within the governorate 
of Mahra, a remote region with a distinct culture and Himyari language, tribal and technocratic 
alliances have been fostered ‘based on notions of a shared apolitical identity’.274 Offering a 
more wide-ranging perspective, in the analysis of Peter Salisbury, national identity now holds 
little sway in Yemen: his argument is that ‘the reality is that most Yemenis do not support 
either the President or the northern rebels; rather, they are part of much smaller groups with 
their own identity, ideology, grievances and political goals, from secessionists in the south to 
Salafists in Taiz and Aden and tribal leaders in the north [second emphasis added]’.275 
Furthermore, he claims that, as the transitional period floundered, and as Yemenis experienced 
a ‘deterioration in security, in the provision of essential services and in economic opportunity’, 
this served to weaken ‘the sense of national identity’, calcifying, instead, ‘local and ideological 
identities’.276 Turning more precisely to the composition of these identities, Salisbury has 
written: 
 
Lowland and southern Yemenis have long seen their identities as distinct from those in 
the historically dominant northwestern highlands. Taizis set themselves apart from 
what they see as a culture of corruption, patronage and violent dominance in the 
northwest, and often couch their descriptions of the highlands in terms of oppositional 
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identities, in which sophisticated, educated, cultured and civic-minded Taizis are 
contrasted with an uneducated and vulgar tribal society.277 
 
Therefore, in the understanding of Salisbury, class, violence, discrimination, tribal affiliations 
and political values have combined, post-2011, to instil distinct characters within Yemen’s 
various regions; this, in turn, has eroded the notion of national belonging to the state of Yemen. 
 
To summarise, notwithstanding the convincing claims that varying forms of a Yemeni national 
identity have taken hold within Yemen, and were reinvigorated in 2011, academics have also 
presented the argument that it is sub-state identities, relating to sect, tribe and geography, which 
dictate collectivity in the state. As with Syria, we can perceive links to the theoretical section 
which preceded this one. We can see that scholars of Yemen contend that these identities have 
been built through rhetoric, symbolism, and commemorative events, but also through feelings 
of exclusion, alienation, competition and exploitation. While the content of these identities are 
not always considered in depth, shared experiences, values, norms and aspirations have been 
argued to define these identities together with re-worked histories and narratives of shared 
suffering. Once more, this content has been developed, and these identities have been 
propagated, from above and below; however, in a way which is dissimilar to Syria, none of the 
studies assessed in this section has considered how Yemen’s peers may have contributed to the 




Identity, as conceptualised within social constructivism, is an intricate and contested idea. 
Nevertheless, I have argued that identities are formed, and re-formed, as members of a group 
consider both who they are and that which they seek. Identities are further shaped by 
interactions with a group’s peers, by the shared perceptions of a group’s peers, and by the social 
structures within which groups operate. These shifting identities which can operate, 
simultaneously or concurrently, at multiple levels are infused with narratives of the past and 
aspirations for the future. 
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I have also demonstrated that, just as understandings of identity are complex and multifarious, 
so too are academic debates concerning collective identity formation in Syria and Yemen. The 
subject has received sustained attention by scholars of Syria: for some, since the rule of Hafez, 
a national, Syrian identity has been encouraged from above and absorbed from below; for 
others, it was the Uprising of 2011 which re-imagined the Syrian national identity, fostering 
ties of belonging to the state imbued with civic values. Nevertheless, yet more writers argue, 
in contrast, that it is pan-Arab bonds or sect-based affiliations which have eclipsed other forms 
of collective identification in Syria. Manipulated and promoted by political and religious 
leaders, from both within and outside Syria; permeated with history and given further meaning 
by violence, trauma, and inequality; and seemingly seized upon and performed at the level of 
the ‘everyday’, these pan- and sub-state identities have waxed and waned, with sectarianised 
identities compellingly argued to have been entrenched following 2011. 
 
Far fewer scholars have considered in depth the meaning of collective identity in Yemen. A 
specifically Yemeni form of belonging has been claimed to have been inspired and fostered, 
by the government, by poets and historians, and by citizens; moreover, similarly to Syria, it has 
been argued that the protesters of 2011 created a new, more civic, vision of the nation and of 
the meaning of the connections between Yemenis. However, sect identities, a tribal identity 
and various local, geographically motivated identities have also been posited to hold power 
within the territory: with the former, the discourse and calculating behaviour of members of 
the political and religious elite is emphasised while discrimination, suffering, and the 
perception of being under threat is also claimed to have driven this sub-state identification 
within Yemen. In relation to the latter, the focus of scholars is on the distinct and divergent 
experiences of Yemenis according to geography, particularly within the south.  
 
Mapping these arguments within this chapter will allow me to compare existing understandings 
of Syrian and Yemeni identities with those identities which appear to have been summoned 
within and shaped through the processes of mediation under investigation in this thesis. I will 
be able to consider whether the socially constructed identities of Syria and Yemen mutated in 
response to the mediation attempts, and to consider which level, or levels, of identity appear to 
have been prompted to rise to the fore. Having charted this scholarship, I will be able to make 
an original contribution to this body of work, together with an original contribution to 
mediation studies. It is mediation studies to which I will turn next. 
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This thesis will explore the relationship between two concepts: mediation and identity. It will 
do so through the prism of the following over-arching research question: how does mediation 
shape the identities of the conflict parties? In Chapter One, I assessed prevailing definitions of 
mediation and reflected, in particular, on the alleged altruism and compassion inherent to the 
practice. There, I described mediation as a process of conflict resolution in which a third party 
intervenes in either an inter-state or civil war, and attempts to assist the conflict parties in 
reaching an acceptable settlement. This form of conflict management is voluntary and demands 
the consent of the conflict parties. I also noted that, while mediation does not entail the use of 
physical force nor should mediators invoke the authority of the law, mediators may, 
nevertheless, pursue a diverse range of strategies in pursuit of a peaceful settlement to violence. 
In Chapter Two, I operationalised identity, drawing upon social constructivist texts to paint a 
complex rendering of the concept. I defined identity as a collectively shared construction of a 
group: a distinctive image of selfhood which reveals both that which the group is, and that 
which the group seeks. I explored the ways in which identities may be sculpted and maintained, 
their content, their mutability, the various levels at which identities may operate, and the 
manner in which norms may serve to both regulate and constitute identities.  
 
This chapter will chart that which we already know about the connection between mediation 
and identity. I have identified a number of studies which consider these two concepts, including 
those in which identity is merely one of many variables explored and those which focus upon 
clear cognates for identity and norms. I have divided these studies into two groups. The first 
group, which I will assess in Section 3.2, considers the impact of identity upon mediation and, 
thus, explores a reversal of the chain I will assess through my own research question. This body 
of scholarship attempts to uncover how the identities, of both the conflict parties and the 
mediators, may serve to shape various aspects of the process of mediation including the 
outcome of a given mediation attempt, the type of mediation strategy pursued, and the 
likelihood of mediation occurring. In addition to being united by their focus on the possible 
influence identity may have on mediation, these works are also united in the methods deployed 
and, relatedly, in the manner in which identity is defined. These studies explore substantial 
63 
 
quantitative datasets and, therefore, are more confidently equipped to tease out causal links. 
However, this approach means that identity tends to be operationalised in such a way that its 
more intricate and fluid characteristics are necessarily sacrificed. As I will explain, it would 
prove incoherent to attempt to build upon these findings in the light of both the conception of 
identity deployed in this study and my decision, more broadly, to be guided by a social 
constructivist approach.  
 
Section 3.3 will then explore a second group of scholarship which, once more, considers 
mediation and identity. This second group differs from the first in that the scholarship contained 
within it echoes my research question, exploring the influence of mediation upon identity, and, 
moreover, it appears to conceive of identity in a way which aligns with social constructivist 
theorising. This second body of literature, however, contains far fewer studies than the first and 
is dominated by scholarship concerning norms; the majority of the works which incorporate 
norms, furthermore, neglect to connect their findings to identity. From these works I will derive 
three hypotheses, and it is through the assessment of these hypotheses that I will structure my 
own analysis of the data I have gathered and analysed. These studies will function as the 
foundation upon which I will build my own arguments. As will become apparent in Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven, I will, variously, reinforce, enrich and challenge the hypotheses isolated 
in Section 3.3. 
 
In Chapter One, I stated that the findings of this thesis will be used to intervene in two academic 
debates. The first debate concerns scholarship surrounding the development of Syrian and 
Yemeni identities post-2011, and this literature was mapped in Chapter Two. The second 
debate concerns impartiality and power in mediation. Therefore, the final section of this 
chapter, Section 3.4, will provide an outline of the arguments which have been developed 
surrounding the roles of impartiality and power within mediation. Furthermore, I will highlight 
that, while ideational forces have been incorporated within these discussions, specific 
considerations of identity have not. In Chapter Eight, I will return to these debates in greater 
depth, demonstrating that my findings contribute to our understanding of impartiality and 
power in the context of mediation. In turn, this supports my contention that the concept of 
identity, understood in social constructivist terms, must be better integrated within the 




3.2 Charting and interrogating the possible influence of identity on mediation 
 
This section will scrutinise the first group of studies identified: those which explore, through 
quantitative methods, the effects of identity upon various aspects of the process of mediation. 
The identities assessed in these studies include both those of the conflict parties and those of 
the mediator. I will organise these studies according to their dependent variable, considering 
the apparent influence of identity upon mediation outcome, mediation strategy, and mediation 
occurrence, before concluding the section with studies which draw descriptive inferences 
surrounding those identities which appear most likely to mediate. In addition to highlighting 
the array of findings reached, together with the disagreements between the authors, I will also 
begin by demonstrating that the manner in which identity is captured within these studies does 
not align with the scholarship explored in Chapter Two, and conclude by contrasting the 
deterministic nature of these studies with my own, constitutive enquiry.  
 
3.21 How is identity conceptualised within these studies?  
 
How does identity tend to be represented within these studies? The manner in which the 
concept is captured varies. For instance, in order to explore the effects of identity in the seminal 
contribution to mediation studies of Jacob Bercovitch et al., published in 1991, mediators are 
ranked ‘along a dimension ranging from government leaders to representatives of international 
organizations’.278 This trend is indicative, and is continued in other works by Bercovitch and 
his collaborators: for example, Bercovitch and Alison Houston refer to the identity of both the 
disputants and the mediator, with the former involving the political and social structures of the 
parties and the latter the ‘rank’ of the actor in question. Political systems are divided into four 
categories (monarchy, democracy, one-party state and military junta), the ‘domestic 
homogeneity’ is measured according to the ‘size and degree of fragmentation of ethnic, cultural 
or religious majorities/minorities’ while the mediators are distributed across the following 
identity groups: private individual, representative or leader of a regional or international 
organization, or small or large state.279 It is notable that different operationalisations of identity 
are deployed for mediators by comparison with the conflict parties, a decision which is not 
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explained. Meanwhile, Karl De Rouen et al. interpret the term identity to mean ‘who’, or 
‘what’, the mediator is: for instance, whether the mediator is the ‘representative of an 
international organization’ or a ‘private individual’.280 
 
We can therefore see that academics contained within this group of scholarship have deemed 
the type or rank of a mediator, and the political and social systems of the disputing parties, to 
signify the identities of the actors embroiled in the mediation events they study. Further 
contributions incorporate similar variables, operationalised in a highly similar manner, into 
their analyses but do not use the term ‘identity’ to encapsulate the variables they investigate. 
Nevertheless, I will also explore the findings of these studies in this section. Moreover, a 
number of scholars purport to investigate the impact of ‘culture’ upon mediation. This variable 
is often operationalised in a markedly similar way to identity and, therefore, those studies 
which do so will also be assessed in this section. Culture, however, is also operationalised in 
slightly different ways. Russell Leng and Patrick Regan reduce the concept to the two facets 
of ‘religion’ and ‘political culture’, with the latter divided into the three categories of 
democratic, communist and non-communist authoritarian.281 Within a study authored by 
Bercovitch and Ole Elgström, however, five dimensions are considered in their attempt to 
assess the impact of culture upon mediation outcomes: geographical proximity, political 
system, political rights, civil liberties, and religion.282 Lastly, for Kanisha Bond and Faten 
Ghosn, political culture is quantified in terms of regime type while a state’s social culture is 
measured across three dimensions: dominant religion, dominant ethnicity and dominant 
language.283 I will consider the ramifications of these operationalisations in the conclusion to 
this section. 
 
3.22 How does identity influence the practice of mediation? 
 
I will now assess the apparent influence of identity, as conceptualised above, upon mediation. 
I will begin with its effect on mediation outcome. Bercovitch et al. argue that the impact of the 
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identity of the mediator upon outcome is ‘not completely clear’ but the claim is nevertheless 
made that it is possible that a government leader ‘has a better chance of mediating 
successfully’.284 Also concerning the type or rank of mediator, Derrick Frazier and William 
Dixon argue that international governmental organisations are more likely to achieve success, 
followed by coalitions of states and then, finally, single-state actors. However, they argue all 
three can be effective.285 Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner, on the other hand, contend 
that, unless non-state actors are involved, mediated agreements tend to be short-lived.286 
 
Concerning the identities of the conflict parties, and their impact upon outcome, Bercovitch 
and Ole Elgström ascertain no relationship between the nature of a country’s political system 
and the outcome of a given mediation attempt287 but Bercovitch et al. propose that disputes 
involving multi-party regimes may be slightly more amenable to mediation than those 
involving other forms.288 Supporting this latter finding, Russell Leng and Patrick Regan claim 
that mediation is more likely to succeed when parties share democratic political cultures.289 
Leng and Regan also conclude that mediation is more likely to succeed when the parties to the 
conflict both exhibit similar ‘social cultures’290 while Bercovitch and Elgström offer support 
for this analysis; in the second article, a very strong relationship is found between cultural 
differences and mediation outcomes, with divergence leading to fewer successful cases of 
conflict mediation.291 
 
Scholars have also explored the causal relationship between identity and mediation strategy, 
and between identity and the likelihood that mediation will take place. Regarding the former, 
Bercovitch and Houston do not find the identity of the mediator to be significant in dictating 
mediation strategy.292 Turning, now, to mediation occurrence, the focus has almost always been 
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upon the identities of the conflict parties. Thus, Burcu Savun claims that disputes involving 
democratic states are less likely to receive mediation;293 this is an argument supported by Sara 
Mitchell et al. in which it is contended that democracies are less likely to be involved in claims 
between two other democracies.294 J. Michael Greig argues that, within enduring conflicts, the 
occurrence of a polity change in one of the rivals within the previous twenty-four months, 
regardless of the nature of the shift, increases the likelihood that the rivals will request 
mediation.295 However, in contrast to the findings of Savun, he argues that third parties appear 
to be drawn to democratic polity changes only.296 Also alluding to the significance of 
democracy, Kyle Beardsley makes the argument that the potential of an adversary being 
negatively received by their domestic audience following a peace settlement increases the 
likelihood that third party involvement will feature in the conflict management process while 
the potential that the disputant will have to make concessions in order to reach a settlement has 
the same effect.297 Lastly, Bond and Ghosn claim mediation offers are more likely to be 
extended when all participants in the peace process are culturally similar.298 
 
Finally, large quantitative datasets have also been explored to infer descriptive conclusions 
surrounding identity and mediation. Therefore, De Rouen et al. conclude that the UN is the 
leading entity engaged in the mediation of civil wars, followed by the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development, the EU, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).299  
Furthermore, Savun claims that major powers are more likely to mediate international 
conflicts.300 An array of, often contradictory, findings have therefore been developed 
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3.23 Key differences between these studies and the approach of this thesis 
 
Chapter Two presented a lengthy discussion of the concept of identity, charting its 
conceptualisation by social constructivist theorists. The collectively narrated experiences and 
aspirations of a people were argued to give meaning to the bonds which join together a group. 
As I noted in sub-section 3.21, a number of the operationalisations deployed within the works 
surveyed in this section certainly hint at these themes. However, the studies are not able to 
consider many crucial elements within the concept of identity. These include its 
intersubjectivity, the possibility that multiple identities may be simultaneously held by a group, 
and the manner in which identities may be debated and contested provoking shifts in shared 
selfhood. Furthermore, the aims of the majority of the interventions discussed in this section 
are deterministic. The authors enquire into patterns and appear to seek ‘rules’ dictating the 
occurrence, process and outcome of mediation, asking whether the identity, of both mediators 
and disputants, dictates mediation success, mediation strategy, and mediation acceptance. 
However, Chapter Two highlighted that social constructivism cannot subscribe to such 
‘mechanical positivist conceptions of causality’.301  
 
Isolating a series of hypotheses from the studies charted in this section, and then assessing their 
validity in relation to the two cases of peacemaking under investigation in this thesis, would 
contradict the conceptualisation of identity proposed in Chapter Two and, moreover, would not 
adhere to the sequencing proposed within my own research question; I will explore the 
influence of mediation upon identity as opposed to the influence of identity upon mediation. It 
would also contravene the broader constructivist approach to causality. It is for this reason that 
I will use a second group of studies to guide my own analysis. These studies, while more limited 
in number, do not employ strict, deterministic language, they tend to explore identity in a social 
constructivist manner and, moreover, they consider the effect of mediation upon identity. It is 
from these works that I will derive three hypotheses which will guide the analysis of the data 
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3.3 Mediation and socially constructed identity: deriving three hypotheses for 
exploration  
 
Roland Kostić has theorised that ‘the creation of a state identity’ forms a crucial element within 
the ‘liberal peace model’.302 As third-party peacebuilders impose ‘state institutions, legislation, 
democratisation and human rights protection’, they may also seek to impose an ‘externally 
constructed national identity onto existing ethnonational communities in order to promote 
legitimacy for the [newly] created state institutions among the population’.303 However, Kostić 
proposes that ‘the identity-building component of external peacebuilding may…exacerbate the 
societal security dilemma which ethnic groups face in terms of threats to the continued 
existence of their identities and cultures’:304 ‘in cases where members of ethno-national 
communities possess a vivid sense of community, often as a result of persecution or violent 
conflict, attempts to impose the western type of nation-state as a universal and normatively 
self-evident standard will reinforce ethnic solidarity and sharpen ethnic differences’.305 The 
potential for ‘societal reparation’ is thus hindered as ethnic groups become further ‘securitised’, 
turning to their leaders to demand the protection of ‘the identity of the group’.306 Kostić has 
written of the manipulation and dishonesty inherent with this practice: external nation-building 
is concealed as liberal peacebuilding and ‘wrapped in a veil of cosmopolitan ethics of assisting 
others’.307 In brief, he contends that the process of peacebuilding may shape the identities of 
conflict parties; indeed, peacebuilders may inflict particular identities, and particularly national 
identities, upon conflict-riven states, while shrouding this practice from view.  
 
Similarly, Stefanie Kappler has argued that ‘representation’, which she defines as a ‘way of 
creating and (re)framing one’s own or another person’s identity’, constitutes ‘a powerful tool’ 
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within peacebuilding’ and operates as a means of reconfiguring societies.308 Peacebuilding 
agencies can deploy representations to suppress the complexity of societies, and render them 
‘compatible with the idea of peace that is imagined and implemented’.309 Nevertheless, such 
impositions can provoke ‘counter-representations’; for instance, Kappler explores the 
invocations made, by a number of Bosnian agencies, of ‘local society as shaped by its peaceful, 
socialist past with a high degree of solidarity among people’. She claims that this ‘can be seen 
as a reaction to the discourses of numerous international peacebuilding actors, who are eager 
to create a new society, dissociated from its history and memory [emphasis in original]’.310 
Thus, as ‘local’ and ‘international’ actors develop both competing and/or cooperative imagery, 
peacebuilding processes can intervene in ‘the development of alternative identities and 
representations of society’.311 Once more, we can perceive the view that peacebuilding may 
intercede in processes of identity construction. In the arguments of Kappler, not only can 
peacebuilders corral societies into certain identities but this process, in turn, can provoke 
further identity contestation as communities resist the narratives espoused by external actors.  
 
Kostić and Kappler focus on peacebuilding as opposed to peacemaking. To what extent have 
explorations of peacemaking, a category of conflict management which encompasses 
mediation, considered and forged similar arguments? In other words, what do we already know 
about the possible influence of mediation upon socially constructed identity? This section will 
assess a series of studies in detail, all of which begin to develop arguments surrounding the 
connection between mediation and identity. From these studies, I will derive three hypotheses 
for exploration in this thesis. Assessing these hypotheses will permit me to forge a broader 
argument concerning the possible influence of mediation upon identity.  
 
3.31 Hypothesis 1: Conflict parties may seek to legitimise their identities through 
participating in mediation 
 
To begin, Karin Aggestam has explored the interplay between mediation and identity and, in 
contrast to the works surveyed in Section 3.2, this author conceptualises identity in a similar 
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manner to social constructivists. For this author, identity is thought of as mutable and as being 
infused with narratives of past trauma. Her focus is upon protracted conflict: accompanied by 
illustrations drawn from the Palestine-Israel dispute and former US Secretary of State John 
Kerry’s efforts to mediate a resolution between 2013 and 2014, Aggestam makes a series of 
nuanced observations. Firstly, this author acknowledges that ‘conflicting parties’ preferences 
and interests are infused with identity politics’ which, in turn, ‘include claims for recognition 
and legitimacy’.312 Recognition, for Aggestam, is intertwined with ‘how the past, present and 
future are perceived by the parties’; particularly in the context of prolonged wars, groups seek 
acceptance, from their adversaries, of their narratives surrounding the conflict, narratives which 
form constituent elements of their identities.313 Without such recognition, there will be ‘a 
dissonance between the self-image’ of groups ‘and the image’ which groups ‘perceive others’ 
have given them.314 Moreover, such a ‘denial of recognition’ can be perceived ‘as an existential 
threat’.315 Indeed, in Aggestam’s view, ‘in protracted conflicts, the parties tend to hold 
diametrically opposed memories of conflict and perceptions of historical injustices’ and this 
can ‘constitute a strong driving force for the prolongation of conflict’.316 
 
Citing Oliver Richmond,317 Aggestam then claims that ‘peace negotiations may’ form the 
backdrop to ‘severe contestations where the parties strive to achieve recognition and 
international legitimacy first, and compromise and conflict resolution second’.318 In such 
instances, material incentives or sanctions may not address the resolution attempt: ‘offering 
material benefits in compensation for deeper cultural values, which are linked to identity 
questions, may be seen as an insult by the parties’.319 Indeed, Aggestam draws on the claims 
of Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod,320 together with Andrew Schaap321 and Patchen Markell,322 
to argue that ‘mediators should’, instead, ‘encourage the parties to directly confront’ their 
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historical grievances.323 Disputants must be encouraged to ‘reflect upon the diversity of 
historical experiences, [and] to re-evaluate national myths’ and, following this, ‘strike a 
historical compromise’ based upon mutually acceptable definitions of ‘fairness and justice’.324  
 
However, Aggestam further cautions that, ‘while the challenge of recognition needs to be 
addressed, mediators should at the same time strive to move beyond victimhood and historical 
grievances’.325 A focus upon these may ‘result in too much focus on the other and in 
antagonistic battles of who is the rightful victim in the conflict’.326 Therefore, ‘mediators 
should give appropriate attention to the struggle of recognition, but also to the ways they can 
assist the parties to acknowledge their untenable ontological conditions and political 
vulnerabilities in the conflict’.327 After all, Aggestam further notes that conflict parties, ‘in their 
quest for recognition’, may accept a seat at the table ‘primarily because it generates recognition 
and international legitimacy’;328 unless mediators are able to support conflict parties in 
listening to, and understanding, the experiences of one another, and facilitate the use of these 
narratives within an agreement, the peace process may be manipulated by the disputants and 
used as a space in which their oppositional identities, and antagonism towards their adversary, 
becomes entrenched. 
 
Aggestam thus draws an intriguing image in which the identities of the conflict parties may 
drive their very participation in mediation: third-party peacemaking may be viewed and 
targeted as an arena in which groups demand the legitimisation of their identity and its attendant 
narratives. She also suggests, therefore, that mediation may serve to mould identity. This is 
apparent through her implication that the identities of the conflict parties may be recognised, 
or undermined, through the process of mediation but, also, through her counsel that identities 
must be confronted and reflected upon within negotiations. The crucial argument within 
Aggestam’s study is that mediation may shape the identities of the conflict parties by 
constituting a space in which disputants may broadcast and develop their identities in search 
of legitimacy. To return to my own area of focus, I will therefore assess, in Chapter Five, the 
following hypothesis: conflict parties may seek to legitimise their identities through 
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participating in mediation. By offering a response, I will build upon the suggestions of 
Aggestam, proposing three further ways in which mediation, identity construction and 
legitimacy can be said to intertwine. These three interventions, in turn, will support my overall 
contention that mediation might indeed shape identity.  
 
3.32 Hypothesis 2: Mediators can use mediation to instigate normative change on the part 
of the conflict parties and this, in turn, can shape the identities of the conflict parties 
 
The previous chapter argued that norms are intertwined with socially constructed identity; to 
reiterate briefly, norms both regulate identities, dictating appropriate behaviour, and constitute 
identities, defining a group’s character and image. While constructed collective identity has 
been relatively neglected within mediation studies, the study of norms occupies a burgeoning 
place within the field. To summarise, it has increasingly been recognised that ‘international 
peace mediators operate within a normative universe’ and that, ‘in interaction with the 
negotiating parties and other stakeholders, [mediators] are constantly involved in the 
application, creation and adaptation of different norms on various levels, whether consciously 
or unconsciously, explicitly or implicitly’.329 Scholars suggest that mediation is, 
‘unequivocally’, a foreign policy tool ‘that can be used to diffuse norms’330 and, moreover, that 
‘mediators’ mandates have progressively extended from their core task of ending violence by 
assisting conflict parties to find a mutually acceptable agreement to upholding specific norms 
associated with durable peace agreements, such as human rights, gender equality, and 
inclusivity’.331 Mediation processes have been characterised as ‘an opportune time to promote 
international norms’332 while it has also been posited that mediators ‘inevitably’ bring with 
them their own normative agenda to conflict resolution, and that this agenda must ‘condition 
the establishment of an eventual normative framework that is expected to regulate the conflict 
and relations between conflict parties’.333 In this sub-section, I will explore the variety of 
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arguments which have been developed concerning the interrelationship between mediation and 
norms together with the one occasion on which this relationship has then been linked to identity 
construction. From these works I will derive a second hypothesis for assessment in Chapter 
Six.  
 
What kind of norms might be pursued in mediation? In 2015, Sara Hellmüller et al. attempted 
to categorise those norms which they perceived to be at work within mediation, distinguishing 
between ‘content-related and process-related norms; between settled and unsettled norms; and 
between definitional and non-definitional norms’. By content-related norms, the authors denote 
that which might ‘be negotiated during a mediation process, and…will eventually figure in the 
final peace agreement’ whereas by process-related norms the authors are referring to ‘how a 
mediation process is planned and conducted’; here, they offer as examples ‘norms around 
inclusivity or the impartiality of the mediator’.334 Settled norms are those which are likely to 
be ‘internalized’ and difficult to contravene whereas unsettled norms ‘can be overridden 
without justification’.335 Lastly, definitional norms pertain to the very nature of mediation; for 
example, ‘the right to life’ can, in the view of Hellmüller et al. be considered to be a ‘content-
related definitional norm in mediation’ as ‘the objective of a mediation process is based on 
norms that value a non-violent resolution of conflicts over military action’.336 The notion is 
that any norm identified as operating within a third-party peace process will fit into each of 
these binaries. However, it also worth noting that Hellmuller et al. have also specifically 
commented that mediators ‘are increasingly faced with normative demands reflecting the 
liberal norms of their mandate-givers [emphasis added]’.337 
 
How might norms be pursued within mediation? An early study, published in 1991 by Brian 
Mandell and Brian Tomlin, explores the manner in which a mediator can instigate normative 
change in order to influence conflict resolution, illustrating the claims made with examples 
drawn from Henry Kissinger’s mediation activities between Egypt and Israel in the period 
1973-76. The authors contend that Kissinger was able to foster three norms to which both Israel 
and Egypt began to adhere, the norm of reciprocity, the norm of functional cooperation, and 
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the norm of mediation negotiation,338 and that this was achieved through the pursuit of four 
strategies. Firstly, they argue that Kissinger ‘generated new learning by altering the preference 
structures of the parties’, achieving this through ‘pressing, compensation and integration 
strategies’;339 ‘pressing’ can be defined as the act of reducing ‘the set of non-agreement 
alternatives available to the parties’, ‘compensation’ entails ‘increasing the number of 
agreement possibilities’ and ‘integration’ involves ‘the identification of a solution within a 
potential zone of agreement’.340 Secondly, Mandell and Tomlin contend that Kissinger 
‘fostered repetitive behaviour by encouraging the parties to invest in a process of incremental 
peace-building whereby satisfaction with the successful implementation of an initial agreement 
generated sufficient momentum and incentive to manage greater risks of accommodation with 
third party assistance’.341 Thirdly, the former US Secretary of State ‘consistently rewarded new 
learning by compensating the parties with substantial financial and military aid and by 
committing the United States to guarantee compliance with all agreements reached by the 
parties’.342 Finally, Kissinger ‘facilitated congruence’ by ‘compelling the parties to make 
public their new intentions to the international community at large’.343  
 
Siniša Vuković has also posited that norms can ‘be diffused’344 through mediation, illustrating 
his claims by exploring the mediation efforts of the EU in Montenegro between 2002 and 2006. 
Vuković explores a further practice through which a norm may be diffused within mediation: 
that which he terms ‘reframing’. Within this process, according to Vuković, a normative 
solution to a given conflict is grounded within an existing normative system: in other words, 
the appropriateness of a resolution is explained to the conflict parties by the mediator, and 
presented as aligning with the normative inclinations of the disputants.345 In a crucial departure 
from Mandell and Tomlin, and in an insight which aligns more closely with Aggestam, 
Vuković argues that ‘mediators do not resort to material resources that create artificial pay-off 
structures, but only resort to discursive techniques aimed at defining the new perimeters within 
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which a solution may sought’.346 Nevertheless, mediators may deploy ‘soft power in the form 
of relations, legitimacy and emulation, in order to strengthen the justification for normative 
claims’.347  
 
Norm diffusion through reframing is thus considered, by Vuković, to constitute ‘a very 
proactive and assertive process performed by peacemaking norm entrepreneurs’.348 However, 
offering a different perspective, Hellmüller has also suggested that norms are ‘inter-
subjectively constructed between international and domestic actors [emphasis added]’; she 
argues that, in the context of the Geneva Peace Process and the Civil Society Support Room 
(CSSR), the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) and Syrian civil society actors negotiated the 
meaning of a particular norm. Her claim is that the OSE’s interpretation prevailed thus 
decreasing ‘the legitimacy of the CSSR in the perspective of civil society actors’.349  
 
Having explored the types of norms which might be promoted within mediation, together with 
how they might be encouraged, I will now consider why norms might be encouraged, together 
with their intended and unintended effects. The overall argument of Mandell and Tomlin is 
that, during a mediation attempt, conflict parties may be compelled to adopt new norms. These 
new norms can come to define the relationship between the conflict parties, thus facilitating 
the reaching of a solution. Vuković, however, focuses both on the relationship between the 
disputants together with the negotiated outcome of the mediation attempt. His argument is that 
norms can be diffused by mediators within a mediation attempt in order to reduce tensions, to 
regulate relations between conflict parties, and to persuade conflict parties to pursue particular 
outcomes.  
 
Turning to unintentional effects, Philipp Kastner has suggested that ‘pushing a normative 
agenda too explicitly can affect’ the ‘legitimacy’ of mediators ‘and as a result, they might be 
sidelined by the negotiating parties’.350 Offering support, Hellmüller et al. held interviews with 
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during peace processes’ to include various normative provisions. However, those interviewed 
by Hellmüller et al. criticised this practice, arguing that such demands both neglect the need to 
work collaboratively with the conflict parties and, moreover, overestimate the ‘power of the 
mediator’.351 Furthermore, these authors found that ‘most’ of the mediators interviewed 
deemed it ‘inappropriate’ to encourage conflict parties to ‘change their behavior’ to emulate 
the normative inclinations of the mediators.352  
 
A final intervention considers not only the role of norms within mediation but, moreover, the 
manner in which this aspect of mediation may have an effect upon the identities of the conflict 
parties. Kostić has characterised the US peacemaking intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH), from early 1994, as ‘a vivid example of the projection of American norms of civic 
nation-building in the Balkans’.353 Briefly, Kostić holds that ‘at an early stage the American 
mediators attempted through discursive practices and framings to construct the recipient 
subject of their policies, the Bosnian nation occupying the territory of Bosnia [emphasis 
added]’.354 This author provides a number of examples of the norms promoted and the manner 
in which they were encouraged; for instance, he highlights that, in February 1994, the American 
administration expressed their support for ‘a formal federation between Bosnian Croats and the 
Bosniak-led Bosnian government in Sarajevo’, and that this federation formed ‘a significant 
aspect of efforts to establish a balance against Serb power on the ground, as well as a way to 
give the Bosnian Muslims and Croats a single voice at the negotiating table’.355 A second 
example given by Kostić is the manner in which much of the new BiH constitution ‘was written 
by American legal experts projecting their own constitutional and political norms’.356 Indeed, 
Kostić cites a US diplomat involved in the process, who argued that the mediation efforts 
sought to entrench a ‘framework of society that followed liberal norms of democracy, free 
market economy and human rights’;357 the US thus pursued, through the promotion of norms 
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within the mediation process, the building of a new ‘Bosnian nation’, and to construct it in such 
a way to mimic the ‘norms of civic inclusiveness and rights’ deemed central to the ‘American 
political identity’.358   
 
Therefore, Kostić not only appreciates that mediation may function as a vehicle through which 
norms are promoted but, moreover, that this this practice, in turn, may serve to shape the 
identities of those ‘receiving’ third-party peacemaking interventions. The work of Kostić, in 
concert with the other studies cited in this sub-section, thus provokes the following hypothesis, 
which I will consider in Chapter Six: mediators can use mediation to instigate normative 
change on the part of the conflict parties and this, in turn, can shape the identities of the conflict 
parties. Within my response, I will assess two norms which appear to have been sought during 
the mediation efforts under investigation, one which can be considered to be ‘content-related’ 
and the other ‘process-related’, arguing that both seem to have interacted with the identities of 
Syria and Yemen. Exploring the promotion of these two norms through the peace processes, 
and examining their apparent effects upon identity, will contribute to my fundamental 
contention that mediation can serve to mould identity. 
 
3.33 Hypothesis 3: The rationales used to justify inclusive peacemaking and the framing 
of those included can transform the identities of the conflict parties 
 
The final study which I will examine here connects inclusive peacemaking with socially 
constructed identity. However, this is not the stated focus of the article: instead, the study seeks 
to reveal the ‘politics behind the various approaches to inclusion’ which, Andreas Hirblinger 
and Dana Landau argue, ‘are characterized by international peacemakers’ varying degrees of 
willingness to acknowledge, deal with and transform relationships of difference’.359 
Nevertheless, the authors regularly invoke the concept of identity and clearly conceive of it in 
a manner which appears to be aligned with constructivist writing: the authors appreciate, for 
instance, that individuals can hold multiple identities, and that the meaning of these identities 
can shift.  
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Before I begin my analysis of the work of Hirblinger and Landau, it is worth briefly noting that 
the concept of inclusion has recently gained a great deal of prominence within peacemaking 
and peacebuilding policy, research and practice.360 The increasing prevalence of inclusion 
represents a marked shift in the practice of mediation: as I explored in Chapter One, 
conventionally, third-party peacemaking is hidden from view, involving a select group of 
political leaders and members of armed groups. While empirical research into inclusion has 
been sharply criticised for its limitations and normative bias,361 it has nevertheless been argued 
that inclusion can increase the sustainability, or durability, of the peace negotiated362 while 
inclusion has also been framed as a moral imperative.363 
 
Within the context of peacemaking and peacebuilding, the term ‘inclusion’ is contested.364 
Nevertheless, having declared inclusion to be a crucial element of effective mediation, the UN, 
in its Guidance for Effective Mediation, defines the concept as follows: ‘inclusion refers to the 
extent and manner in which the views and needs of conflict parties and other stakeholders are 
represented and integrated into the process and outcome of a mediation effort’.365 A broader 
definition, however, proposed by Collette Rausch and Tina Luu, suggests that an inclusive 
peace process will ‘give all groups in a society the opportunity to be heard and to have their 
 
360 Alexander de Waal, ‘Inclusion in Peacemaking: From Moral Claim to Political Fact’ in Pamela Aall and 
Chester Crocker, The Fabric of Peace in Africa (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2017), p. 165; 
Catherine Turner, ‘Mapping a Norm of Inclusion in the Jus Post Bellum’ in Carsten Stahn et al. (eds.), Just 
Peace After Conflict: Jus Post Bellum and the Justice of Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 
130-46 
361 Comparative investigations into the influence of inclusive peacemaking have faced criticism for their failures 
to establish a causal link between inclusion and sustainable peace (Jan Pospisil, Peace in Political 
Unsettlement: Beyond Solving Conflict (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019), pp. 99-100; De Waal, ‘Inclusion 
in Peacemaking: From Moral Claim to Political Fact’, p. 180). Furthermore, the inclusion project has also been 
condemned for its ‘failure to distinguish between process and outcomes’: it has been suggested that ‘it is not yet 
clear whether, and if so how, inclusive peacemaking and peacebuilding set communities on pathways toward 
more inclusive societies’ (Anastassia Obydenkova and Thania Paffenholz, ‘Editorial: The Grand Challenges in 
the Quest for Peace and Democracy’ Frontiers in Political Science 3:691999 (2021), p. 2; see also: Alina Rocha 
Menocal, ‘Political Settlements and the Politics of Transformation: Where Do “Inclusive Institutions” Come 
From?’ Journal of International Development 29:5 (2017), p. 560; Clare Castillejo, ‘Promoting Inclusion in 
Political Settlements: A  Priority for International Actors?’ NOREF [online], available from: 
https://noref.no/Publications/Themes/Gender-and-inclusivity/Promoting-inclusion-in-political-settlements-a-
priority-for-international-actors [last accessed: 22 May 2021], p. 4). 
362 See, for instance: Desirée Nilsson, ‘Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable 
Peace’ International Interactions 38:2 (2012), pp. 243-66; Anthony Wanis-St. John and Darren Kew, ‘Civil 
Society and Peace Negotiations: Confronting Exclusion’ International Negotiation 13 (2008), pp. 11-36 
363 De Waal, ‘Inclusion in Peacemaking: From Moral Claim to Political Fact’, p. 165 
364 Ibid 
365 UN, United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation (New York: United Nations, 2012) [online], available 
from: https://peacemaker.un.org/guidance-effective-mediation [last accessed: 6 February 2021], p. 11 
80 
 
concerns addressed [emphasis added]’.366 Both these definitions lack specificity. How will the 
different ‘groups’ in a society be determined, how will their concerns be addressed, and how 
will they be heard? What does the UN mean by the term ‘stakeholders’, and how will they be 
represented and integrated into a process?  
 
Moreover, by introducing the term representation, the UN further complicates matters. Isa 
Mendes, for instance, has claimed that inclusion within peacemaking can denote both 
participation and representation, two distinct concepts. We can think of participation as 
‘individual engagement’ in the ‘name of oneself’.367 Representation, however, is a far more 
complex and disputed concept. Hanna Pitkin famously defined representation as ‘the making 
present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact 
[emphasis in original]’.368 While Pitkin further identified four different views of 
representation,369 within a peace process we can argue that a representative will render 
‘present’ the ‘voices, opinions, and perspectives’ of a ‘segment’ of society, or ‘collective of 
people’.370 It is clear, particularly within policy-oriented documents, that a ‘segment of society’ 
is often considered to be a synonym for the idea of a sub-state identity group. Thus, in 
discussions of inclusion, identity is often mentioned in passing: the idea that there exist multiple 
identity groups within a conflict-affected society is often invoked while the notion that an 
inclusive peace process might be able to unite these fragmented groups is also introduced.371 
However, identity is rarely defined. Moreover, the (likely fluctuating) content of these 
identities is not examined, and sustained consideration is not given to how inclusion might 
interact with these alleged identities.372 
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An exception is the work of Hirblinger and Landau. Overall, Hirblinger and Landau recognise 
that inclusion pertains ‘not only to political voice and representation, but to the identity of the 
included and their relationships [emphasis added]’.373 Through a content analysis of 
scholarship on inclusion and UN policy documents relating to inclusion, the authors distil three 
different rationales offered within academia and policy documents for inclusive peacemaking, 
each of which is accompanied by attendant ‘framings’ of the included. The latter two rationales 
and framings are deemed by the authors to interact with the concept of identity.  
 
The first rationale detected by Hirblinger and Landau advocates for inclusion on the basis that 
widening participation will render the process more legitimate; this rationale claims that 
inclusion will ensure ‘the process is representative of a broader set of identities and interests’.374 
Furthermore, their argument is that, in the context of this rationale, those included tend to be 
framed in ‘open’ terms. These include phrases such as ‘stakeholders’, ‘communities’, 
‘citizens’, ‘voices’, ‘perspectives’ and ‘civil society’.375 While the authors mention the term 
‘identity’ in their description of this rationale, the authors do not consider further how this 
justification for inclusion may interact with the identities included and, moreover, they deem 
the open framings associated with this rationale to be ‘instrumental’ and to ‘brush over 
difference’.376 
 
Nevertheless, in their discussion of the second rationale identified by these two scholars, they 
handle identity in greater detail. The authors claim that, within the second rationale, inclusion 
is demanded ‘in order to empower and protect particular groups, based on the assumption that 
building peace requires strengthening the position of specific actors that have suffered in 
conflict, or who can be champions of peace’.377 To be precise, in this rationale, inclusion aims 
towards protecting the rights of those included, ‘enhancing their political voice, or addressing 
previous harm’. In relation to this rationale, according to Hirblinger and Landau, those included 
are framed ‘in closed terms, as specific groups with a common identity trait, such as gender, 
language or ethnicity’.378 As examples of closed terms, these authors mention ‘women’ and 
‘youth’, references which are ‘identifiable according to relatively clear criteria’.379 These 
 
373 Hirblinger and Landau, ‘Daring to Differ? Strategies of Inclusion in Peacemaking’, p. 306 
374 Ibid, p. 307 
375 Ibid, pp. 310, 311 
376 Ibid, pp. 307, 311 
377 Ibid, p. 308 
378 Ibid, p. 308 
379 Ibid, p. 310 
82 
 
identity groups are thus ‘accentuate[d] and fixe[d]’;380 in other words, such identities are 
entrenched through inclusive peacemaking and the manner in which the included are framed.381 
Indeed, Hirblinger and Landau contend that ‘closed framings can lead to a competition for 
inclusion between fragmented interest groups’,382 thus exacerbating conflict between identity 
groups as opposed to transforming these relationships.383 
 
The third rationale discovered by the authors argues for inclusion as a means through which 
relationships between groups can be transformed and rebuilt. Within this rationale, inclusion 
is called for as a means ‘to transform and rebuild relations between groups’.384 Citing John 
Paul Lederach, Hirblinger and Landau argue that this justification ‘requires peacemakers to 
make sense of the web of relationships in which conflict occurs, before aiming at social change 
through rebuilding the social spaces that give people a sense of identity’.385 The authors also 
refer to Rama Mani in their exploration of this rationale: in this third view, inclusion aims to 
create a community ‘in which the past division of winners versus losers, victims versus 
perpetrators, “us” and “them” are overcome’ but ‘without erasing or evading differences 
between people’.386 This would seem to suggest that, even if identity groups are not erased, a 
new, over-arching and unified identity would be generated through a peace process, and that 
any elements of identities which encourage animosity operating above or below this level 
would dissipate. Identities would be formed and reshaped through the practice of inclusive 
peacemaking and, specifically, through framing such inclusion as a means of transforming 
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University Press, 2005) 
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relationships between the groups ensnared in conflict.387 Within this rationale, those included 
are described in ‘relational’ terms, for instance through references to ‘powerful’ or 
‘marginalized’ actors.388 These references, the authors claim, ‘derive their meaning from being 
situated in a specific sociopolitical context’.389  
 
To summarise, Hirblinger and Landau offer an original exploration of the possible link between 
inclusive peacemaking – which, incidentally, can also be thought of as a mediation process-
related norm although the authors do not characterise it in this way – and the construction, and 
de-construction, of the identities of the conflict parties. Their suggestion is that the 
justifications for inclusion and the language used to call for inclusion have effects on the 
identities within the states at war, either entrenching sub-state identities or encouraging the 
development of a new, over-arching identity. The decisions of the mediators and the shape of 
the mediation process can therefore be argued to shape the identities of the conflict parties. The 
arguments of Hirblinger and Landau therefore triggers the following hypothesis, which I will 
assess in Chapter Seven: the rationales used to justify inclusive peacemaking and the framing 
of those included can transform the identities of the conflict parties. I will explore the extent to 
which inclusion was sought and achieved, according to the voices represented within my 
dataset, combing the language used for evidence of the rationales and framings elucidated by 
Hirblinger and Landau. My findings will challenge the contentions of Hirblinger and Landau 
by suggesting that the first rationale, and open framings, can indeed by connected to identity 
construction. I will further propose that my own findings do not map neatly onto these authors’ 





To summarise, this second section has considered the limited number of works which have 
started to explore the possible connections between mediation and socially constructed identity. 
From these studies, I have distilled three hypotheses for exploration within this thesis. Through 
the lens of these hypotheses, I will be able to develop a response to the overall research question 
 
387 This is supported, very briefly, by Rausch and Luu who contend that an ‘effective peace process’, which the 
authors imply must be inclusive, can ‘knit together’ the ‘frayed fabric’ of society (Rausch and Luu, ‘Inclusive 
Peace Processes Are Key to Ending Violent Conflict’, p. 2). 




guiding this thesis: how does mediation shape the identities of the conflict parties? As I have 
intimated within this chapter, and as will become clear over the course of Chapters Five, Six 
and Seven, I will question and develop these hypotheses, forming my own original arguments 
surrounding the possible influence of mediation upon identity. 
 
3.4 Contributing to mediation theory: impartial mediators and powerful 
mediation 
 
The previous two sections have explored the mediation scholarship which reveals the contours 
of the relationship between mediation and identity. I began by assessing works which discuss 
the potential impact of identity, of both the mediators and the conflict parties, upon various 
aspects of the mediation process. However, I noted that the operationalisations of identity 
deployed do not align with the conceptualisation developed in Chapter Two and, moreover, 
that the findings explore a different direction of the relationship which will be enquired into 
here. I then assessed literature which has considered the possible effect of mediation upon 
identity, literature which  either conceives of identity in a social constructivist manner and/or 
which considers the role of norms within mediation. From these studies, I extrapolated three 
hypotheses for assessment in this thesis.  
 
This chapter has made clear the relative neglect of socially constructed identity within 
mediation studies. Indeed, it is worth briefly stating that the failure to integrate the spheres of 
international relations theory with scholarship on mediation has been routinely bemoaned.390 
Relatedly, it has often been highlighted that mediation scholars tend to rely upon the 
assumptions of realism without justifying, nor making explicit, this decision:391 as Allard 
Duursma argues, ‘much of the literature on international mediation draws on a materialist 
 
390 See: Marieke Kleiboer and Paul t’Hart, ‘Time To Talk?: Multiple Perspectives on Timing of International 
Mediation’, Cooperation and Conflict 30:4 (1995), p. 312; Deiniol Lloyd Jones, ‘Mediation, Conflict Resolution 
and Critical Theory’, Review of International Studies 26:4 (2000), p. 647; Johan Hellman, ‘The Occurrence of 
Mediation: A Critical Evaluation of the Current Debate’, International Studies Review 14:4 (2012), p. 597; 
Crocker et al., International Negotiation and Mediation in Violent Conflicts, p. 58; Sarah Clowry, ‘International 
Negotiation and Mediation in Violent Conflicts: The Changing Context of Peacemaking’, Peacebuilding 8:3 
(2019), p. 379 
391 Kleiboer and t’Hart, ‘Time To Talk?: Multiple Perspectives on Timing of International Mediation’, pp. 314-
5; Stuart Kaufman, ‘Escaping The Symbolic Politics Trap: Reconciliation Initiatives and Conflict Resolution in 
Ethnic Wars’, Journal of Peace Research 43:2 (2006), p. 201; Hellman, ‘The Occurrence of Mediation: A 
Critical Evaluation of the Current Debate’, p. 597 
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perspective’, ignoring ‘social structures when explaining mediation outcomes’.392 Therefore, a 
response to my overarching research question will prove valuable, offering a sustained and 
original contribution to our understanding of the role mediation may play in shaping identity.  
 
However, I will suggest that my findings also, more broadly, demand the incorporation of 
socially constructed identities within the analytical frameworks of mediation scholars. By 
better incorporating the concept of socially constructed identity, it may prove possible to revive 
and add greater depth to debates which constitute hallmarks of mediation literature. In order to 
demonstrate why, and how, socially constructed identities should be incorporated within the 
analytical frameworks of mediation specialists, the findings of this thesis will be used to refine 
and intervene in two intertwined debates within mediation scholarship: debates surrounding 
the roles of bias and power within mediation. This section will provide an overview of these 
two debates, concluding by highlighting the lack of consideration awarded thus far to socially 
constructed identities. 
 
3.51 Mediator impartiality 
 
Early scholars of mediation assumed impartiality to occupy a central role within this form of 
conflict management; as Peter J. Carnevale and Sharon Arad note, Oran Young’s assertion that 
‘the existence of a meaningful role for a third party will depend on the party’s being perceived 
as an impartial participant [emphasis added]’ is oft-quoted.393 Indeed, the UN still declares 
impartiality to be ‘a cornerstone of mediation’.394 An impartial mediator can be defined as a 
third party devoid of ‘ties to any of the parties’ and without a ‘stake in the negotiated 
outcome’.395 Such traits are believed to ‘increase the parties’ readiness to accept the mediator’, 
to ‘enhance the possibilities of getting information from the disputants’ and, finally, to increase 
‘the perceived fairness of the proposed solutions’.396 According to this line of argument, ‘with 
 
392 Allard Duursma, ‘African Solutions to African Challenges: The Role of Legitimacy in Mediating Civil Wars 
in Africa’, International Organization 74:2, pp. 295, 297; see also: Hellmüller et al., ‘Are Mediators Norm 
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393 Peter J. Carnevale and Sharon Arad, ‘Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation’ in Jacob Bercovitch 
(ed.), Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 
p. 40; Oran Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1967), p. 81 
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a biased mediator, the disfavored party will be less likely to heed the mediator’s suggestions 
for settlement, less likely to divulge information about underlying interests, and less likely to 
accept the mediator in the first place’.397 It has been suggested that an impartial mediator will 
rely ‘purely on persuasion’, facilitating ‘communication between the disputants’ and 
formulating ‘potential solutions based on the newly provided information’;398 this knitting 
together of bias and strategy will explored in greater detail later in this section. As recently as 
2018, Elgström et al. concluded that ‘a biased mediator may find that distrust from its partiality 
prevents it from engaging as a formulator and manipulator’.399 
 
Nevertheless, these authors did concede that a ‘special relation to one party may, at least in 
some instances, be an asset in bringing parties to the table’.400 Indeed, a belief in the importance 
of impartiality has gradually begun to be challenged and the debate surrounding bias and 
mediation continues to simmer. A partial mediator can be thought of in opposite terms to an 
impartial mediator: a partial mediator will be invested in a particular outcome and may, also, 
be ‘closer to one side than the other’ in political, economic and/or cultural terms.401 For a 
number of scholars, it is inevitable that mediators will be biased; as Saadia Touval and William 
Zartman have argued: 
 
…mediators are players in the plot of relations surrounding a conflict, and so they have 
an interest in its outcome; otherwise, they would not mediate. In view of the 
considerable investment of political, moral, and material resources that mediation 
requires and the risks to which mediators expose themselves, motives for mediation 
must be found as much in domestic and international self-interest as in humanitarian 




397 Carnevale and Arad, ‘Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation’, p. 41 
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Crocker et al., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Washington DC: United 
States Institute of Peace, 2001), p. 428 
87 
 
Bercovitch and Richard Jackson offer support, claiming that ‘mediators bring with them 
consciously or otherwise, ideas, knowledge, resources and interests, of their own or of the 
group they represent’, and that ‘mediators often have their own assumptions and agendas about 
the conflict in question’.403 Greig, too, has claimed that mediators ‘play their role in 
negotiations and expend resources not only because they aim to resolve a dispute, but because 
they also seek to gain something from it’.404 
 
As early as 1975, Saadia Touval proposed that such bias may prove to be an advantage: partial 
mediators, he contended, may be better equipped to encourage their favoured party to move 
towards a solution. Furthermore, in the view of this academic, the favoured party may wish to 
preserve its relationship with the mediator while the disfavoured party may seek to earn the 
mediator’s good will: both disputants will, therefore, be more inclined to bend to the will of 
the external peacemaker.405 In more recent years, building upon the work of Touval, scholars 
have proposed a number of reasons for which a partial mediator may prove to be an asset. 
Echoing Touval, both Andrew Kydd and Savun have claimed that only biased mediators can 
credibly counsel their favoured conflict party and encourage the granting of concessions and 
restraint.406 Similarly, Vuković has pointed out that ‘a biased mediator might be acceptable to 
a disfavored party because that specific third party may be the only one capable of mustering 
the necessary resources to produce incentives that could make a difference to the process’.407  
 
Isak Svensson has agreed with much of this reasoning but has also added to it, further arguing 
that, whereas impartial mediators may ‘hasten’ to reach an agreement ‘at the expense of its 
quality’, on the other hand, ‘biased mediators, seeking to protect their protégés, will take care 
to ensure that there are stipulations in an agreement guaranteeing the interests of their side’.408 
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Svensson claims that the reason for the increased effectiveness of biased mediators is due to 
four causal mechanisms: ‘biased mediators share a basic interest in protecting their side’; 
biased mediators can ‘generate private information, and credibly share such information, so 
that the parties can identify each other’s true red lines and find a joint reference point for an 
agreement’; biased mediators are more capable in convincing ‘their side to make concessions 
on the basic issues at stake’; and, fourthly, biased mediators appear ‘more credible in the eyes 
of the vulnerable side and in protecting them against future exploitation through conciliatory 
offers’. Therefore, a biased mediator can ‘counter-balance the risk for cheating on 
concessions’.409 Moreover, the very acceptance of a biased mediator can be interpreted as ‘a 
costly signal of conciliatory intent, enhancing the possibility that the parties can develop a 
sufficient amount of trust’.410 Lastly, in developing arguments in favour of partiality, impartial 
mediators have also been criticised; to summarise, it has been suggested that ‘neutral mediation 
and negotiations are often more protracted, achieving peace takes longer, and in the meantime 
suffering and destruction continue’;411 this argument does, however, contradict Svensson’s 
claim that biased mediators will persist until a higher quality agreement is reached. 
 
3.52 Mediation ‘with muscle’ 
 
The disputes surrounding impartiality are interlinked with a second area of focus within 
mediation scholarship: the discussions surrounding ‘pure’ as opposed to ‘power’ mediation. 
Phrased succinctly, whereas pure mediation  involves ‘reasoning, persuasion, control of 
information and suggestion of alternatives’, ‘power’ mediation, or ‘mediation with muscle’, 
entails ‘the use of leverage or coercion by the third party in the form of promised rewards or 
threatened punishments’ in order to ‘move’ the parties ‘toward a settlement’.412 Although it 
may be assumed that ‘pure’ mediators are necessarily impartial, and that it is only ‘power’ 
mediators who exhibit partiality, this has been challenged: echoing the aforementioned 
statements of Touval, Zartman, Bercovitch, Jackson and Greig, Vuković has suggested that 
even supposedly ‘pure’ mediators possess bias.413 Indeed, as we will see, scholars have 
highlighted the role played by both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of power and, moreover, have 
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emphasised the power held by mediators in their capacity to persuade, to control information 
and to formulate proposals. The term ‘pure’ could, therefore, be considered to be misleading.  
 
Offering further detail on the idea of mediation with muscle, Vuković has summarised power 
mediation as follows: such a process entails the mediator affecting ‘the substance of the 
bargaining process by presenting incentives or delivering ultimatums to the disputing sides’.414 
He further notes that ‘mediators may manipulate parties’ perceptions by resorting to threats to 
use coercive action (such as sanctions or military deployment) against them in order to increase 
the costs of non-compliance and continuation of conflict’.415 Incentives may also be deployed 
‘in order to increase the attractiveness of a negotiated solution’; these incentives ‘may be of a 
material nature and include provisions of financial aid and humanitarian aid, development 
assistance, security guarantees and implementation monitoring’.416 On the other hand, such 
incentives may be less tangible, ‘such as improvement of international reputation, legitimizing 
their cause, and/or enhancement of relations with particular external actors’.417 In the context 
of ‘power’ mediation, it has been argued that a mediator’s ‘leverage’ becomes crucial; Touval 
and Zartman describe leverage as ‘the ability to move a party in an intended direction’ and, 
moreover, characterise it as ‘the ticket to mediation’.418 Such power mediation, Fisher has 
argued, can be more accurately considered to be ‘triadic bargaining in the sense that the third 
party pursues specific interests for its own sake [emphasis added]’ and ‘often leads to 
agreements that have future implications for the third party as a provider of continuing benefits 
and/or the guarantor of agreements’.419 We can see hints, here, at the idea of bias once more. 
 
While scholars have not only focused on ‘hard’ power and have appreciated the potential role 
of ‘soft’ power, the idea that identity construction may constitute a form of power within 
mediation and may, therefore, impact upon the perceived partiality of the mediator, has yet to 
be considered. For instance, in 2002, Carnevale proposed a typology of the different forms of 
strength which can be deployed to influence the course of mediation, a number of which can 
be considered to be ‘social’ as opposed to ‘material’. Categorised under the broad umbrella of 
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‘strategic strength’, Carnevale suggested that mediators can arrive with: legitimate power, or 
the requisite influence to prescribe behaviour; sufficient information to render ‘compliance 
with the mediator’s request seem rational’ and, concurrently, ‘an understanding of the values 
and priorities of the parties’; expertise; ‘status and prestige’; the capacity to coerce the parties, 
perhaps through the threat of the use of force; the ability to provide rewards or benefits; and, 
lastly, ‘relational power’, which Carnevale explains as a ‘structural role’, or the manner in 
which a mediator can ‘take advantage of possible coalitions, or the threat of a coalition, with 
one side’.420 For Carnevale, this final source of power is intertwined with the notion of bias.421  
 
The second broader category posited by Carnevale is that of ‘tactical strength’: the 
machinations of the mediator, and their techniques and procedures. Within this category, 
Carnevale claims that there are four types of power: the control mediators can exert upon 
communication and the information available to the parties; the ability of mediators to 
restructure the disputants’ images of one another ‘by clarifying and interpreting events’ and by 
providing cover for any concessions made; the manner in which mediators can create 
momentum; and, once more, the manipulation of the triad of relationships implicated within 
mediation.422 As Carnevale claims, hinting at impartiality once more, ‘in some cases, the 
mediator needs to steer a precise course between the disputants lest they alienate one side and 
lose their credibility’ however ‘the prospect of siding with one party is [also] an element of the 
mediator’s strength’.423   
 
Timothy Sisk has also forged an argument in favour of ‘forceful’ mediation, contending that 
mediators ‘must act with determination, coercion, and incentives’ to ‘induce the parties to settle 
the conflict through negotiation’.424 Sisk, too, recognises the diverse forms of power, 
encompassing both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ force, which mediators may bring: ‘powerful peacemaking 
comes not just from mediators with resources, such as military backing or money (although 
these help), but from the global credibility and integrity that international mediators bring to 
civil war negotiations’.425 Indeed, Sisk also develops a taxonomy of power which encompasses 
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both the material and the ideational: as examples from his categories, mediators can make use 
of ‘side-payments (material or symbolic) directly to the parties in conflict to induce them to 
modify their demands’; mediators can recognise or validate a group’s cause or right to represent 
the people they purport to represent; mediators can publicly shame the parties; and mediators 
can deploy military force.426 To summarise, it has become difficult to draw a distinct line 
between pure and power mediation, and to align such strategies with impartial and partial 
mediators.  
 
3.53 The absence of identity within debates surrounding mediator impartiality and 
powerful mediation 
 
This section has explored two intertwined debates within mediation scholarship concerning the 
roles of impartiality and power within third-party peacemaking. That which has not been 
considered within the work charted here is whether, and if so how, processes of identity 
construction might be considered to be a form of social power within mediation and might, in 
turn, alter the parties’ perceptions of the impartiality of the mediator. We have seen how 
scholars have considered the roles of other forms of social power: academics have argued that 
perceived ‘political’ or ‘cultural’ closeness might impact upon the assumed impartiality of a 
mediator. The writers surveyed in the previous sub-section have also proposed that mediators’ 
partiality is shaped by the ‘ideas’ they bring, and that soft power should also be thought of as 
mediation ‘with muscle’. Such soft power, in the views of these authors, includes the ability to 
bestow legitimacy upon the conflict parties, to increase the reputation of the disputants, to 
improve their relationships, to make symbolic offerings, and the possession, on the part of the 
mediators, of expertise, status, and persuasiveness. These notions are linked to identity but 
there is a clear opportunity to develop this further and to more directly incorporate the concept 
of socially constructed identities, and the means by which they are imbued with meaning, into 
these debates. 
 
In Section 3.3, I assessed the limited existing scholarship which grapples with the links between 
mediation and identity. These studies do not consider in depth the ways in which their findings 
may contribute to these two mediation debates surrounding impartiality and power. These 
works do, however, contain hints at these themes. We have seen the argument made that 
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pursuing a particular normative agenda may dent the ‘legitimacy’ of the mediators, leading to 
their being sidelined; this appears to be a suggestion that the partiality of the mediators is 
affected by their pursuit of a normative agenda. Furthermore, it has been argued that many 
mediators consider it ‘inappropriate’ to persuade conflict parties to normatively emulate the 
mediator; again this could be a hint at the notion of impartiality. Power was considered in 
slightly greater detail within the scholarship assessed. Terms such as ‘pressing’ and 
‘compelling’ have been deployed to describe the manner in which norms may be promoted, 
while we have seen ‘reframing’ described as ‘proactive’ and ‘assertive’. Moreover, the type of 
power has also been considered. Reframing, for instance, has been described as a form of soft 
power. Furthermore, a debate was contained within the studies surveyed in Section 3.3 
regarding incentives, and whether ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ incentives to promote behavioural changes 
were most appropriate and effective. Nevertheless, a sustained consideration of the links 
between processes of identity construction within, and in response to, mediation and the roles 
played by impartiality and power within mediation has not been attempted. Therefore, in 
Chapter Eight I will reflect on how the answer to my research question can augment and refine 




Chapter Two considered in depth the concept of identity as it is understood by social 
constructivists. This chapter has explored the extent to which this version of identity, thought 
of as an ever-mutating, co-constructed vision of a group, created by its members and by its 
peers, has been incorporated within the analyses of mediation scholars. I began by examining 
an initial group of studies which have purported to explore the impact of identity upon various 
aspects of the mediation process. However, I highlighted that the operationalisations of identity 
employed differ from the conceptualisation I have developed in Chapter Two; that the findings 
of these studies adhere to more mechanical approaches to causality than those favoured by 
social constructivists; and that my own research question will explore the possible shaping 
effects of mediation upon identity as opposed to the effects of identity upon mediation. 
 
I then assessed a second group of studies, more limited in number. These studies represent an 
initial attempt to uncover the ways in which mediation may serve to intervene in processes of 
identity construction; however, the majority focus upon the promotion of norms through and 
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within mediation, and neglect to connect their findings to the concept of identity. I closely 
explored these works and, from these, I have extrapolated three hypotheses for exploration 
within this thesis.  
 
To conclude this chapter, I returned to the mediation scholarship, exploring two prominent, 
enduring and intertwined debates. The first concerns impartiality; I showed that scholars persist 
in questioning the merits and shortcomings of the perceived neutrality of mediators. The second 
concerns the role of power, both soft and hard, within third-party peacemaking. My argument 
was that, despite an appreciation by academics of mediation of the role played by social forces, 
the manner in which processes of identity construction may form a source of power, and may, 
therefore, affect the apparent neutrality of a third party, has yet to be theorised. By exploring 
and offering a response to my over-arching research question, and the three hypotheses 
developed in this chapter, I will therefore be able to make a contribution to these two mediation 
debates. In turn, this will demonstrate the crucial need to better integrate the concept of socially 
constructed identity within the analytical frameworks of mediation scholars. In the next 






















The following chapter will discuss the steps taken to offer an answer to my over-arching 
research question, and to evaluate the three hypotheses formulated in Chapter Three. The 
Syrian and Yemeni civil wars, and the mediation attempts of the UN and other members of the 
international community, persist to this day, challenging and complicating research into their 
contours. Moreover, as Alexander De Waal has highlighted, ‘peace processes are very poorly 
documented’; recorded evidence, where it exists, is frequently ‘locked away’, hidden from both 
the public and researchers.427 Due to the originality and exploratory nature of my research 
question, I have generated my own primary data to evaluate the hypotheses developed, and 
then interpreted this data through the prism of the concept of socially constructed identity.  
 
The methods undertaken to develop an answer to my research question can be summarised as 
follows, with the first three having taken place simultaneously: 
 
1. I conducted 74 semi-structured interviews with 73 interlocutors. These individuals were 
either participants in, or close observers of, the two cases of mediation on which I am 
focusing; 
2. I transcribed 50 press conferences delivered at the UN during, and relating to, the two 
cases of mediation; 
3. I gathered together 110 official documents concerning the two cases of mediation; 
4. I completed a semi-inductive, iterative thematic analysis of the data gathered. 
 
The following sections will reflect on these methods in greater depth, justifying their use and 
explaining how their limitations were mitigated against. Throughout this chapter, the methods 
selected to produce and interpret the data gathered will be linked to social constructivism; it 
will be made apparent that my view of knowledge, and how it may be created, aligns with the 
interpretivist perspective on social science research. The assumption is made that there are 
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‘multiple realities’ and that these are ‘contingent, [and] contextual’;428 that ‘knower and 
respondent cocreate understandings’; that social research in itself can ‘transform the world’, 
expressing it within ‘a series of representations’;429 that, in this thesis, I engage in ‘knowledge 
building [emphasis in original]’ as opposed to discovery; and that I myself, as a researcher, am 
‘located and shifting’ within the project.430 I will return to this final point to conclude the 
chapter, reflecting in depth on my ‘positionality’ and the possible impact of my personal 
identity upon this thesis. 
 
4.2 Semi-structured interviews 
  
This section will explore semi-structured interviewing; I will begin by describing the 
interlocutors consulted and the precise approach I took towards our conversations. I will then 
consider in greater depth the opportunities and challenges presented by semi-structured 
interviews before outlining my sampling strategy and the specific characteristics of so-called 
‘elite’ interviews and remote interviewing. 
 
4.21 Describing the interviews conducted 
 
The reflections of those who participated in the mediation attempts under investigation form 
the major source of data upon which I will draw. Between March 2019 and March 2020, I 
conducted 74 semi-structured interviews with 73 interlocutors. Three of these participants 
discussed both the Syrian and Yemeni cases within our interview; I conducted a second, 
‘follow-up’ interview with two of these participants; and one interview involved two 
participants simultaneously. These individuals include those Syrian and Yemeni politicians and 
members of civil society who were involved in the peace efforts and the international mediators 
in both case studies. Within this latter group, I am including individuals employed by the UN, 
diplomats, representatives of foreign states, and staff members of both international and local 
NGOs. A limited number of those interviewed were also ‘observers’ of the mediation attempts, 
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Saldaña, The Fundamentals of Qualitative Research: Understanding Qualitative Research (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), p. 23 
429 Denzin and Lincoln, ‘Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research’, pp. 3, 24 
430 Leavy, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1,  4 
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including journalists, analysts, academics, Syrian activists, Yemeni politicians and activists, 
and former Western diplomats.  
 
While many interviewees consented to their interview data not only being quoted but also 
linked to their names, with others consenting to their professional titles being connected with 
their words, the decision has been taken to provide each interviewee with one of twelve 
abbreviations. Each interviewee has also been given a unique number. Therefore, in the 
empirical chapters which follow, with the exception of those participants who permitted their 
words to be quoted but requested to remain entirely anonymous (and who are cited as 
Anonymous (1), Anonymous (2), and so on), quotations and thoughts will be attributed to one 
of the following abbreviations depending on their broadly defined role within the peace talks: 
 
Table a) Interviewee abbreviations 
 
Interviewee Type Abbreviation 
Member of the Syrian Opposition and Delegate at Geneva II SO, DaGII 
Member of the Syrian Opposition SO 
Mediator in the Syrian Case Study involved in the Track I Process M, S, TI 
Mediator in the Syrian Case Study involved in a Track II initiative M, S, TII 
International Observer of the Syrian Case Study O, I (S) 
Syrian Observer of the Syrian Case Study O, S 
Delegate at the NDC NDC, D 
Member of the NDC Secretariat NDC, Se 
Mediator in the Yemeni Case Study involved in the Track I Process M, Y, TI 
Mediator in the Yemeni Case Study involved in the Track II Process M, Y, TII 
International Observer of the Yemeni Case Study O, I (Y) 
Yemeni Observer of the Yemeni Case Study O, Y 
 
The decision to use abbreviations was taken in order to protect the interlocutors. However, the 
References list includes the precise names and roles, where consent was given, of the 
interviewees; in other instances, their roles alone are listed, or the phrase ‘Anonymous 
Interviewee’, according to the participants’ wishes. In this list, providing it would not reveal 




Of the 74 conversations held, 40 (54%) were conducted remotely through the following 
platforms: Skype, Zoom, WhatsApp (voice call), Telegram (voice call), by telephone, 
WhatsApp (messages) and by email. Only a limited number (eight, 11%) were conducted 
through the latter two means. The remaining 34 interviews (46%) took place face-to-face. I 
made short trips, to Geneva (May 2019), London (May 2019), Oxford (May 2019), Washington 
DC (September 2019), Istanbul (November 2019) and Amman (February 2020), to meet with 
interviewees in person, largely in professional or public settings. The majority of the 
discussions were conducted in English (67, 91%). Four (5%) face-to-face interviews were 
conducted in Arabic with the support of an interpreter, three of whom were employed, briefed 
beforehand and asked to sign a confidentiality agreement. In the final case, one interview 
participant provided a translation of my words for his colleague before translating his 
colleague’s answers for my benefit; these two interlocutors elected to attend the interview 
together without prior warning and without having mentioned the need for an interpreter. This 
meant I was unable to formally employ a translator in this case. One interview participant, with 
whom I communicated over email, sought the help of a family member in translating his 
responses to my questions; once more, this was a decision taken by the interlocutor without 
prior discussion. Lastly, I conducted email exchanges in a combination of English and Arabic 
with two (3%) interview participants; these participants responded to my queries in Arabic and 
I translated their written answers. Excluding the eight interviews conducted in writing, almost 
all transcripts were shared with the participants for approval431 and many interlocutors edited 











431 The interview transcripts resulting from interviews conducted with an interpreter present were not shared 
with the participants due to the language barrier while, on occasion, I was unable to access an email address for 
the participant and it was therefore not possible to share the transcript for approval.  
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Table b) Interview participants summary 
 
 Number Percentage 
Interview Type 
Face-to-face 34 46% 
Remote 40 54% 
Language 
English 67 91% 
Arabic (with interpreter) 5 7% 
Arabic (without interpreter) 2 3% 
 
Table c): Syria case study interview participants 
 
 Number Percentage 
Participant Type 
Member of Syrian opposition organisation and/or Syrian 
activist 
14 45% 
International ‘mediator’ 6 19% 
Employee of Track II organisation 4 13% 
Observer (Syrian) 1 3% 
Observer (non-Syrian) 1 3% 
Anonymous 5 16% 
 
Table d): Yemen case study interview participants 
 
 Number Percentage 
Participant Type 
Participant in the NDC 19 42% 
International ‘mediator’ 8 18% 
Employee of Track II organisation 3 6% 
Observer (Yemeni) 6 13% 
Observer (non-Yemeni) 1 2% 
Anonymous 8 18% 
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4.22 Reflecting on the method of semi-structured interviewing 
 
An interview can be defined as a conversation, usually one-to-one, between an individual and 
a researcher during which the latter party seeks to gain information or perspectives on a given 
topic or set of topics.432 Within a semi-structured interview, the researcher approaches the 
interview with a guide which lists broad areas to probe with interviewees; however, the 
researcher is not obliged to rigidly adhere to these.433 At the end of each interview, I asked 
whether the participants believed that ‘identities’ were important within the peace processes 
under study. With hindsight, this final question was the least effective; the question felt jarring, 
the participants were frequently uncomfortable with the concept of identity and, rather than 
considering how mediation might interact with identity, the participants would often reel off a 
list of identities they believed to be relevant to Syria and Yemen. Much of the material which 
will be considered in the chapters which follow derive from the earlier sections of the 
interviews as opposed to the responses given to the final question in the interview concerning 
identity. The interviews tended to last for approximately an hour, allowing for detailed 
reflection; however, occasionally, they lasted far longer. Prior to each interview I would ask 
participants to read a Participant Information Sheet, a Privacy Notice and to sign a Consent 
Form, all of which have also been included in Appendices A, B and C. These documents 
featured an overview of the focus of my PhD and therefore mentioned the concept of identity. 
In the interviews, I would emphasise my openness to the possibility that identity was not a 
crucial factor within the peace processes under investigation. Nevertheless, it should be borne 
in mind that these documents, and the final question posed in the interviews, may have 
influenced the responses of my participants. 
 
The semi-structured interviewing method ‘is sufficiently structured to address specific topics 
related to the phenomenon of study, while leaving space for participants to offer new meanings 
to the study focus’.434 Indeed, in semi-structured interviews, participants are permitted and, 
moreover, encouraged to digress from the topic if they so choose. Meanwhile, the researcher 
 
432 Margaret Harrell and Melissa Bradley, ‘Data Collection Methods: Semi-Structured Interviews and Focus 
Groups’, RAND National Defense Research Institute (2009) [online], available from: Data Collection Methods: 
Semi-Structured Interviews and Focus Groups | RAND [last accessed: 8 February 2021], p. 6; Eleanor Maccoby 
and Nathan Maccoby, ‘The Interview: A Tool of Social Science’ in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social 
Psychology: Vol. I Theory and Method (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1954), p. 449 
433 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 408. See Appendix D 
for a copy of my interview guide. 
434 Anne Galetta, Mastering the Semi-Structured Interview and Beyond (New York: New York University Press, 
2013), p. 24 
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must listen intently, reacting to responses by further exploring points deemed, by the 
interviewer, to be crucial, interesting or under-explained, and introducing further topics and 
questions not featured in the guide, if thought to be relevant by the researcher, based upon the 
data gathered during the interview. The purpose of the method is to receive rich, detailed 
answers within which interviewees reveal that which they believe to be significant in relation 
to the topic under investigation.435  
 
I selected the semi-structured interview for a number of reasons. More generally, the capacity 
of the interviewees to dictate the flow of and, indeed, the topics covered within the interview 
is a distinct advantage; not only is the relationship between the researcher and the researched 
less hierarchical436 but a far more accurate representation of the complexities of the social 
world, and the intricacies of the specific phenomena under study as understood by my 
participants, will hopefully have been provided. More specifically, at the interview phase, I 
was guided by a relatively focused, overarching research question: does mediation shape 
identity?437 Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, and as I also emphasised to my participants, I 
wished to remain open to the possibility that identity might not prove relevant to the voices 
encompassed within the dataset and, therefore, a rigid interview guide would have been 
inappropriate. Furthermore, I did not firmly anticipate the precise nature of these identities 
(should they be mentioned or alluded to by my participants), the levels at which they may be 
said to operate, and the manner in which they were expressed, modulated and manipulated 
during the mediation events. Once more, it was therefore crucial that my participants were 
allowed the flexibility to explore, according to their ‘lived experiences’,438 the multifarious 
aspects of both the mediation efforts and the concept of identity.  
 
 
435 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge and Commitment in American Life (New York: Anchor, 1967); Herbert Rubin and Irene Rubin, 
Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data (California: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1995), pp. 8-9  
436 Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data, p. 31; Pertti Alasuutari et al., ‘Social 
Research in Changing Conditions’ in Pertti Alasuutari et al. (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Social Research 
Methods (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2008), p. 7 
437 During the course of my analysis phase, I narrowed this question, eventually formulating it as follows: how 
does mediation shape the identities of the conflict parties? The problems with focusing solely on the identities 
of the conflict parties is reflected on in Chapter Eight. 
438 Margot Ely, Doing Qualitative Research: Circles Within Circles (London: The Falmer Press, 1991), pp. 2, 4; 
Robert Sherman and Rodman Webb, ‘Qualitative Research in Education: A Focus’ in Robert Sherman and 
Rodman Webb (eds.), Qualitative Research in Education: Focus and Methods (London: The Falmer Press, 
1988), p. 7; Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for 
Developing Grounded Theory (California: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1998), p. 11 
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Adopting a semi-structured approach was also the only coherent route I could take in the light 
of my decision to be guided by the social constructivist approach to international relations. This 
necessitates a belief that the search for precise ‘measurements’ of social phenomena is futile 
and falsely reifies the intricate and fluctuating social world which is made up of the intangible, 
mutable beliefs and experiences of many.439 The constructivist approach to interviewing 
favours the semi-structured technique not only due to its inherent flexibility as outlined above, 
a technique argued to ‘make better use of the knowledge-producing potentials of dialogues’440 
but, crucially, due to the manner in which the role of the interviewer as ‘co-constructor’ of the 
data gathered and analysis offered is made more transparent. In summary, there are compelling 
reasons, in the light of my research project, to have employed the semi-structured interview 
during my data collection phase. 
 
Nevertheless, alleged disadvantages to the semi-structured interview do exist. Interpretivists 
have argued that, as interviewers fail to immerse themselves in the social world of the 
participants, their ability to gain a full and accurate understanding of the phenomena they are 
scrutinising is diminished. Moreover, interpretivists also note that hidden behaviour is far less 
likely to come to light during an interview, nor are matters which interviewees take for granted 
but which may be of significance to the researcher prone to surface.441 However, as my research 
concerns mediation attempts which have already occurred, it was not possible to observe the 
events myself. Furthermore, due to the highly confidential nature of mediation, it is highly 
unlikely I would have been able to gain access even if the processes were ongoing. 
Nevertheless, that I will rely on interviews nevertheless represents a limitation to my research. 
 
4.23 Sampling strategy 
 
I adopted a combination of three sampling strategies. The first was purposive sampling, ‘a 
selection method where the study’s purpose and the researcher’s knowledge of the population 
 
439 See: Herbert Blumer, ‘What is Wrong with Social Theory?’, American Sociological Review 19 (1954), pp. 3-
10; Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality (The Hague: Martinus, Nijhof, 1962), p. 
59; Aaron Cicourel, Method and Measurement in Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 107; Berger and 
Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge and Commitment in 
American Life; Yvonna Lincoln and Egon Guba, Naturalistic Inquiry (California: SAGE Publications, 1985); 
Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data, pp. 31-4; David Silverman, Interpreting 
Qualitative Data (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2014), p. 16; Bryman, Social Research Methods, pp. 26-7 
440 Svend Brinkmann, ‘Unstructured and Semi-Structured Interviewing’ in Patricia Leavy (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Qualitative Research (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 286 
441 Bryman, Social Research Methods, p. 493 
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guide the process’;442 I was aware of at least some of the organisations and actors who were 
involved in the mediation efforts on which I am focusing and I began by attempting to contact 
and secure access to these individuals. However, as the full array of participants involved in 
the mediation attempts are not publicly available, I also used ‘snowball’ sampling. This strategy 
‘involves identifying an initial set of relevant respondents, and then requesting that they suggest 
other potential subjects who share similar characteristics or who have relevance in some way 
to the object of study’.443 The researcher then continues to request sets of names from further 
participants as the project progresses. A danger here is that ‘respondents often suggest others 
who share similar characteristics, or the same outlook’; I therefore attempted to ensure that my 
‘initial set of respondents [was] sufficiently diverse so that the sample is not skewed 
excessively in any one particular direction’.444  
 
However, the deeply sensitive and confidential nature of the topic; the limited time available 
for fieldwork (12 months); the manner in which my participants were geographically dispersed, 
with many displaced by war; the ongoing conflicts within Syria and Yemen; the political 
systems of many of the states involved in the mediation efforts; and the elite nature of my 
interviewees negatively affected the size and ‘representativity’ of my sample. For instance, in 
relation to the Syrian case study, I decided that I would not approach members of the Syrian 
government for interviews. Firstly, this was due to their inaccessibility: their membership of a 
largely isolated dictatorship, ensconced in a state waging a war against its own people. 
Secondly, I was concerned that, by meeting such individuals, I might severely limit the number 
of members of the Syrian opposition willing to speak with me. As will form a crucial topic in 
the chapters which will follow, the rift between the opposition and the government runs deep 
while the brutal ‘security’ practices of the two al-Asad administrations drove many members 
of Syria’s political opposition from the country. Members of the opposition were far more 
accessible as interview participants and, therefore, hindering my capacity to speak with them 
by being known to have met members of the government would have also greatly limited the 
overall sample. However, readers of the claims contained within this thesis must remain aware 
of my lack of interviews with members of al-Asad’s government.  
 
 
442 Oisín Tansey, ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling’, Political 
Science and Politics 40:4 (2007), p. 769 




Furthermore, once more in relation to Syria, my sample of interviewees who represent external 
states is strongly skewed towards the West: of those who were willing to be cited in a non-
anonymised format, I was able to speak with British former members of parliament and 
diplomats together with US officials. However, these were not the only states closely involved 
in the mediation effort. 
 
Concerning Yemen, I was successful in interviewing at least one Yemeni participant in six of 
the nine Working Groups; however, I was unable to speak to a member of the ‘Good 
Governance’, ‘Military and Security’, and the ‘Independence of Special Entities’ Working 
Groups. Nevertheless, I was able to interview members of the Presidium, the Consultative 
Committee, the Technical Committee, the Secretariat, and the Secretary-General himself. I 
spoke to ‘independent’ youth, women and civil society representatives but a more limited 
number of the political parties: for instance, I interviewed representatives of the General 
People’s Congress (GPC), Islah and the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) but crucially, while I 
did interview those from the south of Yemen, I did not manage to interview a member of Hiraak 
nor did I speak with a representative of the Huthis. These weaknesses in my sample can be 
attributed, at least in part, to the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Moreover, as with Syria, those 
representatives of external states with whom I spoke in relation to Yemen were all from the 
West, from the UK, the EU and the US.  
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, it nevertheless should also be noted that my goal was to 
build a rich and varied dataset but not to comprehensively represent all different groups which 
participated in the mediation attempt. I did not seek statistical ‘generalisability’; I knew this 
would prove deeply challenging given the phenomenon under study and, moreover, was not an 
appropriate measure of success for qualitative research. Instead, following Sarah Tracy, I 
sought ‘rich rigor’, ‘sufficient, abundant, appropriate, and complex…data and time in the field’, 
and ‘credibility’, to be gained through ‘thick description, concrete detail…crystallization [and] 
multivocality’.445 I believe this was achieved through the high number of detailed interviews 




445 Sarah Tracy, ‘Qualitative Quality: Eight “Big-Tent” Criteria for Excellent Qualitative Research’, Qualitative 
Inquiry 16:10 (2010), p. 840 
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4.231 Who are the Syrian ‘opposition’? 
 
It is also worth briefly reflecting, here, on the Syrian ‘opposition’ and that which the phrase 
denotes. In Chapter One, I briefly outlined how the Syrian opposition swelled and splintered 
during the stages of the Geneva Peace Process under investigation. I will offer more detail here 
in order to further illuminate the sample of interview participants consulted. Prior to the 
Uprisings of 2011, Syrian civil society had been described as a ‘wasteland’.446 Following 
Bashar’s ascendancy in 2000, and his initial seemingly milder approach to governance, a 
proliferation of human rights organisations and discussion forums ushered in the ‘Damascus 
Spring’: parliamentarians, business professionals, academics and opposition activists penned a 
manifesto which called for ‘comprehensive political reforms’ and which was signed by more 
than 1,000 civil society activists.447 While a brutal crackdown followed,448 ‘scattered and 
secretive activists’ had nevertheless been drawn from the shadows. Dissidents ‘became aware 
of each other’s existence, and the language of reform was injected into political discourses’.449 
Nevertheless, the ‘opposition’ in Syria, if it could be called that, remained fragmented, deeply 
divided, and plagued by state repression.450  
 
It has therefore been suggested that ‘the 2011 uprising took the Syrian opposition by surprise 
as much as it did the regime’.451 The groups which came to represent the opposition in the 
mediation period under study gradually emerged during the course of the early years of the 
protests. In April 2011, for instance, after 150 figures signed a ‘National Initiative for 
Democratic Change’, an umbrella group named the Syrian National Coalition for Change was 
established. This movement united opposition activists in exile, many of whom then gathered 
together with other elements of the Syrian opposition at a conference in Antalya in Turkey in 
May and June 2011. This conference elected a consultative and an executive council but this 
meeting, and those which followed, led to ‘splits and disagreements’.452 Soon, the National 
Coordination Body for Democratic Change was formed, and then the Syrian Revolution 
General Commission, and then, in August 2011, the Syrian National Transitional Council. 
 
446 Joshua Landis and Joe Pace, ‘The Syrian Opposition’, The Washington Quarterly 30:1 (2007), p. 49 
447 Ibid, p. 47 
448 Ibid, pp. 47-8 
449 Ibid, p. 48 
450 Ibid 
451 Jonathan Spyer, ‘The Syrian Opposition Before and After the Outbreak of the 2011 Uprising’, Middle East 
Review of International Affairs 15:3 (2013), p. 53 
452 Ibid, pp. 53-4 
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However, the absence of influential Kurdish parties within this Transitional Council, and 
suspicions surrounding ‘the possible behind-the-scenes role of the Muslim Brotherhood’, led 
to the formal establishment, in October 2011, of the SNC.453  
 
During the latter half of 2011 and the majority of 2012, the SNC functioned as ‘the main point 
of reference for countries backing the opposition’.454 However, while it brought together the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, individuals instrumental in the Damascus Declaration, the Syrian 
Revolution General Commission (SRGC), the LCCs, tribal leaders, and a number of Kurdish 
parties, it was criticised for its under-representation of Syria’s minority communities.455 The 
SNC was also troubled by ‘continuing splits and schisms’ and it has been argued that it failed 
to unite ‘the opposition behind a clear program and strategy’.456 The SNC fairly rapidly gave 
way to a new confederation. At a meeting held in Doha in November 2012, Syrian opposition 
groups and figures announced the formation of SOC. A second umbrella group, SOC replaced 
the SNC, although the SNC was subsumed within it.457  
 
My interview participants largely comprise members of SOC (many of whom were also 
involved in the SNC and other earlier bodies); those who were members of the earlier bodies, 
and in particular the SNC, but who did not join SOC; and a limited number of opposition 
‘activists’ who, for a variety of reasons, did not find a place within the formal opposition 
bodies. In the References list, I specify interlocutors’ roles within the opposition, provided this 
does not contravene the requested anonymity of the participant. When I use the phrase 
‘opposition’, and when interlocutors use this phrase, we are referring to members of these 
official bodies together with activists opposed to the al-Asad government.  
 
4.24 Elite interviewing 
 
The individuals I interviewed can be considered to be members of the ‘elite’. With regard to 
the international officials with whom I conducted interviews, the participants were close to, or 
 
453 Ibid, pp. 54-6 
454 No author, ‘The Syrian National Council’, Carnegie Middle East Center (2013) [online], available from: 
https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48334?lang=en [last accessed: 31 May 2021] 
455 Spyer, ‘The Syrian Opposition Before and After the Outbreak of the 2011 Uprising’, p. 56 
456 No author, ‘The Syrian National Council’ 
457 Joseph Daher, ‘Pluralism Lost in Syria’s Uprising: How the Opposition Strayed from its Inclusive Roots’ The 
Century Foundation (2019) [online], available from: https://tcf.org/content/report/pluralism-lost-syrias-uprising/ 
[last accessed: 31 May 2021] 
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are themselves, policymakers. They possessed varying levels of authority and control within 
the mediation processes, are/were employed by prestigious organisations (such as the UN or 
the civil services of governments) or are/were the elected or appointed officials of the states 
which attempted to become involved in the mediation attempts. I also interviewed employees 
of international and local NGOs; while such individuals arguably possess less influence than 
international officials, diplomats and politicians, they nevertheless exerted varying levels of 
agency and weight within the mediation processes and tended to be highly-qualified and 
experienced peacemakers and peacebuilders.458 
 
In relation to the Syrians with whom I spoke, such individuals can also be thought of as ‘elite’: 
they are/were high-ranking members of the official Syrian opposition organisations and, 
relatedly, tend(ed) to possess some form of power within either Syria or the Syrian diaspora 
and, furthermore, within the international community. Once more, they tend(ed) to be highly 
educated, influential, equipped with financial resources and/or in prestigious (self-
)employment, and, moreover, senior in age. Concerning the Yemeni process, a far larger 
swathe of Yemeni society was incorporated within the National Dialogue. However, as 
explored in Chapter One, it is nevertheless the case that the manner in which these individuals 
were selected meant that those known only to the highest echelons of power tended to be invited 
to the negotiations and, indeed, representatives of the main Yemeni political parties remained 
predominant.  
 
The process of interviewing elites is fraught with challenge; indeed, even the very term ‘elite’, 
and that which it implies, is contested.459 Nevertheless, if we follow the definition proposed by 
Darren Lilleker, that elites can be thought of as ‘those with close proximity to power of 
policymaking’,460 this would seem to apply to many of the participants described above. 
 
458 Catherine Goetze has claimed that ‘peacebuilders represent the social type of…the bourgeois or middle-class 
man (or woman) whose main capital is their (distinguished and distinctive) education’ (Catherine Goetze, The 
Distinction of Peace: A Social Analysis of Peacebuilding (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017), p. 
12), further arguing that ‘international peace experts across different organizations and missions hold positions 
of authority because they hold many other powerful resources through which they impose their ideas as “right”’ 
(Catherine Goetze, ‘Response to Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley’s Review of The Distinction of Peace: A 
Social Analysis of Peacebuilding, Perspectives on Politics 16:2 (2018), p. 499) 
459 Michael Woods, ‘Rethinking Elites: Networks, Space, and Local Politics’, Environment and Planning 30:12 
(1998), p. 2101; Katherine Smith, ‘Problematising Power Relations in “Elite” Interviews’, Geoforum 37:4 
(2006), p. 645; William Harvey, ‘Strategies for Conducting Elite Interviews’, Qualitative Research 11:4 (2011), 
p. 432 




Researching the behaviour, motivations, opinions and recollections of elites poses ‘significant 
methodological difficulties that have dramatic effects both on the manner in which research is 
practised and the character of knowledge claims that it produces’;461 I will summarise these 




A number of authors pessimistically note the extreme difficulty faced by researchers in their 
attempts to gain ‘entry’ to elites.462 Although, as Katherine Smith astutely cautions, it is 
important to be aware that other groups in society are by no means any easier than elites to 
access,463 a significant element of, and potential obstacle within, my methods was the process 
of seeking access to my intended interview participants. The existing literature on elites 
suggests a number of strategies which may ease the process of access. Teresa Odendahl and 
Aileen Shaw recommend ‘extensive preparation, homework, and creativity on the part of the 
researcher, as well as the right credentials and contacts’464 while Catherine Welch et al. suggest 
that a researcher must emphasise her/his institutional affiliation(s).465 Furthermore, Frederik 
Thuesen proposes that ‘networks, social capital, and trust are often paramount for gaining 
access to elites’466 while Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman advise that the interviewer must be 
‘politely persistent’ and should write a brief letter or email ‘on the most prestigious, non-
inflammatory letterhead you have access to, stating your purpose in a few well-chosen 
sentences’.467 At the outset of my data collection phase, I possessed no prior links to the groups 
of individuals described in the preceding section, nor had I previously worked in either Syria 
or Yemen. Moreover, even discovering the names of the relevant individuals, together with 
their contact details, proved a challenge as the identity of all the participants in the peace 
 
461 Joseph Conti and Moira O’Neill, ‘Studying Power: Qualitative Methods and the Global Elite’, Qualitative 
Research 7:1 (2007), p. 63 
462 See, for example: Ibid; Smith, ‘Problematising Power Relations in “Elite” Interviews’, p. 648; Rosanna Hertz 
and Jonathan Imber, ‘Introduction’ in Rosanna Hertz and Jonathan Imber (eds.), Studying Elites Using 
Qualitative Methods (California: SAGE, 1995), p. viii 
463 Smith, ‘Problematising Power Relations in “Elite” Interviews’ 
464 Teresa Odendahl and Aileen Shaw, ‘Interviewing Elites’ in Jaber Gubrium and James Holstein (eds.), 
Handbook of Interview Research (California: SAGE, 2002), p. 307 
465 Catherine Welch et al., ‘Corporate Elites as Informants in Qualitative International Business Research’, 
International Business Review 11:5 (2002), p. 614 
466 Frederik Thuesen, ‘Navigating Between Dialogue and Confrontation: Phronesis and Emotions in 
Interviewing Elites on Ethnic Discrimination’, Qualitative Inquiry 16:10 (2011), p. 620 
467 Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, ‘Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews’, Political Science and Politics 
35:4 (2002), pp. 673, 674 
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processes on which I am focusing are not publicly known. Thus my own ‘networks’ and ‘social 
capital’ were limited.  
 
However, as advised, I did thoroughly research the individuals and institutions in which I was 
interested and compiled lists of potential participants and possible means of contacting them. 
For some, their professional or personal email addresses, or telephone numbers, were available 
online. For others, I contacted their organisations to request to be connected with the 
participant, or contacted the participant through their professional or personal social media 
profiles. I also conducted similar research into potential ‘gatekeepers’;468 such individuals 
included academics and journalists, more accessible colleagues and acquaintances of those 
whom I wished to contact, and the media wings of the organisations for which my participants 
work[ed]. When making contact with potential participants, I emphasised, as recommended, 
my institutional affiliation and funding body, and succinctly explained the purpose of my 
research and of the proposed interview; a template email has been attached in Appendix E. The 
inaccessibility of many of my interviewees did, however, as previously discussed, mean my 
sample became more limited. The use of additional data sources, as described later in this 
chapter, was deployed to mitigate against this limitation and it remains the case, in my view, 
that sufficient interviewees were consulted to create ‘descriptions and explanations’ that are 
‘bountifully supplied, generous, and unstinting’ and to produce a dataset which is ‘complex’, 
‘multifaceted’, with ‘multiple and varied voices’, markers of successful qualitative research.469 
 
The ‘elite’ status of my interviewees did, however, aid access in one sense. The majority were 
proficient in English which meant that I was able to conduct most of my interviews in my 
native language. Nevertheless, having asked participants to converse in a language which is 
not their first may have had negative repercussions on the quality of the data gathered; it has 
been argued that ‘impoverished’ interviews may be the result due to the additional effort 
 
468 See: Robert Broadhead and Ray Rist, ‘Gatekeepers and the Social Control of Social Research’, Social 
Problems 23:3 (1976), pp. 325-36; Lisa Campbell et al., ‘Gatekeepers and Keymasters: Dynamic Relationships 
of Access in Geographical Fieldwork’, Geographical Review 96:1 (2006), pp. 97-121; Carolyn Wanat, ‘Getting 
Past the Gatekeepers: Differences Between Access and Cooperation in Public School Research’, Field Methods 
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required by the interviewee.470 In addition, studies have found that ‘when interviewees speak 
in a second language they perceive themselves as less confident, happy and intelligent’.471 I 
made attempts to reduce these possibilities; interview participants were provided with detail on 
the subject matter of the interview prior to our meeting and, indeed, were given a full interview 
guide if requested. Moreover, I ensured both the language and the tone I used were clear and 
easily comprehensible for those for whom English was not their native tongue.  
 
In addition, a limited number of participants requested to speak in Arabic and, in these instance, 
I made arrangements for the interviews to be supported by the presence of an interpreter. 
Interpreters were used only on occasion but it is nevertheless worth briefly surveying the 
challenges associated with the use of translators during interviews and the steps I took to 
mitigate against these. Firstly, it has been argued that interpreters must be familiar with the 
topic of the interview; that there is a risk interpreters can ‘change meanings by omission, 
revision, and reduction of content’;472 that interpreters can influence the responses received 
from participants; and, lastly, that interpreters should be considered to be co-creators within 
the research process and thus involved, to an extent, within the analysis phase.473 In a bid to 
reduce these risks, the three interpreters employed were asked to sign a confidentiality 
agreement, which has been included in Appendix F, and it was communicated to my 
participants that this had taken place; the aim was to ensure the participant remained 
comfortable discussing the sensitive issues which we explored. I also ensured the interpreter 
was provided with the interview guide prior to the interview and offered the opportunity to ask 
any questions she/he may have had in relation to the topic. I requested that the interpreter 
translated both my questions and the responses of the interviewee comprehensively and in a 
manner which retained a closeness with the original words. During these interviews, I made 
notes on the words of the interpreter as I did with my interviewees in other conversations and 
 
470 Perry M. Nicassio et al., ‘Emigration Stress and Language Proficiency as Correlates of Depression in a 
Sample of Southeast Asian Refugees’, International Journal of Social Psychiatry 32 (1986), pp. 22-8; Joseph 
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471 Frank Kline et al., ‘The Misunderstood Spanish Speaking Patient’, American Journal of Psychiatry 137:12 
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ensured I maintained eye contact with the interviewee as opposed to the interpreter, responding 
non-verbally to their responses in an effort to build up a level of rapport similar to that which 
would usually be achieved. Furthermore, I am proficient in Levantine Arabic and was therefore 
able to follow the majority of the conversations held with Syrian participants. I should also 
note that, on occasion, participants would slip, briefly, into Arabic, at which point I remained 
able to understand and engage. Moreover, participants would infrequently search for a term in 
English, repeating the Arabic term and its synonyms; together, we would try to find an 
appropriate translation. I also translated two emails myself; as per my requests to the 
interpreters employed, I attempted to keep my own translations as close as possible to the 
original words of my participants. 
 
4.242 Conduct within elite interviews 
 
Scholars offer a range of advice in relation to the process of the interview itself. The first 
concerns the interview guide. Lilleker counsels that elite interview participants should be given 
time to consider the questions and topics which will be explored prior to the interview;474 
however, due to the limited time available to elite interviewees475 and my desire to conduct 
truly semi-structured interviews, I took the approach of sharing with my interviewees the broad 
topic on which we would focus but offering a more detailed interview guide only if this was 
specifically requested.  
 
The literature is divided with regard to recording or note-taking during elite interviews; while 
recording means that no utterances of the participant are likely to be lost, and that the researcher 
is able to be fully engaged in the conversation, ‘the presence of a tape can be inhibiting…so if 
the material is contentious it may be wiser to consider taking notes only’.476 The topic under 
study here is highly confidential, sensitive and politically charged and, for the Syrian and 
Yemeni participants, their countries remain in crisis and under violent, volatile and 
authoritarian rule; therefore, in a bid to increase the comfort of my participants and, hopefully, 
to deepen the quality of the data gathered, I decided to take notes as opposed to recording the 
content of the interviews. While this means the style of the notes is less conversational and that 
the participants’ precise words may not have always been captured, I attempted to mitigate 
 
474 Lilleker, ‘Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield’, p. 209 
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against this by typing up the notes immediately after each interview to ensure as accurate a 
representation of the conversation as possible was provided. I also shared these notes with 
participants for their approval, allowing the interviewees to make any changes, additions or 
retractions. Many participants did take this opportunity and, on occasion, made sweeping 
changes to the transcripts. I felt that this was an important element of my aim to empower the 
participants and to ensure that I had truly gained their consent and trust. It was also revealing 
to see which sections were deemed by my participants to be too sensitive for inclusion, or the 
manner in which they edited their language for direct quotations. Finally, it has been noted that 
elites, to a greater degree than other ‘types’ of participants, may become distracted during 
interviews: for example, their telephones may ring, a meeting may be called, or their personal 
assistants may interrupt the interview.477 I was prepared for this eventuality and, indeed, such 
moments did occur. I viewed these moments as an opportunity to gain an insight into the 
professional lives and demands of my interviewee, offering valuable contextual information. 
 
4.243 Contested authority 
 
Many discussions of elite interviews devote a great deal of consideration to the subject of power 
relations within interactions with such individuals. For instance, John Fitz and David Halpin 
and Odendahl and Shaw chart their experiences of interviews with elites as being shaped by 
the interviewees’ own sense of authority.478 This is often described in relation to the flow of 
the interview, with authors feeling that interviewees dictate the questions asked: as Conti and 
O’Neill describe, ‘he was providing answers and my questions were, to some degree, 
secondary’.479 Lewis Anthony Dexter also claims that ‘a good many well-informed or 
influential people are unwilling to accept the assumptions with which the investigator starts; 
they insist on explaining to [her or] him how they see the situation, what the real problems are 
as they view the matter’.480 Indeed, in addition to selecting their own questions and topics to 
explore, it has been remarked that elite interview participants may question the very nature and 
strategy of the research and the researcher; less explicitly, they may embark on unrelated 
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monologues in a bid to evade and deflect questions and particular topics and, as a number of 
authors note, this is perhaps linked to the media training which many elites often receive.481 
This can lead to feelings of despondency and ‘inadequacy’ on the part of the researcher.482  I 
was aware of this risk and viewed this as an important insight into the character of the 
interviewee and as an indication of either that which they believed to be most significant in 
relation to the subject or that which they felt most comfortable in projecting or, rather, 
promoting. I kept a field diary and, following interviews, I noted down any reflections on such 
issues. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a number of the interviews did feature the 
challenges described above: this, in turn, must have had an impact upon the shape of the 




Linked to the discussion above, elite interviewees might approach interviews with a certain 
purpose or narrative to promote, may have received media training in how best to communicate 
this message, and may also misrepresent their own position. Furthermore, my interviewees 
could have simply remembered events inaccurately; after all, the mediation attempts upon 
which I am focusing concluded more than five years ago and the peace processes have persisted 
during the intervening period. As described above, the narratives proffered by my participants 
have been treated as such, as representations of their experiences and worthy of analysis 
regardless of the ‘truth’ of the matter.  
 
To grapple with instances in which it is difficult to discern events, the technique often 
suggested is one of ‘triangulation’, the ‘use of more than one method or source of data in the 
study of a social phenomenon so that findings may be cross-checked’.483 However, 
‘triangulation does not lay neatly over research from interpretive, critical, or post-modern 
paradigms that view reality as multiple, fractured, contested or social constructed’. Multiple 
sources converging on a particular point does not mean a ‘specified reality is correct’ as the 
very belief that there is a singular truth to be found contradicts the philosophical underpinnings 
of my research.484 Nevertheless, I have sought to ‘use multiple sources’ in a bid to allow 
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‘different facets of problems to be explored’, to increase the scope of the research and to deepen 
my understanding.485 This practice has been referred to by Laura Ellingson as 
‘crystallisation’;486 as Laurel Richardson poetically describes, a crystal ‘combines symmetry 
and substance with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multi-
dimensionalities, and angles of approach…crystals are prisms that reflect externalities and 
refract within themselves, creating different colors, patterns, and arrays, casting off in different 
directions’.487 Thus, I have sought to incorporate as many views and perspectives as possible 
within my research but the aim was not to verify the perspectives of my sources against one 
another but, rather, ‘to open up a more complex, in-depth, but still thoroughly partial, 
understanding of the issue’.488  
 
4.25 Remote interviewing 
 
The interview participants with whom I spoke are scattered across the world; the conflicts in 
Syria and Yemen have endured and, indeed, intensified since the periods of mediation on which 
I am focusing, forcing many of those who were involved in the peace talks to flee. A high 
number of Yemenis and Syrians are now concentrated in nearby locations such as Istanbul, 
Beirut and Amman; however, many more have found refuge in a variety of cities in Western 
Europe, North America and Australia. As for the international officials who were involved in 
the peace process, many of these individuals have left their former positions and moved to 
different roles, organisations and locations. I undertook short field trips to meet interview 
participants in person; indeed, I sought where possible to meet interview participants face-to-
face, allowing the interviewees to suggest the professional or public location in which they 
would feel most comfortable meeting. This allowed me an insight into crucial settings, such as 
the Palais des Nations in Geneva, the offices of a number of Track II organisations, the SOC 
headquarters in Istanbul, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen 
(OSESGY) building in Amman and, on occasion, the businesses and homes of my interview 
participants. These glimpses into the lives of my participants deepened my understanding of 
their experiences and their personalities and, I believe, strengthened our rapport. However, in 
order to widen and intensify my sample, I also conducted a number of the interviews remotely, 
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using video call software such as Skype and Zoom where possible, but also using telephone, 
email and direct messages if these were the only feasible options. Remote interviewing, as is 
the case with elite interviewing, is accompanied by its own set of advantages and 
disadvantages, and there are recommended strategies for mitigating against the latter.  
 
Just as digital technologies are becoming ubiquitous in everyday life, particularly following 
the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, so too are such technologies ‘starting to form an 
integral part of the toolkit of many social scientists’.489 However, the face-to-face interview 
persists in being promoted and viewed as the ‘gold standard’490 with online interviews 
‘presented as a second choice’.491 Four intertwined reasons tend to be offered for this with the 
first relating to the alleged loss of contextual data pertaining to the environment of the interview 
and the body language of the interviewee. As Robert Weiss writes, the richness of seeing a 
person during an interview can be lost;492 Susie Weller supports this assertion, claiming that, 
even if video communication is used, ‘these digital bodies are fundamentally coarser’, and that 
‘thicker information’ and ‘body talk’ can both be, unfortunately, absent.493 Henrietta O’Connor 
et al. also note that the loss of non-verbal cues can prove challenging.494 Relatedly, it is also 
argued that it can prove more difficult to foster a rapport within online interviews which, in 
turn, can lead to shorter and less detailed conversations.495 This is the experience of Azadeh 
Forghani et al.; these authors explain that, as there was ‘less shared context’, it proved difficult 
to make ‘informal small talk’ at the beginning of their remotely-conducted interviews, a 
technique believed to foster a warmer and more natural connection between the interviewer 
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and the interviewee.496 In addition to being unable to ease into a conversation, the beginning 
of online interviews is often dominated by technological trials as participants and interviewers 
alike hesitantly check the connection.497 It can also be challenging to maintain eye contact with 
participants over video chat.498 An additional ethical risk is also posed within online interviews 
as there is a ‘small possibility that the video transmission could be intercepted by other 
individuals (e.g. hackers) and the person’s identity and data could be revealed to a third 
party’.499 Lastly, it has been noted that last-minute cancellations appear to be more prevalent 
for remote interviews by comparison with those which take place face-to-face and it has been 
suggested that ‘participants [feel] less committed to a video chat interview’.500  
 
These challenges are compounded within interviews conducted by email and using direct 
messages. I only completed a very limited number of interviews in this way, and only when 
interlocutors requested to complete the interview in this manner; the reason cited was often the 
poor internet services in Yemen, which inhibited video or voice calls, but it may have also been 
the case that the interviewees simply felt more comfortable, and more secure, conducting the 
interviews with this degree of distance between us. Many of the advantages of the semi-
structured interview were hindered in these conversations; I was unable to engage with, and 
encourage my participants to speak using non-verbal techniques and, while I was nevertheless 
able to pose ‘follow-up’ questions, these were less natural than they would have been within a 
conversation. Moreover, I could not pick up body language or tone of voice from my 
interviewees. 
 
Where necessary, steps were taken to mitigate against the risks of remote interviews. For 
instance, as it may be more difficult to build rapport in remote interviews, I ensured the initial 
questions posed were those which could be considered less challenging, only proceeding to the 
more difficult or sensitive questions later in the conversation.501 With regard to the ethical risks, 
I ensured that only secure software was used and I was cognisant in advance of the risk that I 
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may receive cancellations, factoring this into my planning. Moreover, it is also important to be 
aware that a number of authors challenge the views summarised above. Indeed, it could be 
argued that the use of video calls, especially if the interview takes place in the interview 
subject’s home or office, may offer a more personal insight into the world of the participant 
than would have been gleaned had the interview taken place in a meeting room or a public 
location such as a café. This in turn means, in my remote interviews, that I may conversely 
have had an even greater opportunity to ‘observe the everyday’, the ‘mundane’, information 
that could help me to ‘better understand participants and their life situations’.502 Moreover, the 
close-up facial image often provided by software such as Skype arguably facilitates ‘a more 
intimate connection and feeling of close physical proximity, conducive to the building of 
rapport’; this, in turn, can also limit distractions, strengthening the connection and focus of the 
interview.503 Furthermore, should interviews be conducted by telephone, the ‘interviewer 
effect’ is decreased; participants are less likely to be influenced by the physical characteristics 
of the interviewer.504 It has even been suggested that participants may be more likely to be open 
to responding to sensitive or embarrassing questions posed over the telephone due to the 
perceived divide between themselves and the questioner.505 Lastly, and linked with the 
previous discussion concerning elite interviewing, it has been suggested that remote interviews 
may be more efficient when approaching elites, and that this group prefers the flexibility 
provided;506 if conducted remotely, elites can speak while travelling, at a time which suits their 
demanding schedules, and can rearrange with ease. They also do not feel the pressure to arrange 
security clearance for the researcher nor to find suitable, private spaces within their places of 
work to conduct the interview. I may therefore have been able to secure a greater number of 
interviews, and thus a richer array of voices within my analysis, by electing to use remote 
interviews in addition to in-person interviews. 
 
4.3 Press conferences 
 
The second source of data upon which I draw in making my claims is a series of press 
conferences delivered by the international mediators, implicated external states and 
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representatives of the Syrian and Yemeni conflict parties. I introduced this second data source 
due to the inherently partial nature of the interview data gathered, due to the limitations of my 
sample, and in a bid to achieve further crystallisation. The interviews provided memories of 
the participants’ actions and thoughts during the period under study. The press conferences, 
however, constitute data generated at the time of the mediation efforts; nevertheless, once 
more, I should emphasise that the purpose of examining this data is not to ‘verify’ the accounts 
provided in the interviews but, instead, to deepen my understanding of the case studies and the 
perspectives of those involved. Furthermore, by consulting the press conferences, I have been 
able to gain an appreciation of the apparent experiences and opinions of individuals with whom 
I was not able to hold an interview. These include individuals who have passed away since the 
mediation attempt, and individuals whom I was unable to contact despite my best efforts and 
individuals, such as representatives of the Syrian government, whom I decided not to approach 
for interviews.  
 
4.31 Describing the press conferences transcribed 
 
During my data collection phase, the UN website ‘UN Live United Nations Web TV’507 
featured a number of videos of press conferences delivered in Geneva during the stages of the 
Syrian and Yemeni peace processes on which I am focusing. This website also included a video 
of the opening of Geneva II in Montreux. The archive of videos was difficult to navigate;508 
indeed, the site has since been redeveloped. To try to ensure all relevant videos were included 
in the dataset, I reviewed all videos listed once I entered the search terms ‘Syria’ and ‘Yemen’. 
I narrowed my search to those recorded between 2011 and 2014 and then included all videos 
which concerned the UN-led peace processes as well as, in the case of Syria, press conferences 
which discussed UNSMIS. In total, I transcribed 50 press conferences. These videos have been 
listed in the References section. Due to the redevelopment of the website, the original links to 
the videos are no longer valid (although all the videos do appear to be being moved to the new 
site). However, I have downloaded all the press conferences included in the dataset and these 
audio-visual files are available on request.  
 
 
507 Available from: http://webtv.un.org/ [last accessed: 11 February 2021]. This link now redirects to the 
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Table e) Press conferences: Syria case study 
 
 Number Percentage 
Delivered by: 
Representatives of the Syrian opposition 3 7% 
Representatives of the Syrian government 7 17% 
Representatives of external states  3 7% 
International ‘mediator’ 28 67% 
Combination of above 1 2% 
 
Table f) Press conferences: Yemen case study 
 
 Number Percentage 
Delivered by: 
Representatives of external states  4 50% 
International ‘mediator’ 4 50% 
 
4.32 Reflecting on the use of press conferences as data 
 
The press conferences consulted in this study can be considered to be political press 
conferences, ‘an institutionalized form for communication between leading politicians and 
journalists’.509 Press conferences tend to feature a brief introduction and conclusion (usually 
delivered by a Chair), ‘an uninterrupted and monological speech made by the politician [or 
politicians] responsible’, and ‘an interactional phase’.510 In this interactional phase, the 
journalists present pose questions to the politicians. The journalists in attendance, and other 
press and media authorities observing the developments, can be thought of as ‘the receivers 
and hearers’; however, ‘the ultimate audience is the international community of politicians, 
and more importantly, the general public who are being represented by their leaders’.511 Aditi 
Bhatia has remarked that political press conferences ‘provide excellent data to study how 
 
509 Göran Eriksson, ‘Follow-Up Questions in Political Press Conferences’, Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011), p. 
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ideologies are discussed and negotiated, how power relations are asserted, and how political 
differences on difficult issues are discussed and communicated in a positive way’.512 
 
Political press conferences, nevertheless, entail specific characteristics, some of which could 
be perceived to be limitations. As Bhatia has noted, ‘speakers in a press conference come 
prepared with a speech, and answers to potential questions, written in advance by a team of 
trained communication diplomats and specialists’; indeed, Bhatia therefore describes the 
politicians delivering a press conference as the ‘animators rather than authors of the material 
they use’.513 Moreover, in press conferences, politicians ‘court’ the press, and ‘feed’ their 
‘egos’, in a bid to ensure favourable coverage.514 Press conferences serve a particular purpose: 
they may be intended to inform but they are also, undoubtedly, intended to persuade one’s 
audience and to promote oneself, one’s group and one’s strategy. Furthermore, the information 
delivered during these conferences is partly dictated by the questions, and therefore the 
interests and partisanship, of the journalists present. This does not mean the data is not 
revealing but, rather, that the data is revealing of the manner in which the groups and 
individuals encompassed by this data source wished their peers and their constituents to 
perceive the mediation efforts and their role within them.  
 
When transcribing the press conferences, I ensured the resulting transcripts reflected as closely 
as possible the style in which the words were spoken, incorporating, for example, pauses and 
verbal exclamations.515 I also marked frequent ‘time stamps’ on the transcripts, allowing me to 
return to the precise points of the video to include analysis of body language and environmental 
context.  
 
4.4 Official documentation 
 
Lastly, I gathered together a third data source which can be categorised as ‘official 
documentation’. International conflict mediation is veiled in secrecy. Written primary sources 
such as meeting transcripts, minutes and agendas were unavailable for analysis. I therefore 
identified an alternative series of written records produced during, and in relation to, the two 
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mediation efforts. The purpose was to further broaden and deepen the sample of voices 
contained within the dataset in a bid to mitigate against the aforementioned limitations of my 
sample of interviewees, and the sample of individuals represented within the transcribed press 
conferences. In total, I gathered 110 such documents.  
 
Table g) Official documents: Syria case study 
 
 Number Percentage 
Document Type 
SNC Press Releases 2 3% 
SOC Press Releases 31 45% 
UN Documents 14 20% 
FoS and London 11 (UK Government) Press Releases 22 32% 
 
Table h) Official documents: Yemen case study 
 
 Number Percentage 
Document Type 
GCC Initiative Documents 2 5% 
NDC Documents 3 7% 
UN Documents 26 63% 
FoY (UK Government) Press Releases 10 24% 
 
4.5 Semi-inductive thematic analysis 
 
The information gleaned from the primary data gathered was then combined to create a rich 
image of the two conflict mediation attempts within which the various, and varied, perspectives 
of those who participated in or observed the mediation efforts were presented. Following this 
synthesis, I conducted a semi-inductive, iterative thematic analysis of the primary data in order 
to address my over-arching research question, and to assess and respond to the three hypotheses 




4.51 Describing the process of thematic analysis 
 
Thematic analysis is a method often used by qualitative researchers yet it is rarely delineated. 
It can be defined as ‘a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within 
data’516 and, in this project, entailed the following steps:517  
 
i. Firstly, I immersed myself within the primary data. 
ii. I then generated an initial set of codes, ‘a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns 
a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of 
language-based or visual data’.518 Drawing upon the material assessed in Chapters Two 
and Three – my knowledge of the concept of identity, how it may be constituted and 
sustained, my knowledge of existing academic debates surrounding identity in Syria 
and Yemen, and my assessment of the limited existing literature concerning the 
relationship between mediation and identity – I generated codes which I believed could 
offer an answer to my over-arching research question and could be used to assess the 
three hypotheses formulated in Chapter Three. I explored the data produced by hand, 
assigning each code a colour or symbol, and highlighting the data associated with each 
code with this colour or symbol. Occasionally, data fitted within multiple codes. 
iii. Having explored all the data once, I then reviewed the 162 codes generated, organising 
these into broader categories and then themes, the latter of which capture ‘something 
important about the data in relation to the research question’ and represent ‘some level 
of patterned response or meaning within the dataset’.519  
iv. I then refined the themes created through returning to the dataset and the initial set of 
codes. On occasion, I discovered additional data to code, or decided data also belonged 
within a second code. I also re-organised a number of the categories and combined 
themes.  
v. Lastly, I named each theme, selecting five which would be analysed and interpreted in 
depth in order to answer my research question. These five are Suffering, Democracy 
and Reform, Discord, National Ownership, and Inclusion. As will become apparent, 
 
516 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’, Qualitative Research in 
Psychology 3:2 (2006), p. 79 
517 Adapted from Braun and Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’, pp. 87-93 
518 Johnny Saldaña, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (London: SAGE, 2014), p. 4 
519 Braun and Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’, p. 82 
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many of these themes, and their attendant categories and codes, are distributed across 
more than one chapter and, therefore, are analysed to respond to more than hypothesis.  
 
The five themes selected, and the categories and codes contained within them, are listed in the 
table below: 
 
Table i) Themes, categories and codes selected for analysis 
 
Theme Categories Codes 
Suffering Terror Fear, Threat, Flee 
Agony Hurt, Anger, Injustice, Neglect, Poverty 
Courage Bravery, Sacrifice 
Defenceless  Vulnerability, Fragility, Weakness, Innocence 
Brutality Destruction, Force, Attack, Violence, 
Terrorism, Massacre, Humanitarian needs, 
Victimhood 
Oppression  Repression, Regime, Dictatorship, Tyranny, 






Democratic institutions, Elections, 
Representation, Accountability, Long-lasting 
support for democracy, Justice, Law, 
Citizenship 
Liberal values Human rights, Freedom, Dignity, Civil state 
Openness Voice, Transparency, Consultation, Pluralism, 
Diversity, Difference 
Transformation Transition, Change, Reform, Novelty, Peace 
Discord Brutality Destruction, Attack, Violence, Battle, Injustice 
Terror Fear, Threat, Flee 
Oppression Repression, Monopoly of power, 
Marginalisation, Silenced, Locked up, 
Trapped, Unwilling to negotiate 
Rivalry Competition, Exclusion, Regime, 
Concealment, Manipulation, Blame, Divisions 
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Accusation Traitor, Foreign Agent, Outsider, Terrorist 
Sub-state groups Youth, Women, Newcomers, Political elite, 
Minority groups, Religious groups, Ethnic 
groups, Class, Sectarianism, Secularism, 
Urban and rural divisions, Geography, Tribe 
National Ownership Authority Leadership, Control, Agency, Power, 
Responsibility, Independence, Sovereignty, 
Strength, Voice 
Intrusion Interference, Dictate, Manipulation, Blame, 
Neo-colonialism, Force, Outsider 
Frailty Futility, Weakness, Failure 
Camaraderie Friendship, Support, Assistance, Nurture, 
Coordination, Cooperation, Competition  
International 
frameworks 
International documents, UN resolutions 




Communication, Consultation, Transparency, 
Coordination, Cooperation 
Obfuscation Concealment, Exclusion, Disconnect 
Sub-state groups Youth, Syrians inside Syria, On the ground, 
Minority groups, Religious groups, South 
Yemen and Southerners, Regional or 
geographic groups, Women, Newcomers, 
Political elite, Civil Society, Stakeholders, 
Pluralism, Diversity, Comprehensive  
 
A more detailed version of this table is included in Appendix G. The version there includes 
illustrative fragments of text to accompany each code, offering further insight into how I 
approached, understood, organised and analysed the data gathered.  
 
Why were these themes selected for analysis? How do they align with the operationalisation 
of identity developed in Chapter Two, and how will they be deployed to assess the three 
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hypotheses formulated in Chapter Three? It will be recalled that, over the course of the 
following three chapters, I will evaluate and offer a response to the following three hypotheses: 
 
1. Conflict parties may seek to legitimise their identities through participating in 
mediation. 
2. Mediators can use mediation to instigate normative change on the part of the conflict 
parties and this, in turn, can shape the identities of the conflict parties. 
3. The rationales used to justify inclusive peacemaking and the framing of those included 
can transform the identities of the conflict parties.  
 
The table on the following page outlines which theme will be used to assess which hypothesis, 
in which chapter, and will briefly comment on the links between the theme and the theoretical 
material and mediation scholarship charted in Chapters Two and Three. It should further be 
noted that a number of the themes will be used to assess more than one hypothesis.
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Table j) Connections between the themes, hypotheses, and conception of identity 
 
Theme: Hypothesis and 
chapter: 
Link to operationalisation of identity: 
Suffering 1 (Chapter 5) In Chapter Two, I noted that narratives of collective trauma frequently form the focal point of shared, 
constructed identities, drawing together individuals and shaping how members of a collective view the 
world and understand their relationships with others. 
Democracy 
and Reform 
1, 2 (Chapters 5 and 6) I consider democracy to be both an aspiration and a norm, whereas reform is characterised as an 
aspiration only. In Chapter Two, I explained that the deliberation of shared aspirations forms a crucial 
thread within group identities. I also argued that norms are intrinsically linked to identity construction, 
serving to both regulate and constitute identities while Chapter Three demonstrated that mediation 
scholars have started to consider how the promotion of norms within mediation may shape conflict 
parties’ identities.  
Discord 1, 3 (Chapters 5 and 7) The theme of discord contains within it evidence of Othering, the casting of external groups into 
counter-identities, together with evidence of antagonism between groups included in the peace 
processes. Furthermore, this theme also includes debates surrounding sub-state identity groups; in 
Chapter Two, I noted the varying levels of identity and the relevance of these debates to scholarship 
concerning group identities in Syria and Yemen.  
National 
Ownership 
2 (Chapter 6) National ownership is a process-related mediation norm and, as explored in Chapters Two and Three, 
norms have been argued to shape identities. Existing scholarship has not yet theorised how this norm 
may shape identities but, in Chapter Two, I noted the varying levels of identity and I will assess whether 
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the focus on the level of the national within this norm shaped the level of identity constructed in the 
mediation attempts.   
Inclusion 3 (Chapter 7) Inclusion is a process-related mediation norm. As explored in Chapter Three, scholars have theorised 




4.52 Reflecting on the method of thematic analysis 
 
Thematic analysis could be conducted entirely inductively;520 in other words, the codes, 
categories and themes generated by the researcher derive from the data rather than the 
researcher’s pre-defined questions or preconceptions. The approach taken here can be thought 
of instead as ‘semi-inductive’.521 At the point at which I undertook the method of thematic 
analysis, I had conducted prior research into the identities deemed by specialists to be of 
importance within Syria and Yemen. I had also conducted research into identities more broadly, 
with a specific focus on the manner in which they are conceptualised within the social 
constructivist approach to international relations. I therefore approached the data armed with 
this knowledge and having developed an overarching research question concerning mediation 
and identity. I also approached the data with three, broad and open, hypotheses.  
 
There are risks associated with the approach I took; it is possible that my ‘analytic field of 
vision’ was narrowed.522 However, it is also worth considering the extent to which researchers 
can truly ‘free themselves of their theoretical and epistemological commitments’.523 
Nevertheless, I attempted to limit my own biases by prioritising the generation of data-driven 
codes and, where possible, codes which use the precise words of my primary sources.524 I also 
devoted considerable time to immersion within the data in a bid to enhance my ‘sensitivity to 




At the outset of this chapter, I commented that I myself, as a researcher, am ‘located and 
shifting’527 within this study. Specifically, I view research as ‘a shared space, shaped by both 
researcher and participants’.528 Kim England has suggested ‘that we approach the unequal 
 
520 Ibid, pp. 83-4 
521 Braun and Clarke refer to this as a ‘theoretical’ thematic analysis (Ibid, p. 84) 
522 Braun and Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’, p. 86; Richard Boyatzsis, Transforming 
Qualitative Information (California: SAGE, 1998), p. 30 
523 Braun and Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’, p. 84 
524 Carol Rivas, ‘Coding and Analysing Qualitative Data’ in Clive Seale (ed.), Researching Society and Culture 
(London: SAGE, 2012), p. 372 
525 Ibid, p. 368 
526 Ibid 
527 Leavy, ‘Introduction’, p. 4 
528 Brian Bourke, ‘Positionality: Reflecting on the Research Process’, The Qualitative Report 19:33 (2014), p. 1 
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power relations in the research encounter by exposing the partiality of our perspective’, by 
locating ‘ourselves in our work’ and by reflecting ‘on how our location influences the questions 
we ask, how we conduct our research, and how we write our research’.529 My (perceived) views 
and values, linked, of course, to my (perceived) gender, race, class, socioeconomic status and 
educational background530 inevitably shaped the evolution of this study and, in particular, my 
interactions with my interlocutors. I will excavate, here, some of the ways in which my personal 
identity interacted with the research process. 
 
Firstly, I believe my ‘positionality’ guided, at least in part, the theoretical framework and case 
studies selected, the hypotheses and research question formulated, and the methods used. The 
decision to focus upon mediation and, more specifically, mediation of the Syrian and Yemeni 
civil wars, was influenced by a number of elements of my personal identity. For instance, my 
experience having lived and worked in Palestine at the time of the breakdown of the US-led 
mediation efforts between 2013 and 2014 drew me to the topic. Furthermore, my personal 
response to the Syrian and Yemeni conflicts drew me to the case studies: in other words, my 
wish to contribute to furthering our understanding not only of these devastating conflicts but 
also the failed efforts to bring to an end to the violence there. As I wrote my funding application, 
in late 2016, Syria and, to a lesser extent, Yemen, were rarely far from news headlines.  
 
I approached this study with committed openness and remained, throughout the preparation, 
data gathering and data analysis phases, attuned to the possibility that identity may not prove 
relevant within the two cases under investigation. Nevertheless, the concept of identity was 
always present, from the very outset of this project and I have, ultimately, forged an argument 
surrounding this idea. What drew me to study identity? I was partially drawn to the concept of 
identity due to its allegedly central role within the politics of the Middle East, an academic 
debate which I discussed in Chapter Two. That identity has faced relative neglect within 
mediation studies also encouraged my focus on the concept. However, I was doubtless also 
partially drawn to the concept, and to social constructivism, for reasons pertaining to my 
personal identity: I believe that my educational background in Music may have led me to feel 
an affinity with the concept of identity, an abstract, intangible idea often imbued with meaning 
through cultural practices. In addition, scholars have found that, in the field of international 
 
529 Kim England, ‘Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research’, The Professional 
Geographer 46:1 (1994), pp. 86-7 
530 Bourke, ‘Positionality: Reflecting on the Research Process’, p. 1 
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relations, ‘women are more likely [than men] to describe themselves as constructivists’. It has 
been suggested that this is because constructivism better reflects how women ‘experience the 
world’, capturing the constrained, intersubjective ‘choices’ which face women,531 and the 
manner in which these structures can mutate. It is therefore also possible that my gender guided 
my focus upon identity as conceptualised by social constructivists.  
 
Thirdly, it has also been found that women are more likely than men to conduct qualitative 
research;532 while a reason is not offered by the authors, as I have explored in this section, 
constructivist research is necessarily interpretivist. Concepts such as socially constructed 
identity cannot be captured well by quantitative methods. If more women are drawn to 
interpretivist paradigms, it is perhaps unsurprising that more women also conduct qualitative 
research. More precisely, the more egalitarian qualitative methods selected, in which research 
participants were encouraged to guide the conversations as far as possible, and in which an 
emphasis placed upon securing meaningful consent, are also connected to my own political 
values and views and, thus, my positionality. 
 
Furthermore, the ways in which my gender, race, class, socioeconomic status, educational 
background and professional experience were ‘read’ by my research participants, and the ways 
in which particular opinions and principles were then ascribed to me, must have shaped the 
information which my participants elected to reveal and the ways in which they framed it. 
Indeed, participants would frequently ask how I became intrigued by the topic under study or 
became interested in the ‘Middle East’, which often led to conversations surrounding my 
professional and personal experience in Palestine. In one memorable exchange, a participant 
extrapolated from this aspect of my identity that, due to my having lived in Nablus, in the West 
Bank, I must not only be left-wing and a member of the UK Labour Party but, moreover, that 
I was likely to be opposed to Western military intervention in Syria. This was a rare example 
in which an interlocutor articulated his assumptions surrounding my identity to me, but others 
must also have made judgements and this is likely, in turn, to have guided that which they felt 
secure in sharing. Moreover, it is possible that certain interlocutors felt more comfortable 
conversing with me, or that I felt more at ease holding interviews with them, due to elements 
of my identity; these dynamics, too, will have shaped the nature of the interviews. I attempted 
 




to reduce the effect of my presence as a far as possible, revealing little about myself and my 
own views on the topic under study and allowing the participants to lead the conversations; 
nevertheless, my institutional profile does outline my educational background and professional 
experience, and my appearance, native language and accent can disclose, or provide clues to, 
other aspects of my identity. I used neutral language, wore muted clothing, and had not 
published my views on the topic under study during the data collection phase; nevertheless, it 
is inevitable that my identity, and the identities of my interlocutors, shaped our interactions, 
and that the ways in which I was sited within the project fluctuated depending on the context 
and the interviewee.533  
 
When analysing the data, and when deciding how to respond to the hypotheses formulated, I 
selected themes which seemed, to me, to be most prevalent within the data, and thus of greatest 
significance to the voices represented. I also selected themes which seemed most appropriate 
to the theoretical framework selected, and to the hypotheses developed. However, there is, of 
course, a possibility that my selection, and my interpretation of these themes, were guided at 
least partially by my identity. As examples, there is a possibility that my professional 
experience working in an international organisation led to my being more attuned to the subtle 
ways in which such institutions wield power, and thus more likely to notice remarks made in 
this vein within the dataset; or I may have better understood, and thus prioritised, the views of 
those interlocutors who shared identity traits and values with me. I attempted to mitigate against 
my own biases, continuously reflecting, during the analysis and writing phases, on the possible 
ways in which my identity might be guiding me towards certain findings. I also sought to 
reduce this limitation by maintaining a strong connection with the data: the analysis phase can 
be described as iterative as I returned multiple times to the raw data to assess whether the codes, 
categories and themes derived were indeed coherent and valid. I also ensured numerous 
quotations were interwoven within my analysis, allowing readers to consider whether they 
agreed with my interpretations. Nevertheless, I would describe this limitation as inescapable, 





533 Lynne Haney, ‘Homeboys, Babies, Men in Suits: The State and the Reproduction of Male Dominance’, 





This chapter represents the final preliminary section of this thesis. I have described the four 
steps undertaken to generate the following three empirical chapters. I have explored in depth 
the process of semi-structured interviewing, outlining the precise approach I took and the 
sample of interviewees consulted. I have described the press conferences transcribed and the 
official documentation gathered. Lastly, I have explained the method of thematic analysis. I 
have been transparent in exposing the various limitations inherent to my approach, and the 
means by which I have attempted to mitigate against these weaknesses, while I have also 
explored my own personal identity, and the manner in which my positionality may have 
interacted with the data collected and the analysis produced. Throughout the data collection 
and data analysis phases, I scrutinised my motives, aims and approach, reflecting upon the data 
gathered, their meanings, the impact of my project upon interlocutors, and my broader 























Chapter 5. Mediation, Identity Construction, and Legitimacy 
 
[The] underlying conflict is about control of the Syrian state and the future of the Syrians as 
a people.534 
 




In this chapter, I will forge three interconnected arguments, all of which will combine to 
support my overall contention that mediation may shape identity. More precisely, my claims 
will demonstrate that mediation can form an arena in which mediators and conflict parties 
engage in processes of identity construction and, furthermore, that the very occurrence of 
mediation can induce these processes. In this chapter, I will analyse three themes detected 
within the dataset: Suffering, Democracy and Reform, and Discord. In Chapter Three, I 
extrapolated the following hypothesis from Aggestam’s work for investigation in this chapter: 
conflict parties may seek to legitimise their identities through participating in mediation. In 
response, I will build upon Aggestam’s contention by proposing three further ways in which 
mediation, identity construction, and legitimacy, according to my interpretation of the data 
gathered, can intertwine.  
 
Firstly, I will argue that, in stages I and II of the Geneva Peace Process, the Syrian opposition, 
in partnership with the official mediator and members of the international community, co-
constructed two fresh facets of the Syrian national identity. These facets present the Syrian 
national experience as being distinguished by suffering, and the nationally held aspiration as 
being a transition to a democratic political system. My argument is that, having reimagined the 
Syrian people in this manner, the Syrian opposition not only demonstrated their compassion 
for, and understanding of, the Syrian people but also then aligned their movement with this 
vision of the Syrian nation, emphasising that their members had, likewise, faced persecution 
and a long struggle for democracy. This indicates that, in the context of civil war mediation, 
conflict parties and mediators can wield processes of identity construction as a means to 
 
534 M, S, TI (2) 
535 Jamal Benomar in UNSC, ‘6878th Meeting S/PV.6878’ (4 December 2012) 
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legitimise a particular conflict party and to justify its claims of representation. In turn, this 
fortifies my fundamental argument that identity can be shaped within mediation. 
 
Secondly, I will claim that mediators and conflict parties can reimagine the identities of the 
nations in civil conflict in a bid to legitimise the intervention of a third party. I will draw, once 
more, on the presentation of victimhood, by both the Syrian opposition and the international 
mediators, as being the unifying experience of the Syrian people; I will then argue that this 
construction may have served to rationalise and defend both consenting to, and launching, a 
process of third-party mediation. The perceived need for third-party involvement may have 
therefore, at least in part, inspired the shape of the national identity imagined during the peace 
process; again, this argument therefore upholds my overall claim that mediation can shape 
identity. However, in this second section, I will also draw upon data concerning the Yemeni 
case study. While the mediators implicated in this second process did seem to envision the 
Yemeni people as being united by suffering, the Yemeni voices represented within the dataset 
appear to offer resistance. This suggests that processes of legitimising mediation through 
identity construction may not necessarily proceed smoothly, and may be met with challenge on 
the part of the conflict parties. 
 
Thirdly, I will show how conflict parties may construct their identities against an ‘Other’ within 
a mediation process, suggesting that this may take place in an attempt to legitimise their 
movements’ claims of representation and ambitions to rule. Here, I will draw on the Syrian 
case once more, showing that both the Syrian government delegates at Geneva II, and the 
Syrian opposition members with whom I held interviews, may have engaged in practices of 
Othering. I will suggest that, in the direct negotiations at Geneva II, the Syrian government 
delegates sought to castigate the Syrian opposition members and their supporters, condemning 
their lack of ‘Syrian-ness’ and implying, therefore, that the Syrian government boasted the right 
to speak on behalf of, and to legitimately rule over, Syrians. However, the manner in which 
Syrian opposition members described these heated exchanges within the interviews I held may 
also represent an attempt on behalf of these interlocutors to similarly rebuke the Syrian 
government, and to characterise their representatives as both vicious and unreasonable. This 
narrative, in turn, may have been promoted in order to imply their own faction’s more 
peaceable and rational nature, a further attempt, therefore, at legitimisation. Thus, once more, 





Finally, I will briefly outline the broader implications of these three arguments. I will reflect 
on the level of the identities characterised; their differences from and similarities to the 
identities explored in existing scholarship concerning group identification in Syria and Yemen; 
the strength of the identities imagined; and the possible repercussions of my analysis on our 
understanding of the relationship between the mediators and the conflict parties and, in 
particular, the perceived impartiality of the mediators. It is worth mentioning that, in this 
chapter, I will examine narratives surrounding the victimhood of the Syrian opposition 
movement, the Syrian people, and the Yemeni people. The intention is not to deny the suffering 
of these three groups. The Syrians and the Yemenis have, unquestionably, endured brutality.536 
However, we must nevertheless examine why it is this facet of the Syrian and Yemeni national 
experiences which was emphasised, within the data gathered, to the exclusion of other possible 
strands within the context of the two mediation efforts under examination in this thesis. 
 
5.2 Legitimising conflict parties by reimagining the nation 
 
5.21 Who are the Syrian people? A nation held hostage 
 
In Chapter Two, I operationalised the concept of collective identity; following Risse, I 
suggested that identities are constructed as actors ‘make sense of who they are and what they 
want’,537 and as their peers contribute to such debates. These ‘collective narratives’, of the past 
and the future, coalesce to form the character of groups, to constitute their ‘images of 
individuality and distinctiveness’.538 I also proposed that collective trauma may be particularly 
likely to draw individuals together, and to inspire a sense of commonality. Building upon these 
claims, here I will assess the theme of Suffering. I will argue that, within the dataset, those 
voices represented sought to portray the Syrian people as being bound together in victimhood, 
and that this national experience was depicted both in the context of, and in later reflections 
on, the mediation process. To begin, according to those members of the Syrian opposition with 
whom I held interviews, the bond which unites the ‘Syrian people’ is suffering at the hands of 
 
536 No author, ‘Syria: Events of 2020’, Human Rights Watch [online], available from: 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/syria [last accessed: 8 April 2021]; No author, 
‘Yemen: Events of 2020’, Human Rights Watch [online], available from: https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2021/country-chapters/yemen [last accessed: 28 June 2021] 
537 Risse, A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres, p. 20 
538 Jepperson et al., ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’, p. 59 
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the al-Asad government. In their words, the Syrian people, imagined as a unified collective, 
are ‘refugees’539 and ‘detainees’.540 They have been ‘kidnapped’,541 ‘killed’,542 starved,543 
abandoned,544 ‘tortured’545 and ‘slaughtered’;546 they are ‘wounded’,547 and they have ‘lost 
everything’.548 They have been exiled,549 driven from their homes,550 and they have faced 
‘atrocities’,551 ‘massacres’,552 chemical weapons attacks,553 ‘repression’554 and ‘violence’.555 
Moreover, they have endured this ‘injustice’556 and ‘tyranny’557 for decades.558 They are, it is 
emphasised, ‘victims’.559 In the statements, press conferences and speeches released and 
delivered by the SNC and SOC during the years of Geneva I and II, the Syrians, once more 
invoked as one, are characterised in a similar fashion.  Much of the same imagery and 
terminology are deployed but, additionally, the nation is also characterised as an ‘unarmed’560 
 
539 SO, DaGII (4); SO, DaGII (3) 
540 SO, DaGII (2); SO, DaGII (4); SO, DaGII (5) 
541 SO, DaGII (4) 
542 SO, DaGII (4); SO, DaGII (3); SO, DaGII (5); SO (4) 
543 SO, DaGII (2) 
544 SO (4) 
545 SO, DaGII (4); SO, DaGII (6); moreover, a third interview participant claimed that ‘there were hundreds of 
thousands of political prisoners, there were those they didn’t even have the space to torture’ (SO (4)). 
546 SO, DaGII (3) 
547 SO, DaGII (4) 
548 Ibid 
549 As one interviewee worded it, ‘people are scattered here and there’ (SO, DaGII (2)). 
550 SO (2) 
551 One participant used this term twice, clarifying that it was al-Asad who had committed these atrocities (SO 
(2)). 
552 SO, DaGII (5); SO (5) 
553 SO (2); SO, DaGII (2); SO (6) 
554 One interviewee mentioned this twice in our conversation: (SO (2)); moreover, a second remarked that al-
Asad ‘closed all the forums, all the Damascus Spring forums, and some of these people were put in jail’ (SO, 
DaGII (3)); and a third interlocutor commented that ‘the response from the government became more bloody 
and more severe, there were hundreds of thousands of political prisoners’ (SO (4)). 
555 SO (2); SO (7). Moreover, a second mentioned the ‘bombing [of] civilians’ (SO, DaGII (6)); while one 
interlocutor used the phrase, ‘under these attacks’ (SO, DaGII (2)). 
556 SO, DaGII (3) 
557 SO, DaGII (5) 
558 SO, DaGII (3); SO, DaGII (1); SO, DaGII (5); SO (5) 
559 One interlocutor spoke of the ‘victims of the regime’ (SO (1)); a second noted that ‘the UN said, very clearly, 
that this was the worst humanitarian situation since the Second World War’ (SO, DaGII (3)); a third interlocutor 
mentioned the following: ‘this regime should be in court, tried against the war crimes it is committing’ (SO, 
DaGII (2)); while one interlocutor stated that ‘the humanitarian implications have been disastrous’ (SO (4)) 
560 SOC, ‘President Ahmad al-Jarba’s Speech, Geneva, Switzerland’ (23 January 2014); SNC, ‘President of 
SNC Delivers a Speech at Friends of Syria Conference’ (2012) 
136 
 
and ‘innocent’561 people in need of ‘protection’,562 ‘under siege’,563 ‘attack[ed]’,564 
‘humiliated’565 by a ‘military dictatorship’,566 facing a ‘murderous onslaught’567 and entrapped 
in ‘a living hell’.568 Indeed, many of the SOC official statements conclude with the phrase, ‘We 
ask for mercy for our martyrs, health for our wounded, and freedom for our detainees’.569 
 
Furthermore, during the interviews, Syrian participants would recount instances in which they 
sought to emphasise this alleged strand of the Syrian character during the negotiations, within 
the halls of the Palais. For instance, one described to me how she ‘was asking, all the 
time…appealing to the regime to just discuss humanitarian needs, detainees, those who had 
been kidnapped, ceasefires’.570 A further interviewee deemed it particularly significant that ‘the 
official representatives of Bashar al-Asad were listening to us talking about state-sponsored 
terrorism, detainees, killings and the criminal nature of the security apparatus…the experiences 
of the Syrian people under the regime since the Bath party took over in 1963’, later remarking 
on the way in which al-Jarba, in a speech delivered in Montreux, ‘showed images of the 
massacres’, commenting that ‘we used it [Geneva II] to raise awareness’.571 Indeed, one 
interlocutor claimed that it was this facet of the Syrian national identity, the suffering of those 
who remained in Syria, which motivated the very participation of SOC in the peace process: 
‘we did not feel we [had] the luxury to say no to sitting with these criminals, if I say no then I 




561 SOC, ‘Statement from the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces to Syrian People’ 
(23 January 2013); SOC, ‘Demands of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces’ (20 
April 2013); SOC, ‘Syrian Coalition President Holds First Meeting with JSR Brahimi and Urges UN to Support 
Political Solution in Syria’ (25 September 2013); SOC, ‘UN-Arab League Envoy Brahimi Should Maintain 
Neutrality’ (7 November 2013); SOC, ‘President Ahmad al-Jarba’s Speech, Geneva, Switzerland’  
562 SNC, ‘Arab League Initiative’ (n.d.) 
563 UN Live, ‘Syrian Opposition Coalition Representatives – Press Conference’ (25 January 2014) 
564 Ibid 
565 SNC, ‘President of SNC Delivers a Speech at Friends of Syria Conference’  
566 Ibid. SOC also used similar phrases: ‘murderous regime’ (SOC, ‘Statement from the National Coalition of 
Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces to Syrian People’) and ‘tyrannical regime’ (SOC, ‘Mission of Special 
Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi’ (29 October 2013)) 
567 SOC, ‘Statement from the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces to Syrian People’ 
568 SOC, ‘President Ahmad Al-Jarba’s Speech at the End of First Round of Negotiations in Geneva’ (31 January 
2014) 
569 This phrase features in twelve SOC press releases. 
570 SO, DaGII (4) 
571 SO, DaGII (5) 
572 SO, DaGII (2) 
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Within the interviews I held with international mediators and officials involved in the peace 
talks during these years, and with close observers of the mediation efforts, I detected far fewer 
occasions on which my participants would feel able to characterise the entire Syrian people. 
Nevertheless, of those who did, a number did tell, once more, a narrative of suffering: they 
would mention the brutality experienced by Syrians,573 the deaths,574 hurt,575 political 
repression,576 torture,577 displacement578 and destruction witnessed,579 together with the 
chemical weapons attacks inflicted.580 More overtly, one participant, an expert in ‘Track II’ 
mediation, mentioned to me that they (sing.) had once been asked by UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) officials, ‘what unifies Syrians?’ This interlocutor told me that their 
(sing.) response went as follows: ‘the legacy of pain, victimhood, the legacy of conflict’.581 
Furthermore, one US official recalled how she attempted to persuade members of SOC to 
attend the peace talks by reminding them that, ‘regardless of the result, you would have all the 
international community descend, the whole world would be watching, and you can highlight 
the plight of the Syrians.’582 It would seem to have been a strategy, then, encouraged by at least 
one official, for members of SOC to characterise the Syrians as ‘suffering’, specifically in the 
international arena of the negotiations. 
 
Moreover, within press conferences delivered by international actors at the UN involved in the 
mediation attempt, these officials and politicians seem far more willing to depict the Syrian 
nation as a whole, and their portrayal overwhelmingly overlaps with that of members of the 
Syrian opposition. The word ‘suffering’,583 often accompanied by the qualifiers ‘immense’584 
and ‘unspeakable’,585 are uttered over and over, and it is stressed that the Syrians are 
 
573 One international official remarked that ‘there was fighting on the ground, it intensified’ (M, S, TI (1)); a 
second mentioned violence, together with the ‘bombs raining down on opposition areas’ (Anonymous (1)) 
574 M, S, TI (1) 
575 M, S, TI (3) 
576 M, S, TII (4) 
577 O, S (1) 
578 Ibid 
579 Anonymous (1); M, S, TI (1) 
580 M, S, TI (1) 
581 M, Y, TII (3) 
582 M, S, TI (1)  
583 This term is used twenty-five times in press conferences delivered at the UN. 
584 UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Media Stakeout’ (11 January 2013); 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference’ (31 January 2014) (in 
this press conference, Brahimi also describes the suffering endured as ‘unspeakable’ and ‘unacceptable’); UN 
Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference’ (15 February 2014) 
585 UN Live, ‘John Kerry (USA) – Press Conference at Geneva Conference on Syria’ (22 January 2014); UN 
Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference’ (31 January 2014) 
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‘innocent’,586 ‘defenceless’587 ‘civilians’.588 The historical nature of the abuse faced is 
mentioned on one occasion by Brahimi,589 while the unity of the population, their connection 
with Syria, and their collective trauma, are alluded to by the then-US Secretary of State, John 
Kerry, who describes the ‘entire nation’ as being held ‘hostage’.590 Brahimi, too, feels able to 
speak on behalf of the internal thoughts of Syrians as a whole: ‘I think we know a little bit what 
the people of Syria are thinking, the people of Syria are thinking, please get something going 
that will stop this nightmare and, and this injustice that is inflicted on the Syrian people’.591 By 
framing the characterisation in this way, Brahimi removes himself as a constructor, and appears 
to be merely repeating the Syrians’ own conception of themselves.  
 
Finally, within official documents and statements released by the UN and the FoS, it should be 
noted that there are fewer attempts to depict the Syrian experience as cohesive, and as being 
marked by victimhood. UN resolutions and the Six Point Plan do lament and condemn the 
violence and bloodshed within Syria,592 and call for urgent humanitarian assistance,593 thus 
painting a similarly bleak impression of life in the country. However, the documents, 
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statements and speeches of the FoS and its members tend to be more direct in framing this 
suffering as a distinctive characteristic of all Syrians: for instance, William Hague, the then-
UK Foreign Secretary, at the FoS meeting in Tunis in February 2012, claimed that, ‘today, we 
must show that we will not abandon the Syrian people in their darkest hour’;594 moreover, the 
statements of FoS are also more explicit in their apportioning of blame: for instance, this is 
‘suffering at the hands of the regime’, maintained Hague in 2013 at a London 11 gathering.595 
My initial argument, therefore, is that a particular strand of the Syrian collective identity seems 
to have been built, propagated, and quite possibly believed in, within stages I and II of the 
Geneva Peace Process, and within reflections on this mediation attempt. The thread constructed 
characterises the Syrian people as being joined together in suffering, and there are indications 
that the mediation environment was targeted as an arena in which this vision of the Syrian 
identity should be emphasised. 
 
5.22 What do the Syrian people seek? Democracy and the ousting of al-Asad 
 
In addition to the argument that collective identities are formed as states make sense of ‘who 
they are’, I have also posited that members of a group are brought together as they consider 
‘what they want’, and as those external to the group influence, and offer their perspective on, 
this matter. In this second sub-section, I will claim that a clear, national interest is voiced 
repeatedly by both the Syrian opposition and those actors involved in mediating the conflict: it 
is claimed that democracy is the universally-held aspiration of Syrians and, relatedly, it is also 
often claimed that the fall of the al-Asad government is desired by the nation. Beginning with 
members of the Syrian opposition, and their conception of the collective aims of the Syrian 
people, as one of my interviewees phrased it: ‘each Syrian [was] working towards the same 
goal. A fight to choose their President and their Prime Minister [emphasis added]’.596 Another 
linked ‘Syrians’, broadly defined, with this goal, arguing that ‘Syria is about the Syrians – it is 
about, how can we move the country from this thuggish mafia to rule of a state. Parliamentary, 
presidential.’597 A further interlocutor stated that ‘Syrians, we have lost everything just to see 
democracy, freedom.’598 Such claims are repeated far more frequently, and in stronger terms, 
 
594 UK Government, ‘“We Must Show That We Will Not Abandon the Syrian People in Their Darkest Hour”’ 
(24 February 2012) 
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within the press conferences, official statements and speeches of the SNC and SOC. For 
instance, in a speech delivered by then-President of the SNC, Burhan Ghalioun, at an FoS 
conference in Tunis in 2012, this narrative is constructed emphatically. At one point, he argues 
the following: 
 
What the Syrian people seek – all the Syrian people – is a government that knows the 
true meaning of accountability and responsibility. What the Syrian people seek is a 
government bound by the rule of law and under which all citizens of all segments of 
society are free and equal in their rights and national obligations. The Syrian people, 
all the Syrian people, want an end to the rule of a mafia family and the establishment 
of a forward-looking, democratic, civil state in this new era…A system of government 
under which all Syrians have equal opportunities… [emphasis added].599 
 
This repetition of the phrase, ‘the Syrian people’, qualified twice with the aside, ‘all the Syrian 
people’, is marked, and we can observe once more that it is claimed that this national collective 
seeks a liberal democratic system, a system which cannot include al-Asad. In the official 
statements released by SOC, which include reproductions of speeches delivered at FoS 
conferences and at Geneva by Ahmad al-Jarba, President of the Coalition between the years 
2013 and 2014, the alleged ambitions of the Syrian people as a whole are also frequently 
conveyed. These hopes are often prefaced with the word ‘legitimate’,600 as though they should 
not be questioned, and the aims are similar to those stated above: a ‘democracy’ is continually 
mentioned,601 together with ‘freedom’,602 ‘justice’603 and ‘universal rights’.604 This is also 
 
599 SNC, ‘President of SNC Delivers a Speech at Friends of Syria Conference’  
600 SOC, ‘UN Vote is a Clear Message: Assad Must End Brutal Suppression of Syria’s Democratic Uprising’ 
(15 May 2013); SOC, ‘Mission of Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi’; SOC, ‘The Assad Regime’s Contradictory 
Remarks on Geneva II’ (6 November 2013); SOC, ‘The Assad Regime Renounces the Very Basis for Geneva 
II’ (28 November 2013) 
601 SOC, ‘UN Vote is a Clear Message: Assad Must End Brutal Suppression of Syria’s Democratic Uprising’; 
SOC, ‘Syrian Coalition President Holds First Meeting with JSR Brahimi and Urges UN to Support Political 
Solution in Syria’; SOC, ‘Mission of Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi’; SOC, ‘The Assad Regime Renounces 
the Very Basis for Geneva II’; SOC, ‘Syrian Coalition Calls on UNSC to Pass Resolution on Humanitarian 
Access’ (11 February 2014) 
602 SOC, ‘Friends of Syria Meeting in Doha’ (24 June 2013); SOC, ‘Summary of Mr. Al-Jarba Speech Delivered 
to the Expanded Friends of Syria at the United Nations’ (27 September 2013); SOC, ‘Mission of Special Envoy 
Lakhdar Brahimi’; SOC, ‘Geneva II is a Chance for the International Community to Prove Its Seriousness’ (26 
November 2013); SOC, ‘The Assad Regime Renounces the Very Basis for Geneva II’; SOC, ‘Syrian Coalition 
Calls on UNSC to Pass Resolution on Humanitarian Access’  
603 SOC, ‘Mission of Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi’ 
604 SOC, ‘Summary of Mr. Al-Jarba Speech Delivered to the Expanded Friends of Syria at the United Nations’  
141 
 
framed as a means of escaping ‘decades of oppression and exclusion’;605 in other words, it is 
claimed that the Syrian people seek to escape the grip of their repressive government.   
 
Within none of my interviews with international mediators were the ambitions and desires of 
the Syrian people as a whole stated. In press conferences delivered by international actors, 
however, both tentative and more direct statements are made in this vein. For instance, then-
UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, claims that ‘the legitimate demands of the Syrian people’ 
are ‘the same demands that people across the Arab world have been making for more than a 
year now’,606 thus implying the Syrians seek democracy and the ousting of their government. 
Annan is both direct, describing the ‘aspirations of the Syrian people’ to be ‘democratic’,607 
and more guarded in his claims: 
 
…we must move quickly forward on the political process to meet the aspirations of the 
Syrian people. We must commence a comprehensive political dialogue between the 
Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition. This must enable 
a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political system in which citizens 
are equal regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities, or beliefs.608 
 
In this representative passage, Annan moves from expressing his desire to deliver the hopes of 
Syrians to claiming that there needs to be a transition to democracy in the country, thus 
implying the two are one and the same. Kerry also feels confident in describing at length the 
‘hopes’ of the ‘Syrian people’ ‘for the future of their country’; once more, he mentions the need 
for the freedom to protest and resist, and states that ‘the resolution to this crisis cannot be about 
one man’s insistence or one family’s insistence about clinging to power’;609 the removal of al-
Asad is therefore once more claimed to be longed for by all Syrians. In 2013, Brahimi, makes 
a more understated claim, and also displays uncertainty, even as he voices it, that he might have 




606 UN Live, ‘Kofi Annan, Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League, on the Situation in Syria – 
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…my feeling is that the Syrians – I think there is, there is near unanimity and, no, not 
unanimity, but certainly a large, large consensus among Syrians – whether they are in, 
actively engaged against the government or not – they all want to give up this 
presidential system and have a parliamentary system.610 
 
Brahimi here stumbles over his words, and corrects himself, before presenting the desires of 
Syrians to be an ousting of al-Asad as President and the introduction of a parliamentary system 
(presumably a democratically elected parliament). Nevertheless, Brahimi grows in confidence 
in his ability to express the interests of the Syrian people during this period; as the chief 
mediator brought the first round of Geneva II to a close, he claimed that ‘both sides understand 
that the Syrian people are longing for a genuinely democratic Syria, where governance is 
transparent and accountable and based on human rights and the rule of law’.611   
 
The hopes of the Syrian people tend not to be expressed directly within the UN resolutions 
crafted during this period of mediation. However, the Final Communiqué of the Action Group 
for Syria, which was convened by Annan, describes in detail the alleged desires of ‘the people 
of the Syrian Arab Republic’. These are claimed to be a ‘genuinely democratic and pluralistic’ 
state, a ‘multiparty democracy’ in which there exists compliance with ‘international standards 
on human rights’ and ‘equal opportunities and chances’ are offered for all.612 Moreover, the 
statements released and speeches made following gatherings of the FoS are forthright in their 
ability to present and promote the ambitions of Syrians as a national collective. As the Chair 
of the FoS meeting in February 2012 succinctly phrased it in their [sing.] conclusions, ‘the 
aspirations of the Syrian people [are] for dignity, freedom, peace, reform, democracy, 
prosperity and stability’.613 Later in 2012, it is mentioned that the Friends are determined to 
‘facilitate a Syrian-led political transition leading to a civil, democratic, pluralistic, independent 
and free state…one which determines its own future based on the collective will of its 
people’.614 If this transition is ‘Syrian-led’, and if it will lead to the outcomes listed, this 
phrasing implies that the described state is that which the Syrians desire. This foregone 
conclusion is repeated by Hague in April 2012615 but, beyond 2012, we no longer see 
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declarations of the desires of the Syrians in FoS statements. To summarise, my interpretation 
is that, within the dataset, the longings of Syrians, presented as unified, are articulated within 
the context of, and within reflections on, the initial years of the Geneva Peace Process as being 
for democracy and, in the rhetoric of certain actors, for the overthrow of al-Asad. This is 
propagated by both the Syrian opposition together with a number of the international actors 
involved in the peace process.  
 
5.23 The Syrian opposition and the Syrian people: Discursively united as one 
 
We have seen how the members of the Syrian opposition and those involved in mediating the 
conflict represented within my dataset persistently painted the Syrian people as suffering, and 
as seeking both democracy and the removal of al-Asad. This sub-section will show that, 
simultaneously, the members of the Syrian opposition captured within this study sought to 
associate their movement with this reimagined version of the Syrian national identity: suffering 
and democracy were claimed to be central to the opposition and, in particular, their experiences 
and aims within the mediation efforts.  
 
However, firstly I would like to suggest that the previous sub-sections have demonstrated the 
frequency with which members of the Syrian opposition would feel able to make statements 
purportedly on behalf of the Syrian people as a nation within the mediation efforts, and within 
reflections on the peace talks. My interview participants and the members of the opposition 
represented in the other data sources analysed seem to be communicating their alleged capacity 
to understand, and speak on behalf of, all Syrians, a rhetorical move which associated their 
organisations, and aims, with the Syrian nation. This thus legitimised the SNC’s and SOC’s 
aspirations to govern. My interpretation is that the opposition was keen to cement an image of 
its movement as being responsible for highlighting, and alleviating, the suffering of the Syrian 
people; in turn, this placed the Syrian nation and its people seemingly at the forefront of the 
opposition’s strategy and narrative, a clear attempt to claim an association with this reworked 
version of the Syrian national identity. Supporting my analysis is the portrayal by one of my 
participants of a particularly moving moment within the talks at Geneva II: 
 
…for example, at one point – there was an incident with Yarmouk refugee camp – it 
was under siege – we brought a photo of a new-born baby – he was dead because of the 
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famine – you could see his ribs, he was really thin…we printed out the picture and 
handed it to him [Bashar al-Jaafari, Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab 
Republic to the UN]…when we took the picture out, we were trying to get a glimpse of 
their humanity, to see if they were still Syrian, still one of us – but there was nothing – 
they put their heads down to avoid looking at the picture [emphasis added].616 
 
The same interlocutor later elaborated on this point, linking this moment even more specifically 
to the notion of a Syrian national identity: ‘that’s why I told you, we showed the baby, from 
the camp, from Yarmouk – we were aware of the Syrian identity – we were looking for a 
glimmer of that light – they [members of the government delegation] failed, they did not have 
the feeling’.617 My interviewee thus connected compassion with ‘Syrian-ness’ in a bid, I argue, 
to deploy identity construction as a means of legitimisation within the peace negotiations. 
 
Secondly, my interlocutors would frequently recount their own personal suffering, and that of 
their family members and activist colleagues. Thus, a participant described to me, in graphic 
detail, the treatment of their (sing.) friend and colleague, a fellow activist and peacemaker: 
‘they detained the peacemakers, the activists – and then they used to put cigarettes on their 
bodies while torturing them. I had a friend, I will show you a picture of his body, what they did 
to him’.618 Other interviewees mentioned their own arrests, and the manner in which the al-
Asad government began to target them and their families, particularly following the 2011 
uprisings: ‘I was detained, of course – it was mentioned that they [the Syrian government] 
would kill me’;619 ‘and then I had to hide, to lay low – people in the regime, they started to 
create websites, pushing for my killing, saying that I needed to be killed, that I was an agent 
for Mossad’;620 ‘I had to flee with my two children – they said they wanted to kill me’;621 and, 
for one Syrian opposition member, who had long been forced to leave Syria, ‘they jailed, 
detained my brother and tortured him’.622 Indeed, many emphasised the personal sacrifices they 
had made by even participating in the opposition, and in the negotiations, stressing how 
difficult it was to take part. ‘I want to put in your mind how difficult is it to have our role’,623 
 
616 SO, DaGII (2) 
617 Ibid 
618 SO, DaGII (6) 
619 SO, DaGII (2)  
620 Ibid 
621 SO, DaGII (4) 
622 SO (4); see also: SO (3) 
623 SO, DaGII (6) 
145 
 
commented one of my participants, while one evocatively claimed that, ‘when you come out 
of these negotiations, me and many others – our stomachs, our guts, felt like they were shredded 
and punished – it was very hard to feel like this’.624 Al-Jarba, in a speech delivered at the end 
of the first round, affirmed that participating in the mediation efforts ‘was not an easy task’, 
that sitting across from the regime was akin to ‘drinking from a poisoned chalice while the 
criminal was killing our women, children, young men and women, and elderly’.625  
 
Thirdly, the majority of the members of the Syrian opposition I interviewed went to great 
lengths to emphasise not only the historic legacy of the opposition within Syria but also the 
efforts they had expended over the years to promote their cause. For instance, one member of 
the opposition, when I invited her to describe her role within the SNC and SOC during the 
years of this mediation attempt, gave me an extensive description of her history of activism 
and, moreover, her family ties to the opposition;626 another provided a great deal of detail on 
his personal involvement in, and support for, the Damascus Spring and the Damascus 
Declaration;627 while a third interviewee remarked, in response to the same question, that ‘I 
think it would be good to give you a little background about myself and how I was in women’s 
rights and a human rights activist before 2011’.628 Lastly, one senior member of SOC spent the 
vast majority of our interview narrating his years-long involvement in activism, offering merely 
cursory details on his involvement in the peace talks.629 My interlocutors would also emphasise 
the democratic qualities of SOC; for instance, a number stressed that the way in which their 
delegation engaged during the mediation attempt allowed a number of members of the team to 
present ideas. This was contrasted with the behaviour of the delegation representing al-Asad: 
‘only one person from the regime spoke…so you could see two different mentalities there. One 
backed a dictatorial regime with one voice, one single message – but we had a pluralistic 
delegation, with different views combined.’630  
 
Therefore, I would like to propose that, within the early stages of the Geneva Peace Process, 
having co-created a newly imagined vision of the Syrian nation, an image distinguished by 
suffering and an aspiration for democracy, the members of the Syrian opposition then sought 
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to align their movement with this construction, and to emphasise their compassion for the 
Syrian people. My suggestion is that this represented an attempt to legitimise one particular 
conflict party: the delegates representing the Syrian opposition. My conclusion therefore differs 
from that of Aggestam, suggesting a further way in which a search for legitimacy may drive 
identity construction within mediation. While Aggestam finds that conflict parties may seek 
recognition from their opponents of the narratives which constitute their identities, I have found 
that conflict parties may seek legitimacy by reconstructing the identity of the nation they wish 
to represent, and then associating their movement with this construction. I have also found that 
mediators, and implicated members of the international community, may contribute to this 
identity building, and legitimisation, process. More fundamentally, this initial claim, built 
through an assessment of the themes of Suffering, and Democracy and Reform, supports my 
overall contention that identity may be shaped within mediation.  
 
5.3 Legitimising mediation by reimagining the identities of the nations at war 
 
The initial section of this chapter explored how the Syrian people were presented in the dataset 
during, and within reflections upon, the initial stages of the Geneva peace process. The first 
sub-section claimed that the collective experience of Syrians was declared, by both the voices 
of the international community and the Syrian opposition captured within the dataset, to be that 
of profound suffering. Then, I suggested that this construction may have served to legitimise 
the Syrian opposition; they, too, presented suffering as being central to their experiences as 
individuals and as a movement, thus rhetorically linking their faction with the image of the 
Syrian people which was built.  
 
In this section, on the basis of the evidence already explored, I will make a second claim. I 
would like to suggest that constructing the Syrian people as being bound together by 
victimhood within the Geneva Peace Process may have served further forms of legitimisation. 
Firstly, this construction may have operated as a means for the Syrian opposition to legitimise 
consenting to third-party mediation. Secondly, this construction may have served to legitimise 
the international community launching, and expending a great deal of effort upon, the peace 
process. Indeed, I would propose that, within stages I and II of the Geneva Peace Process, it is 
possible to perceive a process of identity construction functioning as ‘subjectification’. 
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Drawing on Robert Benford and David Snow,631 Roger Mac Ginty has defined 
‘subjectification’ as ‘the perceptual construction and discursive framing of individuals and 
societies to suit wider goals’, arguing that, ‘in a liberal peace context,632 political actors will 
construct a narrative or narratives that justifies a particular set of actions’.633 He highlights that, 
through subjectification, citizens of a given state may be rendered ‘mono-dimensional’, and 
cast in roles ‘subordinate to those engaged in the recasting: victims, grateful beneficiaries, 
innocent bystanders’.634 Subjectification is not a process reserved for external actors: as Mac 
Ginty claims, ‘virtually all actors – internal and external – engage in some form of 
subjectification in order to understand their social environment and to legitimize their role in 
it’.635 Based upon the evidence explored in the previous section, the Syrian people, and the 
Syrian opposition, appear to have been cast as disempowered victims, in desperate need of 
rescue. Notably, this construction arose as the result of harmonious refrains, taken up by both 
the mediators and the Syrian opposition: by both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ players. However, 
whereas the evidence relating to Syria seems to map, with ease, onto the concept of 
subjectification, in relation to the Yemeni process, the evidence is more contested. I will turn 
now to the characterisations of the Yemeni experience offered within the dataset; after 
presenting this evidence, I will then explore the ramifications for my argument concerning 
identity construction, subjectification and legitimacy in the context of mediation, and for my 
overall claim that mediation can shape identity. 
 
5.31 Contesting the Yemeni national identity: Between resistance and suffering 
 
This sub-section will explore the characterisations of the Yemeni people within the dataset and 
will assess, once more, the themes of Democracy and Reform, and Suffering. I will argue that 
the Yemeni voices captured appear to develop two strands of the Yemeni identity in their 
reflections on, and in the context of, the mediation attempt. The first, which is developed by 
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Yemeni voices, depicts the Yemeni people as being united by the 2011 Revolution and its 
progressive ideals. However, the second presents the nation as being defined by suffering, and 
is largely, although not exclusively, developed by the international mediators and members of 
the international community captured within the dataset.636 To begin with the first thread, one 
Yemeni interlocutor, a member of the revolutionary youth and a participant in the Statebuilding 
Working Group, sought to distinguish the political culture of Yemen from that of Syria, having 
noticed that I was conducting research into the two countries. She commented: 
 
One thing I would also mention – I noticed that you are also working on Syria? Well, 
the situation in Yemen is totally different to the situation in Syria. Yemen is very 
different, has a very different background in terms of the political culture, the political 
parties – people are really engaged, ordinary people. In Syria, it is only the party – only 
the opinion of one party. But Yemen has a history of being a de-centralised country…so 
the case of Yemen is different, the revolution is different – it was very successful in 
that point in time.637 
 
Two further Yemeni interview participants repeated a similar sentiment, both of whom had 
joined the Uprising. One speculated that ‘part of why 2011 was important for so many 
Yemenis’ was due to the way in which the protests ‘provided’ citizens ‘with a new identity’, 
with that which he termed ‘civil-society thinking’.638 A further interlocutor, who did not 
participate in the NDC but was prominent within the Revolution, argued that ‘being Yemeni is 
something new – our last names are based on the villages we come from – national identity is 
very new – it solidified with the revolution’.639 Her argument, therefore, was that the protests 
united Yemenis, imbuing the national character with the ideals fought for by the 
revolutionaries. Taken together, we can perceive hints at the notion that Yemen and, by 
extension Yemenis, are joined together by their commitment to multi-party politics and the 
ideals of the 2011 Revolution and, moreover, that it was the Uprisings which drew the national 
people together. However, it must of course be borne in mind that these three participants were 
all revolutionaries and, moreover, that very few interlocutors expressed this idea. 
 
636 However, I should note that in comparison with the Syrian case, very few interview participants, and none of 
the international officials with whom I spoke, attempted to characterise the collective Yemeni people during our 
discussions of the mediation efforts. 
637 NDC, D (4) 
638 NDC, D (2) 




Furthermore, two participants alluded to a second facet of the Yemeni national identity, one 
closer to the Syrian character depicted in the previous chapter. One interview participant, a 
close observer of the transition but not a participant in the NDC or the negotiation of the GCC 
Initiative, mentioned that the Yemeni people had been ‘poor for a long time’.640 Secondly, a 
delegate to the NDC mentioned within our conversation ‘the deterioration of the economy and 
the stagnation of production’, further elaborating that ‘people were really fed up’, that the 
Yemeni people were struggling under the burden of ‘the level of violence and incidents, the 
rise and rise of al-Qaida’.641 The Yemeni representative to the UNSC also, within UNSC 
meetings in 2013, focused upon the ‘humanitarian suffering’642 of Yemenis and the destruction 
wrought by ‘terrorism and subversive acts’.643 Such a depiction can be perceived within the 
NDC Final Report, too, which was penned by the Yemeni participants in the Conference; 
however, in this document, the agony of Yemenis is often depicted as historical, with the 
implication being that the revolution, transition, and the NDC, had ushered in a new era. For 
instance, in the recommendations made by the Southern Issue Working Group, it is claimed 
that the proposed ‘new federal state shall represent a complete break from the history of 
conflict, oppression, abuse of power and monopoly of wealth’,644 a sentiment echoed by the 
participants in the Rights and Freedoms Working Group: in this chapter of the Final Report, 
the authors claim there will be a ‘break from the past of tyranny’.645 The chapter composed by 
the participants in the Sadah Working Group more broadly discusses the ‘suffering’ of this 
northern region, also mentioning the ‘internally displaced’ and ‘wounded’,646 while the 
Concluding Statements of the report recall the ‘violent and bloody wars’ endured by Yemenis, 
conflicts in which ‘thousands of people’ have been ‘wounded and killed’ and which have 
unleashed ‘vast destruction’ and reveal the ‘weakness of the State, failures of its institutions, 
weak development and foreign influences’.647 Therefore, to summarise, very few of the Yemeni 
voices represented within the dataset made claims on behalf of the Yemeni people. Of those 
who did, two opposing visions of the nation appear to have been offered: one which emphasises 
the resistance of Yemenis, and another which underscores their victimhood. 
 
640 O, Y (2) 
641 Anonymous (6) 
642 The representative of Yemen in UNSC, ‘7037th Meeting S/PV.7037’ (27 September 2013) 
643 The representative of Yemen in UNSC, ‘6976th Meeting S/PV.6976’ (11 June 2013) 
644 NDC, ‘Outcomes Document’, p. 6 
645 Ibid, p. 140 
646 Ibid, p. 13 




However, within the data gathered representing the international mediators and members of the 
international community, the bond uniting the Yemeni people is firmly claimed to be that of 
victimhood. Within the press conferences transcribed in relation to the Yemeni transition, all 
of which were delivered by external parties, the Yemeni people are implicitly portrayed as a 
besieged nation, faced with profound crises in the humanitarian, economic and security sectors. 
For instance, then-President of the Security Council Hardeep Singh Puri intoned the following 
in August 2011: ‘the members of the Security Council expressed their grave concern at the 
serious deterioration of the economic and humanitarian situation in Yemen’, continuing by 
noting that these officials ‘were deeply concerned at the worsening security situation, including 
the threat from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula’.648 Benomar, later in the year, likewise 
remarked that ‘the Yemeni people have suffered throughout this crisis’, further claiming that 
‘this crisis [has] had severe implications in terms of the economic, humanitarian and security 
aspects’.649 The notion of these three sectors having ‘deteriorated’ is repeated on a number of 
occasions650 while the ‘violence’,651 ‘unrest’,652 ‘lawlessness’653 and ‘human rights 
violations’654 endured by Yemenis were also regularly evoked. Benomar also introduced, in 
2011 and 2012, the idea of the ‘fragility’655 of Yemen and, by extension Yemenis, together 
 
648 UN Live, ‘Security Council president H.E. Mr. Hardeep Singh Puri (India) on the Situation in Yemen – 
Security Council Media Stakeout’ (9 August 2011) 
649 UN Live, ‘Jamal Benomar (Special Adviser on Yemen) – Security Council Media Stakeout’ (11 October 
2011) 
650 This is repeated twice in UN Live, ‘Jamal Benomar (Special Adviser on Yemen) – Security Council Media 
Stakeout’ (11 October 2011); UN Live, ‘Sir Mark Lyall Grant (UK) on the Situation in Yemen – Security 
Council Media Stakeout’ (21 October 2011). 
651 UN Live, ‘Sir Mark Lyall Grant (UK) on the Situation in Yemen – Security Council Media Stakeout’; UN 
Live, ‘Peter Wittig (Germany) on Yemen – Security Council Media Stakeout’ (21 October 2011); UN Live, 
‘Jamal Benomar, UN Secretary-General Special Adviser on Yemen – Security Council Media Stakeout’ (28 
November 2011). Also, ‘fighting’ is mentioned in UN Live, ‘Jamal Benomar, Special Adviser for Yemen’ (25 
January 2012).  
652 UN Live, ‘Jamal Benomar, UN Secretary-General Special Adviser on Yemen – Security Council Media 
Stakeout’ (28 November 2011) 
653 UN Live, ‘Jamal Benomar, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Yemen – Press Conference’ (21 
December 2011) 
654 UN Live, ‘Jamal Benomar (Special Adviser on Yemen) – Security Council Media Stakeout’ (11 October 
2011); UN Live, ‘Sir Mark Lyall Grant (UK) on the Situation in Yemen – Security Council Media Stakeout’; 
UN Live, ‘Peter Wittig (Germany) on Yemen – Security Council Media Stakeout’ 
655 UN Live, ‘Jamal Benomar, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Yemen – Press Conference’ (21 
December 2011); UN Live, ‘Jamal Benomar, Special Adviser for Yemen’ (25 January 2012) 
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with the attacks on basic infrastructure endured656 and, once more, their ‘dire’ humanitarian 
needs.657 
 
This theme of the suffering and vulnerability of Yemenis is also apparent within the official 
documents gathered; the UN resolutions, UNSC press releases, UNSC meeting minutes and 
UK Government statements concerning meetings of the FoY. The ‘grave concern’ of members 
of the international community is noted in Resolution 2014 (2011)658 while, once more, ‘human 
rights abuses and violations’, the ‘deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation’, the 
‘increased threat’ posed by Al-Qaida and ‘terrorism’ more broadly, the ‘violence’, ‘attacks’, 
the ‘targeting of infrastructure’, and the need for humanitarian aid are repeated over and over.659 
In a departure from the press conferences, official documents also raise the ‘the killing of 
innocent Yemeni people’, the ‘hundreds of deaths’ of ‘civilians’, the ‘increasing number of 
internally displaced persons and refugees in Yemen’, the use of children in the military and by 
armed groups, the detainment of protesters, and the ‘challenges from spoilers’.660 The resulting 
image is of a people plagued by menace, exposed to the internal threats of a repressive 
government and military, and domestic terrorist movements, unable to access ‘basic supplies 
 
656 UN Live, ‘Security Council president H.E. Mr. Hardeep Singh Puri (India) on the Situation in Yemen – 
Security Council Media Stakeout’. The following is also mentioned in 2012: ‘al-Qaida has expanded its 
activities’, that there are a number of Yemeni provinces outside ‘government control’ and that there have been 
‘attacks on oil pipelines, electricity grids, electricity lines and this is affecting the, the economic situation in the 
whole country and making life simply very difficult for most people’ (UN Live, ‘Jamal Benomar, Special 
Adviser for Yemen’ (25 January 2012)). 
657 UN Live, ‘Jamal Benomar, Special Adviser for Yemen’ (25 January 2012) 
658 UNSC, ‘Resolution 2014 S/RES/2014’ (21 October 2011) 
659 These appear within: UNSC, ‘Resolution 2014’; UNSC, ‘Resolution 2051 S/RES/2051’ (12 June 2012); 
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2140 S/RES/2140’ (26 February 2014);  UNSC, ‘Statement by the President of the Security 
Council S/PRST/2012/8’ (29 March 2012); UNSC, ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council 
S/PRST/2013/3’ (15 February 2013); UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Yemen’ (24 June 2011); 
UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Yemen’ (9 August 2011); UNSC, ‘Security Council 
Press Statement on Situation in Yemen’ (24 September 2011); UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on 
Situation in Yemen’ (26 January 2012); UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in 
Yemen’ (21 May 2012); UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in Yemen’ (13 
September 2012); UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Friends of Yemen’ (28 September 2012); UK 
Government, ‘Friends of Yemen to Meet in Riyadh’ (23 March 2012); UK Government, ‘Friends of Yemen 
Meeting a ‘Critical Moment’’ (23 May 2012); UK Government, ‘Yemeni President Hadi Visits UK Ahead of 
Friends of Yemen Meeting in New York’ (24 September 2012); UK Government, ‘Foreign Secretary at the 
United Nations General Assembly Friends of Yemen Ministerial’ (27 September 2012); UK Government, ‘UK 
to Host Friends of Yemen Meeting in March’ (22 January 2013); UK Government, ‘Foreign Secretary’s 
Opening Remarks – Friends of Yemen’ (7 March 2013); UK Government, ‘The Friends of Yemen Ministerial 
Meeting Co-Chairs’ Statement’ (7 March 2013). 
660 UNSC, ‘Resolution 2014’; UNSC, ‘Resolution 2051’; UNSC, ‘Resolution 2140’; UNSC, ‘Statement by the 
President of the Security Council S/PRST/2012/8’ (29 March 2012); UK Government, ‘UK to Host Friends of 
Yemen Meeting in March’  
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and social services’,661 and faced with turbulence and cruelty. This is both powerfully and 
insistently conveyed. 
 
However, within the transcripts of UNSC meetings conducted concerning Yemen between 
2012 and 2014, a shift can be perceived. To begin, in relation to the official documents, the 
Yemeni people are conveyed in a similar manner to that which is described above. Once more, 
it is noted that ‘the Security Council expresses its strong concern about intensified terrorist 
attacks, including by Al-Qa’ida, within Yemen’, while the ‘formidable economic and social 
challenges confronting Yemen’, and the abandonment of Yemenis ‘in acute need of 
humanitarian assistance’ are, once again, lamented.662 The familiar string of injustices and 
indignities endured by Yemenis are also repeatedly raised;663 however, following the signing 
of the GCC Initiative, the landscape of Yemen is deemed to have improved: in December 2012, 
Benomar proclaimed that ‘an air of normality has taken hold in most parts of the country’, and 
that ‘the fight for control of the cities by rival militias has ended’.664 In the same meeting, the 
representative of South Africa to the UNSC similarly remarked that ‘significant progress has 
been made in moving the country towards democracy and stability’,665 a refrain also seized 
upon by the representative of Portugal.666 Such a sentiment is repeated in 2013; for instance, 
the representative of Pakistan commented that ‘Yemen has walked back from the precipice’.667 
Nevertheless, the ‘vulnerability in Yemen’668 continues to be a concern. Lastly, the notion of 
suffering features within the GCC Initiative Implementation Mechanism: ‘as a result of the 
deadlock in the political transition, the political, economic, humanitarian and security situation 
has deteriorated with increasing rapidity and the Yemeni people have suffered great 
hardship’.669  
 
To conclude, there appears to be a contrast between the image of Yemenis provided by the 
admittedly few Yemeni interview participants who discussed the national character of Yemen: 
 
661 UNSC, ‘Resolution 2014’ 
662 The President of the UNSC in UNSC, ‘6744th Meeting S/PV.6744’ (29 March 2012)  
663 See the vast majority of representatives present at UNSC, ‘6744th Meeting’, UNSC, ‘6776th Meeting 
S/PV.6776’ (29 May 2012), UNSC, ‘6878th Meeting’, UNSC, ‘6976th Meeting’; UNSC, ‘7037th Meeting’ 
664 Benomar in UNSC, ‘6878th Meeting’ 
665 The representative of South Africa in UNSC, ‘6878th Meeting’ 
666 The representative of Portgual comments that Yemen has ‘come a long way’ in UNSC, ‘6878 th Meeting’ 
667 The representative of Pakistan in UNSC, ‘7037th Meeting’ 
668 Benomar in UNSC, ‘7037th Meeting’ 
669 ‘Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition Process in Yemen in Accordance with the 
Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’ (5 December 2011) 
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as we have seen, within my conversations, the Yemeni people are empowered, they are 
politically conscious, civil-minded and united by revolutionary fervour. However, a far weaker, 
and indeed abject, national people is constructed by the international documents analysed and 
by a very limited number of Yemeni interview participants. There seems to be an attempt, 
therefore, at subjectification to legitimise the mediation intervention, an attempt largely 
conducted by international voices in the arena of the UN during the mediation effort. However, 
unlike the Syrian case, there also appears to be a level of resistance to this subjectification, a 
clash between two competing constructions of the Yemeni identity. This, in turn, indicates that 
efforts to build new identities in order to legitimise the interventions of third parties may not 
proceed without obstacles.  
 
More broadly, this section has represented a second deviation from the arguments of Aggestam. 
I have suggested that, rather than seeking legitimacy for their identities from their adversaries, 
conflict parties, together with mediators, may engage in processes of subjectification, possibly 
in a bid to justify third-party intervention. Fresh identities can be imagined in which the nations 
at war are defined by suffering. Identities can therefore be built in order to legitimise the very 
intervention of a third party. This argument provides fortification to my over-arching claim, 
demonstrating that mediation can provoke identity mutations: in the two cases under 
investigation, a perceived need to legitimise the peace processes induced a reimagining of 
identity in both Syria and Yemen.  
 
5.4 Mediation, ‘Othering’, and legitimacy  
 
In this chapter, I have made two arguments concerning the interconnections between 
mediation, identity construction and legitimacy. Firstly, I argued that conflict parties and 
mediators can employ processes of identity construction as a means to legitimise a particular 
conflict party and to justify its claims of representation. Secondly, I claimed that mediators and 
conflict parties can reimagine the identities of the nations in civil conflict in a bid to legitimise 
the intervention of a third party. Taken together, these two claims support my more 
fundamental contention that mediation may not only function as an arena in which identities 




In this section, I will make my final claim by assessing the theme of Discord. I will suggest 
that conflict parties can construct their identities against an ‘Other’ within a mediation process, 
and will propose that this may take place in an attempt to legitimise their movements’ claims 
of representation and ambitions to rule. I explored the process of Othering in Chapter Two, 
explaining that ‘collectively held identities not only define who “we” are but also delineate the 
boundaries of the “Other”’;670 groups form their identities in relation to those of their peers, 
casting ‘Others’ in counter-identities which, in turn, can further illuminate their own self-
conceptions. Here, I will present an illustrative body of evidence which depicts the nature of 
the relationship between the Syrian opposition and the Syrian government delegations during 
the direct talks at Geneva II. This body of evidence seems to imply that the Syrian government 
delegation attempted to exclude the opposition delegates, and their supporters, from claiming 
allegiance with ‘Syrian-ness’, castigating their opponents as ‘foreign’ ‘traitors’. The purpose 
of such allegations may have been to emphasise their own connection with the Syria and, 
therefore, their legitimacy to represent and continue to rule the state. However, the manner in 
which Syrian members of the opposition with whom I held conversations recounted these 
interactions in our interviews may represent a second effort at Othering; within these 
interviews, the Syrian members of the opposition seem to be recounting these stories to present 
the Syrian government delegation as antagonistic and unreasonable, incapable of entering into 
mediated negotiations. By characterising their opponents as aggressive, and diametrically 
opposed to their own movement, the Syrian opposition delegation thus casts their own identity 
as a peaceable, rational and a legitimate representative of the Syrian people within the peace 
process.  
 
Many Syrian interlocutors devoted sections of our interviews to describing the vicious attacks 
they and their colleagues had endured during the mediation attempt; frequently, the attacks, 
according to the recollections of the members of the Syrian opposition, rejected the ‘Syrian-
ness’ of the opposition while my interlocutors regularly stressed that these verbal assaults took 
place in the international arena. For instance, one commented the following: ‘I was there in the 
same room as them – I saw how they acted, attacking people…Accusing us of lying, of being 
an enemy of Syria’.671 Indeed, this interviewee continued on this theme, recalling the reaction 
of al-Jaafari to her presentation concerning human rights violations: ‘he was publicly saying in 
 
670 Risse-Kappen, ‘Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO’, p. 367 
671 SO, DaGII (4) 
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front of the UN that we were traitors, that if I came back I would be killed, I would be homeless, 
that I would never see my home again – trying to deny what I’m saying’.672 A second narrated 
a similar tale: ‘with the head of the negotiations, Bashar al-Jaafari – you can feel that the main 
reason he was there was to provoke us…he would tell us that beheading was waiting for us, 
that we were agents of foreign governments, terrorists’.673 A third interlocutor supported this 
narrative: ‘there was name-calling. The regime delegation would say the opposition were 
terrorists’, later remarking that ‘the regime policy was that we were all Islamists’;674 a fourth 
also commented that ‘they [the government delegation] were accusing us of being terrorists, of 
being foreign conspirators’;675 and a fifth explained that ‘the strategy of the regime was based 
on…provoking others and accusing the opposition delegation of being terrorists, and that they 
do not represent anyone’.676 This notion that al-Jaafari accused SOC, within the context of the 
negotiations, of being ‘foreign agents’ was also repeated by a number of other interlocutors.677 
An international official noted this dynamic too: ‘the opposition – they called themselves the 
Syrian negotiating committee. The government was furious, said that they were terrorists, and 
not Syrians’, later commenting that ‘the government questioned the opposition’s Syrian-ness, 
considered them to be foreign agents. But the other side made it clear they were Syrians’.678  
 
We can see here a profound fracture, performed and emphasised during the negotiations; this 
divide between the two delegations will be returned to in Chapter Seven. We can also perceive 
the way in which al-Jaafari, and those with whom I held interviews, linked the accusations 
made with the notion of ‘not being Syrian’. In order to express his distaste for members of the 
Syrian opposition, and to express his separation from the movement, al-Jaafari denied the 
opposition delegation’s very claim to be, and to represent, Syria, and members of the Syrian 
opposition recognised and recalled this attack five years later; these accusations seemed to have 
remained fresh in their memories. Indeed, it may contribute to understanding why members of 
the opposition, within our conversations and within the official documents and press 
conferences analysed, sought to associate their movement so firmly with the national identity 
of Syrians seemingly constructed during the talks. Lastly, by recalling these attacks, this 
represents an example of counter-Othering; the image of the Syrian government delegation 
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created is one of antagonism and viciousness while the Syrian opposition are cast in the role of 
victims, once more, and of reasonable representatives of the Syrian people, capable of 
interacting within the international sphere. My suggestion is that this engagement in Othering 
represents a further means by which identity construction and legitimisation, within the context 
of mediation, may intertwine. Moreover, this suggestion further supports my proposal that 
mediation may witness and provide scope for processes of identity construction. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has explored the following hypothesis: conflict parties may seek to legitimise their 
identities through participating in mediation. I have offered a tri-partite response. I have taken 
inspiration from Aggestam’s proposal, unearthing three further ways in which legitimacy, 
identity construction and mediation may interweave. Firstly, within the data I have gathered 
and analysed, the conflict parties do not seem to have sought legitimacy for their competing 
versions of their states’ national identities; instead, both a conflict party and a mediator appear 
to have wielded processes of identity construction in order to legitimise a particular conflict 
party. In the context of, and in reflections on, the early stages of the Geneva Peace Process, the 
Syrian national people were reimagined, by both the mediators and the Syrian opposition, as 
being joined together in victimhood and in their aspiration for a democratic political system. 
My interpretation is that the Syrian opposition, in doing so, emphasised their empathy for, and 
knowledge of, this reconstructed version of the Syrian national people. Furthermore, the Syrian 
opposition also presented their movement as sharing these two attributes, discursively linking 
the new Syrian national identity with the Syrian opposition thus legitimising this conflict 
party’s right to participate in the peace process and their political aspirations in Syria.  
 
Secondly, I argued that this imagining of the Syrian nation as being united in suffering also 
contributed to a process of subjectification, enacted by both the mediators and the Syrian 
opposition; this construction of the Syrian identity served to legitimise the intervention of a 
third party, and legitimise the consent, by the Syrian opposition, to the intervention of a third 
party. However, in the case of Yemen, I claimed that we witnessed an attempt at 
subjectification by members of the international community, an attempt which appeared to 
have been resisted, albeit weakly, by the Yemeni voices represented within the dataset. The 
legitimisation process in the Yemeni context did not proceed as smoothly. Thirdly, I presented 
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an illustrative body of evidence from the Syrian case which indicated that both the Syrian 
government delegation and the Syrian opposition may have engaged in processes of Othering 
in a bid to legitimise their own movements.   
 
Therefore, in essence, I have taken the first step in building my overall contention that 
mediation may shape identity. I have shown that mediators and conflict parties, in either 
partnership or in opposition, can reshape the identities of the conflict parties both within and 
in reaction to mediation. Mediation can provide the stage on which identities are reshaped while 
its very occurrence can also spark the reimagination of identities.  
 
In addition to these arguments surrounding mediation, identity construction, and legitimacy, 
the analysis here also has a number of broader implications. I will outline these here, but will 
return to these ramifications in greater detail in Chapter Eight. Firstly, I would like to note that 
it is the Syrian national identity which is characterised, as opposed to any other level of identity: 
the notion of the Syrian people, as a unified collective, is repeatedly invoked by the voices 
represented within the dataset. Secondly, it is a new Syrian national identity which is imagined, 
an identity which deviates from those analysed within existing academic literature on collective 
identification in Syria both preceding and following the Uprisings of 2011. Thirdly, while it is 
the Yemeni people, and thus the Yemeni national identity, which is also imagined within the 
data gathered, this identity is not as convincingly summoned and characterised, and there 
appear to be two competing versions of this identity developed. These versions, however, also 
differ from the identities argued to hold relevance within scholarship of group identities in 
Yemen. Fourthly, within the Syrian peace process, the voices of the mediators represented, and 
the voices of the Syrian opposition represented, seem to co-construct, in harmony, an image of 
the Syrian people and of the Syrian opposition. However, in relation to Yemen, there seems to 
be a divergence between an admittedly limited number of Yemeni voices and the views of the 
international mediators. Fifthly, the images constructed of the two nations by the mediators are 
remarkably similar. There are therefore implications for our understanding of the mutation of 
the Syrian and Yemeni identities within and through the mediation efforts under examination, 
the nature of the relationships between the mediators and the conflict parties, the perceived 
impartiality of the mediators, the meaning of power within mediation, and our broader 





Chapter 6. Mediation, Identity Construction, and Normative 
Change 
 
The new Syria…will be a homeland for all its citizens equally, a democratic civil state based 
on the rule of law and civil liberties in which our citizenship transcends any social, ethnic, 
national or sectarian faction. The new Syria will be one to which Syrians will be proud to 
belong…679 
 
The upcoming National Dialogue provides an opportunity for Yemenis to build a future that 




In Chapter Three, I explored the burgeoning body of work within mediation studies concerned 
with the normative power of mediators. I showed that a growing number of scholars have 
argued that mediation is a practice imbued with norms, and that this form of conflict 
management can be deployed as a foreign policy tool to promote particular norms. Moreover, 
it has been recognised that the promotion of particular norms within peacemaking can, in turn, 
shape the identities of the conflict parties subject to mediation. This final assertion is grounded 
in the constructivist notion that norms are intrinsically linked with identity; it stems from the 
proposition that norms can be thought of as the shared expectations regarding the behaviour of 
actors occupying any given identity. From the literature surveyed in Chapter Three, I derived 
the following hypothesis for exploration here: mediators can use mediation to instigate 
normative change on the part of the conflict parties and this, in turn, can shape the identities 
of the conflict parties.  
 
In this chapter, I assess two themes uncovered within the data gathered: Democracy and 
Reform, and National Ownership. I propose that the international mediators involved in both 
cases did appear to seek to provoke normative change on the part of the conflict parties. 
However, I also develop this claim further: I additionally suggest that mediators can attempt to 
reconstruct conflict parties’ identities in a bid to encourage particular norms, thus reversing the 
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sequencing of events established in the existing literature concerning mediation, normative 
change and identity. In order to make these arguments, I will begin by returning to the data 
analysed in Chapter Five which I claimed showed attempts made, by both the international 
community and members of the Syrian opposition, to argue that the nationally held aspiration 
of the Syrian people is the creation of a democratic political system within the state. In this 
chapter, I will show how this vision of the nation aligns with the normative aims of the UN, 
suggesting that the initial stages of the Geneva Peace Process represented a moment at which 
the mediators sought to subtly encourage democratisation in Syria by presenting democracy as 
being intrinsic to ‘Syrian-ness’. I will also suggest that this attempt appears to have been, to an 
extent, successful: a similar narrative was also woven by the Syrian opposition, interlinking 
democracy with the national goals of the Syrian people. However, I will then examine the 
Yemeni case study. In this instance, members of the international community did, once more, 
seek to argue that all Yemenis, collectively, desire reform: reform which was, on occasion, 
defined as the establishment of a democratic political system. A limited number of Yemeni 
voices within the dataset seem to agree. In this case, we seem to be witnessing a far more 
tentative effort to inspire a norm of democracy through identity construction, and a far less 
assertive attempt, both by Yemenis and international mediators, to envision the aspirations of 
the Yemeni nation.  
 
This chapter will then assess a second norm which I will suggest was promoted during both 
mediation efforts. This is the norm of ‘national ownership’, described as a fundamental tenet 
of mediation by the UN, the mediator in both cases, and a value which emphasises the need for 
conflict parties to consent and commit to third-party peacemaking and, moreover, for these 
disputants to shape the design and implementation of the peace process. After making the claim 
that national ownership was indeed sought after and promoted within the two mediation efforts, 
I will then assess the apparent effects of the promotion of this norm. I will argue that it is 
unclear, according to the voices represented within the dataset, as to whether national 
ownership was indeed achieved; however, there is an indication that the Yemenis involved in 
the NDC may have experienced greater national ownership than the Syrians involved in the 
Geneva Peace Process. Nevertheless, I will claim that the promotion of this norm may have 
served to influence the level of identity in Syria and Yemen which was reimagined within the 
peace processes. We have seen that it was the Syrian people and the Yemeni people who were 
summoned, repeatedly, in reflections on the mediation efforts. It was their national identities, 
their national experiences and national aspirations, which were reimagined, both by the 
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mediators and by the Syrian and Yemeni conflict parties captured in the dataset. I will suggest 
that the norm of national ownership, through its emphasis upon the nation, may have partially 
dictated this focus, both by the mediators and the international community, on moulding fresh 
versions of the Syrian and Yemeni national identities. It may also explain why other levels of 
identities in Syria, levels which were explored in Chapter Two and which tend to predominate 
in academic understandings of identities within the two states, were not conjured up and 
deployed within the peace process. This is despite their apparent influence, as will be explored 
in Chapter Seven. 
 
In essence, the analysis here will further my fundamental claim that mediation can prompt the 
reimagination of the identities of the conflict parties. To conclude this chapter, I will briefly 
sketch the implications of the findings presented for the two bodies of scholarship to which I 
intend to make a contribution. I will highlight that the persistent invocations of a national 
Syrian and Yemeni people challenge the fragmented depictions of identities in these two states 
which predominate in the academic literature. Nevertheless, the apparent centrality of 
democracy, and reform, within these reconceived identities supports previous arguments made 
that the uprisings of 2011, and the violence which followed, triggered a reimagining of 
identities in the state along civic lines. Secondly, that mediation can be deployed in the manner 
conceived in this chapter interacts with perceptions of impartiality and power. The apparent 
exertion of ideational power within the two processes, and the differing extent to which the 
norm of democracy was promoted and absorbed, can assist in understanding the nature of the 
relationships implicated in the two processes and the extent to which the mediators felt able to 
wield power within the peacemaking efforts. 
 
6.2 Promoting the norm of democracy in mediation through identity construction 
 
Democracy does not feature within the UN Charter.681 Nevertheless, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, proclaims in Article 21 that 
‘everyone has the right to take part in the government of [her or] his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives’, that ‘the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government’, and that ‘this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which 
 
681 Simon Rushton, ‘The UN Secretary-General and Norm Entrepreneurship: Boutros Boutros-Ghali and 
Democracy Promotion’ Global Governance 14:1 (2008), pp. 100-1 
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shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free 
voting procedures’.682 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1966, includes similar stipulations in Article 25.683 Moreover, the 
‘Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on Democracy’, penned in 2009, states that 
‘democratic principles are woven throughout the normative fabric of the United Nations’;684 
indeed, in this document it is claimed that the 2005 World Summit saw 170 heads of state and 
government renew their ‘commitment to support democracy by strengthening countries’ 
capacities to implement the principles and practices of democracy’.685 While the Guidance 
Note recognises that ‘there is no one model of democracy’, the document nevertheless asserts 
that ‘the UN framework should seek to address both immediate threats to democratic 
governance as well as the underlying or structural causes of such interruptions’.686 In 2005, the 
UN launched its Democracy Fund (UNDEF), a body which ‘funds, helps design, manages, 
mentors, and generates projects…that contribute to strengthening democracy’.687 Lastly, as the 
UN has recognised, while the sixteenth Sustainable Development Goal, part of a set of aims 
set by the UN General Assembly in 2015, does not use the term ‘democracy’, many of its 
targets ‘are geared towards protecting democratic institutions’.688 Democracy, then, can be 
considered to be a norm sought after by the UN, the lead, although not the sole, mediator in the 
two cases under consideration. 
 
Nevertheless, in the Guidance Note of 2009, the following is also argued: 
 
Local norms and practices must be taken into consideration and weaved into emerging 
democratic institutions and processes to the extent possible…UN assistance should also 
be explicitly requested by local actors and never imposed. The major responsibility for 
 
682 Ibid, p. 101; UN, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (1948) [online], available from: 
https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights [last accessed: 8 April 2021] 
683 Rushton, ‘The UN Secretary-General and Norm Entrepreneurship: Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Democracy 
Promotion’, p. 101; UN, ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (1966) [online], available from: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx [last accessed: 8 April 2021] 
684 UN, ‘Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on Democracy’ (2009) [online], available from: 
https://www.un.org/en/pdfs/FINAL%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Democracy.pdf [last accessed: 8 April 
2021], p. 2 
685 Ibid 
686 Ibid, pp. 2, 3 
687 UNDEF, ‘Democracy As If People Matter’ (2015) [online], available from: 
https://www.un.org/democracyfund/sites/www.un.org.democracyfund/files/democracy_as_if_people_matter.pdf 
[last accessed: 8 April 2021], p. 1 
688 UN, ‘COVID-19: A Spotlight on Democracy’ (2020) [online], available from: 
https://www.un.org/en/observances/democracy-day [last accessed: 8 April 2021]  
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democratic transitions and consolidation lies with forces within the national society and 
no amount of external assistance will create democracy.689 
 
Moreover, UNDEF has argued the following of its work and strategy: ‘our work also aims to 
advance transparency and accountability, promote the rule of law, and encourage responsible 
and inclusive government – while always supporting local ownership and domestic 
engagement [emphasis added]’.690 Furthermore, UNDEF states that their ‘strategy is to support 
local civil society and community leaders in addressing locally identified needs and 
priorities’.691 Within these quotations, we can perceive an apparent emphasis upon the consent 
of those on the receiving end of democracy promotion and a rhetorical commitment, at least, 
to empowering either ‘national’ or ‘local’ actors to lead and define democratisation processes.  
 
To summarise thus far, while democracy can be thought of as a norm pursued by the UN, the 
organisation simultaneously states that democracy should only be encouraged in conjunction 
with, and with the consent of, the ‘local’ and ‘national’ stakeholders of the communities in 
which the norm of democracy is being encouraged. In Chapter Five, I claimed that in the 
context of, and within reflections on, the Geneva Peace Process, the Syrian people as a national 
collective were depicted as seeking a democratic state. I showed that this was emphasised by 
both members of the opposition and those international actors involved in mediating the war. I 
also argued that, having built this construction in partnership with the international mediators, 
the opposition portrayed their own movement as being equally committed to democracy. I then 
contended that this demonstrated a form of legitimisation: a particular vision of the Syrian 
nation appeared to have been imagined, a vision which seemed to support the right of one of 
the conflict parties, the Syrian opposition, to claim to represent, and to seek to govern, the 
Syrian people.  
 
However, this creation of a new facet of the Syrian identity could also indicate a further 
interaction between mediation and identity construction. This fresh envisioning of the nation 
within the mediation attempt could represent an instance of norm promotion and, therefore, an 
indication that mediators might use third-party peace negotiations to promote a given norm by 
characterising it as a strand of the national identity of the state undergoing mediation. In turn, 
 
689 UN, ‘Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on Democracy’, pp. 3-4 




this supports my fundamental contention that mediation shapes identity. This tactic of 
promoting norms through identity construction, by characterising the norm as an intrinsic 
element of Syria’s national identity, may have been adopted due to the purported emphasis of 
the UN upon encouraging locally and nationally owned versions of democracy: by arguing that 
democracy constituted the collectively held will of the Syrian people, the UN may have been 
seeking to remove itself as a norm promoter, appearing to be merely repeating the wishes 
fundamentally associated with the national identity of Syria. This argument represents a 
departure from the literature surveyed in Chapter Three; in this scholarship, by promoting 
norms, mediators can shape the identities of conflict parties. My argument, instead, is that 
mediators can seek to reshape the identities of the conflict parties in order to encourage the 
absorption of particular norms.  
 
That the Syrian opposition espoused a similar narrative concerning the intrinsic association 
between democracy and the Syrian people could suggest that the attempts by the mediators to 
promote the norm of democracy through identity construction were successful; indeed, the 
initial stages of the Geneva Peace Process may have formed the backdrop to an instance of 
socialisation or, perhaps, strategic social construction. These concepts were outlined in Chapter 
Two: socialisation can be thought of as ‘the process through which actors adopt the norms and 
rules of a given community’692 while strategic social construction denotes the process by which 
groups strategically reimagine their identities in order to gain a perceived advantage. By 
probing the assertions of the Syrian opposition and the international community that the Syrians 
as a whole desire a democratic state, the intention is not to deny the long history of democratic 
resistance within Syria, and in particular the aims of and sacrifices made by the 2011 protesters, 
nor to deny the belief in democracy held by the Syrian opposition. Nevertheless, it is worth 
questioning why it was this aim, to the exclusion of others, which received overwhelming 
focus, and which was presented as an essential element of the Syrian national identity. There 
does seem to be evidence that, in the initial stages of the Geneva Peace Process, the UN and 
other members of the international community implicitly, and apparently successfully, 
encouraged the norm of democracy by depicting it as a nationally-shared aspiration, a strand 
within the Syrian identity. There seems to be evidence, therefore, that the mediation efforts 
shaped a facet of the Syrian national identity. However, the picture in relation to the Yemeni 
case study is more complex. 
 
692 Checkel, ‘Socialization and Violence: Introduction and Framework’, p. 592 
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6.21 What do the Yemeni people seek? Reform, and democracy? 
 
Within the data gathered concerning the Geneva Peace Process, the nationally held aspirations 
of Syria are firmly proclaimed. However, within the data gathered concerning the GCC 
Initiative, the Yemeni transition, and the NDC, there are far fewer considerations of the aims 
shared by the Yemeni people. Nevertheless, within the data gathered representing the 
international mediators and members of the international community, a Yemeni desire for 
democracy is mentioned, although not by representatives of the UN; however, more frequent 
are the ideas of ‘transition’, ‘change’ and ‘peace’: in other words, under-specified reform. 
Indeed, I should begin by noting that none of the international officials, during our 
conversations, explored their perspectives on the national ideals of the Yemeni people and this 
theme is only mentioned once within the press conferences transcribed: in October 2011, 
Benomar argued that the Yemeni national collective desired ‘a quick transition’.693 However, 
this topic does receive consideration within the UN resolutions analysed. Within these 
documents, the wishes of all Yemenis are implied to be ‘an inclusive and Yemeni-led political 
process of transition’;694 ‘a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition 
process’ together with ‘peaceful change and meaningful political, economic and social reform, 
as set forth in the GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanism and in Resolution 2014 
(2011)’;695 and, once more, ‘peaceful change’.696  
 
Furthermore, the international voices captured within the transcripts of UNSC meetings often 
consider the wishes of the Yemeni people, and oscillate between calls for reform and more 
precise demands for democracy. For instance, in 2012, Benomar made the claim that the steps 
made by Hadi ‘to advance the transition’ have ‘received the overwhelming support and 
goodwill of the Yemenis’;697 indeed, later in the year, the Envoy argued that ‘the transition 
enjoys the overwhelming endorsement and support of the population’.698 Offering further 
support, within the same meeting, the UK representative to the UNSC claimed that 
international efforts to sanction those ‘intent on disrupting peaceful transition’ will be 
 
693 UN Live, ‘Jamal Benomar (Special Adviser on Yemen) – Security Council Media Stakeout’ (11 October 
2011) 
694 UNSC, ‘Resolution 2014’ 
695 UNSC, ‘Resolution 2051’ 
696 UNSC, ‘Resolution 2140’ 
697 UNSC, ‘6776th Meeting’ 
698 UNSC, ‘6878th Meeting’ 
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implemented, arguing that ‘the Yemeni people demand no less’,699 and this sentiment was 
repeated by many others in this meeting. Within these meetings, the GCC Initiative and the 
NDC are also argued to be desires of Yemenis. For instance, the representative of Morocco 
claimed that the GCC Initiative is a ‘plan on which Yemenis have agreed’ and constitutes ‘the 
determination of its people’.700  
 
In a similar vein, in the summer of 2012, Benomar argued that the NDC was demonstrative of 
‘the Yemeni people’s commitment to choosing dialogue over violence and consensus over 
division’, that the people of Yemen were demanding punishment for saboteurs of the transition, 
and that they were ‘counting on the Security Council to continue speaking in one voice in 
support of the transition’.701 Following the conclusion of the NDC, in February 2014, this 
message was communicated once more: the representative of France noted that ‘a democratic 
transition’ can be considered to respond ‘to the aspirations of the Yemeni people’.702 This 
seemingly deeply-held desire of Yemenis for change is also reiterated within UK government 
statements concerning the FoY. For example, within a speech delivered by Hague at an FoY 
Ministerial in September 2012, held at the United Nations, he argued the following: 
 
The Yemeni people have made clear that they want to see change and we have seen 
progress on reform by the Yemeni government, but there still remains much more to be 
done if there is to be permanent, lasting change and fulfilment of people’s basic rights 
to freedom and democracy.703 
 
Finally, within the text of the GCC Initiative, it is also pledged ‘that the Agreement shall fulfil 
the aspirations of the Yemeni people for change and reform’704 while, in the Implementation 
Mechanism for this Initiative which, as I noted in Chapter One, was drafted with considerable 
input from Benomar, it is acknowledged that ‘our people, including youth, have legitimate 
aspirations for change’ and that ‘the situation requires that all political leaders should fulfil 




701 UNSC, ‘6976th Meeting’. In this meeting, Benomar repeats, twice, the demands of Yemenis for justice while 
others in this meeting also repeat this sentiment. Moreover, the representative of Luxembourg to the UNSC 
argues that ‘remarkable progress has already been made on the path to this peace political transition, which 
responds to the legitimate democratic aspirations of the Yemeni people’. 
702 UNSC ‘7119th Meeting S/PV.7119’ (26 February 2014) 
703 UK Government, ‘Foreign Secretary at the United Nations General Assembly Friends of Yemen Ministerial’  
704 ‘Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative’ (22 May 2011) 
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transition to good democratic governance in Yemen’.705 Thus, those external actors implicated 
in the mediation process in Yemen do appear to envision the collective aims of the Yemeni 
people, although they seem to do so less frequently than those mediators involved in the Syrian 
case. Moreover, whereas in Syria, the international community communicated very clearly that 
the Syrian people desired democracy, which I argued was an attempt to promote the norm of 
democracy, in Yemen, there appears to have been a far more tentative attempt to do this.  
 
To what extent do the Yemeni voices represented within the dataset align with the vision of the 
nation, and of its aspirations, provided by the international mediators? Within the interviews 
conducted, the aims of Yemenis were not frequently mentioned. One interlocutor did imply 
that the Yemeni people sought ‘reform’ and ‘progress’.706 Furthermore, referring only to 
Yemeni youth as opposed to the broader population, one participant described similar goals, 
claiming that the youth had ‘something in common – [they] all wanted, had an aspiration to 
live something different – to change – for a time when their voices are heard’.707 Moreover, an 
additional interlocutor, a former Yemeni politician who did not participate in the NDC, spoke 
broadly of a national desire for ‘ideals’ and ‘of having a less corrupt government’.708 More 
clearly, a desire for political reform constituting an aspiration shared by all Yemenis is 
emphasised to a greater extent within the NDC Final Report. Consider, for instance, the 
following declaration, included within the Concluding Statements: 
 
Today, the Conference is a great testament to the capabilities of the Yemeni people in 
bringing about a peaceful political transition basing it on a proven legacy in the practice 
of democracy…This would be the transition founded on a deep faith in comprehensive 
national partnership for building the new Yemen; a Yemen that is built upon the 
foundations of good governance, the peaceful transfer of power, consolidation of the 
role of the State and its institutions to foster the needs, interests and aspirations of the 
Yemeni people, while ensuring that these institutions are accountable to the people.709 
 
Lastly, the representative of Yemen to the UNSC remarked in December 2012: 
 
705 ‘Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition Process in Yemen in Accordance with the 
Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’  
706 Anonymous (6) 
707 NDC, D (2) 
708 O, Y (1) 




It is also noteworthy that the President wants to foster the necessary environment for 
the National Dialogue…so that everyone can contribute with transparency to obtaining 
tangible and positive results in the form of domestic peace, multilateral democracy, the 
protection of human rights and good governance – all of which is in response to the 
aspirations of Yemenis [emphasis added].710 
 
To summarise: whereas, during the Geneva Peace Process, members of the international 
community appeared to, plainly and forcefully, reconstruct the Syrian national identity in order 
to promote democracy, such a direct effort does not seem to have taken place in relation to the 
Yemeni transition and peace process. If this is an instance of socialisation, or strategic social 
construction, it is far less apparent, within the dataset, than was the case with Syria. There are 
implications associated with this: why did members of the international community neglect to 
promote, as strongly and through identity reconstruction, the norm of democracy in relation to 
Yemen? What might this finding reveal about the relationship between the Yemeni conflict 
parties and the UN? What might this finding reveal about the strength and relevance of the 
Yemeni national identity? I will return to these questions in the conclusion to this chapter. 
 
6.3 Promoting the norm of national ownership in mediation 
 
In this section, I will consider a second norm which could be considered to have been promoted 
within the two mediation efforts: that of national ownership. I will show that, in relation to both 
cases, the mediators, at least discursively, appear to have attempted to promote national 
ownership. Nevertheless, within the dataset, the extent to which national ownership was 
achieved faces deep contestation. My suggestion will be that the focus, by the mediators, on 
national ownership may have shaped the level of the identities which both the mediators and 
the conflict parties sought to characterise; thus, once more, I will lend weight to my 
fundamental claim that mediation may shape identity. However, I will highlight and discuss 
that, despite the Yemeni case apparently having experienced greater national ownership, the 
Yemeni national identity developed within the mediation effort is less sharply depicted than 
the identity developed in relation to Syria. 
 
 
710 UNSC, ‘6878th Meeting’ 
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Is it accurate to deem national ownership a norm within mediation practice? The UN proclaims 
national ownership to be a fundamental tenet of mediation.711 However, as may have been 
apparent in Chapter Three, the vast majority of scholarship concerning norms and mediation 
has focused upon the proliferation and effects of the norm of inclusion. The norm of national 
ownership, while interlinked with inclusion,712 is distinct but there has been little direct 
research into its prevalence and effects.713 Nevertheless, this norm could be seen to be 
inextricably linked with the substantial body of scholarship concerning the ‘local turn’ in 
peacemaking and peacebuilding, and this connection supports my assertion that national 
ownership should indeed be viewed as a norm. How are the two related? In their Guidance for 
Effective Mediation, the UN claims that national ownership ‘implies that conflict parties and 
the broader society commit to the mediation process’ and that ‘solutions cannot be imposed’; 
moreover, the advice offered by the UN is that conflict parties must be closely consulted on 
the design of the peace process and, indeed, should be engaged ‘on procedure and substance’; 
that ‘local’ and ‘indigenous’ forms of conflict management should be drawn upon ‘wherever 
appropriate’; and that the mediation process must be protected ‘from the undue influence of 
other external actors’.714 The Guidance document appears to conflate the local with the 
national715 and the inclusion of national ownership as a tenet could be viewed as an 
acknowledgement of the fierce criticisms of international interventions, and of the so-called 
‘liberal peace’, contained within the local turn.716 In particular, this tenet may be a response to 
the arguments that, for example, negotiating peace agreements in ‘Western bubbles’ in 
accordance with ‘Northern rationalities’ is ‘increasingly unsustainable’,717 that the liberalism 
argued to have been promoted by international institutions from the 1990s onwards represents 
 
711 UN, UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, p. 14 
712 See, for example, Timothy Donais and Erin McCandless, ‘International Peace Building and the Emerging 
Inclusivity Norm’ Third World Quarterly 38:2 (2017), p. 297 
713 The few examples include: Civil Society Dialogue Network Meeting, ‘The UN Guidance for Effective 
Mediation: Translating the Fundamentals into EU Practice’ (2013) [online], available from: http://eplo.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/CSDN_Mediation_Guidance_Report.pdf [last accessed: 8 April 2021] and 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, ‘Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation in the OSCE’ OSCE 
Conflict Prevention Centre (n.d.) [online], available from: 
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/0/126646.pdf [last accessed: 8 April 2021]. In the former, it is claimed 
that ‘the EU is learning that taking on a “backseat role” can be effective’, that ‘it is necessary for the EU to have 
a grassroots approach and to keep funding civil society’ (p. 8); in the latter, a case study is analysed and 
purported to show ‘the importance of national ownership’ (p. 104).  
714 Ibid, pp. 14-5 
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Third World Quarterly 36:5 (2015), p. 830 
716 For a summary of the local turn, see: Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace 
Building: A Critical Agenda For Peace’ Third World Quarterly 34:5 (2013), pp. 763-83 
717 Ibid, pp. 763, 764 
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an attempt, by ‘Western-led’ institutions, ‘to unite the world under a hegemonic system’,718 
and that ‘peace-support interventions’ must be viewed ‘as part of wider historical processes 
linked to power’ and as ‘subtle forms of control’.719 This relationship between the tenet of 
national ownership and the scholarship of the local turn supports my suggestion that national 
ownership constitutes a ‘process-related’ mediation norm, albeit one which may be ‘non-
definitional’ and ‘unsettled’.720  
 
In Chapter One, I provided an overview of the two mediation processes. There, I highlighted 
that the period under study in relation to the Syrian crisis was punctuated by two ‘events’: 
Geneva I and Geneva II. Geneva I was convened by Annan, and did not feature any Syrian 
participants. The attendees, who were representatives of the permanent members of the UNSC, 
a number of Arab states, the Arab League and the EU, produced a roadmap for the future of 
the peace process, and moreover, the future of Syria: it called for a transitional government. 
Geneva II was convened by Brahimi and his team, but featured a far greater degree of 
involvement from Syrian participants. Two delegations attended, one representing the Syrian 
government and one representing the Syrian opposition and, while it would seem that members 
of the international community played a strong role in shaping the membership of the Syrian 
opposition delegation, and while both parties seemed reluctant to commit to attending, Brahimi 
allowed the delegations to negotiate the agenda for the talks. He did not dictate that which 
would be discussed although, presumably, it was the UN which decided that the two parties 
would meet in the Palais, and would sit facing one another, separated by UN staff, for direct 
talks in January and February of 2014. In that chapter, I also provided an overview of the GCC 
Initiative, the Yemeni transition and the NDC. The GCC Initiative, and its Implementation 
Mechanism, were negotiated by a small group of Yemeni political leaders who were overseen 
by representatives of the GCC, Benomar, and the ambassadors of the five permanent members 
of the UNSC and the EU. However, the NDC was designed by a group of Yemenis: its rules, 
its structure, its organisation. The participants were decided by Yemenis, with decisive input 
from Benomar. The day-to-day management of the NDC was executed by a Secretariat, 
 
718 Oliver Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p. 1 
719 Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Where Now for the Critique of the Liberal Peace?’ Cooperation 
and Conflict 50:2 (2015), pp. 174, 177 
720 Terms taken from the taxonomy proposed by Hellmüller et al., ‘The Role of Norms in International 
Mediation’, explored in Chapter Three. However, the Guidance seems to dilute the term ‘ownership’, eliding it 
with mere ‘consent’ and with the capacity to influence, in circumstances deemed appropriate by the third-party 
mediator, the shape of the peace process. Therefore, the inclusion of national ownership within the UN’s 
Guidance may represent a half-hearted, or simply rhetorical, attempt to comply with the aforementioned 
imperatives of the local turn. 
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comprised of Yemenis but, during the discussions of the NDC, Benomar, his staff and members 
of the international community were present. These international actors contributed to the 
negotiations, external facilitators were employed, and Benomar, in particular, purportedly 
intervened to oversee clandestine negotiations. Superficially, the Yemeni mediation effort 
appears to have enjoyed greater national ownership than the efforts in Syria; nevertheless, this 
theme received deep consideration by many voices within the dataset, revealing the complexity 
of this norm and its effects. I will assess these statements next. 
 
6.31 Pursuing national ownership in the Syrian and Yemeni mediation attempts  
 
Firstly, I will demonstrate the pervasiveness of the ideal of national ownership, and its apparent 
status as an influential norm, within the two case studies. I will do this by showing that the 
third-party mediators and members of the international community represented within the press 
conferences and official documentation analysed mentioned persistently the need for the peace 
processes to be Syrian- and Yemeni-led. For example, beginning with the Syrian case, Brahimi, 
in November 2013, claimed that Geneva II ‘is really for the Syrians to come to Geneva to talk 
to one another and hopefully start a credible, workable, effective peace process for their 
country [emphasis added]’.721 Indeed, he later claimed that ‘we want’ Geneva II ‘to be a Syrian 
process, not an international process with Syrian participation’.722 This idea was repeated days 
before the beginning of Geneva II: Ban Ki-moon emphasised that ‘we believed from the 
beginning that the negotiations should be led by and owned by the Syrians’. In addition, 
towards the conclusion of this press conference, in relation to the Syrian opposition, he 
emphasised that these delegates should ‘sit down together with the Syrian government 
delegation in earnest…with a sense of mission for their own people. After all, Syria is their 
own country and they should be responsible for the future’.723 Ban Ki-moon repeated a similar 
idea at the opening of the talks in Montreux724 while, at the same conference, the 
representatives of Russia and China, and the Secretary-General of the Arab League, issued 
warnings concerning the need for the talks to be Syrian-led.725 It is possible to observe, then, 
 
721 UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference’ (25 November 2013) 
722 UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference’ (20 December 2013) 
723 UN, ‘Secretary-General’s Press Briefing’ (19 January 2014) 
724 UN Live, ‘First Meeting, Geneva Conference on Syria’  
725 Lavrov, UN Live, ‘First Meeting, Geneva Conference on Syria’. For further evidence see also: UN Live, 
‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference’ (31 January 2014) 
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an insistence within these press conferences that both power and responsibility should lie with 
the Syrian delegations.  
 
Within official documentation concerning stages I and II of the Geneva Peace Process, there is 
a continued emphasis on the need for the negotiations to be Syrian-led. Resolution 2043, of 
2012, describes a ‘determination’ to facilitate ‘a Syrian-led political transition leading to a 
democratic, plural political system’.726 This phrase, of course, appears to be contradictory 
through its dictation of the resulting shape of politics in Syria. A very similar phrase is 
employed in the Final Communiqué of the Action Group for Syria: here, the members stress 
their desire ‘to facilitate’, once more, ‘the launch of a Syrian-led political process leading to a 
transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them 
independently and democratically to determine their own future’.727 The FoS, too, repeat the 
need for Syrian leadership in the official conclusions to their meetings;728 a draft resolution 
from October 2011 calls, three times, for a process which is ‘Syrian-led’,729 and this idea is 
also reiterated in later draft resolutions.730 
 
Thirdly, within press conferences and official documents gathered concerning Syria featuring 
voices of members of the international community, there are insistent references to the need to 
safeguard Syrian sovereignty. In a press conference delivered at the UN, Ban Ki-moon uttered 
that which transpired to be a well-worn phrase within the material gathered: ‘our actions must 
continue to be based on our strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and 
territorial integrity of Syria’; indeed, he repeated a similar phrase shortly after at the same 
conference.731 Two years later, a similar phrase recurs: Ban Ki-moon, on the eve of the direct 
talks in Geneva, stated: ‘this must be a Syrian-led process, Syrian-owned, one that fully 
respects Syria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity’.732 Indeed, even though Kerry 
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asserted that al-Asad would play no role in the future of Syria in the opening of Geneva II in 
Montreux,733 in a separate press conference delivered on the same day, Kerry spoke of Syria 
as a ‘sovereign, independent and democratic state’.734 Finally, UN Resolutions persistently 
reaffirm the organisation’s ‘strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and 
territorial integrity of Syria’.735 The Final Communiqué of the Action Group for Syria also 
features a very similar formulation which is repeated later in the document,736 as do the London 
11 Final Communiqué737 and the Chair’s Conclusions following the FoS meetings in February, 
April and July of 2012.738  
 
Markedly similar statements concerning Yemeni sovereignty abound within numerous official 
documents and UNSC meetings concerning Yemen739 while, within the few press conferences 
delivered at the UN concerning the GCC Initiative, the transition and the NDC, it was declared 
on a number of occasions that the process would be ‘Yemeni-led’.740 Furthermore, Benomar 
stressed that the UN and the international community would monitor the implementation of the 
GCC Initiative only following requests made by Yemenis before arguing for the need to find a 
‘Yemeni way forward’.741 Moreover, this notion of Yemeni ownership and leadership is 
repeated on a number of occasions within official documents: for instance, in Resolution 2014 
it is declared that ‘the best solution to the current crisis in Yemen is through an inclusive and 
Yemeni-led political process of transition’.742 Less directly, in 2012, Benomar argued in a 
UNSC meeting that, in order for the talks of the NDC to be a success, they ‘must be designed 
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UNSC, ‘Draft Resolution S/2012/77’; and UNSC, ‘Draft Resolution S/2012/538’. 
736 UN, General Assembly, Security Council, Final Communiqué of the Action Group for Syria 
737 UK Government, ‘London 11 Final Communiqué’  
738 UK Government, ‘Chairman’s Conclusions of Friends of Syria Meeting’ (27 February 2012); UK 
Government, ‘Chairman’s Conclusions of Friends of Syria Meeting’ (1 April 2012); UK Government, ‘Friends 
of Syrian People: Chairman’s Conclusions’ (6 July 2012) 
739 UNSC, ‘Resolution 2014’; UNSC, ‘Resolution 2051’; UNSC, ‘Resolution 2140’; UNSC, ‘Statement by the 
President of the Security Council S/PRST/2013/3’ (15 February 2013); Representative of the UK to the UNSC 
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December 2011) 
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UNSC, ‘Resolution 2051’; and UNSC, ‘Resolution 2140’ 
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and driven by the Yemenis themselves’ and, ‘while that will require strong international 
support, its footprint should be light’. He then continued to outline the support the UN would 
provide, claiming that this plan had been developed ‘based on consultation with Yemeni 
actors’.743 The representative of China in the UNSC, in a message similar to the one delivered 
at Montreux in relation to Syria, warned that ‘the Yemeni people should continue to lead’ the 
political process.744 To summarise thus far, in the data gathered and analysed relating to both 
cases, the members of the international community captured within the dataset appear to call 
for Syrian and Yemeni ownership of the two peace processes. This seems to demonstrate a 
level of influence exerted by the norm of national ownership. 
 
6.32 Achieving national ownership in the Syrian and Yemeni mediation attempts? 
 
While I have shown that national ownership seems to have been called for and encouraged by 
the mediators implicated, to what extent did those voices represented in my dataset feel as 
though the Syrian and Yemen people, or Syrian and Yemeni representatives, ‘owned’ the two 
processes? I have gathered a wealth of data both supporting and contradicting the notion that 
the mediation efforts were indeed nationally owned. Nevertheless, none of the participants with 
whom I held interviews concerning the Syrian case directly described the process as having 
been ‘Syrian-led’; aside from three descriptions of the events surrounding the withdrawal of 
Iran’s invitation to Montreux, which was presented as an achievement of the Syrian 
opposition,745 and frequent mentions of the individual leadership positions held by the members 
of the Syrian opposition with whom I conducted interviews,746 no further sense was provided 
by either the Syrians or members of the international community consulted that the Geneva 
Peace Process was indeed a nationally led, Syrian process. A number of Syrian interviewees 
and SOC press releases depicted the presence and actions of members of the international 
community in benign terms, using phrases such as ‘facilitate’, ‘help’, ‘encourage’, ‘generous’ 
and ‘support’; moreover, within press conferences delivered at the UN, and within the official 
documentation of the UN and the FoS, mediators and diplomats deployed similar language to 
describe their approach. The term ‘help’ appears frequently, for example. Nevertheless, a great 
deal of data seems to strongly support the idea that international organisations and officials 
 
743 Benomar in UNSC, ‘6776th Meeting’ 
744 Representative of China to UNSC in UNSC ‘6878th Meeting’ 
745 SO, DaGII (3); SO, DaGII (2); SO, DaGII (6) 
746 SO, DaGII (4); SO (1); SO, DaGII (3); SO, DaGII (2); SO (4); SO (6) 
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dictated the events of the peace process; for instance, a number of Syrian interlocutors 
expressed their discomfort with the Communiqué produced at Geneva I, noting the lack of 
Syrian involvement in producing this document.747 The interference of members of the 
international community within the workings of SOC was also described with apparent 
resentment: several spoke of the establishment of SOC as having been driven by the 
international community; ‘we felt compelled’, remarked one, to launch a new body.748 A 
further Syrian interlocutor recounted the unease of ‘international players’ regarding ‘the first 
flavour of the revolution and the Islamist flavour to the whole scene’, and how ‘they kept 
pushing’ SOC;749 one close observer of the opposition expressed the opinion that al-Jarba was 
elected simply because ‘more countries pushed’ for him;750 while a third wryly remarked: 
‘really, there is something bad when Qatar is invited for a meeting of al-Etilaf’.751 Terms such 
as ‘pushed’ or ‘compelled’ recurred within the interviews.  
 
The international officials interviewed, too, conceded the power and control wielded by 
external states and organisations during the Geneva Peace Process in the operations of the 
opposition organisations. Indeed, one US official admitted the following during our interview: 
‘we were entirely too involved in the nitty gritty of opposition politics – it was both unhealthy 
and unwise’.752 As has been previously described in this thesis, the process by which SOC 
agreed to participate in the mediation efforts was tortuous; the decision was taken ‘at the last 
moment’,753 and almost half of the members of SOC resigned, convinced that to negotiate 
constituted capitulation to the Syrian government. This unwillingness to attend seems to imply 
a lack of ownership of the process; as one interlocutor phrased it, ‘the decision to go to Geneva, 
it wasn’t easy’.754 A second participant mentioned this dynamic too: ‘I need to be frank, from 
the beginning, for the Coalition and for the National Council…they say there will not be any 
negotiations…and so, when the Coalition started to go to Geneva, we were divided into two’.755 
A third deployed stronger language, claiming that members of the international community 
 
747 SO (2); SO, DaGII (3); SO, DaGII (5) 
748 SO (2); see also: SO, DaGII (3); SO, DaGII (2); SO (4) 
749 SO, DaGII (3) 
750 O, S (1) 
751 SO, DaGII (1). The phrase ‘al-Etilaf’ can be translated as ‘the Coalition’ and is a commonly used 
abbreviation for SOC in Arabic.  
752 M, S, TI (1) 
753 SO, DaGII (4)  
754 Ibid 
755 SO, DaGII (2). This was also mentioned by a second interview participant who described how 44 members 
suspended their involvement in SOC (SO, DaGII (5)) 
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‘forced’ SOC to attend Geneva II.756 This interlocutor also speculated that the regime 
delegation only attended due to Russia ‘push[ing]’ them to do so;757 this idea was supported by 
a second interlocutor who speculated that the regime delegation attended because ‘they had to’, 
expressing the belief that ‘they had no choice’ due, once more, to the pressure exerted by 
Russia.758 Indeed, a UK Foreign Minister remarked to me in our conversation that ‘the official 
opposition, they were told they had to turn up’759 while a confidential source, close to the 
negotiations, told me that they (sing.) ‘managed to get the opposition on board’,760 implying 
that their (sing.) efforts had faced resistance. 
 
The international voices represented within the press conferences and official documents reveal 
the seemingly authoritative role of the mediator in the peace talks: Hilary Clinton, in 2012, 
declared the Security Council ‘prepared…to chart a path forward’; in the same year, Annan 
expressed his hope that members of the UNSC ‘will decide to use their collective influence on 
the parties to push them in the right direction [emphasis added]’; while Brahimi admitted, in 
2013, that ‘it is the wider international community…that can really create the opening that is 
necessary to start effectively solving the problem’. We saw the way in which the Communiqué 
of the Action Group for Syria repeatedly states the need for a ‘Syrian-led process’. 
Nevertheless, in a jarring contradiction, this document also consistently dictates the outcomes 
of this process. Thus, it is claimed that the process must lead ‘to a democratic, plural political 
system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs’, 
arguing also that the Syrian ‘parties must be prepared to put forward effective interlocutors 
[emphasis added]’.761 The London 11 Final Communiqué is similarly emphatic, claiming that 
‘when the TGB is established, Assad and his close associates with blood on their hands will 
have no role in Syria’762 before going on to stipulate that, while the sovereignty of Syria will 
be preserved, ‘the future of Syria must be democratic, pluralistic, and respectful of human 
rights and the rule of law. Every citizen must enjoy full equality before the law regardless of 
[her or] his religious or ethnic background’.763 One draft resolution also features a similar 
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758 SO (2). A third also stated that, ‘without the Russians, they [the government delegation] wouldn’t be at 
Geneva and talking’ (SO, DaGII (3)). A fourth interview participant, in answer to the question, ‘why did the 
regime delegation attend?’ responded: ‘Russian pressure, Iranian pressure’ (SO (8)). 
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requirement for the future of Syria,764 as does a statement delivered by Hague in April 2012 at 
an FoS gathering.765 That there will be no role for al-Asad is repeated by Hague in the same 
meeting766 and, again, at the Action Group for Syria in June 2012767 while the sense of 
responsibility seemingly felt by the Action Group for Syria is made clear: in June 2012, Hague 
argued that ‘the world is looking to us for leadership and action to end the bloodshed and horror 
in Syria’.768 Moreover, he stated later in the same address that ‘it is time for all of us to act with 
urgency and determination, to create a roadmap to lead Syria back from the brink, and to insist 
on its full implementation’.769 Furthermore, international frameworks were clung to, across all 
the data sources, as the foundation and basis for the negotiations and the future of Syria.  
 
There is far greater evidence in relation to the Yemeni transition that Yemeni actors wielded 
power or, at least, that this was the narrative which those voices captured within the dataset 
either believed or sought to promote.  Both Yemeni participants and mediators involved in the 
GCC Initiative, the transition and the NDC depicted the process as having been designed and 
managed by Yemenis; one high-ranking member of the Secretariat, for instance, emphasised 
that it was the Preparatory Committee, comprised of Yemenis, which ‘drafted all the rules and 
regulations of the National Dialogue’ and ‘decided on the topics’.770 This sentiment was echoed 
by a member of the NDC Secretariat,771 and this interviewee also mentioned how Yemeni 
facilitators, as opposed to those from outside the country, were most well-equipped to guide 
discussions during the Conference.772 Indeed, a second member of the Secretariat described 
how she and her colleagues succeeded in resisting international interference in this matter: ‘the 
Special Envoy – he wanted to bring facilitators from outside – but we were very strongly 
against that’.773 She also spoke more broadly of the way in which the Secretariat ‘protected the 
process’ from the interventions of members of the international community, thus implying the 
wresting of control by Yemeni participants: 
 
764 UNSC, ‘Draft Resolution S/2012/77’ 
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democratic government with free and fair elections’ (UK Government, ‘“Our Task is to Pressure the Regime in 
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…there was conflict with Jamal Benomar’s offices, with the Ambassadors – they 
assumed that they could come any day, that they could enter any Working Group – but 
we, in the Secretariat, said no, you have to wait for our approval – and they were 
shocked, these Ambassadors – but we said, this is a sovereign process. And Jamal 
Benomar, he thought he could bring an expert at any time – and we would say, we don’t 
need you to bring…The Secretariat protected the process…the Secretariat stood very 
tall, we were the gatekeepers…774 
 
An additional Yemeni interlocutor supported this, arguing that representatives of the 
international community ‘were involved – but the Yemenis directed the process themselves’.775 
Indeed, he narrated a similar story to that recounted by the member of the Secretariat: ‘one of 
the people in Jamal’s office, he was trying to dictate what we should and shouldn’t do – I said, 
you recommend and I decide. Your role is to give advice. I am Yemeni and we are Yemenis’.776 
More broadly, a further interviewee, a revolutionary youth, described the NDC as ‘chance for 
people to make the future of Yemen’, remarking that the Conference ‘was about being 
empowered in politics, in society and economically’.777 A second member of the revolutionary 
youth described, in similar terms, his ‘sense of empowerment’ and, in perhaps the strongest 
declaration of the control exerted by Yemenis within the peace process, asserted: ‘it was 
Yemeni-led, a Yemen-led process’, repeating the claim twice in quick succession.778  
 
In contrast to the interviews conducted concerning Syria, members of the international 
community with whom I held interviews also expressed their sense of Yemeni power within 
the context of the peace process. A former Ambassador to Yemen described how, after the 
election of 2012, he ‘tried to lower [his] profile’, claiming that, ‘at that point, the 
implementation was in the hands of the Yemenis rather than the foreigners – we were less 
directly engaged, or at least less engaged in a public way’.779 One facilitator, employed by the 
UN, simply stated: ‘it was Yemeni-led’, later in our conversation arguing that her actions, and 
 
774 Ibid. This was also discussed by a second interlocutor, who claimed that the Ambassadors ‘would usually 
arrange with the Secretariat’ when to attend (NDC, D (11)). Furthermore, a third interviewee described this 
dynamic in a similar manner (NDC, D (15)) 
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those of her colleagues, were ‘based on what the Yemenis needed’.780 An international 
mediation expert, whose NGO supported the transition process, made clear on a number of 
occasions that the role played by their (sing.) organisation was controlled by Yemeni 
stakeholders: ‘they wanted us to continue’; ‘Hadi – he confirmed our mandate’; ‘we had a 
mandate from the Yemeni President and the Yemeni parties’; ‘we worked through the 
Secretariat’; ‘our main reference was the Yemeni structures’.781 Their (sing.) insistence in this 
regard proved to be a thread which ran throughout our conversation. Relatedly, frequent, and 
effusive, statements concerning the leadership of President Hadi are particularly noticeable 
within the official documents concerning Yemen.782 Lastly, as with Syria, several Yemenis 
whom I interviewed stressed their individual power within the mediation attempt.783 Therefore, 
the notion of Yemeni leadership appears to be prominent within the interviews conducted, the 
press conferences transcribed and the official documents analysed. 
 
As was the case with Syria, the notion that the international mediators and members of the 
international community present ‘helped’, ‘supported’, ‘assisted’ and, even, ‘nurtured’ the 
Yemenis and the peace talks was developed by both the Yemenis and international officials 
interviewed, and within the official documents assessed. Furthermore, while mentions do occur 
within the dataset of the power of the international community during the Yemeni transition, 
the extent of this particular body of evidence is far less than that relating to Syria and thus 
represents a divergence between the two cases. It must be mentioned, nevertheless, that there 
was disquiet expressed within a number of interviews concerning the allegedly undue influence 
exerted by Benomar in particular. Within our interview, for instance, a senior member of the 
Secretariat described how members of the Preparatory Committee grew disgruntled with the 
actions of Benomar: after he proposed percentages for the different groups of participants in 
the NDC, two members purportedly asked, ‘why does Jamal get to decide this? Why is he the 
one making proposals?’ This interlocutor explained that ‘they thought that Jamal was not right 
to interfere in this process’.784 Indeed, later in our conversation, while he admitted that those 
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members of the international community ‘who didn’t have any interests, they tried to be 
helpful’, he nevertheless commented that ‘those with real interests, they were interfering’.785 
Moreover, a further member of the NDC Secretariat spoke of the manner in which the 
international community assumed ‘that they would lead’. She described this as ‘so typical’ 
before detailing the ways in which the Secretariat attempted to resist. This interlocutor also 
mentioned the ways in which ‘international donors, they would decide things without 
consulting Yemenis’.786 A member of the Presidium directly claimed that ‘there was no 
ownership by Yemenis of the political process’787 and one interlocutor, for example, spoke of 
the Envoy in the following terms: ‘he had a bigger role than a mediator, he was like a ruler in 
Yemen’ while a second argued that the close involvement of the Envoy and his staff meant that 
‘the people didn’t feel the outcome [of the NDC] belonged to them’. This interlocutor also 
described how the Special Envoy was received like a President in Yemen. A second participant 
used similar language to describe Benomar too: ‘he had, maybe, the biggest role of any UN 
worker in history…all the parties, they entitled him to take decisions he should not take’. He 
claimed that, ‘if there was a crisis, they would think, let Jamal Benomar decide and we will go 
with his decision’.788 There were additional remarks made in this vein by other interlocutors.789 
 
One participant also described the actions of the UN during the Conference using dictatorial 
terms: 
 
…it was really strange to see how much the UN and [its] staff would become involved 
in every little thing. They kept saying they were impartial. The office of the Special 
Envoy – he would be with us – they would weigh in on how much had been done – the 
whole concept of political neutrality. Whether you can be when you dictate…What 
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Similarly, one revolutionary, who did not participate in the NDC but was, nevertheless, a close 
observer, described the GCC Initiative as ‘separate, not in the Square, excluding people’; she 
also noted how, when she and others expressed their disquiet to the EU Ambassador with the 
agreement, ‘he was personally offended – this shows how involved he was in writing the 
agreement’.791 Finally, in an evocative exchange, one Yemeni consultant, employed by an 
international NGO, described his interpretation of the power held by international officials: 
 
The Yemenis were looking at each other through the crosshairs of their rifles and the 
only way they could talk to each other was through these mediators – they had earned 
the trust and confidence of the Yemeni actors…The Ambassadors had the Yemeni 
political elite in their hands to shape and form in any which way they wanted. The way 
the whole National Dialogue was structured and set up was driven by the experiences 
and tours of duty of those Ambassadors [emphasis added].792 
 
However, none of the members of the international community with whom I spoke 
characterised the transition as having been led by external parties; moreover, within the press 
conferences and official documents gathered there is just one sentiment which offers support 
to this interpretation: the US representative to the UNSC, in 2012, argued that the GCC ‘laid 
the groundwork for Yemen’s political transition’.793 Furthermore, we have seen how, in 
relation to Syria, there was evidence within the dataset of a clinging to international 
frameworks, together with a sense that the opposition participated in the talks against their will. 
There is far less evidence in relation to these ideas regarding Yemen. However, a former 
Ambassador to Yemen described, in our conversation, ‘fairly extensive international 
engagement’ to persuade representatives of the southerners to participate in the NDC794 while 
the representative of Yemen to the UNSC, in 2013, did stress the importance of international 
agreements: ‘Yemen has come a long way on the path to a political settlement, based on the 
Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, as well as Resolutions 
2014 (2011) and 2051 (2012)’.795  
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These concerns notwithstanding, it would appear that the very different mediation approaches 
adopted in relation to the two conflicts did also lead to a difference, or at least a perceived 
difference, in the distribution of power within the two cases. The elite-level, secretive, remote 
talks of the Geneva Peace Process seem to have been largely viewed as internationally owned 
whereas the wide-ranging, inclusive and in-country NDC appears to have more frequently been 
deemed to have been Yemeni-owned. However, the dataset remains ambiguous on this matter. 
The data gathered may therefore indicate that the pursuit of national ownership represents a 
norm still battling to take hold.  
 
6.33 Connecting the norm of national ownership with the reimagined Syrian and Yemeni 
identities 
 
Chapter Two highlighted that there are different levels of identity. In that chapter, I noted that, 
while international relations scholarship tends to focus upon national identity, identities may 
form around numerous loci: the state, the regime, ethnicity, religion, sect, class, tribe, and so 
on. These identities may co-exist, but they may also compete, waxing and waning in relevance 
over time. In Chapter Two, I also explored the academic arguments developed surrounding 
collective identities in Syria and Yemen, briefly surveying the years preceding the Uprisings 
but focusing predominantly on academic perspectives on group identification in the states post-
2011. To recapitulate, scholars have argued that the protests inspired reconstructions of the two 
states’ national identities, fresh visions which imagined the countries, and the bonds between 
its people, in civic terms. Nevertheless, far more frequent within this body of scholarship are 
narratives surrounding the fragmentation of the state and, in particular, its sectarianisation amid 
violence. Scholars often argue that national ties hold little influence within either Syria and 
Yemen, dismiss the nationalist rhetoric of the two regimes as manipulative veneers, claim that 
the states are splintered, and contend that Syrian and Yemeni citizens primarily hold allegiance 
to sub- and supra-state identities.   
 
It is therefore marked that it is the national identities of Syria and Yemen which are reconceived 
within the two mediation attempts. In relation to Syria, as we saw in Chapter Five, the ‘Syrian 
people’ are invoked, over and over, within the dataset: the voices captured feel confident and 
comfortable speaking on behalf of all Syrians. They declare their collective, national 
experience, and their collective, national aspirations. There seems to be a perceived unity of 
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Syrians; in other words, a belief in the apparent enduring relevance of national attachment in 
relation to Syria. As we have also seen, the evidence in relation to Yemen is weaker. The voices 
represented within my dataset did speak of a ‘Yemeni people’, thus implying the relevance of 
the nation as a locus of belonging to those in, and from, the state. However, this phrase recurred 
more frequently in statements delivered by international officials within the arena of the UN. 
Moreover, while shared attributes of these alleged people appear to have been developed within 
the context of, and within reflections on, the negotiations, these depictions are far from firm, 
nor are they deep-rooted. That which appears to have been constructed within, and perhaps in 
response to, the peace talks is merely a glimpse of a possible reimagination of the Yemeni 
national character, and stands in contrast to the sharper depictions offered in relation to the 
Syrian case.  
 
Nevertheless, we could also consider the following evidence. We could consider the names of 
prominent Syrian opposition organisations during this period: the SNC and SOC both include 
the terms ‘Syrian’ and ‘National’ in their titles while the SRGC and the FSA also emphasise 
their ‘Syrian-ness’ within their titles.796 The importance of emphasising this relationship was 
also readily apparent to me when I visited the headquarters of SOC in Istanbul in November 
2019; imposing flags, modified versions of the 1932 Syrian independence flag adopted by the 
revolutionaries in 2011, were draped across the walls and stood, sagging, in dark corners, while 
vast and detailed maps of Syria, bordered by the stripes of the Syrian independence flag, were 
also prominently on display. The NDC, of course, was a National Dialogue. The logo of the 
Conference drew upon the Yemeni flag, adopted after unification: the flag consists of three 
horizontal bands, with red at the head, followed by white and then black. The logo of the NDC, 
an image of which is included in Appendix H, depicts a red ‘speech balloon’ then, overlapping 
slightly but positioned underneath, is the outline of the territory of unified Yemen, in white, 
after which there is a second speech balloon in black. Moreover, the slogan devised for the 
NDC can be translated as follows: ‘through dialogue, we will create the future [emphasis 
added]’.797 My suggestion is that, while the promotion of national ownership may not have 
produced truly Syrian- and Yemeni-led mediation attempts, it may have encouraged this 
rhetorical and symbolic focus upon conjuring up new visions of the Syrian and Yemeni people. 
My suggestion is slightly weakened, however, due to the manner in which the Yemeni 
 
796 This has also been noted by Phillips, ‘Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria’, p. 359 
797 NDC, ‘Outcomes Document’, p. 1 
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mediation attempt appeared to enjoy greater levels of national ownership by comparison with 
the Syrian efforts. Nevertheless, in turn, this suggestion demonstrates the manner in which a 
process-related mediation norm can serve to mould identity, offering weight to my overall 




In this chapter, I have explored two norms which seem to have been promoted during the two 
mediation attempts under study. The first is democracy: I have made the claim that, within the 
initial stages of the Geneva Peace Process, members of the international community and 
members of the Syrian opposition reimagined the Syrian national identity, arguing that the 
nationally held aspiration of the Syrian people is for a democratic political system. Within the 
Yemeni case study, the evidence is less strong but, nevertheless, the international mediators in 
this case attempted to tentatively suggest that reform, and occasionally democracy, constituted 
the national desire of the Yemeni people. A limited number of Yemeni voices expressed 
agreement. I therefore argued that mediators may attempt to reconstruct conflict parties’ 
identities in a bid to foster particular norms, subtly encouraging norms by presenting them as 
being integral to the nation or nations at war. However, I argued that the data related to the 
Yemeni case showed that such attempts may not always proceed smoothly. This argument 
therefore constitutes a further building block, contributing to my overall contention that 
mediation can shape identity. 
 
I then examined a second norm which I argued was sought after during the two mediation 
efforts: the norm of national ownership. I analysed the wide range of data gathered which 
explored this theme, concluding that it appears as though the Yemeni mediation effort enjoyed 
a greater level of ownership by comparison with the early stages of the Geneva Peace Process; 
nevertheless, concerns were voiced by a number of Yemenis regarding the undue level of 
influence exerted by the Special Envoy in particular. However, my suggestion was that the 
persistent promotion of national ownership, and the pervasiveness of this theme, may have 
shaped the conflict parties and mediators in a different way. It may have encouraged those 
involved in the two mediation efforts to focus upon reshaping the national identities of Syria 
and Yemen, as opposed to reconstructing the experiences and aspirations of any of the many 
sub- and supra-state identities which have been consistently argued by academics to hold 
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relevance within the state. The process-related mediation norm of national ownership can thus 
be said to shape identity. I have therefore proposed in this chapter two original ways in which 
mediation, identity construction, and norms may interact.  
 
The findings presented in this chapter contribute to debates surrounding collective 
identification in Syria and Yemen. The insistence that there exist a cohesive Syrian and Yemeni 
people, claims made by both the members of the Syrian opposition, Yemeni voices and the 
international peacemakers represented within my dataset, would seem to challenge the 
fragmented depictions which dominate academic scholarship on collective identification in 
Syria and Yemen. Nevertheless, there is also the possibility that their adamant refrains 
represent attempts to mask the reverse: a concern at the perceived disintegration of Syria and 
Yemen, both in ideational and territorial terms, and are an attempt, therefore, to rhetorically 
hold the states together. Furthermore, the construction of democracy, and reform, as central 
aspirations of the Syrian and Yemeni national identities align with the nascent arguments 
within area studies scholarship which contends that 2011 and its aftermath provoked a 
reimagining of identities in Syria and Yemen which foregrounded civic values.  
 
Secondly, that mediation can be used in the manner explored in this chapter also contributes to 
our understanding of mediator impartiality and power mediation, intertwined debates which 
were outlined in Chapter Three. The mediator appears to have successfully exerted ideational 
power during the Geneva Peace Process, calling into question its impartiality in relation to the 
outcome of the mediation efforts. Moreover, that the members of the Syrian opposition aligned 
so closely with the normative inclinations of the UN, reveals the closeness of this particular 
conflict party with the mediator. However, the mediator seems to have failed to wield such 
power in Yemen; moreover, the Yemeni voices could be considered to diverge from the 
members of the international community on this matter, possibly indicating the nature of their 






Chapter 7. Inclusive Mediation: Does it Strengthen or Rupture 
National Identity? 
 
If you are in a war or a conflict, and you belong only to an ethnicity or a religion, then the 
wound will be deeper. You want something together, everyone…798 
 
…we have been keen that our dialogue [will]…create a common ground…This common 




The series of claims made, and the themes analysed, within Chapters Five and Six have 
collectively furthered my fundamental argument: mediation can shape identity. I have 
demonstrated several ways in which mediation may not only bear witness to identity 
construction but, moreover, may activate identity construction. This final empirical chapter, 
which will investigate the themes of Inclusion and Discord, will seek to clarify whether, and if 
so how, the mediation process-related norm of inclusion shapes identity. I will challenge the 
idea that inclusive mediation shapes identity in the manner in which existing literature suggests; 
I will propose a further way in which inclusive mediation may shape the identities of the 
conflict parties; and I will suggest that there is need for additional empirical research to better 
understand the relationship between inclusive mediation and identity construction. This chapter 
will therefore serve my overall aspiration, which is to understand how mediation might interact 
with identity.   
 
In Chapter Three, I explored the contentions of Hirblinger and Landau that the rationales and 
linguistic framings offered to justify inclusive peacemaking can shape the identities of the 
conflict parties. I noted that these authors have identified three different rationales for inclusion 
which tend to be offered within academia and by international peacemakers: the first calls for 
inclusion on the basis that widening participation will ensure greater representation of the war-
wracked society, thus rendering the peace process more legitimate. The second rationale 
demands inclusion in order to protect particular groups within the state, or states, facing 
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conflict. Lastly, the third rationale identified by the authors calls for inclusion in order to 
transform and rebuild relationships between groups. According to the analysis of Hirblinger 
and Landau, the first rationale tends to be offered in conjunction with open framings of the 
included: ambiguous terms to refer to those included, such as ‘stakeholders’, are employed. 
However, the second rationale is often accompanied by closed framings, language which 
clearly defines participants according to a specific trait, such as ‘women’ or ‘youth’, and which 
essentialises such groupings. Lastly, the third rationale is often associated with relational 
framings, terminology which captures the socio-political context in which the included interact. 
As an example, the authors mention designations such as ‘powerful’ or ‘marginalised’ actors.  
 
As I also explored in Chapter Three, for Hirblinger and Landau, these rationales and framings 
are connected with the concept of identity: the first rationale lacks precision, is difficult to 
operationalise and is unlikely to shape the identities of the conflict parties. The second, 
however, may heighten and entrench sub-state identities, and may lead to ‘a competition for 
inclusion between fragmented interest groups’.800 On the other hand, the third encourages the 
development of a new, unified, over-arching identity within the state or states at war, an identity 
generated through the peace process in which identities operating below the state are either 
subsumed or antagonistic elements are expunged. From the analysis of Hirblinger and Landau, 
I therefore extrapolated the following hypothesis: the rationales used to justify inclusive 
peacemaking and the framing of those included can transform the identities of the conflict 
parties.  
 
To begin, I will briefly define inclusion in the context of peacemaking once more, before 
concisely outlining the shape of the two mediation attempts and those included. I will then 
explore the extent to which, according to the evidence captured within the dataset, inclusion 
appears to have been promoted and achieved within the two mediation efforts. Thirdly, I will 
consider the language used by those voices within the dataset to describe these attempts at 
seeking and securing inclusion, arguing the following: a variety of rationales for inclusion, and 
framings of the included, can be detected in relation to both cases, although the voices 
represented within the dataset rarely consider why inclusion should be sought and its impact 
upon the mediation efforts. However, concerning Syria, I will claim that the first rationale, 
surrounding legitimacy, seems to predominate, as do open framings. Nevertheless, these open 
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framings frequently take the form of invocations of the Syrian people and the Syrian nation, 
and I will suggest, therefore, in a divergence from Hirblinger and Landau, that such framings, 
and the first rationale, can indeed be linked with identity construction. The idea of the relevance 
of a Syrian national identity, of the unity of the Syrian people, seems to rise to the fore in 
discussions of inclusion. I will then argue that the evidence concerning Yemen differs. 
Rationales for inclusion are difficult to detect; nevertheless, closed framings dominate: voices 
list clearly defined groups which were invited to participate in the Conference. However, 
relational framings can also be perceived. In particular, voices speak of newcomers by 
comparison with members of the political elite, implicitly comparing the deep-rooted power 
differentials between the two. Concurrently, the idea that the inclusion of the NDC may have 
transformed Yemen and/or relationships between Yemenis is mentioned, although the notion 
does not frequently recur.  
 
Due to the muddiness of these findings, I will then explore further data. Hirblinger and Landau 
suggest that inclusive peacemaking can either entrench sub-state identities, and augment 
hostilities between these groups, or it can offer the potential to form a reimagined, overarching 
identity in which antagonistic relations between groups are healed. I will assess which of these 
two outcomes appears to have been generated through the two peace processes, returning to 
the data analysed in Chapters Five and Six and highlighting that a freshly imagined, Syrian 
national identity was constructed with greater clarity than was the case with Yemen. I will 
argue that this contests, or at the very least complicates, the framework of Hirblinger and 
Landau. Moreover, I will also introduce further data contained within the theme of Discord, a 
theme which was explored in depth within the dataset and, in particular, during the interviews 
conducted. Within this theme are discussions of the relationships between, and the power of, 
sub-state identity groups in Syria and Yemen. I will explore these data, noting once more that 
the expected effects upon identity of the inclusion rationales and the framings of the included 
do not seem to have aligned neatly in the manner expected within the two cases under 
investigation.  
 
Furthermore, the data contained within the theme of Discord adds complexity to my previous 
arguments surrounding the transformation, through mediation, of the Syrian and Yemeni 
identities, creating an elaborate rendering of the processes of identity construction, and de-
construction, which may have taken place during the two mediation attempts under study. 
Therefore, there are two stories at the heart of this chapter. Firstly, it will consider the role of 
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the norm of inclusion within the two mediation efforts. Secondly, it will consider the character 
of the interactions between the individuals and groups implicated in the two peace processes. 
In doing so, it will attempt to interrogate the link between inclusion and mediation. The result 
is complex and does not provide as straightforward a response as I was able to produce in 
Chapters Five and Six. Inclusion may well shape identity but perhaps not in the manner 
expected, and although mediation appears to have brought about the creation of freshly 
wrought national identities, the strength and durability of these inventions is challenged by the 
data examined in this chapter. These convolutions and contradictions are a testament to the 
intricacy of identity and processes of identity construction, and will be reflected upon in the 
conclusion to this chapter.  
 
7.2 Promoting the norm of inclusion in mediation 
 
In Chapter Three, I offered the following, broad definition of inclusion in the context of 
mediation: an inclusive process will ‘give all groups in a society the opportunity to be heard 
and to have their concerns addressed’.801 I noted, there, that inclusion contains within it the 
ideas of both participation and representation, and exemplifies a marked shift in mediation 
practice which, conventionally, features a select few for furtive discussions, hidden from 
scrutiny. As I explored in Chapter One, the promotion of the deployment of National Dialogues 
following violence has been one response to the growing prevalence of the norm of inclusion. 
I explored National Dialogues in Chapter One, and outlined the membership of the Yemeni 
National Dialogue and how it was convened. I noted how an array of political movements, 
together with civil society, women and youth representatives, were invited to participate in the 
negotiations; however, I additionally commented on the opaque process by which these 
delegates were selected and the lack of engagement from Hiraak in the Conference. In Chapter 
One, I also outlined the Geneva Peace Process, noting that representatives of the Syrian 
government and the Syrian opposition met for the first time in Geneva in 2014 for talks 
overseen by Brahimi; their delegations were limited, with just fifteen members in each. Three 
women participated while political movements representative of ethnic minorities in Syria, 
such as the Kurdish Supreme Committee, and civil society groups and Syrian youth, were not 
directly incorporated. Despite both being convened by the UN during the same time period and 
within the same region of the world, the two cases took markedly different approaches to 
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inclusion and, therefore, based upon the arguments of Hirblinger and Landau, we might expect 
the peace processes to have had equally divergent effects on identities in Yemen and Syria. 
This chapter will assess this assumption. 
 
7.21 Pursuing inclusion in the Syrian and Yemeni mediation attempts 
 
To begin, I will show that there is evidence that the voices within my dataset felt that inclusion 
was sought in both cases, and that this was promoted and, moreover, forced by international 
officials. By assessing this data, it will be possible for me to claim that inclusion was promoted 
within the two cases under investigation, and it will also be possible for me to then assess the 
language used to discuss inclusion through the prism of the framework of Hirblinger and 
Landau. Before I begin, I should also note that, within my interview guide, I did not plan to 
ask a question about inclusion. Instead, this theme was consistently and independently raised 
by participants, and it was often considered in our conversations in great depth. Moreover, this 
theme overwhelmed many of the official documents analysed. It seemed to be a preoccupation 
of the voices captured by the dataset and, while it is challenging to reach firm conclusions 
regarding whether inclusion was achieved and regarding its effect upon identity, it is vitally 
important this theme is considered in the light of its significance to the interlocutors consulted.  
 
Turning firstly to the Syrian case, a number of the Syrian interviewees expressed their 
conviction that SOC sought to be inclusive of both the Syrian people and the various 
movements within the Syrian opposition; indeed, two interlocutors claimed that SOC had been 
established precisely to create a more representative body. As one phrased it: ‘then the 
opposition started to think about a new body, representing more of the Syrian people and the 
Syrian opposition – they created the Syrian opposition’.802 Regarding the influence of the 
international community in this sphere, three Syrian interview participants felt that the 
international community had successfully helped them to be inclusive or, at least, to appear to 
be representative. One interlocutor expressed the following: ‘the Syrian Opposition Coalition 
was given the best possible start. It was given the status of representation…to encourage it, to 
make it legitimate, viable to negotiate’.803 A second participant noted this dynamic too: ‘the 
international community, the EU, the UN – and everyone – after the first resolution in the 
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General Assembly – you felt that they were giving legitimacy to SOC, legitimacy for us to be 
the representatives of the Syrian people.’804  
 
Three members of the international community who supported the Syrian mediation efforts 
also discussed this matter in our conversations, commenting on the assistance provided to 
augment the inclusivity of the opposition. One official described the extensive efforts of the 
US in this vein, implying that the very creation of SOC derived from the wishes of the US to 
improve the Syrian opposition’s connection with Syria: ‘the international community realised 
that if there were negotiations, the SNC was not going to be the right body, that there was a 
need for something new. So, we helped provide the financial and physical support for the 
creation of SOC’. Indeed, this official claimed the following: ‘a lot of my time – my own time 
and that of Ambassador Ford [the US Ambassador to Syria] – was spent trying to help shape 
these opposition institutions…the idea being that if we were ever going to have a negotiated 
solution, we needed to address representation, to address what the opposition was.’805 We can 
see here that the responsibility for encouraging inclusion is deemed to lie firmly with the 
international community as opposed to with the Syrians, and that this interviewee believed a 
great deal of effort had been dedicated to improving the inclusivity of the opposition body. 
Later in the interview, she also made a more explicit link to that which was happening on the 
ground in Syria, and how the US was involved in nurturing this specific link:  
 
…if the opposition was at the table, it needed to be more inclusive and representative 
or the fighting would never stop. It needed to faithfully represent what the street was 
looking for, the whole political spectrum…there were individuals and parties who 
needed to be represented, it needed to be heavily focused on Syrians in Syria…We had 
to identify Syrians who were still in Syria…[emphasis added].806  
 
A consultant employed by the UN supported the assertions made above, noting that Brahimi 
tried ‘very hard to bring Syrian women to the negotiating table’ and, more broadly, that ‘the 
international community realised they needed to broaden representation and participation’.807  
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Indeed, a sentiment which is repeated over and over within the press conferences delivered by 
the mediators implicated in the Syrian peace talks, and within the statements and documents 
released by the international officials involved in this peace process, is that the mediation 
efforts needed to be inclusive. In a verbal briefing delivered by Annan in April 2012, he 
emphasises this point four times. For instance, at one point he utters the following: 
 
We must also move quickly to facilitate a peaceful, Syrian-led, inclusive political 
solution…This should be achieved through a comprehensive political dialogue between 
the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition. A broad cross-
section of Syrian society must be involved…We wish to ensure that the Syrian people’s 
aspirations are realised and that they shape their own future.808 
 
Within the official statements of the international community, this message is oft-repeated. For 
instance, the need to launch ‘a comprehensive political dialogue’, encompassing ‘the whole 
spectrum of the Syrian opposition’809 is mentioned in Resolution 2042. Furthermore, the Action 
Group Communiqué argues that ‘all groups and segments of society in the Syrian Arab 
Republic must be enabled to participate in a national dialogue process…The process must be 
fully inclusive in order to ensure that the views of all segments of Syrian society are heard in 
shaping the political settlement for the transition’.810 This is continued into 2013; Resolution 
2118 stresses ‘that the only solution to the current crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic is through 
an inclusive’ process, later emphasising that the Syrian parties to the forthcoming Geneva 
Conference must be ‘fully representative of the Syrian people’.811 The FoS too, take care to 
stress the need for inclusivity, once more linking this to satisfying the will of the people of 
Syria. For instance, the conclusions of the FoS meeting held in February 2012 then call for ‘an 
inclusive Syrian-led political process…aimed at addressing the legitimate aspirations and 
concerns of Syria’s people’.812  
 
However, a stronger sentiment was also communicated to me by two of the Syrian 
interviewees, and it was also evident within the comments made by Brahimi in a press 
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conference: specifically, that the international community was forceful in its insistence that 
SOC be inclusive. One interlocutor returned to this point on three occasions within our 
interview: ‘I think the international community, they tried to push the opposition to have 
representation from all different Syrians, different backgrounds – they wanted people to 
represent minorities, women [emphasis added]’.813 An activist, analyst and close observer of 
the Syrian opposition similarly commented that one weakness of the SNC had been that 
‘everyone tried to make it bigger [emphasis added]’.814  
 
Turning, now, to the Yemeni case, a desire to be inclusive was voiced by the international 
community in relation to the Yemeni transition and the NDC and, specifically, to the outreach 
work of the international officials. Benomar told the UN, in December 2011, that he and his 
team were ‘look[ing] forward to strengthening [their] engagement on the ground in the next 
few critical weeks’;815 moreover, a Yemeni interlocutor described how the revolution in the 
state was driven by ‘a need to make politics more inclusive’.816 Furthermore, it is worth noting 
here that it was emphasised by a number of interviewees that the inclusivity of the NDC was 
novel. For instance, a high-ranking Secretariat member described the ‘newcomers’ as having 
been ‘empowered’.817 Another member of the Secretariat told me the following story: 
 
And some of them [the traditional power-holders], they would come later, and walk to 
the front row of seats and expect to sit there – but they would find a youth activist 
already sitting there – I remember, the ex-minister, he came one day, late, and he went 
to the front and there was a young activist, a woman, sitting there – and she wouldn’t 
move, and she said, this was a new Yemen – and he was very frustrated – this change 
was happening and he was very frustrated. We told him, there are no reserved seats, we 
are all equal here – this was one of many signs of change.818 
 
Moreover, the aforementioned high-ranking Secretariat official commented that, ‘for the first 
time, we had representatives of the main parties, of GPC, Islah – and civil society, women and 
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youth too – it was the first time such a platform had existed in Yemen’.819 A member of the 
Secretariat also used the phrase ‘the first time’, mentioning, too, the disbelief of the traditional 
power-holders.820 Inclusivity ‘was a new thing’, commented one delegate,821 while another 
remarked that this characteristic ‘was what made the National Dialogue different’.822 Lastly, a 
Yemeni consultant to an international NGO which provided support to the NDC branded the 
participation as ‘a huge leap forward’.823 The NDC Report frames inclusivity as being new 
too824 and this novelty was also mentioned within Security Council meetings.825  
 
Concerning the specific role of the international community in encouraging this inclusivity, a 
number of the Yemeni interlocutors mentioned how the international community had assisted 
the Yemenis in rendering the NDC, and the broader transition, more inclusive. Two discussed 
the deadlock reached during the preparation phase, when the Yemeni members of the 
preparatory committee failed to agree on the number of chairs which would be allocated to 
different groups in the NDC. A Secretariat member commented that ‘the Special Envoy played 
a positive role…he did the numbers and then, a few days later, he came with a proposal’826 
while a second remarked that the Envoy ‘influenced for the right things’, including ‘the 
inclusion of women and youth’.827 
 
Four of the international officials interviewed agreed, expressing their view that the 
international community had helped with regard to the inclusion of broad swathes of the 
Yemeni population. One diplomat claimed that the ‘collective engagement’ of international 
officials in the country ‘aimed at ensuring that all groups and parties effectively joined the 
NDC’.828 Benomar also mentioned, within UNSC meetings, how this body had played a ‘very 
important role in Yemen’, later commenting that its members had encouraged ‘all sides to come 
to an agreement’;829 in accord, the President of the UNSC in 2012 remarked on the efforts of 
UN officials in Yemen ‘to support Yemeni efforts to organise a National Dialogue process that 
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is inclusive, transparent and participatory’.830 Moreover, Benomar spoke extremely highly of 
the effect of his own presence in 2013: 
 
On one of my visits, a woman told me that my presence had broken the wall of fear. In 
2011, it would have been unthinkable for a delegation comprised of women and young 
people to be welcomed at headquarters of an intelligence agency…we are engaged in 
more than a political transition; we are witnessing a transformation of the political 
culture.831 
 
The implication here is that, without Benomar, Yemeni women and youth would not have been 
able to have engaged with the community outreach programme in the way in which they did, 
and that his presence revolutionised the accessibility of Yemeni politics. 
 
Furthermore, in a similar vein to Syria, in meetings of the UNSC, many officials implore the 
Yemenis to ensure that the transition, and the NDC, are inclusive, or note how their colleagues 
have urged the need for this. It was commented that ‘members of the Security Council also 
called on all parties to move forward urgently an inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led process of 
political transition that meets the needs and aspirations of the Yemeni people for change’;832 
and Mark Lyall Grant, former representative of the UK to the UNSC, remarks, in 2012, that 
‘the Security Council emphasises the need for these political processes to be conducted in an 
inclusive manner involving the full participation of the different segments of Yemeni society, 
including the regions of the country, the major social groups and the full and effective 
participation of women’.833 Until 2013, this is repeated over and over while Security Council 
press statements on Yemen feature a similar message, and the FoY also make a comparable 
point: ‘the National Dialogue Conference must allow the Yemeni people, through their 
representatives, to decide for themselves the future of their nation…That dialogue must of 
course be inclusive, with representatives from the north and south of the country, as well as 
women and members of civil society.’834 Lastly, UN Resolutions also frequently make this 
argument. 
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Just three interlocutors expressed the idea that the international community had to force the 
Yemeni mediation attempt to be inclusive. A former Ambassador claimed that he ‘participated 
in making sure the delegations met the requirements’, commenting, in patronising language, 
that ‘there was a lot of hand-holding’.835 Moreover, a consultant to an international NGO, who 
was otherwise broadly critical of both the NDC and the international involvement in the 
mediation attempt, offered the following appraisal: 
  
[The ambassadors] managed to convince Islah for example – and the northern elite – to 
give the southerners fifty percent representation in the National Dialogue Conference. 
They were able to make Islah and the Huthis accept thirty percent women’s 
participation and twenty percent youth participation – these are issues the Yemeni elite 
had not entertained before – and it was only through the persistence of the foreign 
diplomats and Jamal [Benomar]…that those acts were seen as necessary – that’s what 
got the political elites to accept them [emphasis added].836 
 
Finally, slightly stronger language is also used at one point in the NDC Final Report; it is 
mentioned in the Southern Issue Working Group section that the GCC Agreements and the 
UNSC Resolutions ‘require[d]’ the participation and cooperation of all groups.837  
 
This section has therefore demonstrated that inclusion was purportedly sought during the two 
mediation attempts, and that members of the international community played a role in 
encouraging and, indeed, dictating this norm. This section has also provided ample illustrative 
quotations which will allow me to, later in this chapter, analyse the language deployed in a bid 
to investigate the apparent effects of promoting inclusion upon identity in Syria and Yemen. 
 
7.22 Achieving inclusion in the Syrian and Yemeni mediation attempts 
 
Before I consider the claims made that the two peacemaking processes under study were indeed 
inclusive, I must emphasise that a number of interlocutors felt that both the Syrian and Yemeni 
mediation attempts failed to be inclusive and, moreover, in relation to the Yemeni case, their 
 
835 M, Y, TI (4) 
836 M, Y, TII (1)  
837 NDC, ‘Outcomes Document’, p. 6 
196 
 
view was that claims of inclusion instead masked exclusion and were no more than a façade. I 
do not have the space to explore their views in depth here but, as an illustration, I would like 
to note that 12 interviewees who discussed the Syrian case, and 18 interlocutors who spoke 
with me about the Yemeni transition, directly and at times with vehemence criticised the two 
peace processes for their lack of inclusion. Nevertheless, I will assess those voices who did 
claim that the two mediation efforts achieved inclusion in order to later evaluate the language 
deployed.  
 
Claims of having achieved inclusivity, made by Syrians represented within my dataset, can be 
divided into three strands: those which argue that either the SNC and/or SOC successfully 
encompassed the full array of opposition figures; those which contend that the Syrian people 
were embodied within the opposition; and those which, less explicitly, state that the opposition, 
and in particular the delegation at Geneva II, were intimately linked with people and events ‘on 
the ground’. To begin with the first assertion, one participant wrote to me, describing the SNC 
as a political body which reflected ‘the aims and aspirations of the Syrian Revolution’,838 a 
sentiment which was echoed in a speech delivered by Ghalioun in 2012 in which he implored 
the international community to ‘support’ the ‘efforts’ already expended by the SNC ‘in 
coordinating various parties involved in the Revolution within the framework of a national plan 
to accomplish change’.839 One interviewee also described how, during the two rounds of talks 
in Geneva in January and February 2014, the opposition delegation sought to welcome and 
involve those figures opposed to al-Asad who had not been present at the mediation efforts.840 
On two occasions within the dataset, members of the international community appreciated the 
efforts made by the SNC and SOC to represent the many figures within the Syrian opposition. 
For instance, in the Chair’s conclusions to the FoS meeting held in April 2012, it was noted 
that ‘the Friends’ Group recognised the Syrian National Council as a legitimate representative 
of all Syrians and the umbrella organisation under which Syrian opposition groups are 
gathering’.841 
 
In relation to the second claim of inclusion, just three of the Syrian interlocutors made the 
assertion within our conversations that they believed that SOC, and its delegation at Geneva II, 
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were representative of the broader Syrian people. The current president of SOC argued that, ‘if 
you look into our delegation – we had the representation – we had Kurds, Arabs, Christians – 
even sects like the Druze, Alawite, women, men – our delegation was very much diverse.’842 
A second participant explicitly linked popular appeal with visual displays of diversity, 
mentioning the manner in which SOC proudly joined together those from religious and secular 
communities, defectors from the regime, and women: ‘it was popular, people thought it was 
good.’843 Moreover, claims that both the SNC and SOC were representative recur frequently 
within these organisations’ statements, although such declarations do not continue past 2013. 
Such claims are linked, by SOC, to the broader notion of ‘the people’.844 Within a press 
conference in 2013, SOC was keen to note the expansion of the Syrian Revolutionary General 
Commission845 and deemed itself ‘the official representative of the Syrian people’ in a 
statement published later in the same year.846 Furthermore, al-Jarba declared the following in 
a speech to the FoS in September 2013: 
 
I speak to you in the name of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and 
Opposition Forces, which represents the broad spectrum of moderate political 
movements, all the ethnic and religious groups of Syria, local committees and councils, 
and the political arm of the Free Syrian Army.847 
 
Thirdly, six of the Syrian interlocutors emphasised to me their connection with both the Syrian 
people ‘on the ground’, and events within Syria. One described the cultivation of these links as 
‘one of the advancements we were making – we were making contact with local councils inside 
Syria – we wanted them to be in our vision’.848 Another emphasised to me that politicians, like 
him, were ‘not the only people in the opposition. The opposition consists of the youth, of the 
people on the ground’,849 while several stressed that this link to those in Syria was expressly 
cultivated during the mediation efforts in Geneva, and that the perspectives gained influenced 
the negotiating position of SOC. Thus, one interlocutor stated: 
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I didn’t work alone, I contacted all the Syrian organisations, documenting human rights, 
what was happening on the ground – together, we also contacted many activists who 
were brilliant – asking all of them – together, we were discussing all the time – what is 
best, what is most important.850 
 
Similarly, another claimed that she ‘was always in communication with people in the field’,851 
later making an analogous statement which directly connected this act with nurturing ties 
between all Syrians: ‘back then, when we started to convey the voices of the people from the 
field, in the UN, we feel people were feeling a collective Syrian identity’.852 A third delegate 
at Geneva II claimed that the members of SOC ‘were always consulting’, that they were ‘also 
talking with people on the ground’.853 Al-Jarba, too, within speeches delivered in January 2014, 
stressed the ability of SOC to understand and convey the concerns of those Syrians within 
Syria: just a week before the beginning of Geneva II, he stated, ‘we have expressed the truth 
about what is going, on the ground’,854 and, following the first round of talks, he declared: ‘the 
day we took the historic decision to participate in Geneva II, we were able to…address the 
concerns of the revolutionaries on the ground.’855  
 
Members of the international community represented within my dataset describe the opposition 
bodies as inclusive far less frequently, with none of my interlocutors making this claim within 
our conversations; nevertheless, within several press conferences and official documents, the 
Syrian opposition are described as representative by international officials. For example, 
Brahimi claimed that Geneva II would be ‘different’ because ‘the Syrians are going to be 
represented’856 – an implication that the SOC delegation was therefore representative – while, 
a month later, in December 2013, Brahimi stated that the Coalition had told the UN team ‘that 
they are reaching out to others, inside and outside of Syria’.857 The Final Communiqué of the 
London 11 meeting which took place in October 2013 declares SOC to be ‘the legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people’,858 a sentiment repeated by Hague at an FoS meeting in 
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854 SOC, ‘President Ahmad Al-Jarba’s Speech at the Ministerial Meeting on Syria, Paris’ (13 January 2014) 
855 SOC, ‘President Ahmad Al-Jarba’s Speech at the End of First Round of Negotiations in Geneva’  
856 UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference’ (5 November 2013). 
He makes this claim twice within this press conference. 
857 UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference’ (20 December 2013) 
858 UK Government, ‘London 11 Final Communiqué’ 
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Tunis in February 2012859 and included within the Chair’s concluding remarks at the same FoS 
meeting.860  
 
In terms of the inclusive nature of the work of the international mediators, two international 
officials did communicate within our conversations their conviction that they spoke with, and 
included, a broad range of actors. One US official claimed that it required ‘hours of [her] time, 
talking to every person, every group’861 while an individual engaged in Track II efforts claimed 
that her organisation ‘gathered people of different political sides…people close to the regime, 
people clearly opposed, some armed groups, and those in between…representatives of various 
denominations’.862 This sentiment appeared more frequently within the press conferences, 
statements, and official documents of the international community. In May 2012, Mood 
claimed that UNSMIS ‘look[ed] to engage all elements of Syrian society’, linking this to the 
UN’s commitment to ‘help the Syrian people to move forward on their aspirations’.863 In 
addition, the Action Group communiqué pledged to ‘consult widely with Syrian society’864 
while Brahimi also stated in a press conference in early 2013 that he would ‘continue to engage 
all Syrian parties’.865  
 
However, the members of the international community interviewed do not seem to have 
believed that either the SNC or SOC was connected to people or events on the ground in Syria; 
or, if they did, they did not mention this in their interviews. Neither did they seem to feel that 
they, as mediators, were particularly connected to those on the ground: one US official did 
claim that she had worked hard to ‘identify civil society, local governance, rebel leaders, 
activists, rebels’, that, in 2012, she ‘spent [the] entire year on the phone, on Skype, on 
WhatsApp’. Moreover, this same participant claimed that the US process of narrowing down 
the opposition was ‘driven by what was happening on the ground’, thus implying that she and 
her colleagues had a good grasp of events inside Syria.866 The Final Communiqué of the Action 
Group for Syria also claims that its members could appreciate ‘the aspirations of the people of 
 
859 UK Government, ‘“We Must Show That We Will Not Abandon the Syrian People in Their Darkest Hour”’ 
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861 M, S, TI (1)  
862 M, S, TII (4)  
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the Syrian Arab Republic’ because they had been ‘clearly expressed’ to them ‘by the wide 
range of Syrians consulted’.867 Nevertheless, aside from these instances, within my dataset, 
there is no further sense that the international community felt connected to Syrians in the 
country nor that they believed the opposition groups were connected to the ground. 
 
The alleged achievement of inclusivity of the Yemeni transition, and the NDC in particular, 
was focused upon a great deal by those Yemenis interviewed; 15 interviewees described the 
peace process in this manner. Inclusion was framed as having been achieved through the 
representation of the various Yemeni political parties together with the involvement of 
‘independent’ women, youth and civil society delegates and the stipulation that the political 
parties needed to also nominate women and those from the younger generation. More broadly, 
one interlocutor remarked, ‘really, it was so rich’868 while another described the inclusivity as 
leading to the NDC being ‘reflective of Yemen as a country’.869 This inclusivity was argued to 
have extended to the various committees and sub-committees which contributed to the 
preparation and management of the NDC: one characterised the Contact Committee and the 
Preparatory Committee, bodies which oversaw the organisation of the Conference, as not only 
inclusive in their membership, encompassing senior politicians, representatives from the north 
and the south, together with ‘women activists, youth activists’, but as having also been 
committed to reaching ‘out to different people, to al-Hiraak, to the youth’.870  
 
Indeed, another participant, a revolutionary youth delegate to the NDC, told me how the youth 
‘were joining the conference from different geographical areas, different backgrounds, 
different affiliations’, arguing later in our conversation that, ‘we should not reject or ignore the 
outcomes of the National Dialogue. They reflect the diverse voices of the people, of the 
participants – not only the traditionally represented political powers.’871 A Working Group 
Chair described how the members of her section ‘came from all the political parties, from all 
parts of society and classes’872, while the Vice Chair of another Working Group wrote to me 
regarding ‘the diversity of [her] group in terms of politics, geography, ethnicity, Islamic 
religious differences’.873 One interlocutor mentioned how the inclusivity of the NDC motivated 
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her very desire to join the NDC.874 Lastly, the Final Report of the NDC also mentions this topic 
on many occasions. For instance, it is claimed that ‘the document, in our hands, represents a 
summary of the hopes and aspirations of the great Yemeni people’,875 that the vision contained 
within ‘has accommodated the entire country’,876 and that ‘all political and social components’ 
and ‘all segments and groups of society’ within Yemen participated in the NDC.877  
 
Attempts were made during the NDC to fund and facilitate a programme of ‘community 
engagement’, and a number of my interlocutors discussed this during our interviews. Some 
portrayed the scheme as having successfully connected the delegates, and the events of the 
NDC, to the broader Yemeni population. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a senior Secretariat member 
spoke of this work in a positive light;878 he was supported in this view by a second member of 
the NDC Secretariat.879 Within the NDC Final Report, the field visits which were undertaken 
are mentioned by two Working Groups in their sections,880 while the concluding chapter of the 
report boasts of the ‘1578 visions, ideas and contributions’ which ‘were received from various 
groups and segments from all over the country’, arguing that ‘the open, multi-dimensional and 
unique nature of the conference, as well as its seriousness, captured the hearts and minds of 
people’.881  
 
Three international officials who were involved in the Yemeni transition with whom I spoke 
also mentioned, and on occasion praised, the inclusivity of the NDC. For instance, a Western 
diplomat commented that they [sing.] didn’t think ‘it [inclusion] could have been done better.’ 
A high-level diplomat deployed more romanticised language:  
 
To the international observer, it was precisely the composition of the NDC that inspired 
hope that we were witnessing a genuine departure from an untenable past. Put 
differently, the NDC appeared to be so inclusive that it inspired hope…there was 
immense optimism in the air when the conference finally started on the twentieth March 
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2013. Abundant rain fell that day – in one of the driest countries on earth – that in itself 
seemed to make for an auspicious beginning of the NDC.882 
 
On numerous occasions, the inclusivity of the transition and the NDC was noted by members 
of the international community within UNSC meetings and documents. These ranged from 
stating how Benomar had been engaged with a number of groups within Yemeni society – ‘the 
Special Adviser has since remained actively engaged with all Yemeni sides’883 – together with 
repeated mentions of the inclusivity of Yemeni politics under the watch of the international 
community.884 As a Security Council Press statement issued in September 2013 aptly 
summarised: the NDC ‘has generated a peaceful, inclusive and meaningful dialogue about the 
country’s future amongst diverse actors, including youth, women, civil society representatives, 
the Houthi Movement and the Hiraak Southern Movement.’885  
 
In the arena of UNSC meetings, a connection between the negotiations of the NDC with ‘the 
ground’ was mentioned twice: firstly, by Benomar in 2011, when he claimed that he ‘met with 
hundreds of Yemenis from all walks of life, and from all political affiliations’,886 and, later, in 
2013: the Yemeni Ambassador to the UN spoke of the ‘field visits’ planned to take place within 
the capital and ‘17 governorates all over the country’, together with ‘meetings with more than 
11,000 personalities representing the different strata of society and its components’.887  
 
To summarise, while doubt and fierce scepticism are expressed within the dataset concerning 
the inclusive nature of the two mediation efforts – data which I was unable to explore in depth 
here – a number of voices did, nevertheless, praise the shape of the peace talks and those who 
participated. The next section will assess the language used within the dataset to conceptualise 
inclusion in order to begin to consider the apparent effects of this promotion, and possible 
achievement, of inclusion upon identities in Syria and Yemen. 
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7.23 Why was inclusion sought? How were the included framed? 
 
So far in this chapter, I have presented and analysed data gathered which concerns the theme 
of Inclusion, assessing statements made that inclusion was an aspiration, and that inclusion was 
achieved within the two cases of mediation under investigation. I will now consider the 
language deployed: do the voices captured within the dataset wield any of the three rationales 
identified by Hirblinger and Landau? Do they also deploy the attendant framings uncovered by 
these authors? By addressing these questions, I will then be able to predict the apparent effect 
of inclusion upon identities in Syria and Yemen. I will also be able to compare these predictions 
with the findings already reached in Chapters Five and Six, and with additional data contained 
within the theme of Discord. 
 
The tables below provide summaries of the extent to which the three different rationales, and 
three separate framings, recurred within the data I gathered which discussed the theme of 
Inclusion. I have included a more detailed version of this table in Appendix I which 
disaggregates the totals by the type of data source. It should be noted that these quantitative 
summaries include instances of the three rationales and three framings which occur within 
statements made by those voices which dispute that inclusion had been achieved: 
 
Table k) Rationales and framings present within data concerning inclusion and the Syrian case 
 
Rationale Total Framing Total 
1 (legitimacy) 36 (97%) 1 (open) 77 (79%) 
2 (protection) 1 (3%) 2 (closed) 20 (20%) 
3 (transformation) 0 (0%) 3 (relational) 1 (1%) 
 
Table l) Rationales and framings present within data concerning inclusion and the Yemeni case 
 
Rationale Total Framing Total 
1 (legitimacy) 10 (17%) 1 (open) 70 (34%) 
2 (protection) 5 (8%) 2 (closed) 116 (57%) 




Beginning, firstly, with Syria, the voices assessed rarely directly consider the purpose of 
inclusion or its effects upon the mediation process. Nevertheless, I would suggest that inclusion 
appears to be linked primarily with ‘legitimacy’, ‘credibility’ and ‘popularity’. This 
justification aligns with the first rationale isolated by Hirblinger and Landau. However, on one 
occasion, the second rationale surrounding the protection of groups is hinted at. The 
predominance of the first rationale would suggest, according to the analysis of Hirblinger and 
Landau, that those included will be framed in an ‘open’ manner. Such language does recur, and 
predominate, within the data gathered concerning inclusion within the Geneva Peace Process: 
voices speak ambiguously, for instance, of ‘all elements of society’, ‘all levels of society’, 
‘different political sides’, ‘every person, every group’, and ‘all different Syrians’. However, I 
would note that one particular, ‘open’ framing recurs with frequency: both Syrians and 
members of the international community represented within the dataset connect inclusion with 
the idea of encompassing and embodying the nation: the idea of representing ‘the Syrian 
people’ or, more simply, ‘Syria’, is often mentioned while, more subtly, the notion of being 
intimately tied to ‘Syrians on the ground’ or those in ‘the field’ is also raised.  
 
This analysis notwithstanding, it is also possible to perceive ‘closed framings’, although these 
occur less frequently. Within the data gathered concerning Syria, groups such as ‘women’, 
‘Kurds’, ‘Arabs’, ‘Christians’, ‘sects’, ‘secular communities’ and ‘youth’ are intermittently 
described as having been included; however, as opposed to being linked to empowerment, as 
Hirblinger and Landau predict, these closed framings also tend to be associated with 
legitimacy. The third rationale, associated with the transformation of relationships, is difficult 
to detect within the data gathered, and so too are relational framings, appearing to confirm the 
contention of Hirblinger and Landau that this third rationale, and its attendant relational 
framings, tend to appear together.  
 
As I explored in Chapter Three and in the introduction to this chapter, Hirblinger and Landau 
clearly associate the second and third rationales, and their attendant framings, with the concept 
of identity; their argument is that the second rationale for inclusion, and closed framings of the 
included, can strengthen and entrench sub-state identities whereas the third rationale, and 
relational framings, offer the opportunity to not only grapple with ‘the intersectional, complex 
and fluid nature of…identities and interests’ but, moreover, to rebuild ‘the social spaces that 
give people a sense of identity’. The first rationale, and open framings, both of which appear 
most frequently within the data gathered concerning Syria are not, however, deemed by 
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Hirblinger and Landau to interact with identity. My proposal, however, is that this first rationale 
surrounding legitimacy, and the open framings deployed, can indeed be connected with 
identity. In the case of Syria, and within the data I have gathered, a number of the voices 
analysed seem to connect inclusion with the nation or the national people, and there is even a 
sense that inclusive peacemaking can generate national ties. In previous chapters, I have argued 
that members of the Syrian opposition, together with representatives of the international 
community, attempted to reimagine the Syrian national identity before associating their own 
movement with this reconstruction. I have also claimed that members of the Syrian opposition 
may have focused upon envisioning the national identity of Syrians, as opposed to other levels 
of identity relevant within Syria, due to the power of the norm of national ownership. Here, we 
appear to be seeing a bid to legitimise both the Syrian opposition and the Geneva Peace Process 
through persistent claims that the Syrian nation is encapsulated within the opposition bodies 
and, therefore, within the peace process: implicit claims that the peace process and one conflict 
party in particular possess the capacity to understand, to speak on behalf of, and to reflect the 
nation and its interests, and that the opposition and stages I and II of the Geneva Peace Process 
are thus legitimate. Syria’s national identity seems to have risen to the fore, once more, within 
the theme of inclusion.  
 
The image in relation to Yemen differs. Open framings are frequently deployed; voices 
mention ambiguous ideas such as ‘all sides’, ‘all elements’, ‘civil society’ or ‘all stakeholders’ 
together with the idea of the reflection of ‘Yemen as a country’, ‘Yemeni society’, and the 
‘diverse voices of the people’. However, there are merely infrequent hints at the first rationale 
and its attendant idea of legitimacy; for instance, one might recall the manner in which the 
community engagement programme was described as having ‘captured the hearts and minds 
of people’. Far more frequently than was the case in the data analysed concerning Syria, voices 
in the dataset which discussed inclusion in relation to the Yemeni case list the groups included, 
thus deploying closed framings: women, youth, political parties, southerners, Hiraakis and 
Huthis are mentioned, partitioning Yemenis into these groups. However, these closed framings 
are not often associated with the idea of protecting the rights of these groups, as Hirblinger and 
Landau predict. Instead, these closed framings of the included are, albeit infrequently, linked 
with the need to empower those included.  
 
I would argue that the idea of empowerment is more closely associated with the third rationale 
identified by Hirblinger and Landau, the rationale which calls for inclusion on the basis that it 
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will transform the relationships between those incorporated within peacemaking. This rationale 
is associated with relational framings, which are possible to find within the data gathered 
concerning Yemen (although relational framings are not as numerous as closed framings). For 
instance, the term ‘newcomer’ is used frequently and, while it seems to denote the women, 
youth and civil society representatives, it does also imply the lack of formal political experience 
of these groups and, therefore, their historic marginalisation and exclusion. These newcomers 
are also contrasted with members of the political ‘elite’, or traditional power-holders, 
supporting my interpretation that this framing is indeed relational and indicating that those 
interviewed were attuned to the interactions between those included in the mediation effort. 
Moreover, there are direct mentions of the transformational power of the NDC resulting from 
its inclusive nature and, thus, hints at the third rationale. For example, we have seen the 
suggestion that ‘the composition of the NDC…inspired hope that we were witnessing a genuine 
departure from an untenable past’; and that the inclusive nature of the NDC implied 
reconciliation. However, the language of transformation often precedes or follows the 
deployment of closed framings and/or open framings. Consider, once more, the following 
formulation of Benomar: ‘The National Dialogue definitely represents the beginning of a new 
Yemen. It provides an opportunity to broaden the political process, ensuring inclusion by 
allowing Yemenis, men and women, from north to south, from across the political spectrum, 
to engage in dialogue and collectively shape the future of their country’. We can perceive the 
idea of transformation here – through the promise of a new Yemen – but also closed framings 
– men, women, northerners and southerners – along with open framings: ‘across the political 
spectrum’. The landscape is therefore more muddied: the association between inclusion 
rationales and inclusion framings do not map neatly onto the framework of Hirblinger and 
Landau. Furthermore, we see fewer connections made, by the voices analysed, between 
inclusion and the nation, or the national Yemeni people.  
 
From this analysis of the language deployed, according to the suggestions of Hirblinger and 
Landau, the predominance of the first rationale and open framings concerning Syria would 
indicate that the attempts to increase the inclusivity of the peace process, or to discuss the 
inclusivity of the process, achieved little in terms of operationalising inclusion or, of greater 
relevance to this thesis, shaping identity in Syria. However, I have also suggested that the 
discussions of inclusion in relation to Syria appear to have been linked to the idea of the 
national people and may, even, have strengthened this national people as a concept and, 
therefore, strengthened the idea of a Syrian national identity. In Yemen, on the other hand, the 
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dominance of the closed framings, and the fairly frequent use of the third rationale and 
relational framings, would have served to both reify the sub-state identities of those included 
yet, also, would have offered an opportunity to create a new, all-encompassing identity through 
the peace process.  
 
Can we consider these predictions to be accurate? We have seen, so far, that a clear and sharp 
depiction of a new Syria, defined by victimhood and an aspiration for a democratic political 
system, was consistently imagined within the dataset, both by members of the Syrian 
opposition and by members of the international community. We have also seen that national 
ownership appears to have been promoted, if only rhetorically, within the context of and within 
reflections on the Geneva Peace Process. Furthermore, we have seen that, while a fresh Yemeni 
national identity did appear to be constructed during, and within reflections on, the mediation 
efforts, the images created of the Yemeni people seem to have been constructed with far less 
confidence and lucidity in comparison with those painted of the Syrian people. This diverges 
from the assumptions of Hirblinger and Landau: one would assume a new, unifying identity to 
have been more likely to have been generated through the NDC as opposed to the Geneva 
Peace Process. Therefore, it is challenging to unearth precisely how inclusion may have served 
to shape identity in these two peace negotiations. 
 
Moreover, the data already analysed in this thesis must be considered in the light of a further 
theme of prominence within the dataset: that of Discord. I will consider this theme in the next 
section, assessing evidence that Syria and Yemen may have splintered and fragmented during, 
and perhaps even in response to, the peace processes. I will also survey the arguments made 
by interlocutors that it is sub-state identities, as opposed to national identities, which are of 
particular relevance within Syria and Yemen. By analysing this data, I will complicate further 
the apparent relationship between inclusive mediation and identity, thus contributing to my 
overall aspiration to consider whether, and if so how, mediation can shape identity. 
 
7.3 Fragmentation through inclusive peacemaking? 
 
A great deal of the data gathered focused on depicting the Syrian and Yemeni peace processes, 
the Syrian and Yemeni conflict parties, and the Syrian and Yemeni nations as being marked by  
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discord. We have already seen, in Chapter Five, the profound divide between the Syrian 
opposition and the Syrian government delegations during the mediation process: the manner in 
which their members appeared to define their movements against, and in contrast to, their 
opponents. More broadly, a pronounced gulf between the two delegations was a topic on which 
a number of interlocutors, both Syrians and members of the international community, dwelled, 
and this also featured within the press conferences and official documentation analysed. The 
evidence already assessed concerning Othering in Chapter Five suggests, I contend, that the 
attempts made to increase the inclusivity of the Geneva Peace Process failed to contribute to 
the transformation of the ‘web of relationships’ within Syria. This finding is in support of the 
framework of Hirblinger and Landau; the third rationale, and relational framings, were difficult 
to detect within the data gathered concerning Syria. The evidence also contests the strength and 
meaning of the Syrian national identity I have argued was constructed during the mediation 
efforts, and I will return to this point in the conclusion to this chapter and in Chapter Eight. 
 
7.31 Traditional power-holders in combat with newcomers? 
 
I have not yet explored any illustrative bodies of evidence concerning discord related to the 
Yemeni case but will now do so. The manner in which those who were included in the NDC 
were framed in relational terms, as traditional power-holders or members of the political elite 
and as, in contrast, newcomers or the marginalised, would suggest, according to the arguments 
of Hirblinger and Landau, that there was a potential to transform these relationships through 
the peace process, and to create a new, overarching identity in which these two antagonistic 
counter-identities would be united. However, a prominent divide which I detected within the 
data gathered concerning the Yemeni case was between these members of the political elite 
and the other participants in the NDC. This evidence challenges the notion that inclusive 
mediation shapes identity in the ways in which the existing literature predicts and, by assessing 
the theme of Discord, I will contribute to my broader aspiration to assess the relationship 
between mediation and identity. 
 
Traditional power-holders were faced with particular criticism during the interviews held with 
Yemeni interlocutors. A revolutionary youth and member of the Transitional Justice Working 
Group emphasised to me that the Uprisings were ‘driven by a need to address the traditional 
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political actors’ before bemoaning that ‘the regime did not want to give up what they had’.888 
A second revolutionary youth and member of the Statebuilding Working Group argued that 
‘they [the Consensus Committee] wanted to keep it [the issue of federalisation] only for the 
traditional powers to decide’.889 A third participant, also a youth activist, and a member of the 
Rights and Freedoms Working Groups, argued that the NDC ‘was a real battle…there was a 
lot of power, and they were against – the conservatives, the previous regime, the radical groups 
– it was not easy’.890 
 
Moreover, it should be noted that these claims did not stem solely from members of the 
revolutionary youth. For instance, a senior member of the Secretariat claimed that ‘the power-
holders, the policymakers, they just destroyed everything’.891 Offering further support, a 
Working Group Chair expressed her belief that ‘there was management from outside’ her 
Working Group, criticising also the interference of the President: ‘he went through all the 
problems and issues and he made a decision by himself…so I quit my role in the Conference.892 
A second interviewee also spoke of ‘internal hijacking’ by the Consensus Committee, claiming 
that, ‘on major issues, the Presidium wanted to have the last word…they definitely had all these 
issues managed’.893 We can see a repetition, here, of the notion that the delegates had been 
‘managed’ and, even, manipulated. Moreover, this participant later elaborated upon this, 
claiming that ‘it appeared to me that the outcomes – that there was a text already agreed, already 
ready’ and that ‘they [the traditional power-holders] were opposed to us discussing and took a 
number of items off our agenda’.894 Indeed, the Vice Chair of a Working Group lamented to 
me that ‘our politicians and powerful people are looking for their own interests’, further 
commenting that ‘all my beliefs that I fought for during the Dialogue turned out not to be 
achievable – because the powerful people do not want to have a country for all Yemeni 
people’.895 Moreover, one interview participant explained his support for federalisation as 
follows: ‘I was not so particular about the number of regions…really, we just needed to break 
the monopoly of certain people’.896 Lastly, one international official alluded to this idea within 
our interview, recalling the following:  
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…there was frustration on the part of civil society and youth, as the process went 
along…a feeling that they were being marginalised and that the more traditional elites 
were taking the lead…what they saw as a youth revolution had been taken and turned 
into something different – the political class had divvied up the proceeds.897 
 
Therefore, Yemeni voices in particular seem to indicate that the relationship between the 
traditional power-holders and the ‘newcomers’ was not healed by the inclusive nature of the 
peace process, nor by the relational framing deployed by participants in the peace process to 
conceptualise the rapport between the newly included and traditionally excluded, and members 
of the political elite. It is difficult to conclude that a freshly imagined, overarching identity, in 
which antagonistic relations between the powerful and the marginalised were healed, was 
generated through the inclusion of the NDC. In turn, this evidence challenges the predicted link 
between inclusive mediation and identity.  
 
7.32 Invoking sub-state identities in Syria and Yemen 
 
I will now take a broader view. It will be recalled that Hirblinger and Landau suggest that 
inclusive peacemaking can either reify sub-state identities, and inflame antagonism between 
these groups, or it can offer the potential to form a reimagined, overarching identity in which 
antagonistic relations between groups are healed. In Chapters Five and Six, I argued that fresh, 
reconstructed visions of the Syrian and Yemeni nations were articulated within, and in response 
to, the mediation efforts under investigation. While this reworked understanding of the Syrian 
national identity was built with greater clarity by comparison with the Yemeni version, both, 
according to my analysis, were suffused with narratives of collective trauma together with 
aspirations surrounding liberal democracy and reform. Moreover, I contended that these were 
national identities, drawing together Syrian and Yemeni citizens as one. In the light of the 
framework of Hirblinger and Landau, we could assume that such identities would be provoked 
through inclusive mediation, providing this inclusivity had been called for in a bid to transform 
relationships and had been accompanied by relational framings of the included. However, as I 
demonstrated in Section 7.23, this third rationale, and relational framings, were not prominent 
within the dataset concerning Syria and, while they could be detected in relation to Yemen, 
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they were not the predominant prism through which inclusion was viewed by those voices 
represented within the data gathered. This, in turn, challenges the link which exists in the 
literature concerning the impact of inclusive mediation upon identity. 
 
Complicating the matter further, in this section I will demonstrate that many of the interlocutors 
consulted spoke of sub-state identities when prompted to consider the concept of identity: the 
national identities of Syria and Yemen were not the loci of belonging which rose to the fore. 
Despite the different rationales for inclusion and framings of the included detected within the 
dataset, and despite the varying strength of the national identities which appear to have been 
summoned within and in response to the peace processes, it was sub-state identities which 
interlocutors believed held relevance for Syria and Yemen. As mentioned in Chapter Four, in 
almost all interviews conducted, I would directly pose the following question to interlocutors: 
‘do you think identities were important within the mediation process?’ In relation to Syria, the 
vast majority evoked sub-state affiliations. However, very few interview participants linked 
their responses to the mediation process; they described sub-state identities in the abstract. 
Thus, one Syrian interlocutor argued: ‘we never had an identity in Syria… What we had…is 
sub-identities: rural versus city, sect – even the class system. Sect divisions, religion, class, 
rural versus city. We also tried to have ultra-identities – Arabism, Islamism, pan-Arabism’.898 
A second interlocutor offered support to this idea, claiming that ‘identities are very relevant – 
the lack of a strong, Syrian national identity – it did not help’.899 A fourth interviewee also 
made the claim that ‘one of the challenges for Syrians – even if the best peace deal is reached 
– is how to develop a national identity for Syrians’.900 Indeed, a further participant commented 
the following: ‘now we are facing a long process of rebuilding the Syrian national identity’901 
while a second lamented the following: ‘two years ago, the Syrians lost their identity in their 
fight with each other, in their fight with the regional powers’.902  
 
Certain interlocutors, both Syrians and members of the international community, focused in 
particular on the relevance of identities relating to ethnicity and religion. For instance, one 
member of the Syrian opposition responded to my enquiry concerning identity with the 
following: ‘Arab – Kurdish identities – sub-national identities. Racial identities…Religion – 
 
898 SO (1); see also: SO (3) 
899 SO (2); see also: SO, DaGII (2) 
900 SO (8) 
901 SO, DaGII (2) 
902 SO (4)  
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of course’.903 An international official, an employee of a Track II peacebuilding organisation, 
together with a UN Official, also raised the significance of sub-state religious identities within 
Syria.904 Geographic sub-state identities were also mentioned within the conversations held. 
One interlocutor spoke of the importance of regional identities within Syria, drawing divisions 
between the population on the basis of geography: ‘in Syria, we have another 
identity…regionalism – for example, people from Aleppo or people from Damascus, they do 
not see themselves as the same as those from Homs’. He also mentioned a ‘deep’, and less 
apparent, identity: ‘the difference between the rural and urban’.905 An international official also 
commented upon ‘rural versus urban’ identities, remarking that the ‘urban people…they 
despise the rural people’. Indeed, this interlocutor later commented that she had witnessed a 
meeting between a ‘high-ranking member of the regime, and two or three women from the 
opposition – from Idlib and rural Damascus’, that the ‘woman from the regime…she 
considered herself to be lowering herself by talking to these women’. It was ‘not a good 
meeting’, this interlocutor reflected but, nevertheless, in the view of this participant, ‘it was a 
reflection of what Syria is’.906  
 
Concerning Yemen, a similar narrative can be perceived. For example, a member of the 
Secretariat commented that, ‘what happened in the Conference, there were struggles based on 
identities’,907 implying therefore that the powerful identities within Yemen were those 
operating below the state. A second supported this, remarking that: ‘there are multiple identities 
in Yemen… You have people whose identity is not Yemeni first and foremost – it might be 
Sadah or Zaydi…it could be that your true identity is that you are from the south…and there 
are divisions between the Sunnis and Shias.’908 Indeed, a revolutionary youth, despite arguing 
that identities were ‘not important in the Conference’, did admit that ‘there were different 
groups’, and that she would not ‘dream of having one united identity in the Conference’, further 




903 SO (8) 
904 M, S, TII (4); M, S, TI (2) 
905 SO, DaGII (3)  
906 M, S, TII (4)  
907 NDC, Se (1) 
908 Anonymous (8)  
909 NDC, D (15) 
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This sentiment was also bolstered by a member of the Presidium who argued that ‘there is not 
a single identity in Yemen, we have multiple identity disorder’, before mentioning the divisions 
between those of a tribal background, Islah, the Huthis, the GPC, the Nasserites and the 
southern secessionists.910 Moreover, one participant commented that ‘the Huthi 
representatives…they had discipline through their identity as Huthis – and that was related 
to…a particular sect of Islam’.911 Moreover, a Yemeni politician with whom I spoke, despite 
claiming that ‘the national identity existed in everyone in the National Dialogue’, then 
immediately stated ‘but the local or the geographic identities, they stick because of the suffering 
for a long time’.912 A former Yemeni politician also felt that the ‘highest level of identity in 
Yemen’ is ‘along governorate lines, if not lower – tribe, village.’913 
 
Members of the international community also invoked the concept of sub-state identities in our 
conversations concerning the Yemeni mediation effort. A senior diplomat commented on the 
multi-layered, and seemingly geographical, nature of Yemeni identities: ‘identity in Yemen 
comes in different layers…identity is first linked to locality, cities and regions. The south and 
north are very different, separated by geography and history’.914 Very similar ideas were 
offered by a second G10 diplomat.915 These ideas of geographic and sectarian identities were 
repeated by a UN official: ‘the south-north divide was particularly important, or the Shafii-
Sunni divide on the same afternoon – or, the more youth[ful] and urbanised group against the 
old structures, they might have united…It changed, rapidly, over time’.916 Indeed, a second UN 
official aired a very similar narrative, claiming that identity in Yemen is ‘very often a reflection 
of geographic differences. The struggle – the fight between north and south Yemen a mirror of 
those geographic differences – feeling that identity is lost in a larger whole’.917  
 
Therefore, to summarise, when directly asked about the concept of identity, interview 
participants, Syrians, Yemenis and international peacemakers, turned almost instinctively to 
sub-state identities. This complicates, and contests, the proposed link between inclusive 
 
910 NDC, D (8) 
911 Anonymous (8) 
912 O, Y (3) 
913 O, Y (1) 
914 M, Y, TI (3) 
915 M, Y, TI (8) 
916 M, Y, TI (5) 
917 M, Y, TI (6) 
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peacemaking and identity laid out in existing literature, and adds nuance to the findings reached 




This chapter has explored two themes detected within the dataset in an attempt to assess the 
following hypothesis: the rationales used to justify inclusive peacemaking and the framing of 
those included can transform the identities of the conflict parties. The first concerns Inclusion, 
and the second Discord. I began by re-introducing the contentions of Hirblinger and Landau 
that inclusion can interact with the identities of the conflict parties. Superficially, if one merely 
considers the shape of the mediation attempt and the list of participants, it would seem that the 
Syrian case failed to be inclusive and that, within the Yemeni case, sub-state identity groups in 
Yemen were thought of in closed terms but were, nevertheless, incorporated within the NDC 
if not the GCC Initiative. However, this chapter has revealed a more complex landscape.  
 
It would seem that inclusion was encouraged during both the Syrian and Yemeni mediation 
efforts, constituting a topic concentrated upon a great deal within all data sources analysed. 
While a substantial number of voices felt that both the Syrian and Yemeni peace talks failed to 
be inclusive and, moreover, that claims of inclusion concealed exclusion, I focused in this 
chapter on those voices who stated that the mediation attempts were inclusive. I then appraised 
the language used to make these claims through the prism of the framework of Hirblinger and 
Landau. I found that a combination of the three rationales could be detected within the data. 
Nevertheless, the first rationale, calling for inclusion in a bid to increase the legitimacy of the 
peace process, was predominant in the Syrian case. This was, as predicted by Hirblinger and 
Landau, accompanied, most frequently, by open framings. However, I additionally found that 
many of these open framings invoked the idea of Syria, and the Syrian people, thus linking 
inclusion with the idea of embodying and speaking on behalf of a national collective. I reached 
different conclusions in relation to the Yemeni case. In this instance, I found a combination of 
closed and relational framings, with a far greater number of closed framings, accompanied by 
a combination of rationales, with the third rationale surrounding transformation dominating. I 
noted that these findings would suggest, following Hirblinger and Landau, that the attempts 
seemingly made to broaden the inclusivity of the Geneva Peace Process would not have 
interacted with identities in Syria; within Yemen, the inclusivity of the NDC may have 
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crystallised sub-state identities while, simultaneously, provoking the creation of a new, 
overarching identity. 
 
I then returned to, and introduced, further bodies of data in an attempt to assess the predictions 
of Hirblinger and Landau. I noted that, in Chapter Five, I explored the deep divide between the 
two Syrian delegations at Geneva II, enacted through a process of Othering. Secondly, I showed 
that many interlocutors consulted regarding the Yemeni case perceived there to have been a 
gulf between members of the Yemeni political elite and the ‘newcomers’ who participated in 
the Conference. Thus, despite the relational framing deployed to describe these two groups in 
considerations of the inclusion of the NDC, a barrier separating the two remained. They were 
not united within a reshaped vision of the Yemeni national identity through the manner in 
which they were included. Furthermore, I then demonstrated the extent to which the 
interlocutors consulted spoke of sub-state identities, and occasionally supra-state identities in 
relation to Syria, as opposed to national identities, when confronted with a question concerning 
the concept of identity. Interviewees raised a wide range of such identities, ranging from 
collective identification based upon religion, sect and ethnicity, to group identity formed 
around geography and class. 
 
The data analysed within this chapter seem, therefore, to challenge many of the conclusions 
reached in Chapters Five and Six, but also the expected link between inclusive mediation and 
identity proposed within existing scholarship. I have questioned the nature of the link between 
inclusion and identity; according to my interpretation, the data captured within the dataset does 
not seem to support the connection between particular rationales, framings and resulting 
identities. A combination of rationales and framings were detected in relation to each case. 
Even though the third rationale, surrounding transformation, and relational framings were 
slightly more prominent in the Yemeni case, this does not seem to have provoked the creation 
of a new, over-arching identity. Furthermore, despite an absence of the third rationale and its 
attendant framings in relation to the Syrian case, a far stronger national identity, partially 
infused with civic values, appears to have been constructed through the Geneva Peace Process. 
I have found that the first rationale can, it would seem, be linked to identity construction. 
Finally, when confronted with the concept of identity, interlocutors speaking about both cases 
instinctively prioritised sub-state identities, even though this would be expected to be more 
likely in relation to Yemen than Syria, according to the inclusion rationales discovered within 
the data. There appears to be a clear need for further empirical research into the possible impact 
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of inclusive mediation upon processes of identity construction. The picture I have been able to 
paint is intricate and any connections remain unclear. Inclusive mediation may shape identity, 
but precisely how and under which conditions remains to be seen. 
 
Turning, more broadly, to the two areas of scholarship to which I intend to make a contribution, 
my findings, here, concerning discord and the apparent relevance of sub-state identities to my 
interlocutors, could indicate that the ostensible attempts made to characterise and claim an 
association with freshly imagined Syrian and Yemeni identities, attempts which I analysed in 
Chapters Five and Six, merely represent frantic attempts to hold together, at least in speech, 
the Syrian and Yemeni states. These refrains may have been an effort to conceal a concern at 
the perceived disintegration of Syria and Yemen, both in ideational and territorial terms. The 
contentions of Hirblinger and Landau, and the partial support offered to their argument by my 
analysis of the data gathered, can also be connected to the debates concerning ‘power’ 
mediation and impartiality. If inclusion can indeed shape the identities of the conflict parties, 
transforming relationships between those included, this undoubtedly represents a form of 


















Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 
In March 2021 in Deraa, the cradle of Syria’s revolution, demonstrators took to the streets once 
more.918 ‘We are the children of Syria, we chant for freedom’, they cried.919 In Yemen, in the 
same month, protesters stormed the presidential palace in Sanaa, enraged by dire living 
conditions, a lack of services, and the depreciation of the local currency.920 The rallies which 
engulfed the Arab world in 2011 have been characterised as a thawra for karāma and ḥuqūq: 
a revolution for dignity and rights.921 However, Afrah Nassar, a Yemeni journalist, has also 
portrayed the demonstrations of 2011 as having represented a chance to ‘imagine a different 
Yemen’,922 to transform the state. This opportunity to reshape the nations through rebellion, in 
Syria and in Yemen, was frustrated and undermined, although insurrectionist undercurrents 
persist. My contention is that this process of identity mutation seeped into the mediation efforts 
under investigation in this thesis. 
 
I have developed a response to the following, over-arching research question: how does 
mediation shape the identities of the conflict parties? I have gathered and thematically analysed 
a substantial and original qualitative dataset, comprising semi-structured interviews, press 
conferences and official documentation. This data has revealed the contours of two 
contemporary instances of mediation: stages I and II of the Geneva Peace Process, which 
sought to promote a peaceful resolution to the Syrian civil war; and the GCC Initiative, the 
 
918 Oula A. Alrifai and Aaron Y. Zelin, ‘Protests in Daraa, Syria Undermine Assad’s Narrative of Victory’, 
Fikra Forum, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2021) [online], available from: 
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/protests-daraa-syria-undermine-assads-narrative-victory 
[last accessed: 10 June 2021] 
919 No author, ‘Daraa al-Balad Celebrates the Tenth Anniversary of the Syrian Revolution 18 March 2021’, 
Creative Memory of the Syrian Revolution (2021) [online], available from: 
https://creativememory.org/en/archives/218713/daraa-al-balad-celebrates-the-tenth-anniversary-of-the-syrian-
revolution-18-march-2021/ [last accessed: 28 June 2021] 
920 No author, ‘Protesters Storm Presidential Palace in Yemen’s Aden’, Al Jazeera (2021) [online], available 
from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/16/protesters-storm-presidential-palace-in-yemens-aden [last 
accessed: 10 June 2021] 
921 Maytha Alhassen, ‘Please Reconsider the Term “Arab Spring”’, HuffPost (2012) [online], available from: 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/please-reconsider-arab-sp_b_1268971 [last accessed: 10 June 2021]; Isaac 
Avery, ‘Talkin’ Bout a Revolution: Four Reasons Why the Term “Arab Spring” is Still Problematic’, Middle 
East Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science (2021) [online], available from: 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2021/01/20/talkin-bout-a-revolution-four-reasons-why-the-term-arab-spring-is-still-
problematic/ [last accessed: 10 June 2021] 
922 Adam Adada and Ramy Allahoum, ‘Yemen: Remembering the Arab Spring’, Al Jazeera (2021) [online], 
available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/videos/2021/2/3/yemen-remembering-the-arab-spring [last accessed: 
10 June 2021] 
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Yemeni political transition and the NDC, which attempted to peacefully resolve the crisis in 
Yemen.  
 
Earlier in this thesis I noted that crises, such as wars or military defeats, are deemed particularly 
likely to provoke identity shifts. My fundamental assertion is that third-party peace processes 
can also intervene in the reshaping of identities. The members of the political elite representing 
the conflict parties, and the members of the political elite implicated in the mediation team, 
may view mediation as an opportunity to remould the identities of the conflict parties. They 
may re-sculpt identities in search of legitimacy, and in a bid to promote particular norms. 
Moreover, the very occurrence of mediation can trigger the reimagination of identities. A 
perceived need to legitimise the mediation efforts may inspire fresh visions of the conflict 
parties while the mediation process norms of national ownership and inclusion can also 
reconstruct identities.  
 
In this final chapter I will consider the broader repercussions of these findings. I will reflect on 
that which my findings reveal about the transformation of Syrian and Yemeni identities 
following the outbreak of the protests in 2011. I will also contemplate the implications for our 
understanding of the roles played by impartiality and power within mediation, together with 
our broader conception of mediation: its purpose and effects. To conclude, I will outline the 
limitations of this thesis before sketching avenues for future research.  
 
8.1 Connecting the findings of this thesis to scholarship concerning collective 
identities in Syria and Yemen 
 
In forging my overall claim that mediation can shape identity, the findings of this thesis have 
contributed to our understanding of how Syrian and Yemeni identities developed, within and 
through mediation, following the uprisings of 2011. Firstly, my argument has been that, in the 
context of, and in reflections on, the early stages of the Geneva Peace Process, the Syrian 
national people were reimagined, by both the mediators and the Syrian opposition, as being 
bound together by suffering and by their aspiration for a democratic political system. It was the 
Syrian people – the national collective – which was summoned. Despite the compelling 
academic arguments pertaining to the power of supra- and sub-state identities within Syria, the 
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voices within the dataset, within the context of the Geneva Peace Process and within reflections 
on the peace talks, reconceived the experiences and desires of the nation.  
 
Secondly, the Syrian national identity imagined within the mediation effort departs, to an 
extent, from those threads of the Syrian national identity analysed in Chapter Two.923 The role 
of victimhood as the central, unifying experience of Syrians represents a fresh imagining of the 
national identity. However, the alleged intrinsic nature of democracy to Syrian-ness aligns with 
those authors who have argued that the 2011 demonstrations provoked a reimagining of the 
Syrian national identity in civic terms, and also with those scholars who have detected the 
persistence of this civic form of belonging to the nation even as the state descended into 
violence. My arguments therefore offer support to these scholars, and this alignment also serves 
to mitigate against one of the weaknesses of this study: specifically, that my data cannot speak 
to the identifications of the broader Syrian people, nor of political movements aside from the 
Syrian opposition. Taken together, our studies could be viewed as individual tiles which 
coalesce to form a mosaic, creating a multi-faceted image of the Syrian national identity 
following the outbreak of the crisis. The indication seems to be that, following the eruption of 
violence, a civic Syrian national identity has been constructed by the Syrian opposition for both 
domestic and international audiences, that this version of the national identity seems to have 
also been held and propagated from both below and above, and that the UN and other members 
of the international community have further contributed to its imagining. This civic national 
identity marks a stark departure from the national identity encouraged in Syria by the regime 
prior to the civil war.924  
 
However, I must note that, when prompted with the concept of identity, interlocutors focused 
overwhelmingly on the power of sub- and supra-state identities: it was those identities, as 
opposed to any version of a national identity, which instinctively came to their minds. A bleak 
tale can be told of Syria in the years since the collapse of the Geneva II talks; while Syria, now, 
is almost entirely ‘reunited’ under al-Asad, this has not been the case for the majority of the 
years following stages I and II of the Geneva Peace process. The state fractured following the 
 
923 It will be recalled that, as I explored in depth in Chapter Two, scholars have argued that the meaning of the 
Syrian national identity was seized and reinterpreted by protesters and by Syrian opposition figures, and infused 
with civic values and a rejection of sectarianism, both during and following the demonstrations of 2011. 
924 Before the protests, scholars have claimed that both Bashar al-Asad and his father promoted a version of the 
Syrian national identity in which Syria’s ancient history was glorified, and in which familial bonds between the 
leader and his people were romanticised and promoted. Academics have also claimed that the al-Asad 
Presidents turned to Islam in a bid to unify the Syrian people. 
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uprising: rebels seized territory; the government retaliated, attempting to claw back land; the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) took swathes of Syria before its collapse; Kurdish 
forces began to govern and defend territories with significant Kurdish populations; while the 
US, Russia, the UK, France, Israel, Iran and a coalition of Arab states deployed troops and 
launched air strikes within Syria, targeting their adversaries and supporting their allies. As I 
suggested in the conclusions to Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, it is possible that my 
interlocutors’ frequent invocations of the Syrian people, and the seeming efforts made to 
reimagine their experiences and aspirations within the mediation efforts, masked a concern that 
there no longer exists a Syrian people and concealed their alarm at the dissolution of ties 
between Syrians amid violence and conflict.  
 
With regard to group identities in Yemen, my argument has been that the voices of international 
officials represented within the dataset attempted to characterise the Yemeni people as being 
joined together in suffering. However, a limited number of Yemeni voices, instead, depicted 
the Yemeni national experience as being suffused with revolution and resistance, and with 
opposition to the autocratic structures of Yemen. Concerning the nationally held aspirations of 
the Yemeni people, again, this was a topic focused upon more frequently by international 
officials than the Yemeni participants in the process. Taken together, these voices seemed to 
agree that the Yemeni people seek reform, change, and a transition; occasionally this was 
specified more precisely as democracy. However, once more, a relatively narrow group of 
voices constructed this vision, and this reconstruction was not as sharply depicted as it was in 
relation to Syria. Nevertheless, it was the national people, as opposed to sub-state groupings, 
which were imagined, albeit less firmly, in the context of the mediation attempt.  
 
Furthermore, this was a new imagining of the Yemeni nation; the notion that suffering is central 
to the Yemeni national experience did not arise as a strand within the Yemeni national identities 
observed within the scholarship on collective identities in Yemen surveyed in Chapter Two.925 
However, the idea that reform, and potentially democracy, constitute the nationally held 
aspirations of a Yemeni people does seem to align with the limited scholarship which has 
claimed that the demonstrations of 2011 provoked a reimagining of the ties between Yemenis, 
a reimagining guided by civic values. As with Syria, my findings join other studies in creating 
 
925 In Yemen, following 2011, academics have claimed that ‘republican’ ideals became connected with 
‘Yemeni-ness’, along with a spirit of resistance and cross-sectarian unity. Prior to 2011, it has been argued that a 
glorified past, together with commemorative and collective events, drew Yemenis together as a people. 
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an overall argument that, following 2011, a Yemeni national identity, guided by civic values, 
appears to have taken hold at the level of the everyday, to have been promoted and developed 
by Yemeni political and civil society leaders, and to have furthermore been constructed and 
confirmed by Yemen’s ‘peers’: that is, by international officials. Lastly, by introducing data 
representing Yemen’s peers within the international community, I have also differed from 
existing scholarship concerning collective identification in Yemen. 
 
However, the Yemeni national identity imagined is weaker – it is constructed with less clarity, 
and by fewer voices – than that imagined in relation to Syria. Moreover, as was the case with 
Syria, interlocutors reverted instinctively to sub-state identities when approached with the 
concept of identity. In this regard, as a possible explanation, we could note the devastation 
wrought in Yemen following the conclusion of the NDC. The interviews which inform much 
of the research in this thesis were conducted either five or six years following the mediation 
attempt and, in this time, Yemen has been torn apart by an internationalised civil war. An ever-
fluctuating constellation of powers, both external and indigenous to the country, have snatched 
at different regions, fostering and exacerbating dividing lines while the country can no longer 
be considered to constitute one territory. Nevertheless, a similarly grim story can be told, and 
was told above, in relation to Syria. I suggested, in relation to Syria, that the persistent efforts 
made to reconstruct a specifically Syrian people within the context of the mediation effort may 
have represented rhetorical attempts to hold the state together, and to mask unease with its 
fragmentation. Why were such attempts not made in relation to Yemen? Why did the Yemeni 
people prove more difficult to summon and to imagine? These questions are provoked by this 
study. 
 
More broadly, I would like to conclude this section by posing a number of further questions 
which I believe are prompted by the findings of this thesis. Firstly, why was the focus, in 
relation to both cases, on reconstructing the national identities of the two states? Or, in other 
words, why were the collective experiences and aspirations of the two states’ multiple supra- 
and sub-state groups not imagined within the context of the two mediation attempts? While, as 
I demonstrated in Chapter Seven, interlocutors invoked sub-state identity groups in response 
to a direct question concerning identity, the precise meanings of these collectives were not 
reflected upon by the voices represented within the dataset. Secondly, it is noteworthy that the 
national identities of Syria and Yemen reimagined within the dataset bear a remarkable 
similarity to one another: both are reconstructed as being suffused with suffering and 
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distinguished by an aspiration for democracy and/or reform, although the Yemeni national 
identity is far less clearly depicted. In Chapter Two, I described the term identity as referring 
to the ‘images of individuality and distinctiveness’926 constructed and propagated by groups, 
and ascribed to groups. Nevertheless, the idiosyncrasies of the Syrian and Yemeni identities 
appear to have been suppressed within the peace processes, and this aligns with the insights of 
Kappler and Mac Ginty which were explored in Chapters Three and Five. It will be recalled 
that Kappler has argued, in relation to peacebuilding, that international actors can summon that 
which she terms ‘representations’ of societies, representations which obfuscate complexity and 
render communities and nations more compatible with the ‘peace’ sought after by international 
organisations.927 Mac Ginty, on the other hand, has claimed that subjectification often leads to 
mono-dimensionality.928 We also seem to be witnessing such processes and effects, here, 
within mediation. 
 
What might this reveal about the level and nature of identities which were viewed as being 
conceivable in the context of these two UN-led mediation efforts? What might this reveal, in 
turn, about the extent to which the peace processes allowed for frank and truthful considerations 
of the identities of relevance to Syria and Yemen? This study is unable to decisively answer 
these questions but it is possible to speculate, from my findings, that the mediators and conflict 
parties involved in the two cases under investigation, either consciously or unconsciously, 
preferred to think of the conflict parties at the level of the nation, and viewed Syria and Yemen 
through the same lens rather than grappling with their many differences. 
 
8.2 Connecting the findings of this thesis to scholarship concerning impartiality 
and power within mediation 
 
The introduction to this chapter provided an overview of the contribution I have made to our 
understanding of the interrelationship between mediation and socially constructed identity, a 
small sub-field within mediation scholarship. In essence, I have suggested that mediators and 
conflict parties, in partnership or in opposition, can reimagine the identities of the conflict 
parties within and in response to mediation. Mediation can operate as the arena in which 
 
926 Jepperson et al., ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’, p. 59 
927 Kappler, ‘Liberal Peacebuilding’s Representation of ‘the Local’: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 
263 
928 Mac Ginty, ‘Between Resistance and Compliance: Non-Participation and the Liberal Peace’, pp. 168-9 
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identities are reconstructed; the very occurrence of mediation can trigger and fuel processes of 
identity reconstruction; and the practice of mediation, and in particular the norms promoted 
through and contained within it, can serve to mould the identities of the conflict parties. The 
constituent arguments which coalesce to provide substance to this claim all represent original 
contributions to our understanding of the links between mediation and identity: they refine, 
develop and challenge the existing literature which considers how mediation may shape 
identity. 
 
However, more broadly, my suggestion is that the findings of this thesis also demonstrate the 
need to better incorporate ideational concepts, such as identity, within the traditional debates 
contained within mediation studies. I propose that, by systematically considering processes 
such as identity construction, such debates may be enriched. In order to demonstrate this claim, 
I will discuss in this section how my findings concerning identity connect with two intertwined 
debates surrounding the roles of impartiality and power within mediation.  
 
My claim is that my research has shown that identity construction processes can contribute to 
our understanding of whether a mediator may have been viewed as impartial; in turn, this may 
have influenced both the shape of the mediation attempt and possibly its outcome. In relation 
to Syria, the mediator, together with the Syrian opposition, constructed a particular vision of 
the Syrian national identity which framed the second conflict party, the Syrian government 
delegation, as the antithesis to ‘Syrian-ness’: they argued that the collective experience of 
Syrians was cruelty and viciousness at the hands of the al-Asad regime and that the nationally 
held aspiration was to move away from the rule of al-Asad towards a democratic political 
system in which al-Asad would play no role. This construction process, which happened in 
partnership with the Syrian opposition, must have affected the perceived partiality of the 
mediator: it must have seemed as though the UN and the international officials represented 
within the dataset were closer, in views, values and aims, to the Syrian opposition than the 
Syrian government delegation. The talks collapsed, with the two delegations unable to even 
agree on an agenda.  
 
I do not wish to suggest that there is a causal relationship between the apparent bias of the UN 
and the failure of the mediation efforts. It may be the case that the depictions of the Syrian 
people offered by the mediators and an array of international officials, and their alignment with 
the depictions offered by the Syrian opposition, discouraged the Syrian government delegation 
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from meaningfully engaging with the peace talks. The identity claims made may have 
presented the mediator as partisan, as being allied with the Syrian opposition delegation, and 
this may explain the failure of the negotiations. However, there may also be many more factors 
which caused and/or contributed to the breakdown of Geneva I and II, factors which may have 
intersected with one another and with the social dynamics analysed in this thesis. As mere 
examples, at the time at which Geneva II was initiated, al-Asad was in the ascendancy 
militarily, which is likely to have reduced the prospect of his delegation making concessions, 
while the prospect of humanitarian military intervention in support of the opposition seemed 
improbable. My suggestion, simply, is that identity construction processes may contribute to 
the perceived partiality and impartiality of mediators.  
 
The Yemeni case is more complex: this instance of mediation did not comprise two opposing 
disputants attempting to reach a solution. Instead, the NDC brought together hundreds of 
Yemenis, drawn from across the country, from a variety of political factions, together with 
representatives of women, youth and civil society, to envision the future of Yemen. These 
delegates could be considered, therefore, to have constituted multiple, intersecting, ‘conflict 
parties’. Nevertheless, on the basis of the evidence gathered and my analysis, it could be 
claimed that the UN and the broader international community demonstrated a bias of outcome, 
and potentially a bias towards particular groups, in their envisioning of the aspirations of the 
Yemeni people. In contrast to the Yemeni voices in the dataset, these international voices 
insisted that the nationally held aspiration of the Yemeni people was reform and, on occasion, 
this was specified as democracy. Through constructing a particular image of the national people 
of Yemen, the members of the international community expressed a preference for a particular 
outcome, potentially narrowing the range of solutions which could be envisioned by delegates 
to the NDC by presenting this preference as being intrinsic to Yemen and its people. This image 
also seemed to be closest to those ideals articulated in the demonstrations, protests which were 
ignited by youth, by women and by civil society (although the demonstrations were later joined 
by political parties opposed to Saleh and the GPC). By imagining the Yemeni people in this 
way, the members of the international community may have appeared, to members of the old 
regime in particular, to have shared greater affinity with all other delegates to the NDC.  
 
Whether this affected the outcome of the mediation attempt is unclear. The NDC concluded 
with relative success; while the assassination of al-Sharif prevented the delegates from debating 
and voting upon the Final Report, each Working Group did, eventually, agree upon a set of 
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recommendations which were approved by President Hadi. However, these recommendations 
were not implemented. The Huthis took Sanaa less than a year after the Dialogue’s conclusion, 
placing Hadi under arrest before forcing him to flee the country, and triggering a vicious, 
regionalised civil war which persists to this day. Perhaps the partiality of the mediator 
contributed to this result by demonstrating its bias of outcome; perhaps groups, such as the 
Huthis, felt as though they had little stake in that which had been negotiated, viewing the 
outcomes as having been deeply influenced by the international community’s vision of the 
nation. It is also possible that the apparent bias of the mediator, demonstrated through its 
construction of a particular national identity for Yemen, prevented the delegates to the NDC 
from meaningfully grappling with the full array of visions for the future of Yemen, and of 
Yemenis’ varied experiences. This, however, is speculation and it is, of course, possible that 
there were additional contributing factors to the failure of the peace process. One oft-cited 
reason, for example, is the manner in which the federal map which arose from the NDC 
deprived the Huthis of access to Yemen’s ports: a firmly ‘material’ explanation. 
 
In this thesis, I would suggest that I have also shown how identity construction can be 
considered to be a form of power within mediation. Specifically, I have demonstrated how 
identity construction can be employed, by mediators, to convince and corral parties, and to 
guide them towards particular solutions, even if this form of power was not always deployed 
successfully in the two cases examined in this thesis. This contention also intertwines with 
partiality by showing a bias of outcome.  
 
Specifically, I have shown that the international officials appeared to encourage 
democratisation by characterising it as being intrinsic to Syrian-ness and, more tentatively, to 
Yemeni-ness: identity construction was thus wielded, within mediation, as a form of norm 
promotion. Identity construction therefore functioned as a form of power within mediation 
while the mediators simultaneously displayed a preference for a particular outcome: the 
agreement upon democracy forming the future of the two states ensnared in civil conflict. 
Secondly, by promoting the norm of national ownership, I have suggested that this encouraged 
the mediators and the conflict parties to focus overwhelmingly on reshaping, prioritising and 
conceiving of the disputants’ national identities, as opposed to other identities of relevance to 
the two states, thereby narrowing the possible visions, realities and sentiments which could be 
confronted, considered and even articulated within the two peace processes. Thirdly, it is 
possible that the inclusion promoted by members of the international community may have 
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interacted with the identities of the two states, although it has proved difficult to firmly 
conclude this. Nevertheless, it is possible that, by promoting this norm, mediators can, 
intentionally or unintentionally, shape the identities of the conflict parties. Inclusion, according 
to my analysis, may encourage yet further focus upon the nation, may entrench and reify sub-
state identity groupings, or may facilitate the creation of a fresh, over-arching vision of those 
groups in conflict. Inclusion therefore may also represent a source of power within mediation, 
and promoting this norm cannot, therefore, be seen as a straightforwardly neutral act. More 
broadly, I have shown that mediation may induce identity shifts, indicating a profound form of 
social power contained within mediation.  
 
I have therefore demonstrated that, by considering socially constructed identities, it may prove 
possible to uncover further sources of impartiality, and further sources of power, contained 
within mediation, thus enriching our understanding of these two elements and how they may 
interact with the progress of third-party peace processes. My further suggestion is that identity 
may also be able to intervene in additional debates central to mediation studies. I will briefly 
return to this idea in the final section of this chapter. 
 
If mediation and mediators possess, and indeed wield, the power to sculpt the identities of the 
conflict parties, or to trigger reimaginations of identities by the conflict parties, this necessitates 
a reconfiguration of our understanding of mediation. Earlier in this thesis, I argued that 
traditional definitions of mediation proclaim the practice to be defined by an absence of force, 
and a desire to assist conflict parties and alleviate violence. Mediation is thus presented as 
benign, as seeking to facilitate peaceful societies. Nevertheless, it will be recalled that Kostić 
has contended that the imposition of a fresh identity is an integral part of the ‘liberal peace’, 
and that this practice is frequently concealed beneath a veneer of humanitarian impulses.929 
The crux of the social constructivist focus on identities concerns the assertion that ‘identities 
both generate and shape interests’:930 ‘identities condition which actions government leaders 
can entertain, and that which is considered legitimate by their societies’.931 At its simplest, to 
 
929 Kostić, Ambivalent Peace: External Peacebuilding: Threatened Identity and Reconciliation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, p. 16; Kostić, ‘American Nation-Building Abroad: Exceptional Powers, Broken promises and the 
Making of “Bosnia”’, p. 24 
930 Jepperson et al., ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’, p. 60; see also: Telhami and Barnett, 
Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, p. 17; and Marc Lynch, ‘Jordan’s Identity and Interests’ in 
Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (eds.), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), p. 28 
931 Telhami and Barnett, ‘Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East’, p. 7. See also Saideman, 
‘Conclusion: Thinking Theoretically About Identity and Foreign Policy’, p. 199 
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hold an identity is to have ‘expectations about self’,932 or ‘certain ideas about who one is in a 
given situation’,933 which, in turn, shape our perceptions of and attitudes towards others. 
Identities constitute who we are and that which we seek: identities are thus fundamental to 
individuals, groups, societies, nations and transnational communities. For identities to, 
potentially, be remoulded within mediation constitutes a significant and far-reaching form of 
influence, a force with which mediators and conflict parties must reckon.  
 
8.3 Limitations  
 
Throughout this thesis, I have transparently highlighted the limitations of this study and, 
accordingly, have deployed language which could be characterised as tentative or uncertain – 
using terms such as ‘may’, ‘might’, ‘can’ and ‘could’ – rather than claiming to have uncovered 
causal mechanisms or obdurate facts. To summarise again, briefly, crucial limitations of this 
project include the following: firstly, the decision to focus in depth on two cases means the 
findings are not generalisable to third-party peacemaking more broadly. Secondly, the voices 
within the dataset largely represent members of the political elite. A representative sample of 
the broader Syrian and Yemeni populations, or alternative data, such as popular music or street 
art, or an ethnographic study of the two states, are not analysed. Focusing on the rhetoric of 
members of the political elite, and assuming that such discourse can prove valuable in 
understanding group identity, is an accepted and highly commonplace approach within 
international relations scholarship. Nevertheless, the data gathered does not speak to the 
‘everyday’, and cannot reveal the extent to which the identities imagined resonate within Syria 
and Yemen, and within Syrian and Yemeni diaspora communities. This limitation is mitigated 
against, to an extent, by the manner in which I have been able to show, in the previous section, 
that my findings align with those of others who have assessed different forms of data.  
 
A third weakness of the research conducted is the partial nature of the sample of voices included 
in the dataset. For instance, representatives of crucial states and groups involved in the two 
mediation efforts were not consulted nor represented in great depth in the press conferences 
and official documentation. Such voices included members of the al-Asad regime, of the Huthi 
movement, of the Hiraak movement, and of states and international organisations including 
 
932 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, 
International Organisation 46:2 (1992), p. 397 
933 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 170 
228 
 
Russia, China, the Gulf monarchies and the GCC. The failure to incorporate such voices has 
shaped the nature of the claims I have been able to make; nevertheless, the data has been 
sufficient to explore the hypotheses developed, and to make constitutive, as opposed to causal, 
claims in response. A fourth limitation is the manner in which the interviews were conducted 
five or six years following the conclusion of the mediation efforts under study. Interlocutors 
were asked to recall events as opposed to offer their immediate responses to an ongoing peace 
process and, even if their memories remained precise, their perspectives were undoubtedly 
coloured by the years which had passed since the failure of the peace processes: years in which 
further peace talks were launched, and during which violence and conflict persisted. Relatedly, 
while these interviews were complemented by the analysis of press conferences and official 
documentation in a bid to mitigate against their weaknesses, they were not supplemented by 
data such as participant observation, and recordings or minutes of the discussions. It was not 
possible to gather such data but, nevertheless, the limitations of the data which it was possible 
to analyse must be borne in mind. Finally, one inescapable limitation is my own interaction 
with the research: my positionality. In Chapter Four, I reflected upon my own personal identity, 
and how it may have partially guided the research question and methods selected together with 
its possible impact upon my interactions with research participants and the analyses made.   
 
8.4 Avenues for future research 
 
To conclude, I would like to propose that there remains scope for further research regarding 
the interplay between mediation and identity, both within the context of the two cases analysed 
in this thesis and more broadly. A number of these possible paths might also serve to address 
the limitations of this study. Firstly, an analysis of the rhetoric, and identity claims, made by 
representatives of the al-Asad regime within the context of Stages I and II of the Geneva Peace 
Process would be illuminating. For example, examining the extent to which the regime engaged 
in identity construction in the peace process, and whether the identities imagined by these 
individuals aligned with those conjured by the mediators and international officials involved, 
would offer further weight to my contention that the propagation of identity claims can shape 
perceptions of mediators’ impartiality. It would also reveal whether the Geneva Peace Process 
contained within it, and even provoked, an identity conflict: competing views regarding the 
character of the nation. Furthermore, an investigation into the identity claims made during 
parallel peace processes launched to resolve the Syrian civil war, such as those initiated by 
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Russia and Saudi Arabia, could also support, or perhaps challenge, my findings. Such an 
investigation may also reveal whether particular mediators are more likely to engage in 
processes of identity construction through mediation. In a similar vein, the perspectives of 
crucial groups which were not consulted over the course of this study concerning the Yemeni 
mediation could be investigated while, once more, the peacemaking efforts of the UN following 
2015 could also be scrutinised.  
 
I have firmly argued that mediation may not only form a backdrop to processes of identity 
construction but, moreover, can trigger the mutation of the identities of the conflict parties. I 
have unearthed several aspects of mediation which intervene to remould identity. However, 
future research could assess whether further elements of mediation, or norms contained within 
mediation, induce identity transformation. More broadly, arguments surrounding the interplay 
between mediation and identity could be deployed to intervene in further debates which are 
central to mediation. For instance, mediation scholars may be able to broaden the notion of 
‘ripeness’, a theory which has stalked discussions of mediation for decades. In brief, ripeness 
theory concerns the need for mediators to recognise when a dispute is apt for resolution, 
claimed to be the moment at which the parties perceive themselves to be locked in a ‘mutually 
hurting stalemate’. The idea is that the disputants, having conducted a ‘costs-benefits analysis’, 
will realise, perhaps with the help of a mediator, that the most beneficial step is a negotiated 
settlement.934 Mediation scholars may be able to broaden this theory, perhaps by enquiring into 
the extent to which threats to identity exacerbate ‘mutually hurting stalemates’, or through 
assessing whether the pressures inflicted by more material costs are sufficient to outweigh 
contradicting the needs dictated by certain, possibly reshaped, identities. As a second example, 
could the examination of processes of identity construction intercede in debates surrounding 
the meaning of ‘success’ in mediation? Scholars define mediation success in a wide variety of 
ways: as Vuković questions: ‘should the mere fact that mediators managed to move the parties 
from the battlefield to the negotiating table be considered a success?’ If the conflict parties 
‘reach a formal agreement’, does this constitute success? Alternatively, do we need to consider 
the durability of the peace negotiated?935 However, if a goal of the mediator or mediators – 
stated or unstated, known or unknown – is to reshape the identities of the conflict parties, might 
 
934 I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) 
935 Siniša Vuković, ‘Three Degrees of Success in International Mediation’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 42:3 (2014), p. 966; see also: Marieke Kleiboer, ‘Understanding Success and Failure of International 
Mediation’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:2 (1996), pp. 360-89; and Savun, ‘Information, Bias, and 
Mediation Success’, p. 32  
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success be measured by shifts in the identities of the conflict parties? These represent two 
examples of further debates in which the detailed consideration of identity construction within 
mediation may be able to intervene. 
 
Finally, attention must also be paid to the collective identities of mediators and the extent to 
which these develop alongside those of disputants as a result of the dynamics of the mediation 
efforts. The decision within this thesis to explore the impact of the two mediation efforts upon 
the identities of the conflict parties arose due to the data gathered: within the dataset, according 
to my interpretation, the voices assessed reimagined the Syrian and Yemeni identities as 
opposed to those of the mediators. Indeed, at the outset of this study, I was keen to incorporate 
the possible effect the process of mediation may exert upon the identities of the mediators;936 
as Meera Sabaratnam has aptly noted, peace studies has been marred by ‘the study of the effect 
of the subject (the international interveners) on the object (the parties to conflict and the local 
recipients of aid), with little regard for the effect on the interveners themselves’.937 
Nevertheless, within the interviews conducted, interlocutors considered, both implicitly and 
explicitly, the national experiences and aspirations of Syrians and Yemenis and did not 
consider the identities of the mediators, and this trend was repeated within the press 
conferences and official documentation. Future studies must interrogate this tendency, and 
unearth how the identities of the mediators might inevitably be shaped, too, both by third-party 










936 As noted in Chapter 4, the original research question which guided the study was formulated as follows: does 
mediation shape identity? Whose identity was not specified. 
937 As summarised by John Heathershaw, ‘Review Essay: Towards Better Theories of Peacebuilding: Beyond 
the Liberal Peace Debate’, Peacebuilding 1:2 (2013), p. 276; see: Meera Sabaratnam, ‘The Liberal Peace? An 
Intellectual History of International Conflict Management’ in Susanna Campbell et al. A Liberal Peace? The 
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Participant Information Sheet 
 
Project Title: Negotiating the Impasse: Identity and International Conflict Mediation in Syria and Yemen 
 
Researcher: Sarah Clowry 
Department: School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
Contact Details: sarah.a.clowry2@durham.ac.uk  
 
You are invited to take part in a study which I am conducting as part of my ESRC-funded PhD at Durham 
University. This study has received ethical approval from the School of Government and International Affairs, 
Durham University. Before you decide whether or not to agree to take part, it is important for you to 
understand the purpose of the research and what is involved as a participant. Please read the following 
information carefully and do not hesitate to get in contact if there is anything that is not clear and/or if you 
would like more information.  
 
The aim of this study is to explore the attempts made by the international community to mediate the Syrian 
and Yemeni civil conflicts in the period 2011 – 2014. The research will focus in particular on the role played 
by ‘identities’ in processes of third-party conflict resolution.  
 
Interviewees with knowledge of the attempts made by the international community to mediate the Syrian 
and Yemeni civil conflicts have been invited to take part. Your participation is voluntary and you do not have 
to agree to take part. If you do agree to take part, you can withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
Your rights in relation to withdrawing any data that is identifiable to you are explained in the accompanying 
Privacy Notice. Your permission will be obtained to use direct quotes or identifiable data and you will be able 
to request that all information gathered during an interview is kept confidential. 
 
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to participate in an interview concerning international 
third-party conflict mediation of the Syrian and/or Yemeni civil wars in the period 2011 – 2014. Where 
possible, the interviews will take place in a professional setting, in the country in which you are based. 
However, the interviews may also take place over the telephone, Skype or email. The interviews will last for 
approximately one hour and you may be approached for a follow-up interview. During the interviews, you 
can refuse to answer questions and lines of enquiry with which you feel uncomfortable or do not wish to 
answer.  
 
The primary research output will be my PhD thesis which will be submitted in March 2021 and made available 
online at a later date. The findings will also be likely to be shared in academic journals and at conferences. 
All research data and records needed to validate the research findings will be stored for ten years after the 
end of the project. During this time, the data may be used for further legitimate research purposes.  
 
Thank you for reading this information and for considering participating in this study.  
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 صحيفة معلومات المشارك 
 
 كسر حالة الجمود: الهوية والوساطة الدولية في النزاعات في سوريا واليمن عنوان البحث:
 
 سارة كلوري  الباحث:
 ، جامعة دورهام الشؤون الحكومية والدولية كلية  القسم:
 sarah.a.clowry2@durham.ac.uk البريد اإللكتروني:
 
قبل مجلس البحوث االقتصادية  أنت مدعو للمشاركة في دراسة أقوم بها كجزء من رسالتي للدكتوراه الممولة من 
خالقية من كلية الشؤون الحكومية في جامعة دورهام. و قد حصلت هذه الدراسة على موافقة أ واالجتماعية
مشارك أن بصفتك والدولية بجامعة دورهام. قبل أن تقرر ما إذا كنت توافق على المشاركة من عدمها، من المهم 
تفهم الغرض من البحث وماالذي يتضمنه. يرجى قراءة المعلومات التالية بعناية وعدم التردد في التواصل إذا كان 
 .و إذا كنت ترغب في الحصول على مزيد من المعلومات هناك أي شيء غير واضح أ
 
دراسة محاوالت المجتمع الدولي للتوسط في النزاعات المدنية السورية واليمنية في   يهدف هذا البحث الي
. وسيركز البحث بشكل خاص على الدور الذي تلعبه "الهويات" في حل 2014 - 2011الفترةالممتدة مابين 
 .النزاعات بالوكالة
 
وسط في النزاعات األهلية السورية محاوالت المجتمع الدولي للتتمت دعوة األشخاص الذي يتمتعون بدراية حول 
إذا وافقت على المشاركة، فلك  ؛مشاركتك تطوعية وليس عليك الموافقةتعتبر  واليمنية للمشاركة في المقابلة.
فيما يتعلق بحقوقك بسحب أي بيانات شخصية فهي والحق في االنسحاب في أي وقت دون إبداء أي سبب. 
وصية. سيتم طلب إذنك لتضمين كالمك أو استخدام أي بياناتك موضحة في المرفق المتعلق بإشعار الخص
 .الشخصية في البحث، وبإمكانك طلب الحفاظ على سرية المعلومات التي يتم جمعها خالل المقابلة
 
إذا وافقت على المشاركة في هذه الدراسة ، فسُيطلب منك المشاركة في مقابلة متعلقة بوساطة الطرف 
. حيثما أمكن، 2014 - 2011نزاعات الحروب األهلية السورية أو/و اليمنية في فترة مابين الثالث  الدولية في حل 
برنامج  ستجرى المقابالت في بيئة مهنية في البلد الذي تقيم فيه، ومع ذلك، قد تتم المقابالت أيًضا عبر الهاتف أو
د يتم االتصال بك إلجراء مقابلة أو البريد اإللكتروني. ستستمر المقابالت لمدة ساعة تقريبًا وق السكايب
أسئلة ورفض أي استفسارات تشعرك بعدم االرتياح أو ال ي أ استدراكية. أثناء المقابالت، يمكنك رفض اإلجابة على 
 .ترغب في اإلجابة عنها
 
وإتاحتها  2021ستكون نتائج البحث األساسية هي أطروحة الدكتوراه الخاصة بي والتي سيتم تقديمها في مارس 
بر اإلنترنت في وقت الحق. من المحتمل أيًضا مشاركة النتائج في المجالت األكاديمية وفي المؤتمرات. وسيتم ع
تخزين جميع بيانات البحوث والسجالت الالزمة للتحقق من صحة نتائج البحوث لمدة عشر سنوات بعد انتهاء 
 .مشروعة أخرى أثناء هذا الوقت، فيمكن استخدام البيانات ألغراض بحثية ؛المشروع
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PART 1 – GENERIC PRIVACY NOTICE 
 
Durham University has a responsibility under data protection legislation to provide 
individuals with information about how we process their personal data. We do this in a 
number of ways, one of which is the publication of privacy notices. Organisations variously 
call them a privacy statement, a fair processing notice or a privacy policy. 
 
To ensure that we process your personal data fairly and lawfully we are required to inform 
you: 
 
• Why we collect your data 
• How it will be used 
• Who it will be shared with 
 
We will also explain what rights you have to control how we use your information and how 
to inform us about your wishes. Durham University will make the Privacy Notice available via 
the website and at the point we request personal data. 
 
Our privacy notices comprise two parts – a generic part (ie common to all of our privacy 
notices) and a part tailored to the specific processing activity being undertaken. 
 
Data Controller 
The Data Controller is Durham University. If you would like more information about how the 
University uses your personal data, please see the University’s Information Governance 
webpages or contact Information Governance Unit: 
 




Information Governance Unit also coordinate response to individuals asserting their rights 
under the legislation. Please contact the Unit in the first instance. 
 
Data Protection Officer 
The Data Protection Officer is responsible for advising the University on compliance with 
Data Protection legislation and monitoring its performance against it. If you have any 
concerns regarding the way in which the University is processing your personal data, please 






Telephone: (0191 33) 46144 
E-mail: jennifer.sewel@durham.ac.uk 
 
Your rights in relation to your personal data 
 
Privacy notices and/or consent 
You have the right to be provided with information about how and why we process your 
personal data. Where you have the choice to determine how your personal data will be 
used, we will ask you for consent. Where you do not have a choice (for example, where we 
have a legal obligation to process the personal data), we will provide you with a privacy 
notice. A privacy notice is a verbal or written statement that explains how we use personal 
data. 
 
Whenever you give your consent for the processing of your personal data, you receive the 
right to withdraw that consent at any time. Where withdrawal of consent will have an impact 
on the services we are able to provide, this will be explained to you, so that you can 
determine whether it is the right decision for you. 
 
Accessing your personal data 
You have the right to be told whether we are processing your personal data and, if so, to be 
given a copy of it. This is known as the right of subject access. You can find out more about 
this right on the University’s Subject Access Requests webpage. 
 
Right to rectification 
If you believe that personal data we hold about you is inaccurate, please contact us and we 
will investigate. You can also request that we complete any incomplete data. 
 
Once we have determined what we are going to do, we will contact you to let you know. 
 
Right to erasure 
You can ask us to erase your personal data in any of the following circumstances: 
 
• We no longer need the personal data for the purpose it was originally collected 
• You withdraw your consent and there is no other legal basis for the processing 
• You object to the processing and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the 
processing 
• The personal data have been unlawfully processed 
• The personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal obligation 
• The personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of information society 
services (information society services are online services such as banking or social 
media sites). 
 
Once we have determined whether we will erase the personal data, we will contact you to 





Right to restriction of processing 
You can ask us to restrict the processing of your personal data in the following 
circumstances: 
 
• You believe that the data is inaccurate and you want us to restrict processing until 
we determine whether it is indeed inaccurate 
• The processing is unlawful and you want us to restrict processing rather than erase it 
• We no longer need the data for the purpose we originally collected it but you need it 
in order to establish, exercise or defend a legal claim and 
• You have objected to the processing and you want us to restrict processing until we 
determine whether our legitimate interests in processing the data override your 
objection. 
 
Once we have determined how we propose to restrict processing of the data, we will contact 
you to discuss and, where possible, agree this with you. 
 
Retention 
The University keeps personal data for as long as it is needed for the purpose for which it 
was originally collected. Most of these time periods are set out in the University Records 
Retention Schedule. 
 
Making a complaint 
If you are unsatisfied with the way in which we process your personal data, we ask that you 
let us know so that we can try and put things right. If we are not able to resolve issues to 
your satisfaction, you can refer the matter to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). 
The ICO can be contacted at: 
 
Information Commissioner's Office Wycliffe House Water Lane Wilmslow Cheshire SK9 5AF 
 
Telephone: 0303 123 1113 
 




















PART 2 – TAILORED PRIVACY NOTICE 
 
This section of the Privacy Notice provides you with the privacy information that you need to 
know before you provide personal data to the University for the particular purpose(s) stated 
below. 
 
Project Title: Negotiating the Impasse: Identity and International Conflict Mediation in 
Syria and Yemen938 
 
Type(s) of personal data collected and held by the researcher and method of 
collection: 
Personal data will be collected through interviews. This may include participants’ names, 
employment/official role(s), their views on the mediation cases under investigation, their 
views on the broader politics of Syria and Yemen and, potentially, their opinions on identity 
and the role this dynamic played in the mediation attempts. Through such discussions, it 
may be the case that the participants reveal sensitive personal information regarding their 
own political and religious views, or the views of others. The interviews may be audio 
recorded (in such cases, the participants’ permission will be sought). 
 
Lawful Basis 
Collection and use of personal data are carried out under the University’s public task, which 
includes teaching, learning and research. For further information, please refer to: 
https://durham.ac.uk/research.innovation/governance/ethics/governance/dp/legalbasis/ 
 
How personal data is stored: 
• All personal data will be held securely and will be strictly confidential to the 
researcher. 
• If the participant requests that their data be anonymised or pseudonymised, the 
participant will be allocated an anonymous number for data collection which will not 
be connected to her/his name or identity.  
• All personal data in electronic form will be stored on a Durham University drive and 
will be encrypted and password protected. Data will not be available to anyone 
outside the research team.  
• Any recorded interviews will be stored on an encrypted device until it has been 
transcribed by the researcher. No one else will have access to the recording, and it 
will be erased once the transcript has been completed.  
 
How personal data is processed: 
• The data is being collected in order to support the researcher’s analysis of the 
international community’s attempts to mediate the Syrian and Yemeni civil conflicts 
in the period 2011 – 2014.  
• The interviews may be recorded and transcribed before being analysed thematically. 
The data will be anonymised if this is requested by the participants.  
• All research data and records needed to validate the findings will be stored for ten 
years after the end of the project. During this time, the data may be used for further 
legitimate research purposes.  
 
 




Withdrawal of data: 
• The participant can request withdrawal of her/his data unless it has been fully 
anonymised. Once this has happened, it may not be possible to identify the 
participant from any of the data held. 
 
Who the researcher shares personal data with: 
• The raw data will be accessible to, and only analysed by, the researcher. 
• Personal data will only be included in publications, presentations and in the PhD 
thesis if permission has been obtained. 
. 
How long personal data is held by the researcher: 
• Identifiable data will be stored for ten years after the end of the project. After this 
point, the data will be deleted.  
 
How to object to the processing of your personal data for this project: 
If you have any concerns regarding the processing of your personal data, or you wish to 
withdraw your data from the project, please contact Sarah Clowry 
(sarah.a.clowry2@durham.ac.uk).   
 
Further information: 
Researcher: Sarah Clowry 
Department: School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
Contact details: sarah.a.clowry2@durham.ac.uk    
 
Supervisor name: Professor Roger Mac Ginty 


















Privacy notice (Arabic) 
                                    
 
 إشعار الخصوصية 
 
 إشعار الخصوصية العام  - 1الجزء 
 
المشاركين بمعلومات حول تعتبر جامعة دورهام مسؤولًة بموجب تشريعات حماية البيانات عن تزويد 
كيفية معالجة بياناتهم الشخصية. ونقوم بذلك بطرق عّدة، من بينها إصدار إشعارات الخصوصية والتي 
تسمى من قبل بعض المنظمات بشكل مختلف كبيان الخصوصية أو إشعار معالجة عادل أو سياسة 
 الخصوصية. 
 
 وقانونية، يتعين علينا إبالغك بما يلي:  للتأكد من أننا نقوم بمعالجة بياناتك الشخصية بنزاهة 
 لماذا نجمع البيانات الخاصة بك  •
 كيف سيتم استخدامها •
 مع من سيتم تبادلها  •
 
سنشرح لك أيًضا الحقوق الخاصة بك للتحكم في كيفية استخدامنا لمعلوماتك وكيفية إعالمنا برغباتك. 
النترنت وفي تلك المرحلة نطلب بيانات ستقوم جامعة دورهام بإتاحة إشعار الخصوصية عبر موقع على ا
 شخصية. 
 
جزء عام )أي مشترك بين جميع إشعارات الخصوصية  -تتألف إشعارات الخصوصية الخاصة بنا من جزأين 
 .الخاصة بنا( وجزء مصمم خصيًصا لنشاط المعالجة المحدد الجاري تنفيذه
 
 مراقب البيانات 
جامعة دورهام هي مراقب البيانات. إذا كنت ترغب في مزيد من المعلومات حول كيفية استخدام 
الجامعة لبياناتك الشخصية، فيرجى االطالع على صفحات التحكم بالمعلومات على موقع الجامعة أو 
 (0191) 33 46246أو  46103االتصال بوحدة التحكم بالمعلومات على رقم الهاتف التالي: 
 ن طريق البريد اإللكتروني التالي: أو ع
 information.governance@durham.ac.uk 
 
األفراد الذين يؤكدون على حقوقهم بموجب التشريع.  الرد عنتنسق وحدة التحكم بالمعلومات أيًضا 
 .يرجى االتصال بالوحدة في المقام األول
 
 المسؤول عن حماية البيانات 
سؤوالً عن تقديم المشورة للجامعة بشأن االمتثال لتشريعات حماية يعد المسؤول عن حماية البيانات م
البيانات ومراقبة أدائها استناداً إليها. إذا كانت لديك أي مخاوف بشأن الطريقة التي تعالج بها الجامعة 
 :بياناتك الشخصية، فيرجى االتصال بالمسؤول عن حماية البيانات
 
 جنيفر سويل 
 سكرتير الجامعة 
 (0191) 33 46144الهاتف: 




 حقوقك فيما يتعلق ببياناتك الشخصية 
 
 إشعارات الخصوصية و / أو الموافقة 
. وعندما يكون والسبب وراء ذلك معالجتنا لبياناتك الشخصية  يحق لك الحصول على معلومات حول كيفية 
لديك خيار تحديد كيفية استخدام بياناتك الشخصية، سنطلب منك الموافقة. إذا لم يكن لديك خيار 
)على سبيل المثال، عندما يكون لدينا التزام قانوني بمعالجة البيانات الشخصية(، فسوف نقدم لك 
 لبياناتك الشخصية. إشعاًرا بالخصوصية و هو عبارة شفهية أو مكتوبة تشرح كيفة استخدامنا 
 
عند اعطاء موافقتك لمعالجة بياناتك الشخصية، فلك الحق في سحب هذه الموافقة في أي وقت، وفي 
حالة امكانية تأثير قرارك بسحب الموافقة على الخدمات التي بأمكاننا تقديمها، سيتم توضيح ذلك لك، 
 الصائب بالنسبة لك.  بحيث يمكنك مراجعة قرارك و تحديد ما إذا كان هذا هو القرار
 
 الوصول إلى البيانات الشخصية الخاصة بك 
لك الحق في أن يتم إبالغك بما إذ كنا نقوم بمعالجة بياناتك الشخصية، وإذا كان األمر كذلك، فيتم 
الوصول إلى الموضوع. بامكانك الحصول على المزيد من و يسمى هذا األخير بحق منحك نسخة منها 
 .األمر مباشرة على صفحة طلبات الوصول إلى الموضوع بموقع الجامعةالمعلومات حول هذا 
 
 الحق في تصحيح بيناتك 
إذا كنت تعتقد أن بياناتك الشخصية التي نحتفظ بها غير دقيقة، فيرجى االتصال بنا وسنحقق في ذلك، 
 و بامكانك أيًضا طلب استكمال أي بيانات غير كاملة. 
 
 ك إلعالمك بذلك. بمجرد تحديد ما سنفعله، سنتصل ب 
 
 الحق في مسح بيناتك 
 بإمكانك طلب مسح بياناتك الشخصية في أي من الحاالت التالية: 
 عند انتهاء الحاجة إلى البيانات الشخصية للهدف الذي جمعناها له في األصل  •
 عند سحب موافقتك وبالتالي ال يوجد أي أساس قانوني آخر لمعالجة البيانات •
 جة وال توجد أسباب شرعية مهمة للمعالجة عند اعتراضك  على المعال •
 تم معالجة البيانات الشخصية بشكل غير قانوني  •
 يجب مسح البيانات الشخصية لالمتثال الى اي التزام قانوني  •
تم جمع البيانات الشخصية فيما يتعلق بعرض خدمات مجتمع المعلومات )خدمات عبر اإلنترنت  •
 االجتماعي(. مثل المواقع المصرفية أو مواقع التواصل 
 بمجرد تحديد ما إذا كنا سنقوم بمسح البيانات الشخصية، سنتصل بك إلعالمك بذلك. 
 
 حّق تقييد المعالجة 
 بإمكانك طلب تقييد معالجة بياناتك الشخصية في الحاالت التالية: 
ير عند اعتقادك أن البيانات غير دقيقة وتريد منا تقييد المعالجة حتى يتم التأكد أّن البيانات غ •
 دقيقة فعالً 
 المعالجة غير قانونية وتريد منا تقييد المعالجة بدالً من مسحها  طريقة •
عند انتهاء الحاجة الي البيانات لغرض جمعها في األصل، لكنك بحاجة إليها من أجل إنشاء أو  •
 ممارسة أو الدفاع عن مطلب قانوني 
التأكد ما إذا كانت مصالحنا المشروعة عند اعتراضك على المعالجة وتريد منا تقييدها حتى يتم  •
 في معالجة بياناتك تتجاوز اعتراضك. 
 
بمجرد تحديد كيفية اقتراحنا لتقييد معالجة البيانات، سوف نتصل بك لمناقشة ذلك، وعند اإلمكان، نتفق 





جمعها في األصل، و أغلب هذه تحتفظ الجامعة بالبيانات الشخصية طالما كانت هناك حاجة إليها لغرض 
 الفترات الزمنية منصوٌص عليها في جدول االحتفاظ بسجالت الجامعة. 
 
 
 تقديم شكوى 
إذا لم تكن راضيًا عن الطريقة التي نعالج بها بياناتك الشخصية، نطلب منك إعالمنا حتى نتمكن من 
مفوض المعلومات في  تصحيح األمور. وإذا لم نتمكن من ذلك، فيمكنك إحالة األمر إلى مكتب
 العنوان التالي: 
 
 مكتب مفوض المعلومات 
Wycliffe House, Water Lane, Wilmslow Cheshire,   SK9 5AF 
 
 0303 123 1113هاتف: 
 




 إشعار الخصوصية الُمخصّص  - 2الجزء 
 
تحتاج إلى معرفتها قبل تقديم البيانات الشخصية يوفر لك هذا القسم معلومات الخصوصية التي 
 .إلى الجامعة لألغراض المحددة المذكورة أدناه
 
 كسر حالة الجمود: الهوية والوساطة الدولية في النزاعات في سوريا واليمن  عنوان المشروع:
 
طريقة كذلك نوع )أو أنواع( البيانات الشخصية التي تم جمعها وحفظها من قِبل الباحث و
 :معهاج
و قد يشمل ذلك أسماء المشاركين ووظائفهم  ،سيتم جمع البيانات الشخصية من خالل المقابالت 
في سوريا  شاملةوكذلك وجهات نظرهم حول قضايا الوساطة قيد التحقيق و حول السياسة ال 
ومن المحتمل كذلك آراؤهم حول الهوية والدور الذي لعبته هذه الديناميكية في محاوالت  ،واليمن
اركين عن معلومات شخصية حساسة الوساطة. ومن خالل مثل هذه المناقشات، قد يكشف المش
تتعلق بآرائهم السياسية والدينية أو آراء اآلخرين. وقد يتم تسجيل المقابالت صوتياً )في مثل هذه 
 الحاالت، سيتم طلب إذن المشاركين(. 
 األساس القانوني 
يتم جمع واستخدام البيانات الشخصية في إطار المهمة العامة للجامعة، والتي تشمل التدريس 
 التعلم والبحث. لمزيد من المعلومات، يرجى الرجوع إلي: و
https://durham.ac.uk/research.innovation/governance/ethics/governance/dp/legalbasis/ 
 
 كيف يتم تخزين البيانات الشخصية: 
 سيتم االحتفاظ بجميع البيانات الشخصية بشكل آمن وستكون سرية تماًما للباحث  •
رك أن تدرج بياناته على أساس أنها مجهولة المصدر أو تحت اسم مستعار، إذا طلب المشا •
فسيخصص للمشارك رقم مجهول لجمع البيانات والذي لن يكون متصالً باسمه أو هويته 
 الرسمية 
سيتم تخزين جميع البيانات الشخصية في شكل إلكتروني على محرك جامعة دورهام  •
لن تتاح البيانات ألي شخص خارج فريق  ذلك ، وبوسيتم تشفيرها ووضع كلمة مرور لها
 البحث 
سيتم تخزين أي مقابالت مسجلة على جهاز مشفر حتى يتم تدوينها من قبل الباحث و  •
لن يتمكن أي شخص آخر من الوصول إلى التسجيل؛ عند انتهاءالتدوين  سيتم مسح 
 التسجيل نهائياً. 
 
 كيف تتم معالجة البيانات الشخصية: 
البيانات لدعم تحليل الباحث لمحاوالت المجتمع الدولي للتوسط في النزاعات يتم جمع  •
 .2014 - 2011األهلية السورية واليمنية في الفترة 
سيتم  ، ويمكن تسجيل المقابالت وتدوينها قبل المباشرة في عملية تحليلها موضوعياً  •
 .إخفاء البيانات إذا طلب المشاركون ذلك 
ت والسجالت البحثية الالزمة للتحقق من صحة النتائج لمدة سيتم تخزين جميع البيانا •
خالل هذا الوقت، يمكن استخدام البيانات ألغراض  عشر سنوات بعد انتهاء المشروع؛ 
 بحثية مشروعة أخرى. 
 
 سحب البيانات:
بامكان المشارك أن يطلب سحب بياناته ما لم يتم إخفائها هويتها تماماً. وبمجرد حدوث  •
 مكان تحديد بيانات المشارك من أي من البيانات الموجودة. ذلك، فليس باال
 
 مع من يشارك الباحث البيانات الشخصية:
 البيانات األولية ستكون متاحة للباحث وسيتم تحليلها فقط من طرفه.  •
242 
 
سيتم إدراج البيانات الشخصية فقط في المنشورات والعروض التقديمية وفي رسالة  •
 الحصول على إذن المشارك. الدكتوراه إذا تم 
 وقت احتفاظ الباحث بالبيانات الشخصية:
سيتم تخزين البيانات المحددة لمدة عشر سنوات بعد نهاية البحث؛ بعد ذلك، سيتم حذف  •
 البيانات.
 
 كيفية االعتراض على معالجة بياناتك الشخصية لهذا المشروع: 
أو لديك رغبة في سحب بياناتك من   إذا كانت لديك أي مخاوف بشأن معالجة بياناتك الشخصية
 البحث، فيرجى االتصال بجامعة دورهام على العنوان التالي: 
sarah.a.clowry2@durham.ac.uk 
 
 مزيد من المعلومات:
 سارة كلوري  الباحث:
 كلية الشؤون الحكومية و الدولية، جامعة دورهام القسم:
 sarah.a.clowry2@durham.ac.uk البريد االلكتروني:
 روجر ماك جنتي  اسم المشرف:























Appendix C. Consent form 
Consent form (English) 
                                    
Consent Form 
Project title: Negotiating the Impasse: Identity and International Conflict Mediation in Syria and Yemen 
Researcher: Sarah Clowry 
Department: School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
Contact details: sarah.a.clowry2@durham.ac.uk     
 
Supervisor name: Professor Roger Mac Ginty 
Supervisor contact details: roger.macginty@durham.ac.uk  
This form is to confirm that you understand the purposes of the project, what is involved, and that you are 
happy to take part.  Please confirm whether or not you agree with each statement.  
Statement Yes     No      N/A 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet and the privacy notice for 
the above project.                                                                                                 
   
I have had sufficient time to consider the information and ask any questions I might have, 
and I am satisfied with the answers I have been given. 
   
I understand who will have access to personal data provided, how the data will be stored 
and what will happen to the data at the end of the project. 
   
I understand that my words may be quoted in publications, reports, and other research 
outputs. I agree to my real name being used. 
   
If the answer to the above statement is ‘No’, I agree to my official role/job title being 
used. 
   
I agree to take part in the above project.    
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving a reason. 
   
 
 
Participant’s Signature_____________________________ Date______________ 
 




Consent form (Arabic) 
                                    
 استمارة الموافقة 
 
 كسر حالة الجمود: الهوية والوساطة الدولية في النزاعات في سوريا واليمن عنوان البحث:
 
 سارة كلوري  الباحث:
 ة و الدولية، جامعة دورهام يكلية الشؤون الحكوم  القسم:
 sarah.a.clowry2@durham.ac.uk البريد اإللكتروني:
 
 روجر ماك جنتي  اسم المشرف:
  roger.macginty@durham.ac.uk بالمشرف:الخاص البريد اإللكتروني 
 
هذه االستمارة للتأكد من فهمك ألهداف البحث وما ينطوي عليه، وعلى رغبتك في المشاركة. يرجى تأكيد موافقتك 




 التصريح  نعم  ال
 المعلومات وإشعار الخصوصية للمشروع أعاله.  ورقةأؤكد أنني قد قرأت وفهمت    
 
تبادرت إلى ذهني لقد أتيح لي الوقت الكافي للنظر في المعلومات وطرح أي أسئلة    
 البحث، وأنا راضٍ عن اإلجابات التي ُقدمت لي. عن 
 
أدرك من سيكون له حق الوصول إلى البيانات الشخصية المقدمة، وكيف سيتم    
 وماذا سيحدث للبيانات في نهاية البحث. تخزين البيانات، 
 
أدرك أن كلماتي قد يتم تضمينها في المنشورات والتقارير وغيرها من نتائج البحث؛    
 لذلك أوافق على استخدام اسمي الحقيقي. 
 
إذا كان الجواب على التصريح أعاله هو "ال"، فأنا أوافق على استخدام الُمسّمى    
 الوظيفي الخاص بي. 
 
 أوافق على تسجيل المقابلة.    
 
 
 أوافق على المشاركة في البحث أعاله.    
 
 











Appendix D. Interview guide 
 
As explored in Chapter Four, I conducted semi-structured interviews. Therefore, the questions 
and topics listed below are merely indicative; the interviewees were permitted to dictate the 
topics covered, and the way in which they flowed, during the conversation.  
 
Dependent on the participant, I began by explaining precisely the case on which we would be 
focusing (either the Syrian or the Yemeni mediation attempt), clarifying the specific elements 
of the mediation process and the time period in which I was interested. I then explored the 
following questions and topics: 
 
Data Collection Tool 
 
1. Can we begin by discussing your role in the mediation process? How and why did 
you become involved? In which activities did you take part? How did you find the 
experience?  
2. Can you provide an overview of the mediation process? How was it structured? What 
was discussed, and in what way? How did the mediation attempt conclude?  
3. How did the disputants interact with one another/How did you interact with other 
members of your team, and with the other disputants?  
4. [If appropriate] How would you describe your position towards the other party at the 
time of the mediation? Have your opinions in relation to the other party changed at 
all following the mediation attempt? 
5. Can you describe the atmosphere over the course of the mediation process? Did this 
atmosphere change? If so, in what way, and in response to what?  
6. What stance(s)/position(s) did you (or your group/party) adopt during the mediation? 
7. Why did you (or your group/party) adopt [X stance/position] during the mediation? 
What factors motivated this commitment and why was it important to you (or your 
group/party)?  
8. Why do you think [X individual/group] adopted [X stance]?  
9. Why do you think the mediation process took the course it did? Has your perspective 
changed regarding this; did you believe, at the time of the mediation attempt, that a 
different dynamic determined the course of the mediation attempt?  
10. How do you understand the term ‘identity’? Do you think identities were important 
within the mediation process? If so, how?  
11. Is there anything I haven’t asked you about the mediation process, or anything which 
we haven’t discussed which you think we should have? Is there anything you would 
like to add? 
12. Do you have any suggestions for other individuals with whom I should speak over 
the course of my research? Are you able to share their contact details, or the most 











Appendix E. Template email to interview participants 
 




Dear [title and surname], 
 
My name is Sarah Clowry and I am a PhD student at Durham University in the UK. I hope 
you do not mind my getting in touch; I am contacting you in case you might have the time 
to offer some help with my research. 
 
My research focuses on international mediation, and one of my case studies will be [Stages I 
and II of the Geneva Peace Process or the Yemeni transition between the years 2011 and 
2014]. I understand that you were [role during case study] and were involved in the period 
of mediation on which I am focusing. I was therefore wondering whether you might be 
willing to participate in an interview with me concerning your work and experiences during 
this time. It would be fascinating to hear your perspectives. We could conduct the interview 
on condition of anonymity, or even ‘off the record’, if you would feel more comfortable. I 
believe you are based in [location]; if you would be happy to speak with me, perhaps we 
could find a suitable time to talk in [location and month or remote means of interviewing 
and month]. Please do let me know what would be most convenient for you.  
 
I would be very grateful if you were able to help, and please do not hesitate to request any 
further details about my research or my background.  
 
Thank you very much in advance, and I look forward to hearing from you, 
Sarah Clowry 
 
ESRC PhD Student 
School of Government and International Affairs 
Durham University 












Appendix F. Interpreter confidentiality agreement 
 




Project Title: Negotiating the Impasse: Identity and International Conflict Mediation in 
Syria and Yemen 
 
Researcher: Sarah Clowry 
Department: School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
Contact Details: sarah.a.clowry2@durham.ac.uk  
 
In agreeing to offer consecutive Arabic-English interpretation in the course of the above 
project, you are obliged to keep confidential anything that is discussed during the interview 
for which you provide interpretation, including the identity of the interviewee. By signing 
below, you agree to these terms. 
 
 
NAME (Block capitals):  
DATE:   


















Appendix G. Thematic table with data fragments 
 
Table m) Themes, categories and codes selected for analysis with data fragments 
Theme Categories Codes Data Fragment Example 
Suffering Terror Fear ‘this created fear among the 
protestors’  
Threat ‘it was very risky for me and my 
children to stay in Syria…they 
said they wanted to kill me’ 
Flee ‘I had to flee with my two 
children’ 
Agony Hurt ‘our stomachs, our guts, felt like 
they were shredded and 
punished’ 
Anger ‘I felt angry’ 
Injustice ‘this injustice that is inflicted on 
the Syrian people’ 
Neglect  ‘the level of deterioration in the 
everyday lives of Yemeni men 
and women’ 
Poverty ‘the difficult, harsh life of 
ordinary Yemenis’ 
Courage Bravery ‘I know many friends before they 
went to demonstrate, they would 
say goodbye to their mothers, 
their wives, their kids – it was 
such a brave and honourable and 
courageous thing for them to do’ 
Sacrifice ‘I want to put in your mind how 
difficult is it to have our role’ 




Fragility ‘we brought a photo of a new 
born baby – he was dead because 
of the famine’ 
Weakness ‘it became weaker and weaker’ 
Innocence ‘the killing of innocent Yemeni 
people’ 
Brutality Destruction ‘the power-holders, the 
policymakers, they just destroyed 
everything’ 
Force ‘until the war erupted’ 
Attack ‘that was the same time as the 
chemical weapons attack’ 
Violence ‘the bloodshed’ 
Terrorism ‘we were talking about state-
sponsored terrorism’ 
Massacre ‘who commits more and more 




‘in acute need of humanitarian 
assistance’ 
Victimhood ‘how much they suffered’ 
Oppression  Repression ‘the response from the 
government became more bloody 
and more severe, there were 
hundreds of thousands of political 
prisoners’ 
Regime ‘to put the responsibility and 
blame on the regime’ 
Dictatorship ‘the Syrian government is 
authoritarian’  
Tyranny ‘tyrannical regime’ 
Silenced ‘closed all the forums, all the 
Damascus Spring forums’ 
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Detained ‘it was closed and its members 
detained’ 









‘we need to liberalise our society, 
make it more democratic’ 
Elections ‘Elections, the electoral system’ 
Representation ‘almost every political 
representative’ 





‘I was always driving for a 
country that has democracy’ 
Justice ‘they wanted to see…justice’ 
Law ‘the regime should be in court, 
tried against the war crimes it is 
committing’  
Citizenship ‘in which our citizenship 
transcends any social, ethnic, 
national or sectarian faction’ 
Liberal values Human rights ‘also I was known as an activist, 
for women’s rights, human 
rights’ 
Freedom ‘the dream of freedom’ 
Dignity ‘it was about being empowered in 
politics, in society and 
economically’ 
Civil state ‘a democratic civil state based on 
the rule of law and civil liberties’ 
Openness Voice ‘our way to have a say’ 




Consultation ‘communicate ideas, listening – 
continuous interactions’ 
Pluralism ‘we had a pluralistic delegation, 
with different views combined’ 
Diversity ‘every governorate has a different 
culture, a different dialect’ 
Difference ‘the differences were so big!’ 
Transformation Transition ‘transitioning to a new system’ 
Change ‘they started to develop their 
ability to negotiate’ 
Reform ‘we have seen progress on reform 
by the Yemeni government’ 
Novelty ‘This was the first time we had 
anything like this’ 
Peace ‘Syrians seeking peaceful 
change’ 
Discord Brutality Destruction ‘the power-holders, the 
policymakers, they just destroyed 
everything’ 
Attack ‘and they would attack the 
experts’ 
Violence ‘the bloodshed’ 
Battle ‘a real battle…there was a lot of 
power, and they were against’ 
Injustice ‘this injustice that is inflicted on 
the Syrian people’ 
Terror Fear ‘this created fear among the 
protestors’ 
Threat ‘it was very risky for me and my 
children to stay in Syria…they 
said they wanted to kill me’ 




Oppression Repression ‘the response from the 
government became more bloody 
and more severe, there were 




‘we just needed to break the 
monopoly of certain people, their 
control of politics, government, 
economics’ 
Marginalisation ‘They wanted to keep it only for 
the traditional powers to decide’ 
Silenced ‘closed all the forums, all the 
Damascus Spring forums’ 
Locked up ‘they jailed, detained my brother 
and tortured him’ 




‘The regime refused totally – 
particularly on engaging in the 
political transition element or 
anything to do with it’ 
Rivalry Competition ‘the others are not like me, so 
they all push me out’ 
Exclusion ‘and the women, the youth, the 
civil society – they were not a 
part of these discussions unless 
they had their own connections’ 
Regime ‘One backed a dictatorial regime 
with one voice’ 
Concealment ‘so much happened behind closed 
doors’ 




Blame ‘he has blood on his hands’ 
Divisions ‘we were divided in two’ 
Accusation Traitor ‘he was publicly saying in front 
of the UN that we were traitors’ 
Foreign agent ‘the government questioned the 
opposition’s Syrian-ness, 
considered them to be foreign 
agents’ 
Outsider ‘but it was designed by 
international actors – they had, 
not necessarily a lack of 
sensitivity, but a lack of a reality 
check’ 
Terrorist ‘accusing us of being terrorists’ 
Sub-state groups Youth ‘the young people with dreams’ 
Women ‘There was fair and strong 
representation for women’ 
Newcomers ‘the newcomers, they had power’ 
Political elite ‘only for the traditional powers to 
decide’ 
Minority groups ‘even sects like the Druze, 
Alawite’ 
Religious groups ‘or the Shafii-Sunni divide’ 
Ethnic groups ‘we had Kurds’ 
Class ‘even the class system’ 
Sectarianism ‘And also the sect identities, the 
Shia-Sunni divide’ 
Secularism ‘secular communities’ 
Urban and rural 
divisions 
‘urban people…they despise the 
rural people’ 
Geography ‘The south and north are very 




Tribe ‘with the tribal leaders’ 
National 
Ownership 
Authority Leadership ‘The Transitional Justice 
Commission asked me to be the 
head of the Commission’ 
Control ‘they pushed the opposition’ 
Agency ‘we were entirely too involved’ 
Power ‘With the NDC, this process was 
more led by Yemenis’ 
Responsibility ‘our message was that no one was 
going to save them, that they 
were going to have to save 
themselves’  
Independence ‘it was a Yemeni event’ 
Sovereignty ‘one that fully respects Syria’s 
sovereignty’ 
Strength ‘He had a bigger role than a 
mediator, he was like a ruler in 
Yemen’ 
Voice ‘our way to have a say’ 
Intrusion Interference ‘the major regional countries 
interfering’  
Dictate ‘they were told they had to turn 
up’ 
Manipulation ‘secret agreements were 
arranged’ 
Blame ‘he has blood on his hands’ 
Neo-colonialism ‘This doesn’t feel right. Neo-
colonial – didn’t sit well with me’ 
Force ‘I was forced into this group and 
forced to be a part of this group’ 
Outsider ‘but it was designed by 
international actors – they had, 
not necessarily a lack of 
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sensitivity, but a lack of a reality 
check’ 
Frailty Futility ‘it was a complete failure. The 
international community, they 
tried to make all the members 
agree on a solution without 
paying attention to the groups 
outside who were making a war’ 
Weakness ‘We should have had the 
authority to hold the major 
stakeholders accountable’ 
Failure ‘when you look at the big picture, 
yes it failed’ 
Camaraderie Friendship  ‘we became friends, a team’ 
Support ‘they wanted to show political 
support all the time’ 
Assistance ‘They would try to help in any 
way’ 
Nurture ‘the international community 
nurtured the agreement, acted as 
an incubator’ 
Coordination ‘and we were always around each 
other, and discussing, trying to 
coordinate’ 
Cooperation ‘there was compromise, dialogue 
between the different factions’ 
Competition ‘the others are not like me, so 





‘negotiate based on the Geneva 
Communiqué’ 





Inclusion Embracement Inclusivity ‘it needed to be inclusive’ 
Representation ‘it needed to faithfully represent 
what the street was looking for’ 
Participation ‘involving the full participation 
of the different segments of 
Yemeni society’ 
Voice ‘our way to have a say’ 
Clarity and 
Collaboration 
Communication ‘sitting and talking about 
historical grievances’ 
Consultation ‘communicate ideas, listening – 
continuous interactions’ 
Transparency ‘we had many discussions with 
journalists’ 
Coordination ‘and we were always around each 
other, and discussing, trying to 
coordinate’ 
Cooperation ‘there was compromise, dialogue 
between the different factions’ 
Obfuscation Concealment ‘so much happened behind closed 
doors’ 
Exclusion ‘he didn’t attend, he was feeling 
like he was not included’ 
Disconnect ‘They were largely Syrian expats 
and so they didn’t have much 
credibility on the ground’ 
Sub-state groups Youth ‘the young people with dreams’ 
Syrians inside 
Syria 
‘it needed to be heavily focused 
on Syrians in Syria’ 
On the ground ‘the people on the ground’ 
Minority groups ‘even sects like the Druze, 
Alawite’ 
Religious groups ‘or the Shafii-Sunni divide’ 
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South Yemen and 
Southerners 
‘The southerners, they also came 
with a very unique identity’ 
Women ‘There was fair and strong 




‘but the local, or the geographic 
identities’ 
Newcomers ‘the newcomers, they had power’ 
Political elite ‘only for the traditional powers to 
decide’ 
Civil society ‘I was close to civil society’ 
Stakeholders ‘a lot of entities and stakeholders 
trying to push their own agenda’ 
Pluralism ‘we had a pluralistic delegation, 
with different views combined’ 
Diversity ‘every governorate has a different 
culture, a different dialect’ 
Comprehensive ‘We must commence a 
















Appendix H. Yemeni National Dialogue Conference logo 
 
 
Taken from: NDC, ‘Outcomes Document’, p. 1 
 
The text beneath the logo reads as follows:  
 
Comprehensive National Dialogue Conference 


















Appendix I. Disaggregated inclusion rationales and framings tables 
 
Table n) Disaggregated rationales present within data concerning inclusion and the Syrian 
case 
Rationale Data Source Total 
1 (legitimacy) Syrian interlocutors 14 (39%) 
International mediator interlocutors 6 (17%) 
Press conferences delivered by Syrians 0 (0%) 
Press conferences delivered by 
international mediators 
4 (11%) 
Official documents authored by 
Syrians 
2 (6%) 
Official documents authored by 
international mediators 
10 (28%) 
Overall total: 36 (97% of all rationales) 
2 (protection) Syrian interlocutors 0 (0%) 
International mediator interlocutors  0 (0%) 
Press conferences delivered by Syrians 0 (0%) 
Press conferences delivered by 
international mediators 
0 (0%) 
Official documents authored by 
Syrians 
0 (0%) 
Official documents authored by 
international mediators 
1 (100%) 
Overall total: 1 (3% of all rationales) 
3 (transformation) Syrian interlocutors 0 (0%) 
International mediator interlocutors  0 (0%) 
Press conferences delivered by Syrians  0 (0%) 
Press conferences by international 
mediators 
0 (0%) 
Official documents authored by 
Syrians 
0 (0%) 
Official documents authored by 
international mediators 
0 (0%) 









Table o) Disaggregated framings present within data concerning inclusion and the Syrian 
case 
Framing Data Source Total 
1 (open) Syrian interlocutors 22 (29%) 
International mediator interlocutors 7 (9%) 
Press conferences delivered by Syrians 1 (1%) 
Press conferences delivered by 
international mediators 
24 (31%) 
Documents authored by Syrians 2 (3%) 
Documents authored by international 
mediators 
21 (27%) 
Overall total: 77 (79% of all framings) 
2 (closed) Syrian interlocutors 9 (45%) 
International mediator interlocutors 3 (15%) 
Press conferences delivered by Syrians 0 (0%) 
Press conferences delivered by 
international mediators 
3 (15%) 
Documents authored by Syrians 2 (10%) 
Documents authored by international 
mediators 
3 (15%) 
Overall total: 20 (20% of all framings) 
3 (relational) Syrian interlocutors 0 (0%) 
International mediator interlocutors 1 (100%) 
Press conferences delivered by Syrians  0 (0%) 
Press conferences by international 
mediators 
0 (0%) 
Documents authored by Syrians 0 (0%) 
Documents authored by international 
mediators 
0 (0%) 














Table p) Disaggregated rationales present within data concerning inclusion and the Yemeni 
case 
Rationale Data Source Total 
1 (legitimacy) Yemeni interlocutors 3 (30%) 
International mediator interlocutors 0 (0%) 
Press conferences delivered by 
international mediators939 
0 (0%) 
Documents authored by Yemenis 1 (10%) 
Documents authored by international 
mediators 
6 (60%) 
Overall total: 10 (17% of all rationales) 
2 (protection) Yemeni interlocutors 2 (40%) 
International mediator interlocutors 0 (0%) 
Press conferences delivered by 
international mediators 
0 (0%) 
Documents authored by Yemenis 0 (0%) 
Documents authored by international 
mediators 
3 (60%) 
Overall total: 5 (8% of all rationales) 
3 (transformation) Yemeni interlocutors 20 (45%) 
International mediator interlocutors 3 (7%) 
Press conferences delivered by 
international mediators 
0 (0%) 
Documents authored by Yemenis 3 (7%) 
Documents authored by international 
mediators 
18 (41%) 













939 It should be recalled that no press conferences within the dataset feature Yemeni voices. 
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Table q) Disaggregated framings present within data concerning inclusion and the Yemeni 
case 
Framing Data Source Total 
1 (open) Yemeni interlocutors 25 (36%) 
International mediator interlocutors 4 (6%) 
Press conferences delivered by 
international mediators 
9 (13%) 
Documents authored by Yemenis 4 (6%) 
Documents authored by international 
mediators 
28 (40%) 
Overall total: 70 (34% of all framings) 
2 (closed) Yemeni interlocutors 49 (42%) 
International mediator interlocutors 11 (9%) 
Press conferences delivered by 
international mediators 
4 (3%) 
Documents authored by Yemenis 12 (10%) 
Documents authored by international 
mediators 
40 (34%) 
Overall total: 116 (57% of all framings) 
3 (relational) Yemeni interlocutors 13 (72%) 
International mediator interlocutors 1 (6%) 
Press conferences delivered by 
international mediators 
0 (0%) 
Documents authored by Yemenis 1 (6%) 
Documents authored by international 
mediators 
3 (17%) 



















Interviewees (Syria case study) 
 
Advocacy Coordinator (Middle East and North Africa), Women’s International League for 
Peace and Freedom. Interviewed in May 2019 (location/medium retracted to protect 
anonymity of interviewee).  
 
Alma Abdul-hadi Jadallah, Consultant hired by the UN to support the peacemaking period 
under study. Interviewed using Skype in July 2019.  
 
Amr al-Sarraj, Analyst and Activist. Interviewed in Istanbul in November 2019. 
 
Anas al-Abdeh, Member of the Syrian Opposition, Co-founder of the SNC, Member of SOC, 
Member of Syrian Opposition Delegation at Geneva II. Interviewed in Istanbul in November 
2019.  
 
Anonymous Interviewee (1) (‘close to the negotiations’). Interviewed by telephone in 
September 2019.  
 
Anonymous Interviewee (2). Date and location/medium retracted to protect anonymity of 
interviewee. Participant’s words not quoted. 
 
Anonymous Interviewee (3). Date and location/medium retracted to protect anonymity of 
interviewee. Participant’s words not quoted.  
 
Anonymous Interviewee (4). Date and location/medium retracted to protect anonymity of 
interviewee. Participant’s words not quoted.   
 
Anonymous Interviewee (5). Date and location/medium retracted to protect anonymity of 




Beatrice Megevand-Roggo, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Interviewed in Geneva in 
May 2019.  
 
Dima Shehadeh, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Interviewed by Skype in November 
2019. Words not quoted and/or summarised.  
 
Former British Diplomat (a). Interviewed in May 2019 (location/medium retracted to protect 
anonymity of the interviewee).  
 
Former British Diplomat (b). Interviewed in May 2019 (location/medium retracted to protect 
anonymity of the interviewee).  
 
Haitham al-Maleh, Member of the Syrian Opposition, Member of the SNC, Member of SOC, 
Member of Syrian Opposition Delegation at Geneva II. Interviewed in Istanbul in November 
2019.  
 
Hugh Robertson, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Interviewed by 
telephone in September 2019.  
 
Lisa Roman, Outreach Officer, Syria Desk and Senior Advisor to the US Special Envoy for 
Syria, US Department of State. Interviewed in Washington DC in September 2019.  
 
Mariam Jalabi, Member of the Syrian Opposition, Member of SOC. Interviewed by Skype in 
January 2020.  
 
Member of the Syrian Opposition (a). Interviewed in November 2019 (role details, 
location/medium retracted to protect anonymity of the interviewee).  
 
Member of the Syrian Opposition (b). Interviewed in November 2019 (role details, 
location/medium retracted to protect anonymity of the interviewee).  
 
Member of the Syrian Opposition, Member of SOC, Member of Syrian Opposition 




Najib Ghadbian, Member of the Syrian Opposition, Founding Member of the SNC, Member 
of SOC, Special Representative of SOC to the US and the UN. Interviewed by Skype in 
October 2019.  
 
Oubab Khalil, Member of the Syrian Opposition, Member of SOC, Chief of Staff of SOC 
Office in Washington DC. Interviewed in Washington DC in September 2019.   
 
Radwan Ziadeh, Member of the Syrian Opposition, Member of the Syrian National Council, 
Founder of the Syria Experts House, Managing Editor of the Transitional Justice Project in 
the Arab World, Head of the Syrian Commission for Transitional Justice. Interviewed in 
Washington DC in September 2019.  
 
Randa Kassis, Member of the Syrian Opposition, Member of the SNC, Co-founder and 
President of the Coalition of Secular and Democratic Syrians. Interviewed by Telegram in 
January 2020.  
 
Rim Turkmani, Civil Society Activist and Member of the Women’s Advisory Board to the 
UN Special Envoy to Syria. Interviewed in London in May 2019.  
 
Rima Fleihan, Member of the Syrian Opposition, LCC Leader, Member of SNC, Member of 
SOC, Member of Opposition Delegation at Geneva II. Interviewed by Skype in October 
2019.  
 
Samir Nachar, Member of the Syrian Opposition, Founding member of SNC. Interviewed by 
email in December 2019.  
 
Suhair al-Atassi, Member of the Syrian Opposition, Vice-President of SOC, Member of the 
Syrian Opposition Delegation at Geneva II. Interviewed in Istanbul in November 2019.  
 
Track II Mediation Expert. Interviewed in May 2019 (location retracted to protect anonymity 
of interviewee).  
 




UN Official (b) (‘involved in the early stages of the Geneva Peace Process’). Interviewed in 
Geneva in May 2019.  
 
Interviewees (Yemen case study) 
 
Ahmed Awad Bin Mubarak, Secretary-General of the National Dialogue Conference. 
Interviewed by WhatsApp (voice call) in March 2020. 
 
Ahmed Bazara, Chair of the Sustainable Development Working Group of the National 
Dialogue Conference. Interviewed using Zoom in January 2020. 
 
Abdulghani al-Eryani, Consultant employed by Berghof Foundation. Interviewed using 
Skype in July 2019.  
 
Ali Saif Hassan, Member of the Transitional Justice Working Group of the National Dialogue 
Conference. Interviewed using Skype in July 2019. 
 
Alma Abdul-hadi Jadallah, Facilitator employed by the UN. Interviewed using Skype in July 
2019. 
 
Anonymous Interviewee (6). Date and location/medium retracted to protect anonymity of the 
interviewee. 
 
Anonymous Interviewee (7). Interviewed using Skype in July 2019. Participant’s words not 
quoted. 
 
Anonymous Interviewee (8). Interviewed using Skype in November 2019. 
 
Anonymous Interviewee (9). Interviewed using Skype in February 2020. Participant’s words 
not quoted. 
 





Anonymous Interviewee (11). Interviewed by telephone in August 2019. Participant’s words 
not quoted. 
 
Anonymous Interviewee (12). Interviewed using Skype in June 2019. Participant’s words not 
quoted. 
 
Anoymous Interviewee (13). Interviewed by telephone in July 2019. Participant’s words not 
quoted. 
 
Atiaf al-Wazir, Revolutionary, Activist and Journalist. Interviewed using Skype in April 
2019.  
 
Bahria Shamsheer, Member of the Transitional Justice Working Group of the National 
Dialogue Conference. Interviewed by email in January 2020.  
 
Baraa Shiban, Member of the Transitional Justice Working Group of the National Dialogue 
Conference. Interviewed in London in May 2019. 
 
Bilqis al-Lahabi, Vice-Chair of the Southern Issue Working Group of the National Dialogue 
Conference. Interviewed in Amman in February 2020. 
 
Former British Diplomat (a). Interviewed in May 2019 (location/medium retracted to protect 
anonymity of the interviewee). 
 
Former British Diplomat (b). Interviewed in May 2019 (location/medium retracted to protect 
anonymity of the interviewee). 
 
Former G10 Diplomat. Interviewed in May 2019 (location/medium retracted to protect 
anonymity of the interviewee). 
 
Gerald Feierstein, United States Ambassador to Yemen (2010-13). Interviewed using Skype 
in March 2019, and in Washington DC in September 2019. 
 




Khaled Noman, Member of the Statebuilding Working Group of the National Dialogue 
Conference. Interviewed by email in February 2020.  
 
Mahmoud Shahrah, Civil Servant, Department of Information, Government of Yemen. 
Interviewed in Amman in February 2020.  
 
Majed Fadail, Rapporteur of the Rights and Freedoms Working Group of the National 
Dialogue Conference. Interviewed in Amman in February 2020. 
 
Member of the National Dialogue Conference Secretariat. Location/medium retracted to 
protect anonymity of the interviewee. 
 
Member of Sustainable Development Working Group. Interviewed using WhatsApp 
Messaging in February 2020. 
 
Mutea’ Dammaj, Member of the Rights and Freedoms Working Group of the National 
Dialogue Conference. Interviewed by WhatsApp (voice call) in January 2020.  
 
Nadia al-Sakkaf, Member of the Presidium of the National Dialogue Conference. Interviewed 
using Skype in March 2019. 
 
Nasser Sharif, Member of the Southern Issue Working Group of the National Dialogue 
Conference. Interviewed by WhatsApp (messages) in March 2020. 
 
Representative of Search for Common Ground. Interviewed using Skype in May 2019. 
 
Saher Ghanem, Member of the Statebuilding Working Group of the National Dialogue 
Conference. Interviewed by WhatsApp (voice call) in February 2020. 
 
Samia al-Aghbari, Members of the Rights and Freedoms Working Group of the National 
Dialogue Conference. Interviewed by email in January 2020.  
 




Senior Mediation Adviser. Interviewed by telephone in May 2019. 
 
Shatha al-Harazi, Rapporteur of the Transitional Justice Working Group of the National 
Dialogue Conference. Interviewed using Skype in March 2019, and in Amman in February 
2020. 
 
Suad Almarani, Member of the Secretariat of the National Dialogue Conference. Interviewed 
in Amman in February 2020. 
 
Sylvia Thompson, Senior Manager, Crisis Management Initiative. Interviewed in Amman in 
February 2020.  
 
Thuraya Dammaj, Member of the Statebuilding Working Group of the National Dialogue 
Conference. Interviewed by email in January 2020.  
 
UN Official (c). Interviewed using Skype in July 2019.  
 
UN Official (d). Interviewed in May 2019. Location/medium retracted to protect anonymity 
of the interviewee. 
 
Waleed al-Hariri, Director of the US Office, Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies. Interviewed 
by WhatsApp (voice call) in April 2019.  
 
Yahya al-Shu’aibi, Member of the Statebuilding Working Group of the National Dialogue 
Conference. Interviewed by WhatsApp (voice call) in February 2020.  
 
Yemeni Activist and Former Politician. Interviewed in May 2019 (location/medium retracted 
to protect anonymity of the interviewee). 
 
Yemeni Analyst. Interviewed in September 2019 (location/medium retracted to protect 




Press conferences (Syria case study) 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, due to the redevelopment of the UN website which hosts 
recordings of press conferences, links are no longer available to these sources. However, all 
press conferences have been downloaded by the author and are available on request. 
 
UN Live, ‘H.E. Mrs. Hillary Rodham Clinton (United States), H.E. Mr. William Hague 
(United Kingdom), H.E. Mr. Sergey Lavrov (Russian Federation) on the situation in the 
Middle East and Syria – Security Council Media Stakeout’ (12 March 2012) 
 
UN Live, ‘Kofi Annan, Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League, on the situation 
in Syria – General Assembly’ (5 April 2012)  
 
UN Live, ‘United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria, Statement by Major General Robert 
Mood, Head of Mission and Chief Military Observer’ (1 May 2012)  
 
UN Live, ‘Hervé Ladsous (DPKO) on the Status of Deployment of the UN Observers in 
Syria – Press Conference’ (1 May 2012) 
 
UN Live, ‘The UN Peacekeeping Chief, Hervé Ladsous, on the Role of Observers in Syria’ 
(25 May 2012)  
 
UN Live, ‘Joint UN-Arab League Envoy Arrives in Syria at Critical Moment in Crisis’ (28 
May 2012)  
 
UN Live, ‘Major General Robert Mood – Opening Statement to the Press’ (15 June 2012)  
 
UN Live, ‘Briefing by the Joint Special Envoy for Syria and the Head of the UN 
Supervisions Mission in Syria’ (22 June 2012)  
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Media Stakeout (from 




UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the 
League of Arab States on Syria – Interview (30 January 2013)’ (30 January 2013)  
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Media Stakeout 
(Geneva, 5 June 2013)’ (5 June 2013)  
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 
(Geneva, 28  August 2013)’ (28 August 2013)  
 
UN Live, ‘Syria Press Conference (Geneva, 13 September 2013)’ (13 September 2013) 
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 
(Geneva, 5 November 2013)’ (5 November 2013)  
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 
(Geneva, 25 November 2013)’ (25 November 2013)  
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 
(Geneva, 20 December 2013)’ (20 December 2013)  
 
UN Live, ‘Secretary General’s Press Briefing’ (19 January 2014) 
 
UN Live , ‘1st Meeting Geneva Conference on Syria’ (Meeting divided into two videos) (22 
January 2014)  
 
UN Live, ‘Ban Ki-moon and Lakhdar Brahimi – Joint Press Conference at Geneva 
Conference on Syria’ (22 January 2014)  
 
UN Live, ‘John Kerry (USA) – Press Conference at Geneva Conference on Syria’ (22 
January 2014)  
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 




UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 
(Geneva, 25 January 2014)’ (25 January 2014) 
 
UN Live, ‘Syrian Opposition Coalition Representatives – Press Conference (Geneva, 25 
January 2014’ (25 January 2014)  
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 
(Geneva, 26 January 2014)’ (26 January 2014)  
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 
(Geneva, 27 January 2014)’ (27 January 2014)  
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 
(Geneva, 28 January 2014)’ (28 January 2014)  
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 
(Geneva, 29 January 2014)’ (29 January 2014)  
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 
(Geneva, 30 January 2014)’ (30 January 2014)  
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 
(Geneva, 31 January 2014)’ (31 January 2014)  
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 
(Geneva, 11 February 2014)’ (11 February 2014)  
 
UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 
(Geneva, 13 February 2014)’ (13 February 2014)  
 
UN Live, ‘Syrian Opposition Spokesperson – Press Conference (Geneva, 14 February 2014)’ 




UN Live, ‘Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria – Press Conference 
(Geneva, 15 February 2014)’ (15 February 2014)   
 
UN Live, ‘Transcript of Press Briefing with the Secretary-General and Lakhdar Brahimi, 
Joint Special Representative for Syria’ (13 May 2014)  
 
UN Live, ‘Randa Kassis, Geneva Peace Talks 2014’ (19 September 2014)  
 
Press conferences (Yemen case study) 
 
UN Live, ‘Security Council president H.E. Mr. Hardeep Singh Puri (India) on the Situation in 
Yemen – Security Council Media Stakeout’ (9 August 2011) 
 
UN Live, ‘Jamal Benomar (Special Adviser on Yemen) – Security Council Media Stakeout’ 
(11 October 2011 
 
UN Live, ‘Sir Mark Lyall Grant (UK) on the Situation in Yemen – Security Council Media 
Stakeout’ (21 October 2011) 
 
UN Live, ‘Peter Wittig (Germany) on Yemen – Security Council Media Stakeout’ (21 
October 2011)  
 
UN Live, ‘Jamal Benomar, UN Secretary-General Special Adviser on Yemen – Security 
Council Media Stakeout’ (28 November 2011)  
 
UN Live, ‘Security Council President Vitaly I. Churkin (Russian Federation) on Yemen and 
Syria – Security Council Media Stakeout’ (21 December 2011) 
 
UN Live, ‘Jamal Benomar, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Yemen – Press 
Conference’ (21 December 2011) 
 




Official documentation (Syria case study) 
 
SNC, ‘Arab League Initiative’ (n.d) [online], available from: 
http://syriancouncil.org/en/issues/item/108-arab-league-initiative.html [last accessed: 5 June 
2021]  
 
SNC, ‘President of SNC Delivers a Speech at Friends of Syria Conference’ (24 February 
2012) [online], available from: http://syriancouncil.org/en/news/item/585-president-of-snc-
delivers-a-speech-at-friends-of-syria-conference.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘The Syrian Coalition Presents Its Vision for a Transitional Period and Sends a 
Message to the International Community’ (10 January 2013) [online], available from: 
https://en.etilaf.org/press/the-syrian-coalition-presents-its-vision-for-a-transitional-period-
and-sends-a-message-to-the-international-community.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘Statement from the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces to 
Syrian People’ (23 January 2013) [online], available from: 
https://en.etilaf.org/press/statement-from-the-national-coalition-of-syrian-revolution-and-
opposition-forces-to-syrian-people.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘Syrian Coalition Establishes a Framework for Future Political Solutions’ (15 February 
2013) [online], available from: https://en.etilaf.org/press/syrian-coalition-establishes-a-
framework-for-future-political-solutions.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021]  
 
SOC, ‘The Syrian Coalition Denounces All Positions That Stand in the Way of Syrian 
Freedom and That Do Not Align with the Will of the People’ (14 April 2013) [online], 
available from: https://en.etilaf.org/press/the-syrian-coalition-denounces-all-positions-that-
stand-in-the-way-of-syrian-freedom-and-that-do-not-align-with-the-will-of-the-people.html 
[last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘Press Release: Delegation of the Syrian Coalition to Attend Friends of Syria Meeting 
in Istanbul, Turkey’ (20 April 2013) [press release no longer available online, archived by 




SOC, ‘Demands of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces’ (20 
April 2013) [online], available from: https://en.etilaf.org/press/demands-of-the-nation-
coalition-of-syrian-revolution-and-opposition-forces.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘UN Vote is a Clear Message: Assad Must End Brutal Suppression of Syria’s 
Democratic Uprising’ (15 May 2013) [press release no longer available online, archived by 
author and available on request] 
 
SOC, ‘Statement Regarding the Geneva Conference’ (27 May 2013) [online], available from: 
https://en.etilaf.org/press/statement-regarding-the-geneva-conference.html [last accessed: 5 
June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘Statement on Geneva II Conference’ (29 May 2013) [online], last available: 
https://en.etilaf.org/press/statement-on-geneva-ii-conference.html [last accessed: 5 June 
2021]  
 
SOC, ‘The Latest Expansion of the Syrian Coalition’ (1 June 2013) [online], last available: 
https://en.etilaf.org/press/the-latest-expansion-of-the-syrian-coalition.html [last accessed: 28 
May 2020] 
 
SOC, ‘Friends of Syria Meeting in Doha’ (24 June 2013) [online], available from: 
https://en.etilaf.org/press/friends-of-syria-meeting-in-doha.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘Syrian Coalition President Holds First Meeting with JSR Brahimi and Urges UN to 
Support Political Solution in Syria’ (25 September 2013) [online], available from: 
https://en.etilaf.org/press/syrian-coalition-president-holds-first-meeting-with-jsr-brahimi-and-
urges-un-to-support-political-solution-in-syria.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘Summary of Mr. Al-Jarba Speech Delivered to the Expanded Friends of Syria at the 
United Nations’ (27 September 2013) [online], last available from: 
https://en.etilaf.org/press/summary-of-mr-al-jarba-speech-delivered-to-the-expanded-friends-




SOC, ‘Mission of Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi’ (29 October 2013) [online], available 
from: https://en.etilaf.org/press/mission-of-special-envoy-lakhdar-brahimi.html [last 
accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘UN-Arab League Envoy Brahimi Should Maintain Neutrality’ (7 November 2013) 
[online], available from: https://en.etilaf.org/press/un-arab-league-envoy-brahimi-should-
maintain-neutrality.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021]  
 
SOC, ‘The Assad Regime’s Contradictory Remarks on Geneva II’ (8 November 2013) [press 
release no longer available online, archived by author and available on request] 
 
SOC, ‘Geneva II is a Chance for the International Community to Prove Its Seriousness’ (26 
November 2013) [online], available from: https://en.etilaf.org/press/geneva-ii-is-a-chance-
for-the-international-community-to-prove-its-seriousness.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘The Assad Regime Renounces the Very Basis for Geneva II’ (28 November 2013) 
[online], available from: https://en.etilaf.org/press/the-assad-regime-renounces-the-very-
basis-for-geneva-ii.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘President Ahmad Al-Jarba’s Speech at the Ministerial Meeting on Syria, Paris, 12 Jan, 
2014’ (13 January 2014) [online], available from: https://en.etilaf.org/press/president-ahmad-
al-jarbas-speech-at-the-ministerial-meeting-on-syria-paris-12-jan-2014.html [last accessed: 5 
June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘Syrian Coalition Welcomes UN Decision to Withdraw Iran’s Invitation’ (21 January 
2014) [press release no longer available online, archived by author and available on request] 
 
SOC, ‘President Ahmad Al-Jarba’s Speech, Geneva, Switzerland 23 January, 2014’ (23 
January 2014) [online], available from: https://en.etilaf.org/press/president-ahmad-al-jarbas-
speech-geneva-switzerland-23-january-2014.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘President Ahmad Al-Jarba’s Speech at the End of First Round of Negotiations in 




negotiations-in-geneva-january-31-2014.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘President Al-Jarba Addresses the Syrian people at the End of First Round of 
Negotiations’ (1 February 2014) [online], available from: https://en.etilaf.org/press/president-
al-jarba-addresses-the-syrian-people-at-the-end-of-first-round-of-negotiations.html [last 
accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘President Al-Jarba Confirms the Syrian Coalition’s Return to Geneva Talks’ (2014f) 
[press release no longer available online, archived by author and available on request] 
 
SOC, ‘Latest Agreement Regarding Besieged Homs’ (8 February 2014) [online], available 
from: https://en.etilaf.org/press/latest-agreement-regarding-besieged-homs.html [last 
accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘Syrian Coalition Calls for UN Resolution Following Regime Attacks on UN and 
Evacuees in Homs’ (8 February 2014) [online], available from: 
https://en.etilaf.org/press/syrian-coalition-calls-for-un-resolution-following-regime-attacks-
on-un-and-evacuees-in-homs.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘Syrian Coalition Calls on UNSC to Pass Resolution on Humanitarian Access’ (11 
February 2014) [online], available from: https://en.etilaf.org/press/syrian-coalition-calls-on-
unsc-to-pass-resolution-on-humanitarian-access.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘A Speech by President of the Syrian Coalition, Ahmad Jarba, at the Arab League 
Ministerial Meeting – March 9, 2014’ (10 March 2014) [online], available from: 
https://en.etilaf.org/press/a-speech-by-president-of-the-syrian-coalition-ahmad-jarba-at-the-
arab-league-ministerial-meeting-march-9-2014.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘Syrian Coalition Calls for Preserving National Unity’ (12 March 2014) [online], 
available from: https://en.etilaf.org/press/syrian-coalition-calls-for-preserving-national-




SOC, ‘UN Press Conference’ (14 March 2014) [online], last available: 
https://en.etilaf.org/press/un-press-conference.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
SOC, ‘Speech by president of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition 
Forces, Ahmad Jarba – Arab League Summit in Kuwait – March 25, 2014’ (25 March 2014) 
[online], available from: https://en.etilaf.org/press/speech-by-president-of-the-national-
coalition-of-syrian-revolution-and-opposition-forces-ahmad-jarba-arab-league-summit-in-
kuwait-march-25-2014.html [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘Foreign Secretary Welcomes ‘Friends of Syria’ Meeting’ (12 February 
2012) [online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-
welcomes-friends-of-syria-meeting [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘“We Must Show That We Will Not Abandon the Syrian People in Their 
Darkest Hour”’ (24 February 2012) [online], available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/we-must-show-that-we-will-not-abandon-the-syrian-
people-in-their-darkest-hour [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘Chairman’s Conclusions of Friends of Syria Meeting’ (27 February 2012) 
[online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chairmans-conclusions-of-
friends-of-syria-meeting [last accessed: 5 June 2021 
 
UK Government, ‘Chairman’s Conclusions of Friends of Syria Meeting’ (1 April 2012) 
[online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chairmans-conclusions-of-
friends-of-syria-meeting--2 [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘Friends of Syria Meeting Concludes’ (1 April 2012) [online], available 
from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/friends-of-syria-meeting-concludes [last 
accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘“Our Task is to Pressure the Regime in Damascus into Implementing Kofi 





delay [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Remarks at Syria Action Group Meeting’ (30 June 
2012) [online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretarys-
remarks-at-syria-action-group-meeting [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘Friends of Syrian People: Chairman’s Conclusions’ (6 July 2012) [online], 
available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/friends-of-syrian-people-chairmans-
conclusions [last accessed: 5 June 2021 
 
UK Government, ‘Foreign Secretary Attends Friends of Syria Meeting’ (6 July 2012) 
[online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-attends-
friends-of-syria-meeting [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘Foreign Secretary Welcomes Doha Agreement on Syrian Opposition’ (11 
November 2012) [online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-
secretary-welcomes-doha-agreement-on-syrian-opposition [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘UK Hosts International Meeting to Consider Further Political and Non-
Lethal Practical Support to the Syrian Opposition Coalition’ (16 November 2012) [online], 
available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-hosts-international-meeting-to-
consider-further-political-and-non-lethal-practical-support-to-the-syrian-opposition-coalition 
[last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘International Meeting on Support to the Syrian Opposition’ (16 November 
2012) [online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/international-meeting-
on-support-to-the-syrian-opposition [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘Foreign Secretary to Attend Friends of Syria Meeting in Marrakesh’ (11 
December 2012) [online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-




UK Government, ‘Foreign Secretary Remarks at Friends of the Syrian People Meeting’ (12 
December 2012) [online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-
secretary-remarks-at-the-friends-of-syria-meeting [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘UK Hosts Conference on Syrian-led Political Transition’ (9 January 2013) 
[online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-hosts-conference-on-
syrian-led-political-transition [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘Friends of Syria Meet in Jordan to Progress Peace in Syria’ (22 May 2013) 
[online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/friends-of-syria-meet-in-
jordan-to-progress-peace-in-syria (Last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘‘London 11’ Meeting on Syria’ (22 October 2013) [online], available 
from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/london-11-meeting-on-syria [last accessed: 5 
June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘London 11 Final Communiqué’ (22 October 2013) [online], available 
from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/london-11-final-communique [last 
accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘UK Hosts Syria London 11 Senior Officials Meeting’ (13 December 2013) 
[online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-hosts-syria-london-11-
senior-officials-meeting [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘London 11 Statement on Presidential Elections in Syria’ (3 April 2014) 
[online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/london-11-statement-on-
presidential-elections-in-syria [last accessed: 5 June 2021]  
 
UK Government, ‘‘London 11’ Friends of Syria Core Group Ministerial Communique’ (15 
May 2014) [online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/london-11-
friends-of-syria-core-group-ministerial-communique [last accessed: 5 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2042 S/RES/2042’ (14 April 2012) [online], available from: 




UN, ‘Preliminary Understanding: United Nations Supervision Mechanism’ (19 April 2012) 
[online], available from: 
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SY%20UN_120419_UNSupervision
Mechanism.pdf [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2043 S/RES/2043’ (21 April 2012) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/RES/2043(2012) [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UN, ‘Final Communiqué of the Action Group for Syria A/66/865-S/2012/522’ [online], 
available from: 
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SY_120630_Final%20Communique
%20of%20the%20Action%20Group%20for%20Syria.pdf [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2059 S/RES/2059’ (20 July 2012) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/RES/2059(2012) [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2118 S/RES/2118’ (27 September 2013) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/RES/2118(2013) [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UN, ‘Homs Agreement Mediated by the UN’ (7 February 2014) [online], available from:  
https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1525 [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2139 S/RES/2139’ (22 February 2014) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/RES/2139(2014) [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2165 S/RES/2165’ (14 July 2014) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/RES/2165(2014) [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland: Draft Resolution’ (S/2011/612) (4 October 2011) [online], available from: 




UNSC, ‘Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, 
Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft 
Resolution’ (S/2012/77) (4 February 2012) [online], available from: 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/720648?ln=en [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘France, Germany, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and United States of America: Draft Resolution’ (S/2012/538) (19 July 2012) [online], 
available from: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/731938?ln=en [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Central 
African Republic, Chile, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of 
Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft Resolution’ (S/2014/348) (22 May 
2014) [online], available from: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/771366?ln=en [last 
accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
‘Hurritan and Malah Ceasefire’ (16 February 2014) [online], available from: 
https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/2003 [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
Official documentation (Yemen case study) 
 
‘Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative’ (22 May 2011) [online], available from: 
https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1401 [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
Government of Yemen, ‘Presidential Decree No. 24’ (12 September 2011) [online], available 





‘Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition Process in Yemen in 
Accordance with the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’ (5 December 2011) 
[online], available from: https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/758 [last 
accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
Government of Yemen, ‘Presidential Decree No. 184’ (7 December 2011) [online], available 
from: https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1399 [last accessed: 6 June 
2021] 
 
‘Final Report from the Region Defining Committee’ (10 February 2014) [online], available 
from: https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1508 [last accessed: 6 June 
2021] 
 
Government of Yemen, ‘Decision of the President of the Republic No. 17’ (8 March 2014) 
[online], available from: https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1509 [last 
accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
National Dialogue Conference, ‘Outcomes Document’ (2014) [online], available from: 
https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1400 [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘Friends of Yemen to Meet in Riyadh’ (23 March 2012) [online], available 
from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/friends-of-yemen-to-meet-in-riyadh [last 
accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘Friends of Yemen Meeting a ‘Critical Moment’’ (23 May 2012) [online], 
available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/friends-of-yemen-meeting-a-critical-
moment [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘Yemeni President Hadi Visits UK Ahead of Friends of Yemen Meeting in 
New York’ (24 September 2012) [online], available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/yemeni-president-hadi-visits-uk-ahead-of-friends-of-




UK Government, ‘Foreign Secretary at the United Nations General Assembly Friends of 
Yemen Ministerial’ (27 September 2012) [online], available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-at-the-united-nations-general-
assembly-friends-of-yemen-ministerial [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘UK to Host Friends of Yemen Meeting in March’ (22 January 2013) 
[online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-host-friends-of-yemen-
meeting-in-march [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘Friends of Yemen: Questions and Answers’ (1 February 2013) [online], 
available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/friends-of-yemen-q-a [last accessed: 6 
June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Opening Remarks – Friends of Yemen’ (7 March 
2013) [online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretarys-
opening-remarks-friends-of-yemen [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UK Government, ‘The Friends of Yemen Ministerial Meeting Co-Chairs’ Statement’ (7 
March 2013) [online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-friends-of-
yemen-ministerial-meeting-co-chairs-statement [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2014 S/RES/2014’ (21 October 2011) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/RES/2014(2011) [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2051 S/RES/2051’ (12 June 2012) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/RES/2051(2012) [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Resolution 2140 S/RES/2140’ (26 February 2014) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/RES/2140(2014) [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council S/PRST/2012/8’ (29 March 





UNSC, ‘Letter Dated 18 June 2012 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of 
the Security Council S/2012/469’ (21 June 2012) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/2012/469 [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Letter Dated 21 June 2012 from the President of the Security Council Addressed to 
the Secretary-General S/2012/470’ (21 June 2012) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/2012/470 [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Letter Dated 25 January 2013 from the President of the Security Council Addressed 
to the Secretary-General S/2013/61’ (28 January 2013) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/2013/61 [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council S/PRST/2013/3’ (15 February 
2013) [online], available from: https://undocs.org/S/PRST/2013/3 [last accessed: 6 June 
2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘6744th Meeting S/PV.6744’ (29 March 2012) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/PV.6744 [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘6776th Meeting S/PV.6776’ (29 May 2012) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/PV.6776 [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘6878th Meeting S/PV.6878’ (4 December 2012) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/PV.6878 [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘6916th Meeting S/PV.6916’ (7 February 2013) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/PV.6916 [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘6976th Meeting S/PV.6976’ (11 June 2013) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/PV.6976 [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘7037th Meeting S/PV.7037’ (27 September 2013) [online], available from: 




UNSC ‘7119th Meeting S/PV.7119’ (26 February 2014) [online], available from: 
https://undocs.org/S/PV.7119 [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Yemen’ (24 June 2011) [online], available 
from: https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10296.doc.htm [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Yemen’ (9 August 2011) [online], 
available from: https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10357.doc.htm [last accessed: 6 June 
2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Yemen’ (24 September 2011) 
[online], available from: https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10394.doc.htm [last accessed: 6 
June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Yemen’ (28 November 2011) 
[online], available from: https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10460.doc.htm [last accessed: 6 
June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Yemen’ (22 December 2011) 
[online], available from: https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10504.doc.htm [last accessed: 6 
June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Yemen’ (26 January 2012) 
[online], available from: https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10529.doc.htm [last accessed: 6 
June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Yemen’ (22 February 2012) [online], available 
from: https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10553.doc.htm [last accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in Yemen’ (21 May 2012) 





UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in Yemen’ (13 September 
2012) [online], available from: https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10762.doc.htm [last 
accessed: 6 June 2021] 
 
UNSC, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Friends of Yemen’ (28 September 2012) 
[online], available from: https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10778.doc.htm [last accessed: 6 
June 2021] 
 
UNSC ‘Security Council Press Statement on Yemen’ (27 November 2013) [online], available 




Books and book chapters 
 
Adler, E., ‘Constructivism and International Relations’ in Walter Carlsnaes et al. (eds.), 
Handbook of International Relations (London: SAGE, 2010), pp. 95-118 
 
Alasuutari, P. et al., ‘Social Research in Changing Conditions’ in Alasuutari, P. et al. (eds.), 
The SAGE Handbook of Social Research Methods (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2008), 
pp. 1-8 
 
Alexander, J., Trauma: A Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012) 
 
Annan, K. and Mousavizadeh, N., Interventions: A Life in War and Peace (London: Penguin 
Books, 2013) 
 
Bandak, A., ‘Performing the Nation: Syrian Christians on the National Stage’ in Salamandra, 
C. and Stenberg, L. (eds.), Syria From Reform to Revolt Vol. II: Culture, Society, and 
Religion (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2015), pp. 110-29 
 




Bartolomei, C., ‘Sectarianism and the Battle of Narratives in the Context of the Syrian 
Uprising’ in Hinnebusch, R. and Imady, O. (eds.), The Syrian Uprising: Domestic Origins 
and Early Trajectory (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), pp. 223-41 
 
Beardsley, K., The Mediation Dilemma (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011) 
 
Bell, D., ‘Introduction’ in Bell, D. (ed.), Memory, Trauma and World Politics (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 1-29 
 
Bercovitch, J. and Elgström, O., ‘Culture and International Mediation: An Empirical 
Assessment’, in Bercovitch, J. (ed.), Theory and Practice of International Mediation 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), pp. 228-46 
 
Bercovitch, J. and Jackson, R., Conflict Resolution in the Twenty First Century: Principles, 
Methods and Approaches (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2009) 
 
Berger, P. and Luckman, T., The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology 
of Knowledge and Commitment in American Life (New York: Anchor, 1967) 
 
Beshara, A., ‘Introduction’ in Beshara, A. (ed.), The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, 
Pioneers and Identity (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), pp. 1-14 
 
Bonnefoy, L. and Poirier, M., ‘Dynamics of the Yemeni Revolution: Contextualizing 
Mobilizations’ in Beinin, J. and Vairel, F. (eds.), Social Movements, Mobilization, and 
Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2013), pp. 228-45 
 
Bose, S., Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (London: 
Hurst, 2002) 
 
Boyatzsis, R., Transforming Qualitative Information (California: SAGE, 1998) 
 
Brandt, M., Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (London: C. Hurst 




Brehony, N., ‘The Role of the PDRY in Forming a South Yemeni Identity’ in Lackner, H. 
(ed.), Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition (London: Saqi Books, 2014), pp. 19-29 
 
Brinkmann, S., ‘Unstructured and Semi-Structured Interviewing’ in Leavy, P. (ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 
277-99 
 
Bryman, A., Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 
 
Butler, M., International Conflict Management (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009) 
 
Carapico, S., Civil Society in Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
 
Carnevale, P. J. and Arad, S., ‘Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation’ in 
Bercovitch, J. (ed.), Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 39-54 
 
Carnevale, P. J., ‘Mediating from Strength’ in Bercovitch, J. (ed.), Studies in International 
Mediation: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Z. Rubin (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 25-
40 
 
Carter, J., Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Arkansas: University of Arkansas, 1995) 
Cicourel, A., Method and Measurement in Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1964) 
 
Clausen, M. L., ‘Competing for Control Over the State: The Case of Yemen’ in Polese, A. 
and Santini, R. H. (eds.), Rethinking Statehood in the Middle East and North Africa: Security, 
Sovereignty and New Political Orders (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), pp. 182-200 
 
Crocker, C. A. et al., ‘Introduction’ in Crocker, C. A. et al. (eds.), Herding Cats: Multiparty 





Crocker, C. A. et al., International Negotiation and Mediation in Violent Conflicts: The 
Changing Context of Peacemaking (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018) 
 
Darke, D., My House in Damascus (London: Haus Publishing Ltd., 2014) 
 
Day, S. W., Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
 
De Waal, A., ‘Inclusion in Peacemaking: From Moral Claim to Political Fact’ in Aall, P. and 
Crocker, C. A., The Fabric of Peace in Africa (Centre for International Governance 
Innovation, 2017), pp. 165-86 
 
Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y., ‘Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative 
Research’ in Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative 
Research: Third Edition (London: SAGE Publications, 2005), pp. 1-32 
 
Ellingson, L., Engaging Crystallization in Qualitative Research (California: SAGE, 2008) 
 
Ely, M., Doing Qualitative Research: Circles Within Circles (London: The Falmer Press, 
1991) 
 
Erikson, K., Everything in its Path (New York: Pocket, 1976) 
 
Eriksson, M. and Kostić, R., ‘Peacemaking and Peacebuilding: Two Ends of a Tail’ in 
Eriksson, M. and Kostić, R., Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding: Peace From the Ashes of 
War? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 5-21 
 
Fisher, R., ‘Pacific, Impartial Third-Party Intervention in International Conflict: A Review 
and Analysis’ in Vasquez, J. et al. (eds.), Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict 





Fitz, J. and Halpin, D., ‘Ministers and Mandarins: Educational Research in Elite Settings’ in 
Walford, G. (ed.), Researching the Powerful in Education (London: University College 
London Press, 1994), pp. 32-50 
 
Forghani, A. et al., ‘Conducting Interviews with Remote Participants’ in Judge, T. and 
Neustaedter, C., Studying and Designing Technology for Domestic Life: Lessons from Home 
(Massachusetts: Elsevier Inc., 2015), pp. 11-32 
 
Frazier, D. and Dixon, W., ‘Third-party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946 – 
2000’, Bercovitch, J. and Gartner, S. S. (eds.) International Conflict Mediation: New 
Approaches and Findings (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 43-66 
 
Galetta, A., Mastering the Semi-Structured Interview and Beyond (New York: New York 
University Press, 2013) 
 
George, A. and Bennett, A., Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005) 
 
Goetze, C., The Distinction of Peace: A Social Analysis of Peacebuilding (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2017) 
 
Hammond, M., Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009) 
 
Hashemi, N. and Postel, D., ‘Introduction: The Sectarianization Thesis’ in Hashemi, N. and 
Postel, D. (eds.), Sectarianization (London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 2017), pp. 1-22 
 
Hertz, R. and Imber, J., ‘Introduction’ in Hertz, R. and Imber, J. (eds.), Studying Elites Using 
Qualitative Methods (California: SAGE, 1995), pp. vii-x 
 
Hill, G., Yemen Endures (London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 2017) 
 
Hine, C., ‘The Internet and Research Methods’ in Nigel Gilbert and Paul Stoneman, 




Hine, C., Virtual Ethnography (London: SAGE, 2000) 
 
Hinnebusch, R., ‘The Politics of Identity in the Middle East International Relations’ in 
Fawcett, L. (ed.) International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), pp. 151-71 
 
Hinnesbusch,, R., Syria: Revolution From Above (London: Routledge, 2001) 
Hokayem, E., Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2013) 
 
Jackson, R. and Sørenson, G., Introduction to International Relations: Theories and 
Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 
 
Jepperson, R. et al., ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’ in Katzenstein, P. 
(ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 33-75 
 
Johnsen, G. D., The Last Refuge: Yemen, Al-Qaeda, and the Battle for Arabia (London: 
Oneworld Publications, 2013) 
 
Kappler, S., ‘Liberal Peacebuilding’s Representation of ‘the Local’: The Case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, Richmond, O. and Mitchell, A. (eds.), Hybrid Forms of Peace: From 
Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 260-76 
 
Katzenstein, P., ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security’ in Katzenstein, 
P. (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1-32 
 
Khoury, P. S., Syria and the French Mandate (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) 
 
Kissinger, H., White House Years: The First Volume of His Classic Memoirs (London: Simon 




Kostić, R. ‘American Nation-Building Abroad: Exceptional Powers, Broken promises and the 
Making of “Bosnia”’ in Eriksson, M. and Kostić, R., Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding: 
Peace From the Ashes of War? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 22-39 
 
Kostić, R. Ambivalent Peace: External Peacebuilding: Threatened Identity and 
Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 
Uppsala University, Sweden, Report No. 78 (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitetsstryckeriet, 2007) 
 
Lackner, H., Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neo-Liberalism and the Disintegration of a State 
(London: Saqi Books, 2017) 
 
Laitin, D., Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1998) 
 
Leavy, P., ‘Introduction’ in Leavy, P., (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research: 
Second Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 1-24 
 
Lederach, J. P., The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005) 
 
Leenders, R., ‘“Oh Buthaina, Oh Sha’ban – the Hawrani Is Not Hungry, We Want 
Freedom!”: Revolutionary Framing and Mobilization at the Onset of the Syrian Uprising’ in 
Beinin, J. and Vairel, F. (eds.), Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the 
Middle East and North Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), pp. 246-61 
 
Lesch, D., Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad (US: Yale University Press, 2012) 
 
Lincoln, Y. and Guba, E., Naturalistic Inquiry (California: SAGE Publications, 1985) 
 
Lynch, M., ‘Jordan’s Identity and Interests’ in Telhami, S. and Barnett, M. (eds.), Identity 





Maccoby, E. and Maccoby, N., ‘The Interview: A Tool of Social Science’ in Lindzey, G. 
(ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology: Vol. I Theory and Method (Reading: Addison-
Wesley,1954), pp. 449-87 
 
Markell, P., Bound by Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) 
 
Mitchell, S. et al., ‘Practicing Democratic Community Norms: Third-Party Conflict 
Management and Successful Settlements’ in Bercovitch, J. and Gartner, S. S. (eds.), 
International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2009), pp. 243-64 
 
O’Brien, J. C., ‘The Dayton Agreement in Bosnia: Durable Cease-Fire, Permanent 
Negotiations’ in Zartman, W. and Kremenyuk, V., (eds.), Peace Versus Justice: Negotiating 
Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
2005), pp. 89-112 
 
O’Connor, H. et al., ‘Internet-Based Interviewing’ in Fielding, N. et al., The SAGE Handbook 
of Online Research Methods (London: SAGE, 2008), pp. 271-89 
 
Odendahl, T. and Shaw, A., ‘Interviewing Elites’ in Gubrium, J. and Holstein, J. (eds.), 
Handbook of Interview Research (California: SAGE, 2002), pp. 299-316 
 
Phillips, C., The Battle for Syria (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016) 
 
Pinto, P., ‘The Shattered Nation: The Sectarianization of the Syrian Conflict’ in Hashemi, N. 
and Postel, D. (eds.), Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East 
(London: Hurst Publishers, 2017), pp. 123-42 
 
Pitkin, H., The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019) 
 





Renan, E. (translated by Martin Thom), ‘What is a Nation?’ in Bhabha, H. K. (ed.), Nation 
and Narration (Abingdon: Routledge, 1990), pp. 8-22 
 
Richardson, L., ‘Writing: A Method of Inquiry’ in Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds.), The 
SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research: Second Edition (California: SAGE, 2000b), pp. 
923-48 
 
Richmond, O., ‘The Linkage Between Devious Objectives and Spoiling Behaviour in Peace 
Processes’ in Newman, E. and Richmond, O. (eds.), Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing 
Spoilers During Conflict Resolution (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2006), pp. 59-77 
 
Richmond, O., A Post-Liberal Peace (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011) 
 
Rifai, O., ‘Sunni/Alawi Identity Clashes During the Syrian Uprising: A Continuous 
Reproduction?’ in Hinnebusch, R. and Imady, O. (eds.), The Syrian Uprising: Domestic 
Origins and Early Trajectory (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), pp. 242-59 
 
Risse, T. and Ropp, S. C., ‘International Human Rights Norms and Domestic Change: 
Conclusions’ in Risse, T. et al. (eds.) The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and 
Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 234-78 
 
Risse, T., A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2011) 
 
Risse-Kappen, T., ‘Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO’ in 
Katzenstein, P. (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 357-99 
 
Rivas, C., ‘Coding and Analysing Qualitative Data’ in Seale, C. (ed.), Researching Society 
and Culture (London: SAGE, 2012), pp. 366-92 
 
Rubin, H. and Rubin, I., Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data (California: 




Ruggie, J., Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge, 1998) 
 
Sabaratnam, M., ‘The Liberal Peace? An Intellectual History of International Conflict 
Management’ in Campbell, S. et al. A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of 
Peacebuilding (London: Zed Books, 2011), pp. 13-30 
 
Sadowski, Y., ‘The Evolution of Political Identity in Syria’ in Telhami, S. and Barnett, M. 
(eds.), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (New York: Cornell University Press, 
2002), pp. 137-54 
 
Saideman, S., ‘Conclusion: Thinking Theoretically about Identity and Foreign Policy’ in 
Telhami, S. and Barnett, M. (eds.), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 169-200 
 
Salamandra, C., A New Old Damascus: Authenticity and Distinction in Urban Syria (Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 2004) 
 
Saldaña, J., The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (London: SAGE, 2014) 
 
Saldaña, J., The Fundamentals of Qualitative Research: Understanding Qualitative Research 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
 
Saouli, A., ‘The Tragedy of Ba’thist State-Building’ in Hinnebusch, R. and Imady, O. (eds.), 
The Syrian Uprising: Domestic Origins and Early Trajectory (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 
pp. 12-29 
 
Savun, B., ‘Mediator Types and the Effectiveness of Information-Provision Strategies in the 
Resolution of International Conflict’ in Bercovitch, J. and Gartner, S. S. (eds.), International 
Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 96-114 
 





Sherman, R. and Webb, R., ‘Qualitative Research in Education: A Focus’ in Sherman, R. and 
Webb, R. (eds.), Qualitative Research in Education: Focus and Methods (London: The 
Falmer Press, 1988), pp. 2-21 
 
Silverman, D., Interpreting Qualitative Data (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2014) 
 
Sisk, T., International Mediation in Civil Wars: Bargaining with Bullets (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2009) 
 
Strauss, A. and Corbin, J., Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for 
Developing Grounded Theory (California: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1998) 
 
Svensson, I., International Mediation Bias and Peacemaking: Taking Sides in Civil Wars 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2015) 
 
Telhami, S. and Barnett, M., ‘Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East’ in 
Telhami, S. and Barnett, M. (eds.), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 1-25 
 
Touval, S. and Zartman, W., ‘International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era’ in Crocker, 
C. A. et al., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict 
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), pp. 427-444 
 
Tully, J., Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
 
Turner, C., ‘Mapping a Norm of Inclusion in the Jus Post Bellum’ in Stahn, C. et al. (eds.), 
Just Peace After Conflict: Jus Post Bellum and the Justice of Peace (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2020), pp. 130-46 
 
Valbjørn, M., ‘Introduction: The Role of Ideas and Identities in Middle East International 
Relations’ in Valbjørn, M. and Lawson, F. H. (eds.), International Relations of the Middle 




Vuković, S., ‘Norm Diffusion in International Peace Mediation’ in Turner, C. and Wählisch, 
M. (eds.), Rethinking Peace Mediation (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2021), pp. 37-52 
 
Vuković, S., International Multiparty Mediation and Conflict Management: Challenges of 
Cooperation and Coordination (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016) 
 
Wedeen, L., Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary 
Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) 
 
Wedeen, L., Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008) 
 
Weiss, R., Learning From Strangers: The Art and Method of Qualitative Studies (New York: 
The Free Press, 1994) 
 
Wendt, A., Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999) 
 
Yadav, S. P., ‘Sectarianization, Islamist Republicanism, and International Misrecognition in 
Yemen’ in Hashemi, N. and Postel, D. (eds.), Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of 
the Middle East (London: Hurst Publishers, 2017), pp. 185-98 
 
Yassin-Kassab, R. and al-Shami, L., Burning Country (London: Pluto Press, 2016) 
 
Yin, R. K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods (California: SAGE Publications, 
1984) 
 
Young, O., The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1967) 
 
Zartman, W. I. and Touval, S., ‘International Mediation’ in Crocker, C. A. et al (eds.), 
Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World (Washington DC: 




Zartman, W. I., Ripe for Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) 
 
Zehfuss, M., Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality (Cambridge: 




Abdelal et al., R., ‘Identity as a Variable’, Perspectives on Politics 4:4 (2006), pp. 695-711 
 
Aberbach, J. and Rockman, B., ‘Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews’, Political Science 
and Politics 35:4 (2002), pp. 673-6 
 
Aggestam, K., ‘Peace Mediation and the Minefield of International Recognition Games’, 
International Negotiation 20 (2015), pp. 494-514 
 
Al-Doughli, R., ‘The Symbolic Construction of National Identity and Belonging in Syrian 
Nationalist Songs (from 1970 to 2007)’, Contemporary Levant 4:2 (2019), pp. 141-54 
 
Al-Doughli, R., ‘What is Syrian Nationalism? Primordialism and Romanticism in Official 
Baath Discourse’ Nations and Nationalism (forthcoming) 
 
Aranguri, C. et al., ‘Patterns of Communication Through Interpreters: A Detailed 
Sociolinguistic Analysis’, Journal of General Internal Medicine 21:6 (2006), pp. 623-9 
 
Atran, S. and Axelrod, R., ‘Reframing Sacred Values’, Negotiation Journal 24:3 (2008), pp. 
221-26 
 
Bachleitner, K., ‘A “Civic” Syria? Syrians and Syrian Refugees Envision Their Nation Amid 
Conflict and Displacement’, Nations and Nationalism (forthcoming) 
 





Benford, R. and Snow, D., ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and 
Assessment’ Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000), pp. 611-39 
 
Bercovitch, J. and Gartner, S. S., ‘Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: The Contribution of 
Mediation to Short-lived Conflict Settlements’, International Studies Quarterly 50:4 (2006), 
pp. 819-40 
Bercovitch, J. and Houston, A., ‘Why Do They Do It Like This? An Analysis of the Factors 
Influencing Mediation Behaviour in International Conflicts’, The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 44:2 (2000), pp. 170-202 
 
Bercovitch, J. et al., ‘Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of 
Successful Mediation in International Relations’, Journal of Peace Research 28:1 (1991), pp. 
7-17 
 
Berenskötter, F., ‘Parameters of a National Biography’, European Journal of International 
Relations 20:1, pp. 262-88 
 
Berman, R. and Tyyskä, C., ‘A Critical Reflection on the Use of Translators/Interpreters in a 
Qualitative Cross-Language Research Project’, International Journal of Qualitative Methods 
10:1 (2011), pp. 178-90 
 
Bhatia, A., ‘Critical Discourse Analysis of Political Press Conferences’, Discourse & Society 
17:2 (2006), pp. 173-203 
 
Björkdahl, A., ‘Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological 
Reflections’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15:1 (2002), pp. 9-23 
 
Blumer, H., ‘What is Wrong with Social Theory?’, American Sociological Review 19 (1954), 
pp. 3-10 
 
Bond, K. and Ghosn, F., ‘Cultural Similarity and Mediation Offers in Interstate Conflicts, 




Bourke, B., ‘Positionality: Reflecting on the Research Process’, The Qualitative Report 19:33 
(2014), pp. 1-9 
 
Braun, V. and Clarke, V., ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’, Qualitative Research in 
Psychology 3:2 (2006), pp. 77-101 
 
Broadhead, R. and Rist, R., ‘Gatekeepers and the Social Control of Social Research’, Social 
Problems 23:3 (1976), pp. 325-36 
 
Brown, R. H., ‘Cultural Representation and Ideological Domination’, Social Forces 71:3 
(1993), pp. 657-76 
 
Brubaker, R. and Cooper, F., ‘Beyond “Identity”’, Theory and Society 29:1 (2000), pp. 1-47 
 
Campbell, L. et al., ‘Gatekeepers and Keymasters: Dynamic Relationships of Access in 
Geographical Fieldwork’, Geographical Review 96:1 (2006), pp. 97-121 
 
Chaban, N. et al., ‘Perceptions of EU Mediation and Mediation Effectiveness: Comparing 
Perspectives from Ukraine and the EU’, Cooperation and Conflict 54:4 (2019), pp. 506-23 
 
Checkel, J., ‘Review: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, 50:2 
(1998), pp. 324-48 
 
Checkel, J., ‘Socialization and Violence: Introduction and Framework’, Journal of Peace 
Research 54:5 (2017), pp. 592-605 
 
Chevée, A., ‘From Suriyya al-‘Asad to Suryatuna: Civic Nationalism in the Syrian 
Revolutionary Print Press’, Nations and Nationalism (forthcoming) 
 
Clausen, M., ‘Competing for Control Over the State: The Case of Yemen’, Small Wars & 
Insurgencies 29:3 (2018), pp. 560-78 
 
Clowry, S., ‘International Negotiation and Mediation in Violent Conflicts: The Changing 




Conti, J. and O’Neill, M., ‘Studying Power: Qualitative Methods and the Global Elite’, 
Qualitative Research 7:1 (2007), pp. 63-82 
 
Crowe, S. et al., ‘The Case Study Approach’, BMC Medical Research Methodology 11:100 
(2011), pp. 1-9 
De Rouen, K. et al., ‘Introducing the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) Dataset’, Journal of 
Peace Research 48:5 (2011), pp. 663-72 
 
De Zulueta, F., ‘Bilingualism and Family Therapy’, Journal of Family Therapy 12:3 (1990), 
pp. 255-65 
 
Deakin, H. and Wakefield, K., ‘Skype Interviewing: Reflections of Two PhD Researchers’, 
Qualitative Research 14:5 (2014), pp. 603-16 
 
Donais, T. and McCandless, E., ‘International Peace Building and the Emerging Inclusivity 
Norm’ Third World Quarterly 38:2 (2017), pp. 291-310 
 
Duursma, A., ‘African Solutions to African Challenges: The Role of Legitimacy in Mediating 
Civil Wars in Africa’, International Organization 74:2, pp. 295-330 
 
Elgström, O. et al., ‘Perceptions of the EU’s Role in the Ukraine-Russia and the Israel-
Palestine Conflicts: A Biased Mediator?’, International Negotiation 23 (2018), pp. 299-318 
 
England, K., ‘Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research’, The 
Professional Geographer 46:1 (1994), pp. 80-9 
 
Eriksson, G., ‘Follow-Up Questions in Political Press Conferences’, Journal of Pragmatics 
43 (2011), pp. 3331-44 
 
Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K., ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political 




Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K., ‘Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science 4 
(2001), pp. 391-416 
 
Fisher, R. and Keashly, L., ‘The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation 
Within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention’, Journal of Peace Research 28:1 
(1991), pp. 29-42  
Gerring, J., ‘What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?’, American Political Science 
Review 98:2 (2004), pp. 341-54 
 
Goetze, C., ‘Response to Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley’s Review of The Distinction of 
Peace: A Social Analysis of Peacebuilding, Perspectives on Politics 16:2 (2018), p. 499 
 
Greig, J. M., ‘Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?’, American Journal of 
Political Science 49:2 (2005), pp. 249-66 
 
Gurowitz, A., ‘The Diffusion of International Norms: Why Identity Matters’, International 
Politics 43 (2006), pp. 305-41 
 
Guzzini, S., ‘A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations’, European 
Journal of International Relations 6:2 (2000), pp. 147-82 
 
Haney, L., ‘Homeboys, Babies, Men in Suits: The State and the Reproduction of Male 
Dominance’, American Sociological Review 61:5 (1996), pp. 759-78 
 
Harvey, W., ‘Strategies for Conducting Elite Interviews’, Qualitative Research 11:4 (2011), 
pp. 431-41 
 
Heathershaw, J., ‘Review Essay: Towards Better Theories of Peacebuilding: Beyond the 
Liberal Peace Debate’, Peacebuilding 1:2 (2013), pp. 275-82 
 
Hellman, J., ‘The Occurrence of Mediation: A Critical Evaluation of the Current Debate’, 




Hellmüller, S. et al., ‘How Norms Matter in Mediation: An Introduction’, Swiss Political 
Science Review 26:4 (2020), pp. 345-63 
 
Hellmüller, S., ‘Meaning-Making in Peace-Making: The Inclusion Norm at the Interplay 
Between the United Nations and Civil Society in the Syrian Peace Process’, Swiss Political 
Science Review 26:4 (2020), pp. 407-28 
 
Hinnebusch, R., ‘Identity and State Formation in Multi-sectarian Societies: Between 
Nationalism and Sectarianism in Syria’, Nations and Nationalism 26:1 (2019), pp. 138-54 
 
Hinnebusch, R., ‘Syria: From ‘Authoritarian Upgrading’ to Revolution?’, International 
Affairs 88:1 (2012), pp. 95-113 
 
Hirblinger, A. and Landau, D., ‘Daring to Differ? Strategies of Inclusion in Peacemaking’, 
Security Dialogue 51:4 (2020), pp. 305-22 
 
Hirschberger, G., ‘Collective Trauma and the Social Construction of Meaning’, Front. 
Psychol. 9:1441 (2018), pp. 1-9 
 
Holliday, J., ‘The Asad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War’, Middle East 
Security Report 8 (2013), pp. 7-68 
 
Hopf, T., ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, International 
Security 23:1 (1998), pp. 171-200 
 
Isaacs, R. and Polese, A., ‘Between “Imagined” and “Real” Nation-building: Identities and 
Nationhood in Post-Soviet Central Asia’, The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 43:3 
(2015), pp. 371-82 
 
Ismail, S., ‘The Syrian Uprising: Imagining and Performing the Nation’, Studies in Ethnicity 
and Nationalism 11:3 (2011), pp. 538-49 
 
Jones, C., ‘The Tribes that Bind: Yemen and the Paradox of Political Violence’, Studies in 




Kappler, S., ‘The Dynamic Local: Delocalisation and (Re-)localisation in the Search for 
Peacebuilding Identity’, Third World Quarterly 36:5 (2015), pp. 875-89 
 
Kastner, P., ‘Glocal Peace Mediators as Norm Translators’, Swiss Political Science Review 
26:4 (2020), pp. 364-83 
 
Kaufman, S., ‘Escaping The Symbolic Politics Trap: Reconciliation Initiatives and Conflict 
Resolution in Ethnic Wars’, Journal of Peace Research 43:2 (2006), pp. 201-18 
 
Kleiboer, M. and t’Hart, P., ‘Time To Talk?: Multiple Perspectives on Timing of 
International Mediation’, Cooperation and Conflict 30:4 (1995), pp. 307-48 
 
Kleiboer, M., ‘Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation’, The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 40:2 (1996), pp. 360-89 
 
Kline, F. et al., ‘The Misunderstood Spanish Speaking Patient’, American Journal of 
Psychiatry 137:12 (1980), pp. 1530-3 
 
Kostić, R., ‘Nationbuilding as an Instrument of Peace? Exploring Local Attitudes Towards 
International Nationbuilding and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Civil Wars 10:4 
(2008), pp. 384-412 
 
Kumaraswamy, P. R., ‘Who Am I? The Identity Crisis in the Middle East’, Middle East 
Review of International Affairs 10:1 (2006), pp. 63-73 
 
Kydd, A., ‘Which Side Are You On?’, American Journal of Political Science 47:4 (2003), 
pp. 597-611 
 
Landis, J. and Pace, J., ‘The Syrian Opposition’, The Washington Quarterly 30:1 (2007), pp. 
45-68 
 
Lane, D., ‘Identity Formation and Political Elites in the Post-Socialist States’, Europe-Asia 




Leng, R. and Regan, P., ‘Social and Political Cultural Effects on the Outcomes of Mediation 
in Militarised Interstate Disputes’, International Studies Quarterly 47:3 (2003), pp. 431-52 
 
Leonardsson, H. and Rudd, G., ‘The “Local Turn” In Peacebuilding: A Literature Review of 
Effective and Emancipatory Local Peacebuilding’ Third World Quarterly 36:5 (2015), pp. 
825-39 
Lilleker, D., ‘Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield’, Politics 23:3 
(2003), pp. 207-14 
 
Lloyd Jones, D., ‘Mediation, Conflict Resolution and Critical Theory’, Review of 
International Studies 26:4 (2000), pp. 647-62 
 
Lorentzen, J., ‘Women’s Inclusion in the Malian Peace Negotiations: Norms and Practices’, 
Swiss Political Science Review 26:4 (2020), pp. 487-505 
 
Mac Ginty, R. and Richmond, O., ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda For 
Peace’ Third World Quarterly 34:5 (2013), pp. 763-83 
 
Mac Ginty, R., ‘Between Resistance and Compliance: Non-Participation and the Liberal 
Peace’ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 6:2 (2012), pp. 167-87 
 
Madge, C. and O’Connor, H., ‘Online Methods in Geography Educational Research’, Journal 
of Geography in Higher Education 28:1 (2004), pp. 143-52 
 
Maliniak, D. et al., ‘Women in International Relations’ Politics and Gender 4:1 (2008), pp. 
122-44 
 
Mandell, B. and Tomlin, B., ‘Mediation in the Development of Norms to Manage Conflict: 
Kissinger in the Middle East’, Journal of Peace Research 28:1 (1991), pp. 43-55 
 
Mani, R., ‘Rebuilding an Inclusive Political Community After War’, Security Dialogue 36:4 




Maynard, J. L., ‘Identity and Ideology in Political Violence and Conflict’, St. Antony’s 
International Review 10:2 (2015), pp. 18-52 
 
McCoyd, J. and Kerson, T., ‘Conducting Intensive Interviews Using Email’, Qualitative 
Social Work 5:3 (2006), pp. 389-406 
 
Mendes, I., ‘Inclusion and Political Representation in Peace Negotiations: The Case of the 
Colombian Victims’ Delegations’, Journal of Politics in Latin America 11:3 (2019), pp. 272-
97 
 
Murray, C. and Wynne, J., ‘Researching Community, Work and Family with an Interpreter’, 
Community, Work and Family 4:2 (2001), pp. 157-71 
 
Murthy, D., ‘Digital Ethnography: An Examination of the Use of New Technologies for 
Social Research’, Sociology 42:5 (2008), pp. 837-55 
 
Nicassio, P. M. et al., ‘Emigration Stress and Language Proficiency as Correlates of 
Depression in a Sample of Southeast Asian Refugees’, International Journal of Social 
Psychiatry 32 (1986), pp. 22-8 
 
Nilsson, D., ‘Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable 
Peace’ International Interactions 38:2 (2012), pp. 243-66 
 
Obydenkova, A. and Paffenholz, T., ‘Editorial: The Grand Challenges in the Quest for Peace 
and Democracy’ Frontiers in Political Science 3:691999 (2021), pp. 1-6 
 
Paffenholz, T., ‘Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Beyond the Inclusion-Exclusion 
Dichotomy’, Negotiation Journal 30:1 (2014), pp. 69-91 
 
Paffenholz, T. and Ross, N., ‘Inclusive Political Settlements: New Insights from Yemen’s 
National Dialogue’, PRISM 6:1 (2016), pp. 198-210 
 
Paffenholz, T., ‘Perpetual Peacebuilding: A New Paradigm to Move Beyond the Linearity of 




Phillips, C., ‘Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria’, Third World Quarterly 36:2 (2015), pp. 
357-76 
 
Price, R. and Reus-Smitt, C., ‘Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and 
Constructivism’, European Journal of International Relations, 4:3 (1998), pp. 259-94 
Richmond, O. and Mac Ginty, R., ‘Where Now for the Critique of the Liberal Peace?’ 
Cooperation and Conflict 50:2 (2015), pp. 171-89 
 
Richmond, O., ‘The Problem of Peace: Understanding the “Liberal Peace”’, Conflict, 
Security and Development 6:3 (2006), pp. 291-314 
 
Rocha Menocal, A., ‘Political Settlements and the Politics of Transformation: Where Do 
“Inclusive Institutions” Come From?’ Journal of International Development 29:5 (2017), pp. 
559-75 
 
Rushton, S., ‘The UN Secretary-General and Norm Entrepreneurship: Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
and Democracy Promotion’ Global Governance 14:1 (2008), pp. 95-110 
 
Salamandra, C., ‘Sectarianism in Syria: Anthropological Reflections’, Middle East Critique 
22:3 (2013), pp. 303-6 
 
Salamé, G., ‘The Middle East: Elusive Security, Indefinable Region’, Security Dialogue 25:1 
(1994), pp. 17-35 
 
Savun, B., ‘Information, Bias, and Mediation Success’, International Studies Quarterly 52:1 
(2008), pp. 25-47 
 
Schaap, A., ‘The Proto-Politics of Reconciliation: Lefort and the Aporia of Forgiveness in 
Arendt and Derrida’, Australia Journal of Political Science 41:4 (2006), pp. 615-30 
 
Seitz, S., ‘Pixelated Partnerships, Overcoming Obstacles in Qualitative Interviews Via Skype: 




Smith, K., ‘Problematising Power Relations in “Elite” Interviews’, Geoforum 37:4 (2006), 
pp. 643-53 
 
Spyer, J., ‘The Syrian Opposition Before and After the Outbreak of the 2011 Uprising’, 
Middle East Review of International Affairs 15:3 (2013), pp. 1-13 
 
Stanley, L. and Jackson, R., ‘Introduction: Everyday Narratives in World Politics’, Politics 
36:3 (2016), pp. 223-35 
 
Tansey, O., ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling’, 
Political Science and Politics 40:4 (2007), pp. 765-72 
 
Thuesen, F., ‘Navigating Between Dialogue and Confrontation: Phronesis and Emotions in 
Interviewing Elites on Ethnic Discrimination’, Qualitative Inquiry 16:10 (2011), pp. 613-22 
 
Touval, S., ‘Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations’, Jerusalem 
Journal of International Relations 1:1 (1975), pp. 51-69 
 
Tracy, S., ‘Qualitative Quality: Eight “Big-Tent” Criteria for Excellent Qualitative Research’, 
Qualitative Inquiry 16:10 (2010), pp. 837-51 
 
Vuković, S., ‘Peace Mediators as Norm Entrepreneurs: The EU’s Norm Diffusion Strategy in 
Montenegro’s Referendum on Independence’, Swiss Political Science Review 26:4 (2020), 
pp. 449-67 
 
Vuković, S., ‘Soft Power, Bias and Manipulation of International Organizations in 
International Mediation’, International Negotiation 20 (2015), pp. 414-43 
 
Vuković, S., ‘Strategies and Bias in International Mediation’, Cooperation and Conflict 46:1 
(2011), pp. 113-9 
 
Vuković, S., ‘Three Degrees of Success in International Mediation’, Millennium: Journal of 




Wanat, C., ‘Getting Past the Gatekeepers: Differences Between Access and Cooperation in 
Public School Research’, Field Methods 20:2 (2008), pp. 191-208 
 
Wanis-St. John, A. and Kew, D., ‘Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Confronting 
Exclusion’ International Negotiation 13 (2008), pp. 11-36 
 
Welch, C. et al., ‘Corporate Elites as Informants in Qualitative International Business 
Research’, International Business Review 11:5 (2002), pp. 611-28 
 
Weller, S., ‘Using Internet Video Calls in Qualitative (Longitudinal) Interviews: Some 
Implications for Rapport’, International Journal of Social Research Methodology 20:6 
(2017), pp. 613-25 
 
Wendt, A., ‘Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, 
International Organisation 46:2 (1992), pp. 391-425 
 
Westermeyer, J., ‘Working With an Interpreter in Psychiatric Assessment and Treatment’, 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 178:12 (1990), pp. 745-9 
 
Woods, M., ‘Rethinking Elites: Networks, Space, and Local Politics’, Environment and 
Planning 30:12 (1998), pp. 2101-19 
 
Zisser, E., ‘Who’s Afraid of Syrian Nationalism? National and State Identity in Syria’, 
Middle Eastern Studies 42:2 (2006), pp. 179-98 
 
Online reports, blog posts, news articles, web pages, and theses 
 
Adada, A. and Allahoum, R., ‘Yemen: Remembering the Arab Spring’, Al Jazeera (2021) 
[online], available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/videos/2021/2/3/yemen-remembering-
the-arab-spring [last accessed: 10 June 2021] 
 
Al-Hamdani, R. and Lackner, H., ‘War and Pieces: Political Divides in Southern Yemen’, 




accessed: 4 February 2021] 
 
Alhassen, M., ‘Please Reconsider the Term “Arab Spring”’, HuffPost (2012) [online], 
available from: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/please-reconsider-arab-sp_b_1268971 [last 
accessed: 10 June 2021] 
 
Alrifai, O. A. and Zelin, A. Y., ‘Protests in Daraa, Syria Undermine Assad’s Narrative of 
Victory’, Fikra Forum, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2021) [online], 
available from: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/protests-daraa-syria-
undermine-assads-narrative-victory [last accessed: 10 June 2021] 
 
Avery, I., ‘Talkin’ Bout a Revolution: Four Reasons Why the Term “Arab Spring” is Still 
Problematic’, Middle East Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science (2021) 
[online], available from: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2021/01/20/talkin-bout-a-revolution-
four-reasons-why-the-term-arab-spring-is-still-problematic/ [last accessed: 10 June 2021] 
 
Barnes, C., ‘Dilemmas of Ownership, Inclusivity, Legitimacy and Power: Towards 
Transformative National Dialogue Processes’, Berghof Foundation (2017) [online], available 
from: https://berghof-foundation.org/library/dilemmas-of-ownership-inclusivity-legitimacy-
and-power-towards-transformative-national-dialogue-processes [last accessed: 21 May 2021] 
 
Bayoumy, Y., ‘Yemen’s Federal Plan A Bold Idea, But Many Hurdles Remain’, Reuters 
(2014) [online], available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-politics-
analysis/yemens-federal-plan-a-bold-idea-but-many-hurdles-remain-
idUSBREA1M05720140223 [last accessed: 18 February 2021] 
 
Beukian, S., ‘Nationalism and Collective Trauma’, The State of Nationalism: An 
International Review (2018) [online], available from: 





Black, I., ‘Kofi Annan Resigns as Syria Envoy’, The Guardian (2012) [online], available 
from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/02/kofi-annan-resigns-syria-envoy [last 
accessed: 27 May 2020] 
 
Burke, E., ‘EU-GCC Cooperation: Securing the Transition in Yemen’, Gulf Research Center 
(2013) [online], available from: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/166407/Edward_Burke_-_EU-
GCC_Cooperation_Securing_the_Transition_in_Yemen_1042.pdf [last accessed: 17 
February 2012] 
 
Castillejo, C., ‘Promoting Inclusion in Political Settlements: A  Priority for International 
Actors?’ NOREF [online], available from: https://noref.no/Publications/Themes/Gender-and-
inclusivity/Promoting-inclusion-in-political-settlements-a-priority-for-international-actors 
[last accessed: 22 May 2021] 
 
Charbonneau, L. and Hafezi, P., ‘Iran Invite to Syria Talks Withdrawn After Boycott Threat’, 
Reuters (2014) [online], available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-un-
iran/iran-invite-to-syria-talks-withdrawn-after-boycott-threat-idUSBREA0J01K20140120 
[last accessed: 27 May 2020] 
 
Civil Society Dialogue Network Meeting, ‘The UN Guidance for Effective Mediation: 
Translating the Fundamentals into EU Practice’ (2013) [online], available from: 
http://eplo.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CSDN_Mediation_Guidance_Report.pdf [last 
accessed: 8 April 2021] 
 
Daher, J., ‘Pluralism Lost in Syria’s Uprising: How the Opposition Strayed from its Inclusive 
Roots’ The Century Foundation (2019) [online], available from: 
https://tcf.org/content/report/pluralism-lost-syrias-uprising/ [last accessed: 31 May 2021] 
 
De Soto, A., ‘End of Mission Report’, published by McCarthy, R. and Williams, I., ‘Secret 
UN Report Condemns US for Middle East Failures’, The Guardian, (2007), [online], 
available from: http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-
files/Guardian/documents/2007/06/12/DeSotoReport.pdf and 




Dovi, S., ‘Political Representation’ in Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition) [online], available from: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/#PitFouVieRep [last accessed: 20 
June 2021] 
 
Gaston, E., ‘Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue’, United States Institute 
of Peace Special Report 342 (2014) [online], available from: 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR342_Process-Lessons-Learned-in-Yemens-
National-Dialogue.pdf [last accessed: 17 February 2021] 
Harrell, M. and Bradley, M., ‘Data Collection Methods: Semi-Structured Interviews and 
Focus Groups’, RAND National Defense Research Institute (2009) [online], available from: 
Data Collection Methods: Semi-Structured Interviews and Focus Groups | RAND [last 
accessed: 8 February 2021] 
 
Hassan, A. S., ‘National Dialogue Conference: Managing Peaceful Change?’, Accord Issue 
25 (2014) [online], available from: https://www.c-r.org/accord/legitimacy-and-peace-
processes#:~:text=Legitimacy%20and%20peace%20processes%3A%20from%20coercion%2
0to%20consent&text=Legitimacy%20matters%20for%20peace.,the%20bedrock%20of%20p
eaceful%20societies. [last accessed: 2 June 2021], pp. 50-4 
 
Hellmüller, S. et al., ‘Are Mediators Norm Entrepreneurs?’, swisspeace Working Paper No. 3 
(2017) [online], available from: 
https://www.swisspeace.ch/assets/publications/downloads/Working-Papers/b59c7cb279/Are-
Mediators-Norm-Entrepreneurs-17-swisspeace-sara_hellmueller-julia_palmiano_federer-
jamie_pring.pdf [last accessed: 4 February 2021] 
 
Hellmüller, S. et al., ‘The Role of Norms in International Mediation’, swisspeace and NOREF 
(2015) [online], available from: 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3bba5eeac53a8f455f351617aeaf195e.p






Hirblinger, A. and Landau, D., ‘Strategies of Inclusion in Peacemaking: Beyond Box-ticking 
and Photo Opportunities?’, Security Dialogue Blog (2020) [online], available from: 
https://blogs.prio.org/SecurityDialogue/2020/02/strategies-of-inclusion-in-peacemaking-
beyond-box-ticking-and-photo-opportunities/ [last accessed: 30 May 2021] 
 
Lederach, J. P., ‘Forging Inclusive Peace’ in Andy Carl (ed.), ‘Navigating Inclusion in Peace 
Processes’ Accord Issue 28 (2019) [online], available from: https://www.c-
r.org/accord/inclusion-peace-processes [last accessed: 24 June 2021] 
 
Malik, N., ‘The Arab Spring Wasn’t In Vain. Next Time Will Be Different’, The Guardian 
(2020) [online], available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/dec/21/arab-spring-people-movement 
[last accessed: 21 May 2021] 
 
Mohammed, A. and Lowe, C., ‘“Friends of Syria” Condemn Assad but See More Killing’, 
Reuters (2012) [online], available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/syria-meeting-
tunis/friends-of-syria-condemn-assad-but-see-more-killing-idINDEE81N0I320120224 [last 
accessed: 27 May 2020] 
 
Murray, C., ‘Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference’, (2013) [online], available from: 
http://www.bme.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/196/Journal_articles/Murray
%20Yemen's%20National%20Dialogue%20Conference%20October%202013.pdf [last 
accessed: 17 February 2021] 
 
No author, ‘Attacks on Ghouta: Analysis of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria’, 
Human Rights Watch (2013) [online], available from: 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/09/10/attacks-ghouta/analysis-alleged-use-chemical-
weapons-syria [last accessed: 27 May 2020] 
 
No author, ‘Civil War in Syria’, Council on Foreign Relations [online], available from: 





No author, ‘Daraa al-Balad Celebrates the Tenth Anniversary of the Syrian Revolution 18 
March 2021’, Creative Memory of the Syrian Revolution (2021) [online], available from: 
https://creativememory.org/en/archives/218713/daraa-al-balad-celebrates-the-tenth-
anniversary-of-the-syrian-revolution-18-march-2021/ [last accessed: 28 June 2021] 
 
No author, ‘Friends of Yemen: How Has it Performed and Where is it Going?’, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (2013) [online], available from: 
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/55375d834.pdf [last accessed: 18 February 2021] 
 
No author, ‘Friends of Yemen: Questions and Answers’, UK Government (2013) [online], 
available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/friends-of-yemen-q-a [last accessed: 
18 February 2021] 
 
No author, ‘Global Humanitarian Overview: Yemen’, UN OCHA (2021) [online], available 
from: https://gho.unocha.org/yemen [last accessed: 17 January 2021] 
 
No author, ‘National Dialogue Conference’, Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-
General for Yemen (no date) [online], available from: https://osesgy.unmissions.org/national-
dialogue-conference [last accessed: 17 February 2021] 
 
No author, ‘National Dialogue Handbook: A Guide for Practitioners’, Berghof Foundation 
(2017) [online], available from: https://berghof-foundation.org/library/national-dialogue-
handbook-a-guide-for-practitioners [last accessed: 21 May 2021] 
 
No author, ‘NDC Consensus Committee’, National Dialogue Conference [online], available 
from: http://www.ndc.ye/page.aspx?show=97 [last accessed: 18 February 2021] 
 
No author, ‘NDC Presidency’, National Dialogue Conference [online], available from: 
http://www.ndc.ye/page.aspx?show=92 [last accessed: 18 February 2021] 
 
No author, ‘NDC Secretariat General’, National Dialogue Conference [online], available 




No author, ‘Outcome of the Subcommittee of the Southern Working Group: Agreement on a 
Just Solution to the Southern Question’ (2013) [online], available from: 
https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/140118_agreement_on_the_southern_question_e
n_final.pdf [last accessed: 18 February 2021] 
 
No author, ‘Protesters Storm Presidential Palace in Yemen’s Aden’, Al Jazeera (2021) 
[online], available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/16/protesters-storm-
presidential-palace-in-yemens-aden [last accessed: 10 June 2021] 
 
No author, ‘Sarkozy Pushes ‘Friends of Syria’ Group at UN’, Euractiv (2012) [online], 
available from: https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/sarkozy-pushes-
friends-of-syria-group-at-un/ [last accessed: 27 May 2020] 
 
No author, ‘Syria: Events of 2020’ Human Rights Watch [online], available from: 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/syria [last accessed: 8 April 2021] 
 
No author, ‘The Syrian National Council’, Carnegie Middle East Center (2013) [online], 
available from: https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48334?lang=en [last accessed: 31 May 2021] 
 
No author, ‘UK Hosts Syria London 11 Senior Officials Meeting’, UK Government (2013) 
[online], available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-hosts-syria-london-11-
senior-officials-meeting [last accessed: 28 May 2020] 
 
No author, ‘UN Observers Suspend Syria Work’, BBC (2012) [online], available from: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18471686 [last accessed: 27 May 2020] 
 
No author, ‘What is the Geneva II Conference on Syria?’, BBC (2014) [online], available 
from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24628442 [last accessed: 27 May 
2020] 
 
No author, ‘Yemen: Events of 2020’, Human Rights Watch [online], available from: 





Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, ‘Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation in 
the OSCE’ OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre (n.d.) [online], available from: 
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/0/126646.pdf [last accessed: 8 April 2021] 
 
Paffenholz, T. et al., ‘What Makes or Breaks National Dialogues?’, Inclusive Peace and 
Transition Initiative [online], available from: https://www.inclusivepeace.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/05/report-national-dialogues-en.pdf [last accessed: 2 June 2021] 
 
Papagianni, K., ‘National Dialogue Processes in Political Transitions’, Civil Society Dialogue 
Network Discussion Paper No. 3 (2014) [online], available from: 
https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/National-Dialogue-Processes-in-
Political-Transitions-January-2014.pdf [last accessed: 17 February 2021] 
 
Planta, K. et al., ‘Inclusivity in National Dialogues: Guaranteeing Social Integration or 
Preserving Old Power Hierarchies?’, Berghof Foundation (2015) [online], available from: 
https://berghof-foundation.org/library/inclusivity-in-national-dialogues-guaranteeing-social-
integration-or-preserving-old-power-hierarchies [last accessed: 21 May 2021] 
 
Rausch, C. and Luu, T., ‘Inclusive Peace Processes Are Key to Ending Violent Conflict’ 
United States Institute of Peace Peace Brief 222 (2017) [online], available from: 
https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/05/inclusive-peace-processes-are-key-ending-
violent-conflict [last accessed: 3 June 2021] 
 
Salisbury, P., ‘Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State’, Chatham House (2016) [online], 
available from: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2016/05/yemen-stemming-rise-chaos-state 
[last accessed: 4 February 2021] 
 
Salisbury, P., ‘Yemen’s Southern Intifada’ in Yemen’s National Dialogue POMEPS Briefings 
19 (2013) [online], available from: https://pomeps.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/POMEPS_BriefBooklet19_Yemen_Web.pdf [last accessed: 18 




Schmitz, C., ‘Yemen’s National Dialogue’, Middle East Institute Policy Paper 1 (2014) 
[online], available from: 
https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Charles%20Schmitz%20Policy%20Paper
.pdf [last accessed: 17 February 2021] 
 
Silverstein, S., ‘Syria’s Radical Dabka’, Middle East Report 263 (2012) [online], available 
from: https://merip.org/2012/05/syrias-radical-dabka/ [last accessed: 3 February 2021] 
 
Stigant, S. and Murray, E., ‘National Dialogues: A Tool for Conflict Transformation’, United 
States Institute of Peace (2015) [online], available from: 
https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/10/national-dialogues-tool-conflict-transformation 
[last accessed: 21 May 2021] 
 
Thépaut, C., ‘The Astana Process: A Flexible but Fragile Showcase for Russia’, The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2020) [online], available from: 
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/astana-process-flexible-fragile-
showcase-russia [last accessed: 17 January 2021] 
 
Thiel, T., ‘Yemen’s Imposed Federal Boundaries’, Middle East Research and Information 
Project (2015) [online], available from: https://merip.org/2015/07/yemens-imposed-federal-
boundaries/ [last accessed: 2 June 2021] 
 
Thiel, T., ‘Yemen’s Negotiated Transition Between the Elite and the Street’, London School 
of Economics (2014) [online], available from: 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2014/03/03/yemens-negotiated-transition-between-the-elite-and-
the-street/ [last accessed: 18 February 2021] 
 
UN, ‘COVID-19: A Spotlight on Democracy’ (2020) [online], available from: 
https://www.un.org/en/observances/democracy-day [last accessed: 8 April 2021]  
 
UN, ‘Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on Democracy’ (2009) [online], available 
from: https://www.un.org/en/pdfs/FINAL%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Democracy.pdf 




UN, ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (1966) [online], available from: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx [last accessed: 8 April 2021] 
 
UN, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (1948) [online], available from: 
https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights [last accessed: 8 April 
2021] 
 
UN, United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation (New York: United Nations, 2012) 
[online], available from: https://peacemaker.un.org/guidance-effective-mediation [last 
accessed: 6 February 2021] 
 
UNDEF, ‘Democracy As If People Matter’ (2015) [online], available from: 
https://www.un.org/democracyfund/sites/www.un.org.democracyfund/files/democracy_as_if
_people_matter.pdf [last accessed: 8 April 2021] 
 
Wintour, P., ‘Yemen Houthi Rebels Kill Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’, The 
Guardian (2017) [online], available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/04/former-yemen-president-saleh-killed-in-
fresh-fighting [last accessed: 18 February 2021] 
 
Worren, T. S., ‘Fear and Resistance: The Construction of Alawi Identity in Syria’, MA thesis, 
(Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, Oslo, 2007), available 
online: https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/16035 [last accessed: 3 February 2021] 
 
Yadav, S. P., ‘Best Friends Forever for Yemen’s Revolutionaries?’ in Yemen’s National 
Dialogue POMEPS Briefings 19 (2013) [online], available from: https://pomeps.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/POMEPS_BriefBooklet19_Yemen_Web.pdf [last accessed: 18 
February 2021], pp. 18-20 
 
Zyck, S. A., ‘Mediating Transition in Yemen: Achievements and Lessons’, International 
Peace Institute (2014) [online], available from: https://www.ipinst.org/wp-
content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_mediating_transition.pdf [last accessed: 2 June 2021] 
 
